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PART III.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

AFFAIRS

OF

PERSIA AND CENTRAL ASIA.

July to December 1914.

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1	Sir W. Townley ...	188 Tel.	June 30, 1914	Gendarmerie in Fars and Kerman. Matters settling down at Kazerun. Major O'Connor thinks Swedes should be maintained. Intrigues of Governor-General, Kawam, and Soulet against Swedes at Shiraz (see No. 54)	1
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5	" " ...	148 Tel.	2,	Future of gendarmerie. Refers to Part II, No. 217. Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs will not yet express any precise views on subject. He says that in the north they must be restricted to districts where they are employed at present, and only used as a police force on the roads (see No. 36)	2
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14	Sir G. Buchanan ...	151 Tel.	7,	Anglo-Persian oil deal. Refers to No. 9 and Part II, No. 192. Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs complains that His Majesty's Government have changed whole character of oil concession, and wanted definite pledge that His Majesty's Government would not use rights obtained in or near Russian zone (see Nos. 26 and 35) ...	7
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Printed for the use of the Foreign Office. November 1914.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Persia and Central Asia.

PART III.

[29684]

No. 1.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 1.)

(No. 188.)
(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, June 30, 1914.

LATEST reports from Shiraz show that matters are settling down in the neighbourhood of Kazerun, where gendarmerie appear to have at length asserted themselves, whilst measures are being taken to extend their control on the road north of Shiraz.

Nasir-i-Divan is reported to have come in under an arrangement with Colonel Uggla and to have arrested a brother of Ali Mahomet Kamariji, who was conspicuous for his opposition to the gendarmerie last February.

Major O'Connor, who is here, is strongly of opinion that the gendarmerie under Swedes should be maintained, in spite of the fact that he has been obliged to report at times unfavourably. He points out that they have now asserted themselves, and that it is due to their presence on the road that Kavam and Soulet have had to come to heel. He thinks that if British officers took place of the Swedes we might suffer loss of prestige, of which the effect would be far-reaching in the event of a reverse, and that loss of life might entail most serious consequences. I would add that it would be hard to get Persian Government to pay for a force under British officers. Major O'Connor thinks that as a matter of economy radius of the activity of the gendarmes might cease on reaching southern plains, and that the policing of the road in that district might be entrusted to the Governor of Bushire. Cox favoured such a scheme, which also meets, I believe, with the approval of Major Knox. Eloquent testimony to the effect which the gendarmerie are having upon the situation in Fars is borne by the fact that all the personages of the region are intriguing against them. There is no doubt that the Governor-General, Kavam, and Soulet are all implicated, and now the latter is endeavouring to get Bakhtiaris to join league partly directed against the gendarmerie and partly for mutual self-protection against a possible situation which may arise in the north.

I can control all their intrigues, and am able to place sharp warning here and there, showing that I know what is going on, and that any action on their part hostile to the policy of His Majesty's Government in Persia will incur my severe displeasure. Thanks to the gendarmerie and the influence exercised to-day by His Majesty's Government in Persia it is realised that such a threat is no idle one.

(Repeated to Bushire.)

[29318] No. 2.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 143.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July* 1, 1914.

YOUR telegram No. 186 of 29th June: Azerbaijan.

I hope you may be able to induce your Russian colleague to send the necessary instructions to Tabriz.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 298.)

[29318] No. 3.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 299.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July* 1, 1914.

MY telegram No. 143 of to-day to Tehran.

Your Excellency should in your next interview with Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs give the substance of the report from Tabriz as an instance of the urgency of the point brought to his Excellency's notice in the memorandum in my despatch No. 217 of 10th June.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 144.)

[29934] No. 4.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 147.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, July* 2, 1914.

YOUR telegram No. 299 of 1st July.

I called attention of Minister for Foreign Affairs to report from Tabriz recorded in Tehran telegram No. 186 of 29th June, and his Excellency took note of it.

He told me that he was waiting for a letter from the Russian Ambassador, which he expected on Sunday, before communicating to me his reply to our memorandum. He added that there would be no difficulty about the consuls, as they would receive strict instructions, to which they would be obliged to adhere, but he did not know what to do to satisfy British public opinion that Russia harboured no aggressive designs against India. I replied that any suspicions that might be entertained in certain quarters of Russia's designs would be to a great extent allayed were the Russian consuls to desist from any action calculated to undermine Persian independence. Minister for Foreign Affairs, however, contended that it was evident from our attitude with regard to the Trans-Persian Railway, and with regard to almost everything that Russia did in the Middle East, that she was the object of inveterate suspicion on our part. He wanted to remove all such suspicions, but was at a loss what to do.

[29935] No. 5.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 148.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, July* 2, 1914.

MY telegram No. 144 of 30th June.

I have not yet succeeded in getting Minister for Foreign Affairs to express any precise views on the subject of the Swedish gendarmerie.

In the course of conversation to-day he said that, as regards locality, they must be restricted in the north to the districts where they were employed at present, and that the gendarmerie must only be used as a police force on the roads. He suggested at one moment that the Swedes should be replaced by British officers in the south, but added that he must go into the question more thoroughly before expressing any definite opinion.

[29584] No. 6.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 145.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July* 2, 1914.

YOUR telegram No. 187 of 30th June: Finance.

I announced in House of Commons on 29th June that His Majesty's Government would be prepared to advance 50,000*l.* solely for gendarmerie purposes in Fars and Kerman.

I agree, of course, with view expressed in last paragraph of your telegram.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 302.)

[30574] No. 7.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 258.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 2, 1914.

I TOLD the Russian Ambassador to-day that I heard that Reshid, whom the Russian Government wished to have appointed as Governor of Azerbaijan, was an ex-ferrash: a man of such low rank that it would be putting an indignity upon the Persian Government to demand that they should appoint him to the post of Azerbaijan, which used to be a place held by the Valiahd. It was a pity that the Russian Government could not have selected Firman Farma, who I believed was strongly Russophile. I was speaking only privately to Count Benckendorff, as I intended to send a memorandum on the subject. I did not regard it as our business to interfere in the appointment of Governors in the Russian sphere, and therefore I should stand aside and not interfere as regards any candidate whom the Russian Government were supporting, but it would be too much to expect that we should give active support to a man like Reshid.

Count Benckendorff said that he himself knew nothing of Reshid. He hoped that, in the memorandum we sent, I would put some phrase such as I had used before, to the effect that we recognised that Persian Governors in the north of Persia must be sympathetic to Russian interests.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[28918] No. 8.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Howard.

(No. 31.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 2, 1914.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 95, Confidential, of the 22nd ultimo, reporting a conversation with the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs relative to the Swedish officers employed in the Persian gendarmerie.

In reply, I have to request that you will convey to Herr Wallenberg an expression of my thanks for his frank and courteous attitude in this matter, and that you will tell his Excellency that so soon as His Majesty's Government have arrived at a decision on the question they will not fail to inform him of it.

You should also inform his Excellency that His Majesty's Government have decided to advance to the Persian Government a sum of 50,000*l.* for the immediate requirements of the gendarmerie in Fars and Kerman, and are in consultation with the Russian Government on the subject, as will be seen from the accompanying copy of a telegram to His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh.*

A copy of Sir G. Buchanan's reply is also enclosed.†

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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* Part II, No. 196. † Part II, No. 217.

[29579] No. 9.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 303.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July* 3, 1914.

YOUR telegram No. 145 of 30th June.

I gather from the Russian Ambassador that M. Sazonof wants some statement from us that he can use authoritatively to correct misapprehensions of Russian press about Persian oil concession.

I am sending you Hansard report of my speech in Parliament on 29th June, and you can give that to M. Sazonof for any use he likes to make of it.

You can also point out to him that the British Government does not acquire any rights under the concession that were not possessed by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company already. The rights are now neither more nor less than they were when Anglo-Russian Convention was made. I do not anticipate that the acquisition by the Government of a share in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company will lead to our taking any action in the neutral zone except what would be taken by any trader or commercial company.

You may remind M. Sazonof that when a force, now withdrawn, was sent temporarily to Shiraz the Russian Government was informed and consulted.

When M. Sazonof was at Balmoral I discussed with him the question of lending British officers to organise a Persian force to protect the trade routes in neutral zone, though that was only a contingency at the time, and, as a matter of fact, has not been done yet.

Those, surely, are guarantees that, if the oil concession or anything else required, in our opinion, special measures in the neutral zone that affected the Anglo-Russian Agreement, we should consult with the Russian Government before taking them.

M. Sazonof can, of course, make what statement he pleases in the sense of this telegram and of my telegram No. 283 of 25th June to you.

[30252] No. 10.

Sir W. Garstin to Foreign Office.—(Received July 4.)

Sir, 8, *Bishopsgate, London, July* 3, 1914.

SINCE I had the honour of addressing you on the 8th May in regard to the affairs of the Société internationale d'Études du Chemin de Fer transpersan, a meeting of this body has been held in Paris. At this meeting it was urged by our French and Russian associates that, in justice to the interests of the société as a whole, the question of applying to the Persian Government for an option for a Trans-Persian railway might fairly be dissociated from the arrangements and adjustments which the Foreign Office memorandum of the 8th April stipulates as conditions precedent to the grant of Foreign Office support.

The Société d'Études propose, therefore, on their part, to refrain from further comment upon the aforesaid document at the present juncture; but with a view to avoiding further delay in their operations, and in order to enable them to obtain the option for a Trans-Persian line of railway which they desire and which appears to be acceptable in principle to the Governments interested, they venture to suggest that the stipulation in regard to the retrocession of a port concession to a special company would more opportunely be included in an undertaking to be entered into between the société and the Foreign Office than in the text of the actual letter of the société to the Persian Government.

Should this be admitted, it is hoped that in the text now enclosed the Foreign Office will consider the slight modification at the end of the last paragraph as covering the requirements of paragraph 8 of their memorandum to the Russian Government (8th April, 1914).

While, therefore, the British group of the Société d'Études in no way depart from the views which I had the honour of laying before you on the 8th May, they are willing, in deference to the wishes of their French and Russian associates, to join them in suggesting that attention should be concentrated in the first instance upon the option pure and simple. This would mean that the option would receive immediate official support at Tehran, and that all outstanding questions of arrangements as between the British and Russian Governments and other parties interested would be left for

ulterior adjustment within the period of the year subsequent to the option being actually obtained.

I am, &c.
W. E. GARSTIN.

Enclosure in No. 10.

Projet de Requête au Gouvernement persan.

M. le Ministre,

LA Société internationale d'Études du Chemin de Fer transpersan, qui s'est créée avec le concours des principaux établissements financiers français et russes et avec celui d'une des plus grandes maisons de Londres et de ses co-participants, a notifié sa fondation à son Excellence M. le Ministre de Perse à Paris, en le priant d'en faire part à son Gouvernement.

La réponse transmise par son Excellence Samad Khan Momtazos Saltaneh permettant de présumer un favorable accueil de la part du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Chah, la société s'adresse en toute confiance à votre Excellence pour obtenir les autorisations, facilités et titres qui lui seront nécessaires afin de mener à bien l'entreprise définie par ses statuts.

Dans sa pensée, cette œuvre sera, dès le début, avantageuse à l'Empire de Perse, en développant, au profit de ses populations, de son industrie, de son commerce, de son sol et de son Administration elle-même les ressources de toute nature que l'absence de grandes voies de communication laisse aujourd'hui inutilisées.

A cet effet, nous prions votre Excellence de faire accorder à la société :

1. Les autorisations nécessaires pour les études et les travaux préparatoires pour la construction d'un chemin de fer traversant la Perse du nord-ouest vers le sud-est, en passant par Téhéran, dont le tracé au-delà de cette capitale sera ultérieurement déterminé et soumis ensuite à l'approbation du Gouvernement persan.

2. Une option au profit de la société pour la concession de cette ligne dans une forme susceptible de garantir les intérêts engagés.

Nous serions, en outre, heureux d'être assurés de la bienveillance avec laquelle le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Chah voudrait bien examiner, le moment venu, les propositions que, par suite des études que la société aura faites, elle formulera ultérieurement en vue de déterminer :

1. Le point du littoral méridional de la Perse où la ligne projetée atteindrait éventuellement la mer; et

2. Les embranchements qui, après élaboration du tracé, conformément aux études et aux travaux susmentionnés, seraient jugés indispensables au bon fonctionnement de la ligne et au développement économique des régions traversées. Les embranchements pourraient être définis d'une façon plus précise au fur et à mesure de l'achèvement des études.

Enfin, il est évident que l'entreprise du chemin de fer projeté ne saurait avoir toute son utilité, et prospérer sans que lui soit assurées la liberté et les facilités nécessaires pour ses opérations sur tous les points où la ligne principale et ses embranchements viendraient à aboutir à la mer. Nous devons donc prier le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Chah de nous donner à cet égard, et d'une manière générale, les sécurités indispensables. Les questions concrètes concernant la concession éventuelle, l'administration, l'affermage et le contrôle des ports resteraient d'ailleurs réservées pour être ultérieurement examinées et résolues moyennant des accords à intervenir entre le Gouvernement persan et les divers éléments anglais intéressés et notre société elle-même.

[30272] No. 11.

Note communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 4, 1914.

NOUS apprenons que Messrs. Wratislaw et Wilson, commissaires anglais à la Commission de Délimitation turco-persane, désirent accélérer la conclusion de la délimitation. Tout en partageant en principe ce désir, le Ministère Impérial des Affaires Étrangères fait observer que la section septentrionale de la frontière depuis

Vazné est particulièrement importante au point de vue de la Russie, et présente des conditions qu'il y aura lieu d'étudier avec soin et en détail, de nombreux points pouvant donner lieu à contestation.

D'après les informations du Ministère Impérial, les commissaires anglais semblent redouter les zones du nord, plus froides, dangereuses pour les Indiens, à leur service, peu accoutumés à ces climats. Peut-être serait-il possible de se passer d'une partie d'entre eux. M. Sazonof désirerait savoir d'urgence le point de vue à ce sujet de Sir Edward Grey.

Ambassade Impériale de Russie,
Londres, le 4 juillet, 1914.

[30268] No. 12.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 4.)

Sir, *India Office, July 4*, 1914.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 29th June regarding the proposed lease of islands in the Persian Gulf, and to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of further telegrams that have been received from the Government of India on the subject.

I am to say that Lord Crewe finds it difficult to suggest a maximum figure for the terms to be offered to the Persian Government for a long lease of the islands. The dominant consideration is their strategical value for naval and military purposes, and the most competent judge of this value is the Admiralty, who have now a direct interest in the islands on account of their potential oil resources and by reason of the recently concluded arrangement with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

If Sir Edward Grey sees no objection on grounds of general policy to acquiring territorial rights in the Persian Gulf, and the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury will consent to increase, if necessary, the amount to be offered by His Majesty's Government as annual rent to the Persian Government to 50,000*l.* or even to 75,000*l.*, Lord Crewe will advise his Council to sanction a contribution from Indian revenues of a moiety of the sum actually agreed on. It is understood that if oil is raised in the islands by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, royalty would be payable to His Majesty's Government as lessee instead of to the Persian Government, and that the Indian Government, if a moiety of the annual rent is met from Indian revenues, would be entitled to one-half of all such receipts.

The Persian Government should be able to raise a large loan, possible as much as 1,000,000*l.* on the security of an annual rent of 50,000*l.* for ninety-nine years. It might be a condition of His Majesty's Government giving their assistance to the Persian Government to conclude such a loan that His Majesty's Minister at Tehran is informally associated with the Treasurer-General in the expenditure of the proceeds, and that the maintenance of order in Fars and Kerman, and the repayment of outstanding Anglo-Indian advances are a first charge upon them.

I am, &c.
LIONEL ABRAHAMS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 12.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *June* 14, 1914.

ISLANDS in Persian Gulf.

With reference to paragraph 7 of my telegram of 22nd ultimo, a fresh investigation has been made confidentially, from which it appears, as reported by the Resident, Bushire, that the estimated net annual profit which the Muin formerly derived from his original concession, granted in 1904, works out approximately at 20,000*l.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 12.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *June* 28, 1914.

PERSIAN islands.

Please refer to Townley's telegrams, dated 19th and 22nd June, on the question of a lease. We trust that he understands that our suggestion that negotiations should commence with an offer of which present commercial income should be the basis of calculation was made merely because it affords a definite figure for the purpose of discussion and because the aspirations of the Persian Government were likely thereby to be elicited. The suggestion of a maximum figure still presents difficulties to us, but we shall be prepared, whatever price may eventually be decided by His Majesty's Government to be worth paying, to consider an Indian contribution. We hold strongly, in any event, that as regards Henjam, Larak, and Kishm, we must not let slip the opportunity that is now afforded of securing a lease, and that we should, if possible, secure a lease of these, adding the remaining two islands if this can be done without complicating the negotiations or enhancing the price unduly.

[30435] No. 13.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 6.)

(No. 189.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, July 6*, 1914.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs has resigned. His Excellency presented his resignation some days ago, but it was only on Saturday that the Prime Minister saw that it would be impossible to make him reconsider his decision. Minister for Foreign Affairs alleges ill-health, and has been threatening for some time to leave his colleagues in the lurch a few days before the coronation, when it would be impossible to replace him. I have not considered it desirable to make any effort to keep Minister for Foreign Affairs in office. His action is only on a par with his false and intriguing character. There is small doubt that his idea is that, by resigning now, he severs his connection with a Cabinet whose days are numbered, and counts upon resuming office after the coronation either as Prime Minister or as Minister for Foreign Affairs under Sipahdar or Saad-ed-Dowleh. He has been the chief cause of discord in the Cabinet for months past, and has, I consider, entirely forfeited our good-will. He is thoroughly discredited in the country. He doubtless hopes that Russian Government will see in his resignation a protest against presentation of recent memorandum recording Persia's grievances against Russia.

I have urged Prime Minister to take portfolio of Foreign Affairs himself, and to let some other Minister act at the Home Office until after the coronation.

[30746] No. 14.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 7.)

(No. 151.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, July 7*, 1914.

I GAVE Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday *aide-mémoire* embodying your telegrams Nos. 283 of 25th June and 303 of 3rd July, as well as enclosures in your despatch No. 251, and told him that I would send him Hansard's report of your speech when it arrived.

After saying that he had already read it in the "Times," he remarked that he would not raise slightest objection to our lending Persian Government British officers for protection of trade routes, but that fact that you did not now anticipate necessity of taking any special measures in neutral zone, and that Admiralty were insisting that first new developments should be made on islands or on points near coast afforded absolutely no guarantee for the future. What he wanted was some definite engagement that would satisfy Russian public that we were not establishing a monopoly over whole of neutral zone.

I replied that in face of article 3 of Persian Agreement of 1907 Russia could not dispute validity of a concession that had been granted in 1901. At time of signature of that agreement Russian Government were aware that Mr. D'Arcy had obtained

exclusive concession for oil throughout Persia, with the exception of the five northern provinces, and as they had then tacitly recognised it, they could not now raise objections.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that action taken by His Majesty's Government had changed whole character of concession. He did not want oil. Russia had enough and to spare, and we were at liberty to develop all the oil areas in south marked on Blue Book map, but it was a different matter with those near Kermanshah. Russian public would never tolerate arrangement under which a company controlled by British Government could operate in Russian zone and virtually absorb whole of the neutral zone. He did not want to make difficulties, but he must ask us to state publicly that we would not avail ourselves of all the rights conferred on D'Arcy by the concession.

I repeated all the arguments used in your above-mentioned telegrams, and insisted that nothing had been changed. His Excellency, however, adhered to what he had said, and, as his view of the matter is universally held here, he is not likely to give way.

[30747] No. 15.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 7.)

(No. 152.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, July 7, 1914.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 7th July: Anglo-Persian oil contract.

Though purchase of shares by His Majesty's Government will not, if they can help it, in any way alter character of oil concession, it will be impossible to make either Russian Government or Russian public accept this view. They both hold that sooner or later control exercised over company by His Majesty's Government will inevitably lead to our political ascendency in greater part of neutral zone.

Consequence will, I fear, be that they will endeavour to counteract this result by pursuing a policy of penetration southwards through the neutral zone.

I would therefore venture to submit that it is advisable for us to offer Russia some satisfaction with regard to oil-wells in the north. We do not apparently intend to develop them for years to come, and there is such a large field open to us in south that it is worth company's while to make a little sacrifice to gain Russia's goodwill.

By article 9 of its concession Anglo-Persian Company is empowered to found subsidiary companies for the working of its concession, and Russian opposition would, I think, be disarmed were His Majesty's Government to undertake that when time comes for developing oilfields near Kermanshah, or any others that may be discovered to the north of those marked on Blue Book map as reported oil areas, an Anglo-Russian company, somewhat on lines of Anglo-German company in Mesopotamia, should be formed for their exploitation. No term need be fixed for opening up of these oilfields, but if they are ever to be developed company would, I believe, gain by working in co-operation with, rather than in opposition to, Russia. It is the political rather than the economic side of the question that is of importance in the eyes of the Russian Government, and such a spontaneous offer on our part might dispose them to adopt a more conciliatory attitude with regard to larger question of their general policy in Persia.

[30272] No. 16.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Wratislaw.

(No. 14.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July 7, 1914.*

RUSSIAN Government have made a communication in which they say that, while concurring in your wish to accelerate the work of Commission, the northern section of the frontier above Vazné is of special importance to Russia, and the conditions require careful study, as many points may be in dispute. Russian Government understand that you apprehend climatic effects on Indians, but whether of escort or survey party is not stated. If the former, they suggest that number should be reduced. As to the survey party, I understand from your despatches that Russian survey party is not adequate in numbers or equipment to undertake work. In any case, it is not necessary to rush through work, or to finish it by the end of the year if this is impracticable, as if you should have to leave, Wilson could take over.

[30272] No. 17.

Sir Edward Grey to Count Benckendorff.

SIR E. GREY presents his compliments to the Russian Ambassador, and has the honour to acknowledge his Excellency's communication of the 4th instant respecting the demarcation of the Turco-Persian frontier.

His Majesty's Government fully appreciate the considerations emphasised by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and they have accordingly instructed Mr. Wratislaw not to hasten the work if such a course is incompatible with efficiency and thoroughness. At the same time, Sir E. Grey would point out to the Russian Ambassador that, according to the reports received from Mr. Wratislaw, it is impossible to dispense with the Indian surveyors (as distinct from the escort), since the Russian technical staff is not adequate in numbers for the work to be accomplished.

Foreign Office, July 7, 1914.

[30759] No. 18.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 8.)

(No. 200.)
Sir, *St. Petersburgh, July 3, 1914.*

I HAVE the honour to acquaint you, with reference to my despatch No. 191 of the 24th ultimo, that the "Novoe Vremya" of to-day's date publishes a long article on the subject of Persia and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in connection with recent utterances in the House of Commons.

The "Novoe Vremya" points out that questions were raised as to whether or not the purchase of the company's shares by His Majesty's Government has materially altered the foundations of the Anglo-Russian agreement; has destroyed the neutral zone; has brought the sphere of British influence into direct touch with that of Russian influence; and, finally, has affected the integrity of Persia. The article observes sarcastically that, judging from the statements made in the House, nothing would appear to have been changed, unless it be for the better; England has obtained exclusive rights in the neutral zone, but this is not contrary to the spirit or letter of the convention of 1907, which is in no need of revision.

Referring to the activity of Russian consular officers in Persia, the "Novoe Vremya" declares that your statement on this subject, though couched in your usual courteous language, amounts to a charge against the Russian Government, and calls upon the latter to furnish a detailed reply thereto.

The article reverts to the question of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, and states that Persia is above all in need of funds with which to effect economic reforms. She has naphtha springs which would amply supply her needs, but she has been deprived of this source of wealth by a monopoly granted to foreigners for a term of sixty years. Those who are sincere friends of Persia are exhorted either to abolish or redeem this monopoly. The "Novoe Vremya" declares that the purchase of the oil company's shares by His Majesty's Government involves the same control over Persia as the purchase of the Suez Canal shares did over Egypt. This alone, the article states, furnishes more valid grounds for a revision of the Anglo-Russian convention than the alleged violation by Russian consuls of their powers. In conclusion, the "Novoe Vremya" declares:—

"We are ardent advocates of the Anglo-Russian rapprochement, but it is not confined to Persian affairs. Persia constitutes, as it were, the test of its value; if that test prove unsatisfactory, we shall be obliged to renounce our faith in its durability."

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[30947] No. 19.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 8.)

(No. 415.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, July 8, 1914.*

FOLLOWING from British Commissioner on Turco-Persian frontier, No. 19 :—

"Captain Wilson's despatch No. 34, Very Confidential, paragraph 4.

"According to my arrangement at Mohammerah with Russian Commissioner, our four Indian surveyors were to be sent home from Kasr-i-Shirin when the Russian surveying staff was to have been increased as previously agreed upon.

"As, however, Russian Commissioner received no increase of staff at Kasr-i-Shirin, it was agreed between him and Captain Wilson that three Indian surveyors should continue work as far as Banneh, when the question would be considered again, as the work could not for the present proceed without them. We have now reached latitude of Banneh, and my Russian colleague declares himself in a position to take over all the map making. I have agreed that Indian surveyors shall cease working for Commission on the understanding that Russian workmen carry on without undue delay. But I decline to accede to my Russian colleague's further demand that our three Indian surveyors should be sent back to India at once, as he considers, wrongly, in my opinion, that arrangement made for Kasr-i-Shirin, where there was every facility for sending them off, still holds good.

"I can detach no officer to conduct them, and, besides being unsafe, it would be [group undecypherable] cruel to send them from the middle of Kurdistan to find their way across Mesopotamia to Bagdad in the height of summer. They must now go on with Commission and return with the rest of the Indian contingent when it is over.

"I shall be grateful if you will explain matter to Russian Ambassador, to whom I understand my Russian colleague is telegraphing."

[30946] No. 20.

Mr. Howard to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 8.)

(No. 13.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Stockholm, July 8, 1914.*

PERSIAN Gendarmerie.

Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me to-day that Swedish Government had decided to allow Swedish officers to continue till 1st March next, which time they hoped would be sufficient to allow British and Russian Governments to arrive at an arrangement as regards this question. If the two Governments wished officers withdrawn after that date Swedish Government would do so.

[29065] No. 21.

Memorandum communicated to Count Benckendorff.

SIR EDWARD GREY has given his careful consideration to Count Benckendorff's memorandum of the 25th ultimo, in which the hope was expressed that His Majesty's Minister at Tehran might be instructed to support his Russian colleague in proposing to the Persian Government that Sardar Reshid, ex-Governor of Ardebil, should succeed Shuja-ed-Dowleh as Governor-General of Azerbaijan.

Whilst His Majesty's Government have felt constrained to criticise the attitude of Shuja-ed-Dowleh in the conduct of the administration of the province, they have not demanded his recall, and they would not have wished to give advice or to express an opinion as to the selection of high Persian officials in the provinces comprised in the Russian sphere, had not M. Sazonof invited their co-operation in promoting the appointment of a successor to Shuja.

Since, however, the Russian Government suggest Sardar Reshid as the particular candidate for the post which Sir W. Townley should be instructed to support, Sir E. Grey cannot disguise the fact that, according to the information furnished to His Majesty's Government, Sardar Reshid's previous history from the days of his employment as a menial in the service of the Governor of Ardebil has been such as to inspire the greatest possible mistrust both as to his capacity and as to his personal

character. The appointment of such a man to the post of Governor-General at Tabriz, which has hitherto usually been held by the heir to the throne, would necessarily be exceedingly distasteful to the Persian authorities.

Sir E. Grey has always considered it perfectly natural that the Russian Government should insist on high Persian officials in the northern provinces being selected with due regard to their ability and disposition to work amicably with the Russian authorities, and he therefore does not consider it a matter in which he should interfere. In any case he would not give active support to a person of Sardar Reshid's standing and antecedents.

Sir E. Grey believes it would be possible to choose a person of eminence and distinction for the position, such, for instance, as His Highness the Farman Farma, whose sympathies towards the Russian Government are, so he understands, beyond question.

Should M. Sazonof desire it, Sir E. Grey would be happy to authorise Sir W. Townley to support M. Korostovetz in pressing the candidature of His Highness on the Persian Government.

Foreign Office, July 8, 1914.

[31017] No. 22.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 9.)

(No. 416.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, July 8, 1914.*

FOLLOWING sent to Wratislaw to-day :—

"Your telegram No. 19.

"The Russian Ambassador is extremely reluctant to authorise any change in the agreement by which the three Indian surveyors should leave the Commission at Banneh after the arrival of the Russian survey staff. He states that there should be no difficulty in their return from Banneh viâ Mosul, but, if necessary, the Turkish Government can be asked to furnish an escort. He attaches importance to Russia's having the same preponderance in delimiting the northern sections of the frontier which we had as far as Banneh, and thinks that the continued presence of the Indian surveyors, even though they cease working, will cause difficulties and jealousies."

[31330] No. 23.

Mr. Howard to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 11.)

(No. 98.)
Sir, *Stockholm, July 4, 1914.*

THE statement which you made in the House of Commons on the 29th ultimo respecting Persia, in the course of which you said that His Majesty's Government would advance another 50,000*l.* for the payment of the gendarmerie under Swedish officers, has been well received by the two papers here which, as I reported in my despatch No. 94 of the 22nd June, took exception at the "Times" article of the 12th ultimo. It has been interpreted as meaning that His Majesty's Government still look with favour on the Swedish officers and their work.

The "Göteborgs Handels Tidning" of the 2nd instant published an interview with General Hjalmarson, head of the gendarmerie in Persia. He said that no fears need be entertained on account of the gendarmerie. Persia, it was true, was passing through a severe economic crisis—was obliged to borrow money, principally from Russia and England, in return for which these States obtained concessions for railways, mines, &c. But he had recently been informed by the Persian Finance Department that the revenue was increasing by 10,000,000 fr. a year. The present revenue was about 70,000,000 fr. and the expenditure about 100,000,000 fr., so that in a few years the budget would be balanced. The general continued that it was a necessity for the Persian Government to maintain the gendarmerie, as otherwise the men, who were now instructed in shooting and discipline, would turn into roving bands and constitute a danger for the security of the country, worse than any which had existed before. General Hjalmarson had no fear of any Russian invasion. The Russian troops in Northern Persia had even been largely reduced of late.

The principal impression, says the reporter, left by the interview was that General Hjalmarson was optimistic as regards the work of the Swedes in Persia.

I saw yesterday Mr. Cooper, the Swedish consul-general at Tehran, who has been spending some time in Stockholm. He told me that his impression is that official circles here are not enthusiastic about the continuance of the Swedish gendarmerie in Persia, and that they are inclined to be pessimistic as regards the general situation. The general public, however, take little or no interest in the matter. This is also my view, but, as already stated, I believe that if it was supposed that His Majesty's Government did not properly appreciate the services of the Swedish officers this would speedily cause considerable irritation throughout Sweden, and might lead to a demand for their immediate withdrawal.

I have, &c.
ESME HOWARD.

[31393] No. 24.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 11.)

(No. 191.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, July* 10, 1914.

YOUR telegram No. 142 of 27th June.

Moment has now come when it appears to me that it would be risky to hold up the 50,000*l.* advance any longer. I have received urgent appeals for money from both Shiraz and Kerman. Southern customs receipts will suffice to meet service of the interest on the fresh advance, but there is no security available over and above those given for the previous advances. In default of a loan the repayment of capital can only be made on the same basis as for the previous advances, repayment of which should commence 1st July next.

I propose that the money advanced should be placed to the credit of the Treasurer-General at the Imperial Bank of Persia, that requisitions on it should be addressed by the Swedish officer commanding at Shiraz to the financial agent, who should communicate the same to the Treasurer-General after consultation with British consul, who will advise me of his approval. Imperial Bank of Persia to make no payment without my sanction on each occasion. This latter proviso will be private arrangement between Treasurer-General and myself, and the consul's sanction will be secured unofficially.

Can I proceed on these lines?

[31508] No. 25.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 11.)

(No. 153.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, July* 11, 1914.

I AM sending by Mr. O'Beirne reply of Russian Government to our memorandum, as well as copies of two letters which I have received from Minister for Foreign Affairs, on subject of Persian oil concession and Swedish gendarmerie.

Russian reply is of inordinate length and disappointing. Considerable space is devoted to defence of Russia's action, but arguments are weak and tone childish. Though no precise engagements are taken, it leaves it to be inferred that Shuja is to be sacrificed, and that collection of taxes by consuls is to be stopped.

In telling me yesterday that I should receive reply in course of the evening, Minister for Foreign Affairs said he was giving us satisfaction on both the above-mentioned points as well as on that of the post-office, which he was prepared to abolish, and that he understood from letter he had received from London that these were the three questions to which we attached importance. I also gathered from what he said that practice of creating protected subjects will be discouraged.

If Minister for Foreign Affairs has not given through Russian Ambassador in London more definite assurances with regard to all these questions than those contained in Russian *aidé-mémoire*, we ought, I think, to ask for them. If acquisition of lands by Russian subjects is to be continued, we might stipulate that agents of the Persian Administration are not to be excluded from estates thus acquired, as has been the case at Ispahan.

On my referring in our yesterday's conversation to question of the neutral zone, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that, in concluding paragraph of his *aide-mémoire*, he had put forward what he termed an "amorce," by which I understand him to mean an invitation for us to make proposals on the subject.

As his Excellency could not see me to-day, and as he is leaving on Monday for the country, I shall not see him again till end of next week.

[30747] No. 26.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 11, 1914.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, copies of two telegrams from His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh* reporting remarks made to his Excellency by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding the purchase by His Majesty's Government of shares in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

Sir E. Grey understands that the intention of their Lordships is to develop wells situated in the south and near the shore of the Persian Gulf and by these means to make sure of a supply of oil for His Majesty's navy. If this is the case, it would *primâ facie* not appear impossible to work the areas in the north and north-west on the lines suggested by Sir G. Buchanan and on terms advantageous to the company from the pecuniary point of view.

I am to add that if some arrangement of the above nature can be arrived at it would, for reasons of general policy, be desirable and would react favourably upon other political questions in Persia.

I am, &c.
EYRE A. CROWE.

[31510] No. 27.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 12.)

(No. 192.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, July* 12, 1914.

GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S persistent maladministration appears to have brought matters to a head at Kermanshah.

British consul telegraphs that voting station (elections are in progress) has been closed by ruffians in the pay of the Governor-General. Bazaar is closed, and disturbances are imminent, as both sides are armed.

British consul also reports that Sardar Akram, until recently at enmity with Governor-General, has entered province with a force, presumably to attack local reliable chief, who has guaranteed security of the road. Result is that 10,000 packages of goods are delayed at the frontier owing to insecurity of road, and that stoppage of trade is likely to cause failure of merchants who trade with Manchester.

Deputy Governor has told manager of the Imperial Bank of Persia that Governor-General will do nothing without the instructions of the Russian consul. I have addressed note to Minister for Foreign Affairs detailing the situation and holding Persian Government responsible for losses that may be incurred by British trade interests, and stating that failure of the Government to take any action to remedy an evil to which its attention has been repeatedly called cannot fail to make the worst possible impression on His Majesty's Government. (End of R.)

Previous representations made to my Russian colleague have had no effect, but the Russian Government are really responsible, because Farman Farma has been kept in office at their instigation, the natural inference being that the damage done by his misgovernment to British trade interests was not distasteful to them.

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* Nos. 14 and 15.

[31612] No. 28.

Mr. Howard to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 13.)

(No. 102.) *Stockholm, July 9, 1914.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I to-day communicated to the Swedish Minister the contents of your despatch No. 31 of the 2nd instant, conveying to his Excellency an expression of your thanks for his courtesy in the matter of the Swedish gendarmerie. Herr Wallanberg seemed gratified, and asked for a copy of the despatch, which, omitting the references to telegrams to and from St. Petersburgh, I have given him. He told me, as reported in my telegram No. 13 of yesterday's date, that the Swedish Government had decided not to withdraw the Swedish officers from Persia before the 1st March. He hoped that this would give Great Britain and Russia sufficient time to arrive at an arrangement over Persia in which the future status of the Persian gendarmerie would be included.

The great mistake, he continued, that had been made in the business by the Swedish Government was in not having at the outset come to an arrangement with Great Britain and Russia, instead of contenting themselves with an agreement with the Persian Government only. He desired again to emphasise the fact that the Swedish Government only desired in this question to act on the lines that suited both the British and Russian Governments. If both Governments agreed that they desired the Swedish officers to remain in command of the gendarmerie after the 1st March, then they would be allowed to do so, otherwise they would be withdrawn on that date in accordance with the decision now taken by the Swedish Government. Herr Wallenberg said that he had not yet said anything on the subject to the Russian Government, but that the Swedish Minister in St. Petersburgh, who was now on leave, would on his return to that capital about six weeks hence be instructed to make a communication to the Russian Government in the above sense.

I have, &c.
E. HOWARD.

[31575] No. 29.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 13.)

(No. 193.) *Tehran, July 13, 1914.*
(Telegraphic.)

GOVERNOR-GENERAL of Ispahan complains that action of Russians makes it impossible for him to carry on the administration. System of the leasing by the Russians of small portions of the villages in the neutral zone and then claiming that Governor's representatives cannot enter villages because Russian interests are engaged in them is assuming large proportions, and is carrying Russian absorption down to the frontier of Fars.

I have spoken to my Russian colleague, who has promised to telegraph to St. Petersburgh on the subject, but, as he seems to consider that Russian action, which entirely prevents the local representative of the Central Government from carrying out his duties, is justifiable, I do not expect much alleviation of the abuse from his representations.

[31785] No. 30.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 13.)

(No. 194.) *Tehran, July 13, 1914.*
(Telegraphic.)

MY telegram No. 185 of 29th June.

Russian Minister tells me that he has received a laconic telegraphic reply from St. Petersburgh to Persian memorandum of grievances. It appears that Russian Government are prepared to admit joint action of Persian Administration and consuls in collection of taxes on express condition that northern revenues shall not be in future hypothecated to Imperial Bank of Persia, and that all the concessions now asked for by Russia be conceded. Question as to possession of landed property is to be regulated on basis that all lands already acquired remain property of their Russian owners.

Shuja may go and be replaced by Vali Ahd, who, however, is not to proceed to his post at present. Farman Farma may meanwhile act as Governor-General, but with Sardar Rechid in an advisory (controlling) position by his side as he is so well acquainted with all the local questions. Withdrawal of Russian troops is made dependent upon increase of Cossack brigade, but gendarmerie, whose disappearance is perhaps anticipated, are apparently to be allowed to operate on roads in conjunction, as I understand, with Cossacks.

My Russian colleague expressed sincere hope that I would co-operate with him in getting Persians to realise friendly nature of Russian proposals, but more especially in bringing about an arrangement between the two banks on northern revenues and mint questions. Although he professes to see most friendly disposition towards Persia in Russian Government's proposals, he has asked for permission not to make a communication to Persian Government until after coronation, as he fears effect which it may have, and says he cannot give a coronation present with one hand and this answer with the other. At the same time Russian Legation is letting it be widely known that Russian reply is most hostile so that no one will dare to choose office in face of such a situation.

Interests of Imperial Bank of Persia, which are old-established, will suffer severely if its radius of action is arbitrarily curtailed.

[31835] No. 31.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 13.)

(Telegraphic.)
(Private.) *Tehran, July 13, 1914.*

THE Persian crisis has reached an acutely critical stage. There is no money to pay either the gendarmerie or Court or Coronation expenses. The European press articles about the recent oil arrangement and the impending partition of Persia have created an impression of most painful uncertainty. Mornard's resignation and the possibility of the early withdrawal of both Belgians and Swedes, if not known officially, are generally suspected. There are rumours of impending disturbances in various places. Everyone is discouraged and depressed. When the tenor of the Russian answer becomes known, all hope in the future will be lost. A collapse must lead to partition, or at least to Russian administration of the north and British of the south, which would inevitably result in the same. I have tried hard to keep the ship afloat, but it looks as if the Russian Minister's destructive methods have been too much for me. The so-called weak coterminous frontier between British and Russian spheres of influence in the event of partition can be made a very strong one, if we command the friendship of the tribes from Pusht-i-kuh to Bunder Abbas, and at comparatively small expense. British officers as military advisers would probably be welcome.

The whole situation is reviewed exhaustively in despatches, which should reach you on 20th July, but I should like to know if you wish me to make a last determined effort to maintain the position. It can possibly be done and the next two months of financial famine tided over, but nothing can save Persia but a loan, or money procured from the sale of territory to Russia in the north and to us in the south, under condition that the Russian Government will withdraw the Russian troops and keep their hands off what is left. Russia would possibly keep her word for five years, during which time Persia with money might so secure her position that the necessary excuse for interference would not be forthcoming.

Mornard has put the alternative schemes of a loan or the sale of territory before the Cabinet Council confidentially.

The manager of the Imperial Bank of Persia thinks that he could arrange a further short loan of 100,000*l.*, but it would have to be secured on the northern internal revenue. With this money and 100,000*l.* to be derived from the Kerman mining concession, he thinks that Persia could carry on till March.

The moment has come when I must ask for a definite expression of your wishes, more especially as I have reason to believe that the Russian Legation is misrepresenting my action at St. Petersburgh.

[31393] No. 32.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 151.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July* 13, 1914.

YOUR telegram No. 191 of 10th July: Persian finance.

It is imperative that not only requisitions for money be supervised, but also actual expenditure of it be checked, through accounts rendered by Swedish officers.

Kerman should be treated *pari passu* with Shiraz.

Subject to satisfactory arrangement of these points, you may act as proposed.

[31510] No. 33.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No 313.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 13, 1914.

SIR W. TOWNLEY'S telegram No. 192 of 12th July.

You should ask Russian Government to send instructions to give energetic support at Kermanshah as regards measures necessary to prevent goods being delayed and trade held up. It would be desirable to confine our request to this one point.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 152.)

[30252] No. 34.

*Foreign Office to India Office.**

Foreign Office, July 13, 1914.

Sir,

WITH reference to my letter of the 6th March last relative to the Trans-Persian Railway project, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before the Marquess of Crewe, copies of two letters from the British group of the Société d'Études and of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh on the subject.†

In face of the strong insistance of the Russian Government on an immediate application for an option, Sir E. Grey feels that it will be difficult for His Majesty's Government not to agree to such an application, on the conditions agreed upon between him and M. Sazonof at Balmoral in September 1912, the text of which will be found in the Blue Book, Persia No. 1 (1913) No. 345.

The concession of exclusive mineral rights for 100 kilom. on each side of the line was, however, neither mentioned nor contemplated at that time, though in June 1913 the Russian Ambassador stated that if the land on either side of the line were held by a foreign company the railway would be threatened. His Excellency then added that the land in question need not be more than 60 versts—40 miles on each side. It would perhaps be best that the whole question of mineral rights in regions adjoining the railway should be reserved for further consideration; the option for the line itself might, however, be applied for now without mention being made of the mineral concession or with an express reservation that the application for mineral rights referred only to the Russian sphere.

Sir E. Grey is accordingly of opinion that, subject to a definite understanding on this point, the note, of which a copy is enclosed in Sir W. Garstin's letter of the 3rd instant, might now be presented to the Persian Government, and would propose so to inform His Majesty's Minister at Tehran and the British group of the Société d'Études. Before doing so, however, Sir E. Grey would wish to receive the observations and concurrence of Lord Crewe.

I am, &c.
EYRE A. CROWE.

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* Also to War Office, Admiralty, and Board of Trade, *mutatis mutandis*.
† Part II, Nos. 82 and 211; and *supra*, No. 10.

[31799] No. 35.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 14.)

(No. 213.)
Sir, *St. Petersburgh, July* 11, 1914.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 151 of the 7th July, I have the honour to enclose copy of a private letter which I have received from M. Sazonof on the subject of the Persian oil concession, in which his Excellency once more expresses the hope that His Majesty's Government will refrain from exercising their rights of exploitation in the Russian zone and in the adjacent districts of the neutral zone.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 35.

M. Sazonof to Sir G. Buchanan.

Mon cher Ambassadeur, *Saint-Pétersbourg, le 27 juin* (10 *juillet*), 1914.

JE tiens à vous remercier de la communication que vous avez bien voulu me faire dans votre aide-mémoire en date du 21 juin (4 juillet), année courante, et de vous dire combien j'apprécie les explications amicales données à notre Ambassadeur par Sir E. Grey au sujet de la concession de l'Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Je crois devoir pourtant attirer votre attention sur les considérations suivantes:

La presse russe, comme vous le savez, a été sérieusement alarmée par l'affaire en question, et nous serions très heureux de pouvoir disposer de certaines assurances plus positives de votre part pour calmer les appréhensions de notre opinion publique.

Tout en reconnaissant que la concession de la compagnie avait été acquise avant la convention de 1907, le fait qu'elle a passé entre les mains du Gouvernement britannique modifie essentiellement le caractère de cette entreprise. Pour rester fidèle à l'esprit de notre accord, il serait fort désirable que le Gouvernement britannique se désistât de ses droits d'exploitation de naphte dans la partie de la zone neutre attenante à notre sphère d'influence et à plus forte raison dans cette dernière. Une déclaration de ce genre contribuerait considérablement à rassurer notre opinion publique, et je serais sincèrement reconnaissant au Gouvernement britannique de vouloir bien me faire dès qu'il le jugera possible.

Très sincèrement à vous,
SAZONOF.

[31800] No. 36.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 14.)

(No. 214.)
Sir, *St. Petersburgh, July* 11, 1914.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 148 of the 2nd instant, I have the honour to enclose copy of a private letter which I have received from M. Sazonof transmitting to me an *aide-mémoire* on the subject of the Swedish gendarmerie and the Persian Cossack Brigade.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 36.

M. Sazonof to Sir G. Buchanan.

Saint-Pétersbourg, le 27 juin
Mon cher Ambassadeur, (10 *juillet*), 1914.

EN réponse à votre lettre du 18 juin (1er juillet) courant, je crois devoir vous faire savoir que nous n'avons pas d'objections à ce qu'une avance de 50,000*l.* soit faite

par le Gouvernement britannique au Gouvernement persan pour le maintien de la gendarmerie, sous les ordres d'officiers suédois, dans le midi de la Perse.

Quant à notre point de vue sur l'activité de la gendarmerie dans le nord de ce pays, vous le trouverez exposé dans l'aide-mémoire ci-inclus.

A vous très cordialement,
SAZONOF.

Enclosure 2 in No. 36.

Memorandum.

LE Gouvernement Impérial n'a pas été saisi par le Gouvernement suédois de la question faisant l'objet de l'aide-mémoire de l'Ambassade britannique en date du 16 (29) juin courant, mais lors du passage à Saint-Pétersbourg du Colonel Hjalmarson le point de vue du Ministère Impérial sur la question de l'engagement de nouveaux officiers suédois pour la gendarmerie persane, ainsi que sur celle de la sphère d'activité de cette gendarmerie lui a été exposé, en présence du Ministre de Suède à Saint-Pétersbourg, dans les termes suivants :

Le Gouvernement Impérial n'a point d'objections à ce que de nouveaux officiers suédois soient engagés pour remplacer ceux dont les contrats sont expirés. Quant à l'augmentation du nombre des officiers suédois en Perse en général, le Gouvernement Impérial ne s'oppose pas à l'engagement d'une certaine quantité d'officiers nécessaire pour le service de la gendarmerie dans le midi de la Perse. En ce qui concerne le nord de ce pays, le Gouvernement persane a déjà été informé de ce que le Gouvernement Impérial trouve essentiel que le maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité y soit confié à la Brigade de Cosaques persans sous les ordres d'officiers russes. Le Gouvernement russe a été poussé à faire cette proposition par les considérations suivantes :

Le nord de la Perse étant habité par un grand nombre de sujets russes possédant de vastes intérêts commerciaux et économiques, les interventions forcément fréquentes d'une force policière sous le commandement d'officiers étrangers ne manquerait pas de créer un état de choses peu rassurant. De là également possibilité de conflits qui pourrait entraîner des complications sérieuses.

Le Gouvernement russe est en train d'examiner la question de la réorganisation de la Brigade de Cosaques en vue de rendre cette force plus active et d'écarter certains griefs que le Gouvernement persan a contre elle. Le Gouvernement Impérial s'occupe également de la délimitation des sphères d'activité de cette brigade et de la gendarmerie aux soins de laquelle on pourra peut-être confier la sécurité de certaines routes dans le nord.

N'ayant pas de raison pour modifier son point de vue depuis le passage par Saint-Pétersbourg du Colonel Hjalmarson, le Ministère Impérial croit devoir porter à la connaissance de l'Ambassade britannique qu'il compte régler son attitude dans la question de la gendarmerie persane sur les principes ci-dessus exposés.

Saint-Pétersbourg,
le 27 juin (10 *juillet*), 1914.

[31801] No. 37.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 14.)

(No. 215.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, July* 11, 1914.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 153 of to-day, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith translation of an *aide-mémoire* which has been communicated to me by M. Sazonof, and which contains the reply of the Russian Government to the memorandum handed to the Russian Ambassador in London on the situation in Persia.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 37.

Memorandum communicated to Sir G. Buchanan by M. Sazonof.

(Translation.)

IN the memorandum submitted by the British Foreign Office to the Imperial Embassy in London, and dated the 10th June of this year, the views of the London Cabinet are put forward as to the present position occupied by Russia in Persia, and the opinion expressed is, in effect, that the actions of Russian representatives in Northern Persia are undermining the principle of the independence and integrity of the country on which the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 is based.

In support of this opinion the following data are quoted :—

The Governor-General of Tabriz has become an autonomous ruler who does not obey the instructions of the Central Persian Government, and at times even acts in direct defiance of orders given him. He is at the same time completely under the control of the Russian Consulate-General, the commands of which he obeys implicitly, and the support of which deprives the Central Government of the possibility of calling this personage to account.

Further, Persian Governors such as, for instance, those at Resht, Kazvin, and Julfa (Ispahan) are in fact selected, or at least maintained, in their posts by Russian consuls, and their residence in the locality is conditional on their acting in full accordance with the wishes of Russian representatives. The Central Government do not dare to dismiss them except with the consent of the Russians, however revolutionary, dishonourable, or generally unsatisfactory their behaviour may be. The Russian Minister at Tehran recently called for the resignation of the Minister for the Interior, who, it is said, is one of the least incapable and inactive of the officials of the State, and was selected for this post upon the recommendation of the Russian Government itself.

By affording Russian protection to individual persons in Azerbaijan, Meshed, and even in such southern localities as Ispahan, Russian administrative control has to a considerable degree extended to the financial administration, which in consequence is at times seriously embarrassed thereby. In Azerbaijan there have been instances when a great portion of the taxes due from persons under Russian protection have been collected, entirely independently of the Persian financial administration, by Russian consuls who have deposited the money in the Russian Bank without rendering any account of the amounts thus taken from the Persian Treasury. The result of this action has been the complete disorganisation of the finances of this province.

Without annexing Northern Persia in the full sense of the word, the Russian Government have practically acquired the supreme political authority and a preponderating influence through their agents in the entire administration, which, if not in name, has in fact become Russian.

The result of Russian methods of action in Northern Persia in connection with the unsatisfactory position of affairs in the south has been the creation in the north and north-west of almost a monopoly for Russian trade. With the impetus given to this trade by the substitution in the north of Russian for Persian authority, it must inevitably develop a tendency to penetrate to the south also, replacing both here and there British and other foreign trade which can only enter Persia by southern trade routes, and is entirely cut off when these routes are closed.

Further, a general tendency, it is said, is observed for Russian political influence to extend to the neutral zone, as is evidenced from the action of the Russian consul at Ispahan and his intervention in the duties of the Governor-General of this province, as also from the project for an irrigation concession at the source of the Karkunan.

Before proceeding to a review of the above-quoted points from the memorandum of the London Cabinet, the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs deem it necessary to express certain general considerations on the question of Russian methods of action in Persia in connection with the situation in that country.

It is well known to the British Government with what complications the change of the State régime in Persia was attended, and how the events which took place in that country reflected adversely on Russian interests, which, owing to the contiguity of the two countries and the close economic ties which have long since existed between them, appreciably exceed, at least in the northern part of Persia, the interests of any other Power. Without entering into details, it must be noted that the decline of the Government authority and the disorders which arose as the result of anarchy in the country caused losses amounting to

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many millions to Russian subjects, and even led to no small sacrifice of human life. At the same time, during this period, with rare exceptions, there was noticeable a systematic attitude of ill-will towards Russia on the part of Persian ruling spheres, imbued with ultra-nationalistic ideas not in accordance with the cultural or ethical level of these spheres, or with the general economic and political condition of Persia. Under such a condition of affairs the Imperial Government, to their extreme regret, found themselves compelled to take their interests in northern Persia into their own hands by the installation of Russian troops in the more important localities. This step, which was attended with considerable material sacrifice and other inconveniences for Russia, resulted in the establishment of comparative order within the localities specified, to the general advantage not only of Russian subjects, but also of other foreigners, and, above all, of the local population. The presence of Russian columns in Persia has not borne, and does not bear, at the present time, however, any character of the nature of an occupation, as the Russian troops are in no way concerned with the internal life and administration of the country. The task of the columns is to maintain order by the prevention of bloodshed and armed attacks between mutually hostile local parties. On the other hand, such circumstances as the weakness of the ties uniting the provinces with the centre, and the above-mentioned feeling of the latter, as also the impossibility of permitting anti-Russian agitation, lawlessness, violence, extortion, &c., in localities where the troops are quartered have inevitably demanded the exercise of certain action on the local authorities by the Russian consular representatives, who have been compelled *nolens volens* to take upon themselves to a certain degree a leading rôle in local affairs in order to avoid complications which might have far more serious consequences. Again, local Persian administrators sincerely desirous of maintaining order in the provinces entrusted to them, and who have not aimed solely at the gratification of the nationalistic tendencies of the Extreme Liberal parties in the capital, or at deriving personal material benefits from their official position, have naturally sought a rapprochement with Russian representatives, clearly recognising that only with their support and the presence of Russian detachments can the aims for which they are striving be attained. Owing to this, the necessary state of affairs has now been created, by virtue of which in the majority of the northern provinces of Persia a predominating influence of Russian consular representatives is noticeable. This influence brings about those conditions under which only is a peaceful development of local life and safety of person and property conceivable, with the natural result of prosperity of trade and industry. Although a recognition of this is possibly displeasing to the national self-respect of Persian-ruling spheres, the people everywhere fully appreciate the blessings which they obtain in this manner, blessings which they could scarcely obtain at an early date under a weak and inconsistent Government, the activity of which is hampered by the absence of solidarity and an almost incessant struggle by separate individuals for power.

The Imperial Government, as formerly, free from all aggressive aims and in no way dreaming of any forcible acquisitions whatever, consider that in addition to safeguarding their strictly commercial and industrial interests in Persia, they have a cultural mission to perform, the pacification of the Persian provinces adjoining Russia, and the bestowal of tranquillity on their population, closely bound economically and by conditions of life with the population of their own outlying regions. They are of the opinion that this duty will rest on them until the Persian Government themselves shall be in a position to guarantee law and order throughout the country.

Turning to the separate points of the British memorandum, the Imperial Government think it their duty to put forward the following explanation :—

The most important province of Persia, from the point of view of Russian interests in Azerbaijan, from time immemorial closely connected with the Caucasus. The Imperial Government cannot be indifferent as to who stands at the head of this province, which still quite recently was the scene of the greatest disorders and most unbridled action by the dregs of the so-called Persian revolution. After a series of unsuccessful local rulers, appointed by the Central Persian Government, the power finally passed into the hands of the present Governor-General, Shuja-ed-Dowleh, who from the very commencement displayed great firmness and a full knowledge of local conditions, and knew how to restore order in the province within a comparatively short period of time, and to inspire the necessary respect towards himself. It is natural that such a personality won the approval of the Russian Government, and commenced to enjoy the full support of their local representatives. Unfortunately, however, the Tehran Cabinet up to the present have been unable to reconcile themselves to the fact that Shuja-ed-Dowleh has established himself in Azerbaijan by

an unusual method, *i.e.*, without the proper reverences and gifts in Tehran. Sympathy with the ex-Shah, of which he is usually charged, was fully refuted by the manner in which he acted during the attempt of Mahomet Ali to recover his lost throne. Persistently following one aim only—the restoration and maintenance of order in his province, Shuja-ed-Dowleh remained a true servant of the Government, deviating only from the execution of such proposals of the latter as either were contrary to the aim specified, or threatened to involve him in a conflict with the Russians, whose support he naturally valued as the sole means for a successful realisation of his task. Appreciating the ability and great energy of this man, the Imperial Government cannot but esteem him, and wish that he may retain authority as long as possible. Unfortunately, however, Shuja-ed-Dowleh himself is now with increasing frequency complaining of bad health, and is desirous of the necessary rest, therefore the question of his replacement by another has perforce become one for consideration, and has already formed the subject of discussion with the Government of the Shah.

As regards the selection of persons for administrative posts, and also the changing of such, this, in accordance with old-established custom, has always been effected by agreement between the Imperial and Persian Governments. So far as is known, the British Government have also enjoyed, and continue to enjoy, this right, an instance of which was recently noted in Seistan and Kainat. This right of a voice in such questions by the two Powers most interested in Persian affairs arises from the necessity that by a due choice of persons they shall guarantee their vital interests in their respective spheres of influence. It is impossible, moreover, not to note here that Russian representatives, of course, never support Governors of "revolutionary, dishonourable, and unsatisfactory character." The resignation of the former Minister for the Interior, Prince Ein-ed-Dowleh, a typical Persian of the old régime, was evoked chiefly because he renewed to its full extent the former method of sale of posts, and for the sake of his own interested, avaricious aims removed men useful from a Russian point of view. Apart from this, the Prince, in search of popularity among the extreme nationalists, commenced to conduct a policy clearly ill-disposed towards Russia, while, on the other hand, as is well known to the Imperial Government, playing a double game and secretly in touch with the reactionary elements, assuring them of his immutable devotion to absolutism. Such duplicity could only have the most ruinous consequences from the point of view of the establishment of tranquillity in the country which is so desirable. It is impossible not to mention, among others, also those intrigues which Ein-ed-Dowleh conducted against other members of the Cabinet, as, for instance, Vosug-ed-Dowleh, who were recognised by the Russian and British Governments as the most useful members of this Cabinet.

During the burdensome times through which Persia has lived and is in part still passing, and owing frequently to the insecurity of person and property, the number of natives seeking the protection of foreign representatives has undoubtedly considerably grown. In this category are principally those persons who are under financial obligations to banks and trading firms and the ruin of whom would involve severe loss for the latter, and also persons who, during the difficult time of persecution of everything Russian in Persia had the courage, as formerly, to display feelings of friendliness towards Russia. The protection of such persons from persecution and violence is naturally the duty of Russian representatives in Persia. This institution of protected persons is undoubtedly undesirable in principle and conducive of no little trouble, but it will automatically disappear when law, order, and respect for the political convictions of others are reinstated in the country. Noting in passing that Ispahan, although it lies somewhat to the south, forms, nevertheless, a portion of the zone apportioned to Russian influence by the agreement of 1907, the Imperial Government cannot accept as correct the opinion that the protection afforded to the above-mentioned persons is a source of embarrassment or loss to the finances of Persia. On the contrary, the Imperial Government maintain that it is only owing to the co-operation afforded by the Russian representatives to the Persian financial administration that the latter is in a position to realise its functions, and regularly to increase the revenue of the Treasury of the Shah. The difficulties which this administration at times meets in its path are for the most part the result of ignorant methods and an unwillingness on the part of its separate organs to reckon with local conditions of life and other peculiarities. Among these organs, unfortunately, are certain Belgian officials, who do not listen to the good advice offered them by the Russian representatives having relations with them, and always tendered in a kindly spirit. The frequent conflicts which have in consequence arisen between officials of the "maliat" administration on the one hand, and Russian subjects, together with those under Russian protection, on the other, induced the Imperial

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Minister, in agreement with the Chief Treasurer of Persia, to entrust the collection of taxes from these persons to Russian consuls, with the participation of the Discount and Loan Bank of Persia. By this measure, among others, has been partially decided the question of the deposit in the above-named bank of the Government revenues of Northern Persia, which, contrary to the spirit of the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, M. Mornard, since 1913, has been placing in the British Bank. However, the Persian Government saw a violation of their rights in this first attempt to introduce a new method, guaranteeing the Government of the Shah an accurate receipt of taxes and avoidance of such highly undesirable mutual friction and recrimination, and M. Mornard hastened, not only to repudiate the agreement concluded with them, but even to talk of the arbitrary actions of Russian consuls. At present, the question of the collection of the "maliat" from Russian subjects and protégés also forms a subject of negotiation between the Imperial and Persian Governments and with a readiness on the part of the latter to meet half way the legitimate wish that the revenues of the northern provinces shall be deposited with the Russian Bank, as was done in 1912, and with the establishment of a certain control by the consulates as regards the correctness of the assessment, a favourable settlement of the question appears fully possible. It is scarcely necessary to mention that a precise account is kept of all sums collected by Russian consuls, and that not one copeck of these amounts is taken from the Persian Treasury. If the Persian Financial Department state otherwise such statement does not merit belief.

Owing principally to the geographical position of the two countries, Russian trade has always predominated in northern and north-western Persia over the trade of all other States. If the imports of the latter have specially diminished of late years it is due—as is justly remarked in the British memorandum—chiefly to the absence of safety for traffic along the caravan routes of southern Persia. However, the Imperial Government cannot but recall that on their part they have never placed any obstacles in the way of the British Government in its endeavours to secure an effective protection of the southern routes. As regards the penetration of Russian wares into Southern Persia, no such movement is at present noticeable, and even appears to be little likely beyond the limits of the Ispahan province, which constitutes, as has been already pointed out, a portion of the Russian sphere of influence.

Finally, with reference to the mention made in the memorandum of the tendency of Russian influence to extend into the neutral zone, it can only be said that such tendency may to a certain degree appear only in the Ispahan province, as is shown by the instance cited in the British memorandum of projected irrigation work in the same region. Moreover, the appearance of influence and a realisation of economic enterprise within the limits of the neutral zone is not forbidden either Power by the Anglo-Russian agreement, and, so far as is known, Great Britain is taking wide advantage of this right in Bakhtiaria, and in her relations with such persons, as, for instance, the Sheikh Khasal of Mohammerah.

In concluding with this point their reply (to the memorandum), the soundness of which can scarcely be denied, the Imperial Government cannot conceal their profound regret that their actions in Persia, dictated by vital necessity, regularly meet with such evident mistrust from British public opinion, notwithstanding repeatedly given assurances as to the entirely disinterested motives of Russia, confirmed by all her actions during the period of the Persian crisis. This symptom is all the more to be regretted in that its action may extend far beyond the limits of the comparatively narrow scope of Persian affairs, and may find an echo in other points of contact of the interests of the two Powers. Deeming such consequences as equally undesirable and even dangerous for the two friendly Governments, and endeavouring by every possible means to assist in the removal of the above-mentioned distrust, nourished apparently to a considerable extent by traditional fears in India of a possible Russian invasion of that country, the Imperial Government are prepared with all attention and good wishes to consider, jointly with the London Cabinet, what measures can be taken with a view to a lasting establishment of a reciprocal correct understanding and complete confidence, which is so important for their respective interests.

[31832]

No. 38.

Mr. Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 14.)

(No. 14.)
(Telegraphic.) R.

Mosul, July 14, 1914.

YOUR telegram No. 15 of 7th July.

I have drawn attention of Commission to the matter, and when we shortly reach a more civilised neighbourhood it may be possible to erect something more classy in the way of boundary pillars.

Hitherto Commission has done its best with materials procurable, but, even had it been otherwise feasible, it would have been useless to erect elaborate pillars until the local authorities on the barbarous side of the frontier were in a position to prevent their being destroyed by dissatisfied parties, as we hear has already been done in several instances at least.

When inhabitants have become accustomed to new state of things Turkish and Persian Governments might combine to erect permanent pillars.

[31835]

No. 39.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 154.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 14, 1914.

YOUR telegram of 13th July.

I fully realise the precarious position and am discussing whole position with Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, which must take time.

You should certainly continue to do everything in your power to keep the Administration on its legs, though if this proves to be impossible you may be sure that I shall not impute the failure to you, for I realise more than ever the difficulty of the situation. I had understood from your previous telegrams that advance of 50,000*l.* for gendarmerie would release moneys for other purposes, and would allow of difficulties being tided over. But I await your despatches.

A short loan secured on northern internal revenue would raise awkward questions with Russia, and, pending discussions with Russian Government in regard to the whole Persian question, I am inclined to suspend pressing for the Kerman mining concession, and if the Persian Government give it at this moment it should be clear that they do it of themselves under financial and not British pressure.

I had not before receipt of your telegram heard of any suggestion that Russia should acquire Persian territory by purchase. Nor can I at this stage say anything as to the feasibility of a large Persian loan. It seems doubtful whether any such loan could be floated without guarantees which would in any case have to include effective foreign control of Persian finances.

[31308]

No. 40.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 267.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, July 14, 1914.

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran on the subject of the collection of taxes in Northern Persia by the Russian consulates.*

I have ascertained that the Treasurer-General has no objection to a copy of his memorandum contained in Sir W. Townley's despatch being communicated to the Russian Government, and your Excellency is accordingly authorised to make such use of it as you may think desirable in your conversations with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and, if necessary, to communicate a copy of it to M. Sazonof.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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* Part II, No. 205.

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[32379] No. 41.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 282.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 14, 1914.

I TOLD Count Benckendorff to-day the substance of Sir Walter Townley's telegram No. 192 of the 12th instant, omitting any mention of the last paragraph.

I said that I would say nothing for the moment as regards the general maladministration of the Governor-General in Kermanshah. For points of that sort, I would wait till I could deal with the points in the Russian reply to our memorandum. I asked Count Benckendorff, therefore, particularly to observe that I was not raising any general question in connection with this telegram, and that the reason of my speaking to him was to ask the Russian Government to send instructions to the Russian consul in Kermanshah to give energetic support to the Persian Governor-General in taking any measures to keep open the trade route by which our goods arrived. I should presently have complaints from Manchester that British goods were being excluded, and their place being taken by Russian goods that arrived by other trade routes.

Count Benckendorff showed himself thoroughly alive to the point, and promised to telegraph to his Government.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[32276] No. 42.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 16.)

(No. 196.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, July* 16, 1914.

THE unfortunate Russian habit of extending protection to all persons even remotely connected with Russian interests has caused a fresh incident at Ispahan. Notorious brigand Reza Joozani recently looted a travelling caravan at Gav Peeseh on Ahwaz road. Governor-General sent a force which attacked gang, killing six men and bringing back two prisoners to Ispahan. Russian consul-general immediately demanded release of the prisoners on score that they are villagers of the Zil-es-Sultan. Governor-General has refused to surrender them at the risk of increasing Russian enmity towards himself.

Incident serves to show difficulties which Persian officials have to encounter in keeping order under existing conditions.

[32291] No. 43.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 16.)

(No. 197.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, July* 16, 1914

YOUR telegram No. 154 of 14th July.

Difficulties of financial situation have been increased by the fact that all surplus on the half-year's northern customs receipts has been swallowed up by unexpected Russian demands; 60,000 tomans (10,930*l.*) have been impounded by order of the legation to meet "claims of Russian creditors," no details being given, and 169,000 tomans (30,000*l.*) on account of "supplementary expenses incurred by the Cossack brigade." As usual no accounts are given, and it was previously agreed with the Treasurer-General that over 20,000*l.* of this sum should be repaid 1st January next.

As the northern customs receipts are arbitrarily seized to meet Russian demands, it should be borne in mind that the Seistan receipts, which are purely British, and the Kermanshah receipts, which are derived from British, Turkish, and German trade, are included in "northern customs."

32115] No. 44.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 156.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 16, 1914.

MY telegram No. 151 of 13th July.

It appears from Major O'Connor's telegram No. 196 of 29th May to you, now communicated to me by India Office, that out of the 30,000*l.* earmarked from last advance for Fars administration only 10,000*l.* reached that province, and that he anticipated similar diversion of funds if further advance was made.

If facts were as stated it constitutes gross violation of conditions of former advance, and method of payment of 50,000*l.* now about to be made would have to be completely changed. If Treasurer-General can give and enforce such orders as are reported in O'Connor's telegram, it would not be right to pay any British Government money over to him. Possibly moneys required for gendarmerie could be paid by you direct through consular officers without reference to Persian Government.

Please report facts of case at present unknown to me.

[32347] No. 45.

Consul-General Sir C. Hertslet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 17.)

(No. 60.)
Sir, *Antwerp, July* 16, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 39, Commercial, of the 1st instant, forwarding a copy of a despatch from the acting consul-general for Fars, enclosing a report from the commercial adviser in the Persian Gulf.

I have caused enquiries to be made on the point specially referred to in your despatch, viz., the extent of German interest in the Belgian sugar refinery known as La Raffinerie Tirlemontoise. I have received information through one of the leading sugar export merchants at Antwerp, who himself forwards sugar to the Persian Gulf in the vessels of the Hall Line, that so far as he is aware there is no German interest, either direct or indirect, in the Raffinerie Tirlemontoise, which is purely a Belgian firm. It may be of interest for me to state that the sugar refineries of this country do not, as a general rule, deal with the forwarding of the sugar which they manufacture. This work is undertaken by merchants or brokers, who select the means of transport by which the sugar is despatched. It would consequently be a matter of indifference to the Raffinerie Tirlemontoise whether the sugar produced from that factory was despatched to the Persian Gulf by British or German vessels. I gather that the best means for fostering this trade in British bottoms would be for the actual buyers, many of whom are British firms, to indicate to the merchants from or brokers through whom they make their purchases their desire that the sugar for their order should be sent in British ships to the Gulf, and consigned on through bills of lading by the river companies working in conjunction with the British steamship companies.

In regard to Major Knox's suggestion that there should be British bills of lading from Antwerp to Ahwaz, involving British carriage throughout the journey, I understand that this is possible, since a consignment of 58 tons of glassware was shipped from Antwerp to Ahwaz on through bills of lading by the British steamship "Merton Hall," which sailed from Antwerp for the Persian Gulf on the 24th January, 1914.

The Antwerp representative of the Hall Line has courteously supplied me with particulars, which are given below, of the shipments of sugar to the Persian Gulf by the steamers of that company from Antwerp since the beginning of the present year. It should be observed that all these orders have been booked in Antwerp, and none of them appear to have been instigated by British firms exporting sugar to the Gulf.

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The following are the shipments of sugar by the Hall Line vessels to the Persian Gulf during 1914 :—

	Tons of Sugar.
By the steamship "Merton Hall," sailed January 24, 1914—*	
For Bushire	355
For Mohammerah	139
For Bagdad viâ Basra	14
By the steamship "Seistan," sailed February 17, 1914—*	
For Bushire	253
For Mohammerah	73
For Bagdad	60
By the steamship "Tangistan," sailed March 16, 1914—*	
For Bushire	170
For Bagdad	61
By the steamship "Manica," sailed April 20, 1914—*	
For Bushire	164
For Bagdad	122
By the motor-ship "Arum," sailed May 22, 1914—*	
For Bushire	130
By the steamship "Anatolia," sailed June 20, 1914—	
For Bushire	200
For Mohammerah	5
For Basra	29

The above figures show that a certain proportion of the sugar shipped from Antwerp to the Gulf is now being carried by British ships since the inauguration of a regular service by the Hall Line. It would seem not unreasonable to imagine that this amount might be appreciably increased were British buyers to insist that the sugar they purchase for the Gulf should be shipped by the British line.

I will not fail to report any further information which I may succeed in procuring respecting trade from Antwerp to the Persian Gulf.

I have, &c.
CECIL HERTSLET.

[32453] No. 46.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 17.)

(No. 198.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, July* 17, 1914.

YOUR telegram No. 156 of 16th July.

I did not report matter to you, as I awaited O'Connor's visit to Tehran to enquire particulars of the case. Full report of the arrangements made for the future control of the Fars finances will reach you in due course. I do not think that action of the Treasurer-General was so reprehensible as would appear from O'Connor's telegram.

Distribution of 50,000*l.* will be controlled by consuls and myself.

[32276] No. 47.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 328.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July* 17, 1914.

SIR W. TOWNLEY'S telegram No. 196 of 16th July.

The whole road from Ispahan to Ahwaz lies in the neutral sphere, was constructed chiefly by Lynch, and is a purely British enterprise.

If the Governor-General of Ispahan is to be prevented from exercising any power over notorious brigands caught *in flagrante delicto*, the situation will become intolerable.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 157.)

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* Also small quantities of general cargo

[32658] No. 48.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 18.)

(No. 160.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, July* 18, 1914.

DISTURBANCES at Kermanshah.

On the receipt of your telegram No. 313 of 13th July, I forwarded to Minister for Foreign Affairs an *aide-mémoire* embodying its substance, but as his Excellency only returned from the country to-day he had not seen it when I drew his attention to prejudice being caused to British trade by action of Governor-General at Kermanshah.

His Excellency promised to telegraph to Russian consul, but declared that latter could not have influenced Governor-General's action.

[32291] No. 49.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 332.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 18, 1914.

SIR W. TOWNLEY'S telegram No. 197 of 16th July: Persian finances.

Your Excellency may, if a suitable opportunity presents itself, remind Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs of facts mentioned in second paragraph and urge his Excellency to moderate the Russian demands in view of the fact that in any case 20,000*l.* were to be repaid next January.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 158.)

[32817] No. 50.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 20.)

(No. 180. Very Confidential.)
Sir, *Tehran, June* 19, 1914.

THE Russian Minister called upon me a few days ago to ask me for certain information about the operations of the Anglo-Persian Oil Syndicate, with a view apparently to ascertaining where the wells actually being worked are situated. M. Korostovetz did not appear to desire any detailed information. I pointed out on the map the various places where work is in progress.

The conversation then turned upon general topics of interest, and I informed M. Korostovetz that I understood that the Persian question is to form the subject of early consideration on the part of our two Governments. I sketched roughly the nature of the communication you, Sir, made to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in London, the purport of which you did me the honour to communicate to me in your telegram No. 109 of the 4th instant. I also informed my Russian colleague of what had passed at the conversation between Sir G. Buchanan and M. Sazonof on the 9th instant.

M. Korostovetz at once took up the cudgels for Arfa-ed-Dowleh, and said that he could not understand how M. Sazonof could have spoken in such a manner of a man whose breast is covered with high Russian decorations, and who is a personal friend of more than one Russian Grand Duke, and whose *agrément* as Persian Minister in St. Petersburgh was practically obtained by M. Poklewski more than a year ago. M. Korostovetz appeared to attribute the opposition to Arfa-ed-Dowleh to M. Klemm, who is anxious to retain Ishak Khan at St. Petersburgh as a means of communication with Saad-ed-Dowleh, whom he still strongly supports for the highest administrative post in Persia after the Shah's coronation. My Russian colleague then proceeded to speak in disparaging terms of Saad-ed-Dowleh, who would be, he seemed to consider, an undesirable Prime Minister, both because he has no following, and because he would certainly prove himself an obstinate and difficult man to deal with.

I replied that this might well be the case, more especially for Russia, as the Turkish Ambassador had told me that Saad had boasted to him that, if he came into power, he would clear all the Russian troops out of Azerbaijan in three months. The Ambassador appeared to have been much impressed by this tall talking on Saad's part,

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which was doubtless only on a par with his assertion to the Turkish representative on the same occasion that all South Persia would be with him, the true fact being that South Persia is so afraid of what might happen if he came into power that negotiations are already on foot with a view to bringing about a combination of the important southern tribes to meet all possible eventualities. Saad, I said, had also told the Ambassador that he would only accept office on the distinct understanding that the two legations would not interfere in the formation of his Cabinet. This showed, it appeared, that he had changed his tactics since he endeavoured to form a Cabinet on his return to Tehran about eighteen months ago. On that occasion he used to send a trusted emissary to M. Poklewski once every two days with a fresh draft Cabinet for his approval. It might of course only mean that Saad is skilful at suiting his conversation to his listener. Anyhow, I added, he had won a new adherent to his cause in the Ambassador, whose faith in the amusing, loquacious old charlatan I had failed to shake.

We then turned to the question of Azerbaijan, and M. Korostovetz stated that the Persian question had really little to do with the continued presence of Russian troops in that province. He volunteered that order had been sufficiently re-established to allow of a large number of the Russian troops being withdrawn, but, he added, "the Viceroy of the Caucasus impressed upon me when I was at Tiflis, on my way here, that Russia cannot afford to leave the vulnerable southern frontier of the Caucasus exposed to a possible aggressive movement on the part of Turkey. M. Korostovetz then said that Russia would never annex Azerbaijan by force of arms. To this statement I replied, "No, you are content to do so by illegal purchase of landed properties." M. Korostovetz laughed, and said that such a method is a perfectly legitimate one, and should be encouraged.

I answered that this at all events is being done by Russian consuls, not only in Azerbaijan, but in other northern provinces as well as in Ispahan, but more especially in Asterabad, where I understood that Russian agents were selling lands that do not belong to them to Russian immigrants, who are arriving a thousand at a time to colonise Persian territory. The contention that Russians could hold landed property in Persia appeared to me, I said, a novel one, and one that seemed quite at variance with the spirit of that clause of the Treaty of Turkmanchai which laid down that Russian subjects can possess residential property and places of business in towns, thus clearly indicating that they cannot possess real estate elsewhere. Moreover, it was a well-known fact that it was generally understood that foreigners could not hold such property. This had been recognised by his own predecessor, M. Poklewski, who had said to the Regent in my presence some two years ago that a revision of this habit, custom, law, prohibition, or whatever it might be, would be sought as one of the conditions of the loan which was then believed to be impending. The acceptance of the principle by Russian agents had further been confirmed quite recently by the representatives of the Russian Bank who went to London to settle the question of the mint contract with the Imperial Bank of Persia. At the conclusion of the negotiations they had solicited the friendly co-operation of their British colleagues in getting this very prohibition raised. I owned that the managers of the Russian Bank here, by lending large sums of money on landed properties to impecunious Persians, had apparently discounted the future revision of the prohibition, but he himself, on his arrival, had complained that the bank had done bad business, and had sought my intervention in order that the Imperial Bank might make more room for them. I pointed out at the time that the British Bank would never compete in this business, which savoured more of money-lending at high rates of interest than of genuine banking business.

M. Korostovetz replied that he could not agree with me that the Treaty of Turkmanchai gave any indication that foreigners could not hold landed property in Persia, but he said with a cynical laugh that he had told the Persian Government that he would not oppose their buying out the Russian owners if they made a loan for that purpose. He argued that it was always open to people to buy land in a foreign country, and refused to see that the conditions in Persia are different to those existing elsewhere, because the purchase of land here entails not only the land, but all that is on it and connected with it, including the labourers, passing practically out of Persian administration under that of the nearest Russian consul, who at once protected it as if it were a new-gotten piece of Russian territory, taxes not even being paid unless they were collected by the Russians, in the which case the Persian Government heard no more about them.

M. Korostovetz then said that he had been asked soon after he came to Tehran

what he was going to do to assist the regeneration of Persia. He had replied that he had received no instructions from St. Petersburgh about that. All he had been told to do was to endeavour to get the Urmia Concession and one or two others, and to secure an increase of the Cossack brigade. He concluded that Persia could look after her own regeneration. He then went on to say that it was ridiculous to expect that the Russian representative would interest himself in the welfare of a foreign country, however unfortunate, except in so far as that welfare coincided with the furtherance of Russian interests. It was different for me, who represented what would probably be generally voted the most civilised and most civilising country in the world, whereas no one would call Russia civilised. The same argument held good, he continued, as far as supporting the constitutional form of government is concerned. Such an attitude is natural to an Englishman, who has constitutional institutions inbred in his bones, but it was folly to suppose that a Russian can genuinely support such a form of government. He had, he said, sent numerous telegrams to Shuja-ed-Dowleh, in accordance with his instructions, urging him to facilitate the elections, but how could he, the representative of a country in which the Duma will probably be swept away in a few months, put forward arguments to convince Shuja of the desirability of a Constitution.

I have reported this conversation at some length because it appears to me interesting as showing the spirit which animates my Russian colleague. Outside indications would make it appear doubtful whether he has telegraphed to St. Petersburgh in the sense of the language he held about Arfa-ed-Dowleh. I have also good reason to believe that, despite what his personal opinion about Saad-ed-Dowleh may be, he is strenuously carrying out instructions from St. Petersburgh to push his candidature as Prime Minister after the coronation. I hope to be in a position to report further upon this subject in a later despatch.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

[31639] No 51.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 13.)

(No. 182.)

Sir,

Tehran, June 28, 1914.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 185 of to-day's date, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of an unsigned memorandum which was presented to the Russian Minister by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 27th instant. This document, which recapitulates Persia's various grievances against the recent actions of Russian officials in Azerbaijan and elsewhere, would have been handed to M. Korostovetz on the previous day had he not adopted the somewhat peculiar attitude of refusing to see Vossugh-ed-Dowleh on that day, although he must have been aware that yesterday being a Persian holiday it was not a convenient day for the Minister to make the communication.

Vossugh-ed-Dowleh came to me directly from the Russian Legation and handed me a copy of the memorandum he had left with M. Korostovetz. His Excellency requested me to send you this document, Sir, and said that the Persian Government solicited the good offices of His Majesty's Government as a signatory of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, to which Persia had adhered, in representing to the Russian Government that the action of the Russian officials in Azerbaijan and elsewhere was contrary to the spirit of that arrangement.

I informed Vossugh-ed-Dowleh that the question was occupying the attention of the Governments of London and St. Petersburgh, and that I had reason to believe that a friendly exchange of views had already taken place.

I subsequently saw the Russian Minister, who told me that he had replied to Vossugh-ed-Dowleh that he would transmit the memorandum to his Government, but had pointed out in his own name that it would be more easy to reach a settlement of the questions at issue if the Persian Government made some proposals of a nature to make it appear that they were anxious to reach a friendly settlement.

I told M. Korostovetz that the Persian protests appeared to me to be perfectly legitimate ones, and that the Government could hardly be expected to suggest offering favours in return for the abolition of what they considered to be abuses.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 51.

Unsigned Memorandum communicated to Russian Minister by Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

A LA veille du couronnement de Sa Majesté Impériale le Schah, le Gouvernement persan attache une grande importance à ce que cette solennité ait lieu dans un atmosphère de calme et de tranquillité; il a également à cœur de pouvoir, dans la mesure du possible, résoudre les difficultés qui gênent la marche des affaires du pays.

Or, les rapports d'amitié et de bon voisinage qui existent entre la Russie et la Perse et l'unité de vues des deux Gouvernements sur la manière de voir précitée autorisent, sans doute, le Gouvernement persan à attendre de la part du Gouvernement Impérial de Russie des marques sensibles d'un concours tout particulier pour atteindre ce but.

Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de Perse croit, en conséquence, devoir signaler au Ministre de Russie avec franchise les difficultés que rencontre le Gouvernement persan, et il a recours aux bons offices de son Excellence pour appeler sur cette situation l'attention sérieuse de son Gouvernement.

M. Korostovetz n'ignore pas, en effet, l'ingérence des agents consulaires russes dans les affaires financières du pays en Azerbaïdjan et ailleurs. Son attention a été maintes fois, tant par écrit que verbalement, attirée sur ces procédés illégaux, qui constituent tous une violation des droits les plus sacrés et essentiels de la Perse; son Excellence a été priée instamment de remédier, dans le plus bref délai, à un état de choses contraire à l'indépendance de la Perse et incompatible avec les assurances données par la Russie.

Malgré les représentations du Gouvernement Impérial de Perse, la situation ne s'est point améliorée, et lesdits procédés—loin de prendre fin—s'accentuent; ces incidents, qui se répètent, ont, d'ailleurs, soulevé une agitation dans l'esprit public qu'il serait nécessaire de calmer dans l'intérêt même des bonnes relations entre les deux pays.

La Perse, qui, par suite des assurances amicales données par la Russie, avait la conviction de pouvoir compter sur le concours de celle-ci pour continuer tranquillement son organisation financière, déjà en bonne marche, et sortir de son embarras financier, se trouve aujourd'hui, à son plus grand étonnement et regret, en proie à une désorganisation de ses finances suscitée par les ingérences injustifiables des autorités consulaires russes, et le Gouvernement persan se trouve, de ce fait—surtout en Azerbaïdjan—en présence d'un état de choses anormal et intolérable qui l'empêche de rétablir sa situation financière.

Vossough-ed-Dovleh a, donc, l'honneur de prier instamment le Ministre de Russie—afin de remédier aux mauvais effets résultant du retard apporté à la satisfaction des justes demandes formulées par le Gouvernement persan—de provoquer d'urgence les ordres les plus précis aux agents consulaires russes en Azerbaïdjan et, d'ailleurs, de s'abstenir de toute intervention dans les affaires financières du pays, et de ne point entraver les agents financiers de la Perse dans le libre exercice de leurs fonctions.

Depuis quelque temps les sujets russes se livrent, avec l'appui des agents consulaires russes, à l'achat et à la location de propriétés foncières en Perse en violation de l'article 5 du Traité de Turkmantchaï,* consacré par les usages déjà très anciens. Cette manière d'agir a fait l'objet de nombreuses communications à la Légation Impériale de Russie; le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères a fait appel aux bons offices de M. Korostovetz pour mettre terme à ces transactions illégales; il s'est efforcé à exprimer, par sa note du 15 djémadiol-aval, le point de vue de son Gouvernement, qui a été, d'ailleurs, apprécié et confirmé par les prédécesseurs de M. Korostovetz. Il est à regretter que son Excellence, au lieu d'interdire à ses ressortissants l'achat et la location d'immeubles, ait mis en question, dans ses réponses, les principes même posés par les traités, les usages, la tradition.

Vossough-ed-Dovleh n'a pas besoin d'énumérer les inconvénients et les conséquences fâcheuses qui doivent résulter du fait de la continuation de cet état de choses et les difficultés que pourrait entraîner cette innovation au point de vue judiciaire et administratif. Mais il a encore une fois recours à l'esprit d'équité du Ministre de Russie pour arriver sans délai à un accord basé sur les traités.

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères doit, également, saisir cette occasion d'appeler l'attention du Ministre de Russie sur le rôle joué dans ces derniers temps par Samad

* *I.e.*, the commercial treaty of that date.

Khan Chodja-ed-Dovleh, qui a été, en effet, un instrument pour la création des difficultés récentes. Le Gouvernement persan constate avec regret que Chodja-ed-Dovleh, se portant fort de l'appui du Consul général de Russie, a même abusé de cet appui en manifestant son manque de loyauté à l'occasion de la proclamation du couronnement de Sa Majesté Impériale le Schah et sa désobéissance aux ordres du Gouvernement central concernant les élections. Il a poussé l'insubordination jusqu'à percevoir lui-même illégalement les impôts, en déclarant clairement qu'en cela il est soutenu par les autorités consulaires russes.

Le Gouvernement persan, reposant une entière confiance en l'esprit de justice du Gouvernement Impérial de Russie, s'attend à ce que des instructions formelles soient données aux autorités consulaires de Russie de ne plus permettre à des personnes comme Chodja-ed-Dowleh de se croire appuyées par elles, et de troubler ainsi l'harmonie qui doit exister entre les deux pays voisins.

En conclusion, le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères se permet de faire remarquer au Ministre de Russie que l'occasion du couronnement serait le moment le plus opportun pour remplir la promesse d'évacuation du territoire persan par les troupes russes. Cela ne manquerait pas de produire une excellente impression sur l'opinion publique et contribuerait à augmenter la sympathie qui doit exister entre les deux peuples et qu'on doit par tous les moyens entretenir dans l'intérêt des bonnes relations entre les deux pays.

D'autre part, M. Korostovetz le sait, le Gouvernement de Saint-Pétersbourg a déclaré qu'à son opinion on ne pourrait procéder à l'évacuation de certaines régions à moins d'être assuré que la sécurité n'y serait point ébranlée après le retrait des troupes russes. Or, les mesures les mieux calculées à atteindre la consolidation de la sécurité et la protection des routes commerciales, telles l'organisation des finances et la création de la gendarmerie pour maintenir l'ordre dans toute l'étendue de l'Empire, sont malheureusement entravées. D'un côté se produisent les ingérences exposées ci-dessus dans l'organisation financière qui en reste paralysée, et d'autre part l'absence d'un concours cordial à l'extension de la gendarmerie dans tout le pays rend difficile et précaire le développement de cette force, qui, au début de sa formation, inspire déjà la confiance de pouvoir parfaitement remplir sa mission.

En portant ce qui précède à la connaissance du Ministre de Russie, Vossough-ed-Dovleh, confiant dans les sentiments de conciliation et de sympathie du Gouvernement Impérial de Russie, prie M. Korostovetz d'appeler l'attention sérieuse de son Gouvernement sur un état de choses devenu intolérable pour la Perse, et il a le ferme espoir que le Gouvernement de Saint-Pétersbourg voudra bien y faire mettre terme d'urgence.

Téhéran, le 25 *juin*, 1914.

[32818] No. 52.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 20.)

(No. 186.)

Sir,

Tehran, June 29, 1914.

I HAD a long conversation this morning with my Russian colleague upon the subject of the Persian memorandum respecting the recent action of Russian consuls in Azerbaijan and elsewhere, which formed an enclosure in my despatch No. 182 of yesterday's date.

M. Korostovetz, with whom I had already exchanged views upon the subject yesterday afternoon, repeated what he had then said about the Persian Government making some proposals which would facilitate a settlement, instead of contenting itself with a bald statement of so-called grievances. I pointed out that it hardly appeared reasonable to expect the Persian Government to offer Russia an easy way out of a false situation, for which they (the Persian Government) could not be held responsible, and I asked the Minister what he considered could have been put forward as a suggestion that would have facilitated a settlement.

M. Korostovetz replied that it is necessary that there should be some sort of control, and that it is essential to secure that the taxes collected from Russian subjects should be paid into the Russian Bank. He added that many Russians and Russian-protected persons complained that they were improperly taxed, and again urged that all that had been done had been done in consequence of a proposal made by the Treasurer-General. On my pressing the point, he seemed unable to substantiate his case very clearly, and took refuge behind the statement that he was not personally

responsible, as he had acted upon instructions received from St. Petersburgh after he had communicated M. Mornard's proposal to his Government.

I called my colleague's attention to the fact that it is a habit of taxpayers to complain of the taxes they have to pay, and that the somewhat arbitrary method of imposing taxes in Persia furnished ample opportunity to the discontented, but I asked if there was any reason to suppose that a Russian occupying one farm was more severely taxed than a Persian occupying the neighbouring one. If the Persian found that the Russian did not pay his taxes, he would probably not be slow to obtain that Russian protection, which could apparently be had for the asking, which would exempt him also from paying his taxes. It was to put a stop to this abuse that M. Mornard had tried to make an arrangement with the Russian Legation, and had put forward a proposal which had been at once misconstrued and put in force without any answer of acceptance being returned. I argued that it was clear, and had hitherto always been accepted, that clause 5 of the Treaty of Turcomanchai, by sanctioning the acquisition of dwelling-houses and business premises in towns, implied that Russian subjects had no right to possess landed property elsewhere. M. Poklewski, by constantly alluding to the necessity for a revision of this prohibition, had officially recognised its existence.

Granted, however, that Russians could possess such property, I could discover no reason why they should not pay the land tax upon the same like any other landowner in Persia, nor could I see why the Russian consul should meddle in the matter, or why the money collected must necessarily be paid into the Russian Bank. Moreover, I said, both he and the Russian Government appeared to have overlooked the fact that the "maliat" of Azerbaijan and Nazanderam, in the latter of which provinces the Imperial Bank of Persia has no branch, has never been paid into the British Bank. I added that the action of the Russian Government appeared like an attempt to coerce the Persian financial administration into taking any legitimate banking business from this British institution, which was quite justified under its charter, made prior to the 1907 understanding, in doing business throughout Persia, irrespective of zones or spheres of influence.

M. Korostovetz here urged that all the banking advantages in Persia are on the side of the Imperial Bank, and that it was but fair to bring grist to the Russian mill in this way. He also sounded me as to whether, in the event of the Russian consuls being told to desist from the collection of taxes, some arrangement could not be reached under which the northern "maliat" should again be paid into the Banque d'Escompte. I replied that there could be no possible trouble about reaching such an agreement, provided that the Imperial Bank was paid off the money advanced by it to the Treasury on that security. The Russian Bank would then have nothing to do but to advance money to the Treasury on the same terms as the Imperial Bank does to-day, but it could hardly be considered fair that the impoverished Persian Treasury should be forced to borrow money at a high rate of interest from the Russian Bank, when it could obtain the same money at a lower rate from the British Bank, which I had reason to know does very good business at this lower rate. M. Korostovetz pleaded that the less fortunate circumstances of the Russian Bank should be taken into account. To this I replied that I could not see why, as long as the conditions were fair, and no existing arrangements between the various Governments were infringed, the Persian Administration should be called upon to pay for the unlucky position of the Russian Bank or British interests be damaged. It was clear from the turn the conversation took that, as I had long suspected, the grievance that the "maliat" of the northern provinces is paid into the Imperial Bank is not foreign to this effort on the part of the Russian Government to force a portion at least of the northern revenues into the coffers of the Banque d'Escompte.

I then read M. Korostovetz Sir G. Buchanan's telegrams No. 138 of the 21st June down to the passage where his Excellency reports that M. Sazonof declared that he would not let Persia stand in the way of the maintenance of good relations between England and Russia, and No. 141 of the 25th June. I called his special attention to the fact that M. Sazonof appeared to be misinformed as to the capability of the financial administration to collect the taxes without the assistance of the Russian consuls. The Treasury can quite well do this, provided that no opposition is made to their operations by the Russian consuls, and that orders are issued to Russian subjects and protected persons to pay the taxes.

I urged that it is most desirable that an immediate stop should be put to the abuse of extending Russian protection to anybody who seeks it in pursuit of his own ends. M. Korostovetz appeared ready to recognise that this abuse was a real one, and

assured me that he had not since his arrival in Persia extended Russian protection to a single Persian. He argued that it was impossible for a Russian Minister to refuse to do this when he was urged to do so by some Grand Duke whose support had been sought by an influential Persian. I replied that he was presumably alluding to certain special cases which had only served to bring discredit on the persons seeking Russian protection, but that the real abuse is caused by the manner in which the Russian consuls in the provinces extend wholesale protection to Persians. To such a pitch has this been carried that reports of a recent conflict between villagers under Russian protection with their neighbours under German protection in the province of Ispahan speak of the combatants as Russians and Germans.

M. Korostovetz asked me why I espoused the Persian cause so warmly. I replied that I did so for two reasons: firstly, because the attitude of Russia appeared to me to be at variance with the spirit of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, to the observance of which I felt myself in honour bound; and, secondly, because Russian action clearly caused damage to British interests, as I had already shown him. He asked how the possession of landed property by Russians affected British interests. I replied that it did so only in so far that we had always scrupulously observed the meaning of the Treaty of Turkomanchai, and that by ignoring it Russians had stolen a march on us, and had acquired valuable property which British subjects, in some cases, would have gladly bought, had they been permitted to do so. It had, I said, been the system of lending money at usurious interest to impecunious Persians on mortgages of landed property that had brought the Russian Bank to what he had described to me as a critical situation. M. Korostovetz owned that whatever the meaning of clause 5 of the Treaty of Turcomanchai might be, the Banque d'Escompte is precluded by the terms of its concession from lending money on the security of landed property.

My Russian colleague gave me no hint that he thought that I had been made conversant with the contents of the note of protest before it was presented to him; but, as I gathered that he would like to know if I had had any share in it, and as doubtless mischief-makers had assured him that I had inspired it, I told him that upon the Persian Government seeking my advice as to whether such a note should be presented or not, I had asked for your instructions, Sir, as I knew that the situation in Persia was under discussion in London and St. Petersburgh, and that you had replied that I should tell the Government here that I could not advise them, and that they must use their own judgment in the matter. I laughingly added that he had doubtless heard all sorts of stories about what I had done, as I had been solemnly assured that he had himself concocted the first note, subsequently cancelled by the Regent, with the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

When I came to the mention of the neutral zone, in reading Sir G. Buchanan's telegram No. 141, M. Korostovetz expressed great interest, and asked me to tell him all I knew about that part of the discussions which had taken place. I replied that I knew no more than was stated in the passage of the telegram I had just read, from which it appeared that the Russian Government favoured a partition of the zone, whilst His Majesty's Government preferred not to alter the *status quo*. M. Korostovetz then repeated at great length what he had said to me previously, namely, that he had always considered the neutral zone a mistake, and that he had been confirmed in that opinion from a study of the archives of the last seven years, which he had made before coming here. I gathered from what he added that his opinion had been recently asked upon this point, and that he had replied that his experience since he had been in Persia had further strengthened his conviction. I understood from him that he had advocated the creation of a neutral zone formed of the capital and the province of Tehran, somewhat on the lines of the district of Columbia in the United States, and that he was in favour of Russia turning her entire attention to the consolidation of her interests in the five northern provinces, in which she should be given an entirely free hand, untrammelled by our "friendly remonstrances." "People," he said, "believe that because Tehran is in the Russian sphere it is entirely under the influence of the Russian Legation. Such, however, is not in fact the case, and British influence is greater than Russian."

In reply to an enquiry as to what I thought about the zone question, I replied that it had always seemed to me that the disappearance of the neutral zone must eventually lead to partition. The recent feverish zeal of the Russian consuls at Ispahan, who appeared determined to create of that province a second Azerbaijan, might, however, well produce serious friction some day between British and Russian interests unless our respective attributes in the neutral zone were more clearly defined. The acquisition by His Majesty's Government of important interests in the oil-fields, and the practical Russification of a large tract of country by the administration of the

Zil-es-Sultan's properties by the manager of the Russian Bank, had brought our interests into unpleasantly close touch. If the Karkunan irrigation scheme went through it would cause our respective influences to overlap in a manner that might be productive of an incident at any moment.

M. Korostovetz then said that he personally had never been in favour of this scheme, both because he considered the field of operations too remote from Russia's legitimate sphere of interest, and because he much doubted the financial success of such a vast undertaking in the heart of Persia. He said that he had been surprised that we had not openly opposed the scheme from the first, and that he thought that it would have been more frank of us to have done so. I replied that we had been perfectly frank in our attitude at the moment, as it did not then appear as if the scheme could do us any harm. Circumstances, I said, had now changed, and the acquisition of the important oil interests appeared to me to make it imperative that we should improve our existing good relations with the Bakhtiaris. The introduction of a large Russian enterprise did not appear calculated to help us in this direction unless British capital and British engineers were associated with it, because he knew very well that the presence of a large number of Russians on the outskirts of the Bakhtiari country would be likely to lessen our influence over that tribe, or would at least give the chiefs a chance of endeavouring to make use of each of us to our mutual disadvantage. Since seeing M. Korostovetz I have heard from Akbar Mirza, the son of the Zil closely connected with the scheme, that it has been practically abandoned.

In conclusion, I said to M. Korostovetz that this frank exchange of views should at least serve to dispel a belief which appeared to have gained credence that our relations are not so cordial as they were in the past. We neither of us, I added, had perhaps so much need of that expansiveness which was an amiable characteristic of M. Poklewski, but I felt sure that we understood each other, and that we were both imbued with an earnest desire to co-operate loyally and cordially in the execution of our duties in all matters in which our mutual interests are concerned. M. Korostovetz warmly reciprocated my sentiments, and we parted on the best of terms after a two hours' conversation which had been marked throughout by friendly cordiality.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

[32819] No. 53.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 20.)

(No. 188.)

Tehran, July 3, 1914.

Sir,

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 152 and 155 of the 30th and 31st May respectively, I have the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul at Tabriz, reporting a conversation with his Russian colleague on the subject of the reconstitution of the Tabriz municipality and the appropriation by the Governor-General of the indirect taxes for the purposes of that institution.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 53.

Consul Shipley to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 8. Confidential.)

Tabriz, June 10, 1914.

Sir,

WITH reference to my telegram Nos. 30 and 31 of the 29th and 30th May last respectively on the subject of the reconstitution of the Tabriz municipality by the Governor-General, Shuja-ed-Dowleh, the appropriation by the latter of the indirect taxes for the purposes of that body and the consequent issue by M. Molitor, the Director of Finances of Azerbaijan, of a notice to the effect that the payment of such taxes to others than the properly accredited representatives of the Finance Administration would be considered illegal, I have the honour to report to your Excellency that, in a conversation which I had recently with my Russian colleague, M. Orlof, I took an opportunity of referring to the above proceedings with the object of eliciting his views on the subject generally. These views I soon discovered were of a somewhat

uncompromising nature, for I had barely mentioned the name of M. Molitor, when my colleague interposed with the question whether I thought it proper for anyone to oppose as M. Molitor had done what was a strictly legal act. These indirect taxes, M. Orlof went on to say, were, as was well known, the property of the municipality until, as a consequence of the events of two and a half years ago that body had been abolished, and Shuja-ed-Dowleh, therefore, had done nothing but reappropriate what had formerly belonged to it. To this view of the matter I ventured to demur on the grounds that even admitting the above representation of the facts to be correct, I thought that as these indirect taxes had been subsequently placed by the Persian Government under the control of the Finance Administration, the consent of the former to any rearrangement should previously have been obtained, and the same might be said with reference to the reconstitution of the municipality. Under these circumstances it seemed to me that M. Molitor had taken the only action possible to him as the representative of the central Finance Administration. Shuja-ed-Dowleh, I added, was not an independent ruler. To this latter observation M. Orlof readily assented but asked whether I believed that the Ministers at Tehran, had their permission been applied for, would have consented to the cession to the municipality of these indirect taxes and to the pecuniary loss to themselves which would result from the taxes no longer being sent to Tehran. Even with reference to the maliyat, *i.e.*, the Government taxes properly so called, the cost of collection was in his, M. Orlof's opinion, entirely out of proportion to the amount collected and, though his remarks in this connection had no reference to the Belgian officials upon whom he had no desire whatever to cast any reflections, there was, he maintained, as much peculation going on among the subordinate Persian collectors as under the old system, while the conduct of these latter towards the defenceless taxpayers had given rise to continual complaints. As far as Russian subjects, however, were concerned, he was glad to say that this had now been put an end to. The latter would henceforth pay their taxes directly to the Russian consulate and would consequently be free from this particular form of vexation. In reply, and without entering into a discussion as to how far abuses might be said to exist or not on the part of these subordinate collectors, I said that as far as the Belgian officials themselves were concerned the duty for which they had been appointed, viz., to account for and exercise control over such funds as were received on behalf of the State was, I had always understood, being efficiently performed by them and from this my colleague did not dissent. Now that these indirect taxes, I went on to say, had been handed over to the municipality there would, if the accounts which had been given to me of former methods of conducting Persian finance were correct, be very little real control at all, and I added that I could not myself see where the guarantees for the proper employment of the funds now obtained were to come from. The reply of M. Orlof on this point was not very clear, but I gathered from his concluding remarks that in case foreign subjects were asked to contribute to the cost of town improvements a certain control would be exercised by two of their representatives whom, he had reason to believe, the foreign consulates would be requested by the local authorities to appoint for that purpose.

I have, &c.
H. S. SHIPLEY.

[32176] No. 54.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 16.)

(No. 190.)

Tehran, July 5, 1914.

Sir,

I REPEATED to His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire for his information my telegram No. 188 of the 30th ultimo on the subject of the maintenance of the gendarmerie under Swedish officers.

I have the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a telegram which I have received from Major Knox offering certain observations and comments in connection therewith.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Enclosure in No. 54.

Major Knox to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 168.)
(Telegraphic.)

Bushire, July 2, 1914.

REFERENCE Minister's telegram No. 188 of 1st July.

The point which immediately concerns me is protection of road below Kotals.

In principle I favour proposal wholeheartedly, but conditional precedent is some control of conduct of financial agent; Governor is kept by Belgians admittedly and advisedly in the dark as regards revenues and expenditure, and we have reason to believe that the needs of the local administration are being starved to supply Tehran with funds. Neither the Governor nor I can offer useful opinion until Bourgeois is put in his place.

He acknowledges no right of the Governor to be kept informed, much less to control expenditure.

Governor does not want to spend money without check, but he must be allowed to represent local needs before Tehran absorbs surplus funds, and check extravagance of customs and maliat expenditure.

He will, I believe, accept help and guidance from the Resident in discharge of this duty.

Finance agent says that he cannot subsidise the khans from local revenues. He may be correct. We have no means of judging. If so we shall require funds.

As regards the gendarmes I am on less sure ground, as I have no personal experience of their value. But people are distinctly unfavourable, and from them I should not draw the inference of His Majesty's Minister from their admitted local unpopularity. It is, I gather, due to Swedish methods, and not to their restoration of order, which is not restored. I should hope for popularity for British officers, and think fact that there was remote chance of retribution for treacherous murder would render them less probable.

As regards difficulty of inducing the Persian Government to pay for force if officered by British, it would appear that force must be financed by loan and also His Majesty's Government's advance on slenderest or no security. In these circumstances Persian objections are unworthy of consideration, and efficiency of the force in the south sole object in view.

A British officer who behaved like Swedes did at Kazerun would have been cashiered. Southern Persia will never forgive them. I feel confidence that British officers could raise efficient force in the south however much the Central Government opposed them, and it is difficult to see how British prestige could be more committed than it will be by warnings in support of the Swedes, who, as far as the general impression here goes, are anti-British in the south and east, whatever they may be in Tehran. We shall thus be responsible for the conduct of the force, which will not hesitate to injure our Persian interests where they are most valuable and oppress our Persian well-wishers should occasion offer.

(Addressed to Foreign Office; repeated to Tehran.)

[32821] No. 55.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 20.)

(No. 191.)

Sir,

Tehran, July 6, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a report from the late Belgian Financial Agent at Mohammerah, which has been communicated to me by the Treasurer-General. In sending me this report M. Mornard has made no complaint against the British consular officers concerned, but it serves to underline one of the reasons given for his recent resignation, namely, that it is impossible for the Belgian financial administration to carry on its work so long as it cannot feel sure of the genuine support of the British and Russian consular officers.

M. Bouckaert has died since submitting his report to M. Mornard.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 55.

M. Bouckaert to M. Mornard.

M. le Trésorier général,

Mohammerah, le 5 *mai*, 1914.

VOUS semblez croire qu'en Arabistan les consuls anglais sont prêts à accorder leur appui pour l'organisation du service des finances. Il n'en est malheureusement pas ainsi; bien au contraire, ils en sont adversaires. Je justifie mon affirmation.

Le 21 juin, 1912, Mr. Wilson, Political Officer, chargé d'une mission spéciale à la frontière turque, ex-consul intérimaire à Mohammerah, me dit que les Belges avaient tort d'entreprendre la perception du Maliat, que nos efforts étaient voués à un échec certain, que tout l'argent qui prenait la route de Téhéran était détourné par le Gouvernement, et que les Anglais rendraient un mauvais service aux Persans en usant de leur influence pour aider l'organisation. Depuis j'eus encore plusieurs entretiens avec ce zélé capitaine, et chaque fois il ne put s'empêcher de se montrer hostile à nos efforts. Plus tard il devint consul à Dizfoul, et il était en train de négocier le passage par le Louristan lorsqu'il fut désigné comme membre de la commission des frontières.

Mr. Gray, vice-consul d'Ahwaz, s'occupe seulement des tribus Bakhtiaris, auxquelles il ne recommande certainement pas le payement de leurs impôts. Bien des fois il me déclara qu'il ne comprenait pas comment son Gouvernement pouvait encore consentir à des prêts à la Perse, à un état à l'agonie. . . .

Néanmoins je pense que ce magistrat est seulement indifférent à notre entreprise et qu'il ne provoquerait pas de difficultés par parti pris. D'un autre côté il passe l'été à Isfahan et est absent d'Ahwaz pendant sept mois sur douze.

Le rôle de Major Haworth, consul à Mohammerah, ne doit pas vous être inconnu. Vous vous souvenez encore des différends que M. Fourman eut avec lui.

Malgré que le directeur de l'Anglo-Persian Oil Company eût remercié par écrit mon prédécesseur pour l'établissement d'un bureau de poste à Abadan, M. le Consul exigea sa suppression. Il soutient les fraudeurs parce que Cheik Ghazal et son entourage tirent profit des opérations. Il conseilla au même personnage de renvoyer le vérificateur Shamouel et approuva l'emprisonnement arbitraire de cet agent. Par tous les moyens en son pouvoir il cherche à diminuer l'autorité de notre administration et à humilier les directeurs belges placés sous les ordres de Cheik Ghazal, seigneur d'un autre âge. En suite de ces agissements je ne puis plus renvoyer ou engager un Baloutch sans avoir obtenu l'approbation préalable.

Cela se fait encore à l'amiable, mais à la moindre difficulté la situation sera intenable.

J'ai sous les yeux une lettre récente de la firme Lynch d'Ahwaz, dans laquelle elle se plaint de la concurrence déloyale qui lui est faite. En soutenant le Cheik, M. le Consul a en grande partie paralysé l'action de la Douane; de peur d'être maltraités les employés n'osent plus faire de saisies. Si le commerce anglais souffre il doit s'en prendre en premier lieu à celui qui doit défendre ses intérêts.

Il fallait rappeler ces dernières affaires de la Douane pour mieux comprendre l'hostilité de ce magistrat à l'organisation des finances.

Évidemment je ne sais pas si M. le Consul exécute les instructions de ses supérieurs ou s'il veut réaliser des idées personnelles. Peut-être les Anglais préparent-ils le protectorat de l'Arabistan. Peut-être M. le Consul veut-il mettre son Gouvernement devant le fait accompli. De toute façon il a pour devise, "La Perse hors de l'Arabistan."

Les menaces que tous les ans les Bakhtiaris font au Cheik ne peuvent que le pousser à s'éloigner davantage de Téhéran, à rompre les faibles liens. D'un autre côté dois-je répéter que toutes les revendications faites par l'observation du firman concernant la Douane sont conseillées et approuvées par M. le Consul d'Angleterre?

Dans des conditions analogues, les Anglais ont récemment rendu soi-disant autonomes les états du Cheik de Koweit, de celui de Bahrein et de plusieurs autres encores. A Bassora ils mènent la même politique séparatiste. La nationalité arabe se réveille sous la bienveillante protection de l'Angleterre.

J'en arrive au Maliat proprement dit et à l'opposition de Major Haworth.

Profitant de la tournée du consul à Chouchter et Dizfoul, ainsi que du voyage en Europe de Hadji Reis, j'avais obtenu de Sardar Arfa la promesse de régler ses comptes d'Oud-il et de cesser ses payements directs au Gouverneur général, &c. Mon télégramme du 29 mars dernier fut relatif à cette affaire. A la suite de l'intervention du consul tout est de nouveau ajourné.

On me rapporte qu'il aurait conseillé au Gouverneur général de recommencer à percevoir le Maliat et qu'il aurait recommandé à Sardar Jang de payer à Edjlal-es-Saltaneh des sommes auxquelles il n'a aucun droit. Tous les contribuables de ma région savent que les Anglais voient d'un bon œil que l'on ne paie pas les impôts.

Si le Cheik n'était pas instigué par des mauvais conseillers intéressés il serait moins difficile de traiter avec lui.

Cela m'amène à dire deux mots de Hadji Mohamed Ali, Behbehani, Rais Tudjar, Ministre du Cheik, homme très rusé, très vénal. Il manigance tous les tripotages, partout il pêche en eau troublée; chaque expédition, chaque pacification lui rapporte un pourcent élevé. Il prélève la dîme sur tous les cavaliers, artilleurs, tofangtchis et autres budgetivères de ce genre. Sa parole est sacrée auprès des indigènes et très influente auprès des étrangers. Or, cette puissance se met souvent au service de M. le Consul.

Je crois avoir démontré, M. le Trésorier général, qu'il n'est pas possible d'intéresser M. le Consul de Mohammerah à la réorganisation. Hier encore il me disait qu'il ne saurait pas contribuer à prolonger la vie de la Perse. Cette idée est tellement ancrée dans la tête des différents consuls que j'ai rencontrés qu'ils n'en font plus aucun mystère.

Pour terminer: si—comme vous l'avez prescrit—je dois attendre l'appui de ces magistrats, je puis me croiser les bras pour longtemps à moins que, par impossible, le remplaçant de Major Haworth ne soit animé d'autres intentions.

Le Contrôleur des Finances,
BOUCKAERT.

[32825] No. 56.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 20.)

(No. 195.)

Tehran, July 8, 1914.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the usual monthly summary of events in Persia for the past four weeks.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 56.

Summary of Events in Persia for four Weeks ending July 8.

Tehran.

The Cabinet.—Vosouk-ed-Dowleh, the Foreign Minister, resigned on the 1st July. Owing to the proximity of the coronation it is difficult to find anyone willing to take the post or any other in the Cabinet. It is generally felt that the Shah will entrust the formation of a new Cabinet, after the coronation, to Mustaufi-ul-Mamalek, and that Mushir-ed-Dowleh and his brother, Motamin-ul-Mulk, will be included in his Cabinet.

Governor of Luristan.—Nizam-es-Sultaneh has at last left for his post.

The Medjliss.—The hope of collecting a quorum for the new Medjliss at Tehran before the coronation has been abandoned. So far the following towns have completed their elections: Resht, Ispahan, Hamadan, Kum, Sultanabad, Meshed, and Yezd. The result has been the return of clericals and reactionaries. The three deputies for the districts surrounding Tehran have not yet been elected.

Russian Activity in Azerbaijan and Ispahan.—The Foreign Minister called on the Russian Minister and on His Majesty's Minister on the 1st July, when he presented a *note verbale* drawing attention to Persian grievances, which related principally to Russia's attitude in Azerbaijan. Dr. Pugin has gone to Ispahan by motor, taking with him M. Hentig of the German Legation. A few days later Akber Mirza left for Ispahan in his motor, taking with him three members of the Russian Legation.

The Coronation.—Active preparations are being made for the coronation, which will take place on the 21st July. The Regent proposes to leave for Europe immediately afterwards. A clause in the Constitution of the 8th October, 1907 (article 39), provides that "No Sovereign can ascend the throne unless, before his coronation, he appear before the National Assembly, and, in the presence of the National Assembly and

the Senate and the Cabinet of Ministers, swear the following oath . . . . ." In view of this clause many people consider that, as the Medjliss cannot be assembled in time, the coronation should not take place. There is furthermore a controversy regarding the Shah's age. Article 38 of the Constitution decrees that the Shah can only govern in person when he has reached the age of 18. According to the principal authorities the Shah was born in the year 1315 A.H., and will therefore be 17 on his next birthday. The Regent, however, alleges that he has definite proof that the Shah was born in 1314 A.H., and will be 18 next birthday.

G. P. CHURCHILL, *Oriental Secretary.*

Tabriz.

The members of the new municipality, sixteen in number, have now been appointed by the Governor-General. They are fairly representative, including three Armenians and five Musulmans who may be regarded as Constitutionalists. Endeavours are being made to represent that the majority of Persian subjects do not desire the withdrawal of Russian troops from Azerbaijan. It is reported from Urumieh that a military demonstration by the Russian troops was decided on in order to "impress the people." Notices were posted up warning the population to get under cover on hearing firing. It is understood that this demonstration was connected with the supposed firing upon Russian troops reported in the last month's summary. A large block of villages south of Urumieh has been bought by the Russians, in the district between Ushnu and Mergaver and were apparently in the possession of a Kurdish chief who had gained them through Turkish influence. The whole of the districts to the west of Lake Urmia are dominated by Russian detachments of varying strength. The example of Tabriz has been followed at Maragha, where a municipality, also appropriating the indirect taxes has been established, and where the chief Musulman landowners have been directed to pay the land taxes direct to Shuja-ed-Dowleh. A further notice warning the inhabitants as to their behaviour towards the Russian troops has been posted by the Governor-General. It is understood that the Russian Government is at last contemplating the removal of the latter. The successor they suggest, Sardar Rashid, is, if appointed, likely to perpetuate the present Governor-General's reputation. Communications are still passing between the latter and the ex-Shah at Odessa.

Resht.

The Russian bank was held up on the 17th June by eight armed Georgians who made off safely with a considerable sum of money.

Meshed.

The Governor-General has had instructions from Tehran to expedite the elections, but it is doubtful, owing to the various difficulties which have arisen whether the deputies from Khorassan can be in Tehran in time for the coronation. From all accounts the deputies likely to be returned will be anything but representative. No representatives are to be sent to Tehran for the coronation on account of expense. An official denial has been given to the report that a German consulate was to be started in Meshed. It is reported that Dr. Pugin who represents a German firm in dyes is endeavouring to open a connection with Kabul viâ Herat. The Russian immigration campaign in the Astrabad district continues unabated. Efforts are being made to combat the malaria which is the principal hindrance to Russian colonisation, two hospitals having been started at Astrabad and Gumbad-i-kabuz. A general movement of the Russians to acquire lands and influence along the northern frontier of Khorassan, at Zurabad, Daragez and North of Bujnurd is reported, while Russian intervention with troops in the matter of land disputes in Daragez appears to be imminent. Orders have been received from Tehran for the repair of the Askabad road, a Belgian official being placed in charge. Almost daily complaints are being received against the revenue gendarmerie, and it is reported that the principal tribes are considering a combined movement to resist the high-handedness of the Revenue Department. Mirza Khalil, the finance agent responsible for the troubles at Turbat-i-haidari reported last month, who had been dismissed, and whom it was intended to punish, has been allowed to escape through the connivance of the Finance Department and is *en route* to Tehran.

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Ispahan.

The elections are completed. None of the Russian protégés have been elected. Reports continue to be received of difficulties caused by the Russian land-leasing campaign and the consequent extension of Russian protection with the loss that it implies to the Persian revenues. The latest development is a series of disturbances in the Qumisheh district arising out of disputes over land leased to Russian and German subjects, the former bitterly resenting German interference. The Governor-General is perseveringly continuing in office in spite of the opposition and difficulties which are created for him. The newly-appointed Russian consul, M. Preobrejensky, arrived on the 13th June, meeting with a gratifying if not spontaneous reception from the notables of the town. The Karkunan water scheme is not now likely of realisation. The town is quiet, but frequent robberies have taken place in the neighbourhood. Reza Khan Jouzani, the well-known bandit, has eluded the forces sent after him by Samsam-es-Sultaneh, and is reported to be endeavouring to join hands with Naib Hosein. Another robbery is reported on the Lynch Road at the Gavpeesah pass. Sardar Jang, who is undertaking operations south of that road for its protection is meeting with some difficulties, but has been assured of the support of His Majesty's Minister. The first consignment of oil by the Persian Oil Company has reached Ispahan, but it is not yet known how it will compete with the Russian product. Captain Ranking, His Majesty's consul at Ahwaz, is in summer quarters at Ispahan.

Seistan.

Five representatives from Seistan for the coronation have been selected. It is doubtful whether they will attend owing to the expense involved. No news as to the election of members for the Medjliss have yet been received. According to the electoral law which has not yet been changed, instructions are sent to the Governor through Meshed. The Governor's forces have had a successful engagement with a band of Baluch raiders near Deh Salm. Forces amounting to about 600 have been sent against the large Baluch lashkar in the neighbourhood of Neh. Intrigues in favour of Hashmat-ul-Mulk are still rife. The Seistan branch of the Imperial Bank is reported to be working at a loss since the institution of a branch at Birjand. The 700 rifles and ammunition sent to Shaukat-ul-Mulk viâ Robat have been taken over. His Britannic Majesty's consul refers in his reports to the insecurity of the country and of travelling nowadays in Seistan and Kain, and the disappearance of the flocks and herds met with on the roads last year. It is not only the Baluch who are dreaded but a small number of Afghan outlaws who frequent the Farah and Lash Juwain borders.

Yezd.

Arrangements for the elections are reported to be progressing satisfactorily. Roads are reported safe. The caravan traffic appears to continue very satisfactory. 2,600 camels are reported to have passed through Yezd in one week in various directions. The leader of the reactionary movement of 1911 at Yezd was hanged on the 21st May.

Shiraz.

Major O'Connor has repeatedly reported the unsatisfactory attitude of the Governor-General, who does not conceal his animosity towards all foreigners in the employ of the Administration. A crisis was reached in the middle of June, when the Fars local forces were unceremoniously taken from the control of Colonel Merrill by the Governor, who was supported by the Central Government. The Kazerun situation shows some improvement. Nasr-ed-Diwan has been persuaded by Colonel Uggle to return to Kazerun and come to terms, and has arrested the brother of the notorious brigand, Ali Mahomed, who was conspicuously active against the gendarmerie in the disturbances in February last. The last reports show that the traffic is proceeding normally both on the Bushire and Ispahan roads. The gendarmerie are preparing to take over the latter. Major O'Connor is at present in Tehran, where he is consulting with His Majesty's Minister.

Kerman.

A committee has been appointed to carry out the preliminary measures for the elections. The Baluch were believed to be contemplating another descent on Narmashir, but have been discouraged by the advent of the new Governor and his Bakhtiaris, and by dissensions among themselves. No money has been sent from Tehran for any of the Government departments. The non-receipt of funds for the gendarmerie especially is causing grave anxiety. It is feared that the carpet trade will be seriously embarrassed for want of wool, owing to the disinclination of caravans to venture through Bam owing to exaggerated stories re the Baluchis on the one hand and Bakhtiari on the other. Dr. Ronne, the recently arrived Swedish doctor, has died of enteric fever.

Kermanshah.

A committee to supervise the elections, representative of landowners, the ulems, merchants and shopkeepers, has been constituted. An abortive attempt has been made to enforce the arms regulations. The tribal dissensions continue unabated. The Governor-General has taken no action except to continue his complicated intrigues. There is still no measure of security on the important trade route to Bagdad.

Bushire.

The Turkish consul is reported to have committed suicide on the 3rd July.

Ahwaz.

Work on the reconstruction of the Ahwaz–Borasjun telegraph line has been suspended for the season. The iron standard line has been successfully carried through to Ram Hormuz. A report from Ahwaz of the 18th May states that the railway company's engineers were about to reconnoitre bridge sites up the Karun and localities with a view to water supply for the line.

RICHARD A. STEEL, *Major, Military Attaché.*

[32826] No. 57.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 20.)

(No. 196.)

Sir, *Tehran, July 6, 1914.*

THE Persian situation is so obscure, and the future of the country at the moment of Sultan Ahmed Shah's official accession appears so uncertain, that it has seemed to me that it would not be without interest were I to endeavour to lay before you, in as concise a manner as possible, a review of the political and financial conditions under which the young Shah will commence his reign in a fortnight's time. It will be necessary for me, in order that you, Sir, may acquire as true an appreciation as it is possible to convey in the language of a despatch of the real situation, that I should lay it before you as I see it, without fear or favour. I am not conscious of any political bias, but I am aware of the fact that it is possible that a two-and-a-half-years' intimate connection with the somewhat cramped stage of Persian politics may have in a certain measure warped my judgment. You, Sir, from a distance will be able to correct whatever unintentional misreading of the signs of the times, as they present themselves to me, may be apparent.

The circumstances that governed the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 created in Persia three zones—the Russian, which stretches from Kermanshah, by way of Ispahan and Yezd, to the Perso-Afghan frontier along the southern limit of the province of Khorassan; the neutral, which contains all the southern and south-western provinces, together with the eastern district of the Kainat, leaving to the British zone the provinces of Kerman and Seistan, the latter of which with the Kainat remained as appanage of the province of Khorassan. The ostensible object of the zones was a commercial one. They were intended to indicate those parts of Persia in which Great Britain and Russia should respectively have exclusive rights, without interference from the other, to seek for commercial concessions, whilst the neutral zone remained open to both parties to the agreement as a common field in which either could seek for advantages with the knowledge and consent of the other.

Since by far the larger portion of the British interests established in Persia before the signature of the Anglo-Russian Convention were situated in the neutral zone, in which Russia had no interests, it became early apparent that any encroachment on the

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part of Russia south of the line of demarcation of the Russian zone would be of a nature to affect adversely some British interest. Moreover, the town of Ispahan, which may well be considered the cradle of British commerce in Persia, passed under direct Russian influence. This fact, coupled with the practical closing of the southern trade routes, in consequence of the disordered state of the country, has enabled Russian trade to oust British trade from the old capital of the country. There are signs of some slight revival of British trade, thanks to the fact that the Ahwaz-Ispahan, or Bakhtiari road, has now been kept open by the khans for close upon two years. There is also an improvement on the Ispahan-Shiraz-Bushire road, but trade viâ the southern route has had a severe fright from which it is unlikely to recover rapidly, even should the present conditions, which are not yet very satisfactory, be greatly improved at an early date. Russian trade has acquired a firm foothold at Ispahan, which has also passed almost entirely under the domination of the Russian consul and bank manager. An arrangement, under which the immense properties of the Zil-us-Sultan are now administered by the latter, has contributed in no small measure to bring about the present situation in the city and province of Ispahan, which is to-day entirely under Russian political influence.

It would be hard to blame the Zil and his sons very severely for this surrender of a large portion of a central Persian province to Russian influence. From the moment that the Bakhtiaris took the town, some four years ago, the Governor-General has been a Bakhtiari. This important tribe has rendered invaluable service to the cause of constitutional Persia, but the tribesmen have shown themselves unfortunately little better than freebooters when in the employment of the Government. The chiefs have, many of them, good qualities, but they have not proved themselves capable administrators, and have acquired an unenviable reputation for rapacity. In addition, the Zil's family and the Bakhtiaris are hereditary enemies, in consequence of the Zil having, in the days of his might, caused one of the leading khans, the father of Sansam-us-Sultaneh, Sardar Assad, and Sardar Zafar, to be put to death. Under such circumstances it is not to be wondered at that the Zil has sought foreign protection for his properties. Unable to find it with us, His Highness turned to Russia, with most satisfactory results, I understand, as far as increased revenues are concerned. The Zil's sister, Banoo Osma, also enjoys Russian protection, and her extensive properties are administered by a Russian. Recently a Dr. Pugin, a Chilean in the employment of a German colour firm, has appeared on the scene, and has leased several villages south of Ispahan. A fracas, attended by loss of life, has already taken place between Dr. Pugin's (German) villagers and the (Russian) villagers on Banoo Osma's estates, showing the possible dangers that attend the leasing of properties by foreigners, since, under existing circumstances, all the inhabitants of a leased village pass under the protection of the lessee, and practically cease to recognise the jurisdiction of the Persian authorities.

In addition to the British trade interest in the province of Kerman, which are largely connected with the carpet industry and certain local products, the Imperial Bank of Persia has a branch at Kerman, and is about to establish one at Bunder Abbas. The Indo-European Telegraph Department has also constructed for the Persian Government, and controls a telegraph line viâ Kerman and Bam to Robat in British Baluchistan, with continuation to India, and there are other telegraphic and trade interests in certain of the Gulf ports of Kerman. The bulk of British interests have, however, as has been stated above, long been centred in the neutral zone, formerly more especially at Bushire and Shiraz, but latterly largely also at Mohammerah and Ahwaz, since the opening of the Karun River to trade. A brisk traffic is carried on from the latter place by the road which passes through the Bakhtiari mountains, and is known both as the Bakhtiari road and the Lynch road, Messrs. Lynch having carried out its construction for the account of the khans.

In 1901 a petroleum concession was given to Mr. Knox d'Arcy, which conferred upon him the right to mine for oil throughout the country, except in the five northern provinces. Petroleum has been found and worked, as you, Sir, are aware, at Kasr-i-Shirin and Chiah Surkh on the Turco-Persian frontier, and also in the Bakhtiari country, in the Shushtar-Ahwaz neighbourhood. A very largely increased importance has been given to this British enterprise by the fact that His Majesty's Government has recently acquired a controlling interest in the share capital of the syndicate. The effect that this action may be expected to have upon the political situation in Persia will be dealt with further on in this despatch. In 1890 the concession for a road from Tehran to Mohammerah, originally given to Yahya Khan, came into the possession of the Imperial Bank of Persia, and was subsequently transferred to Messrs. Lynch. This concession in its present form confers upon Messrs. Lynch the right to construct a

carriage road from Tehran viâ Kum to Sultanabad, Khoremabad, and Mohammerah, with branches to Kashan and Ispahan. The road has been made to Kum and Sultanabad, and there is now reason to hope that Messrs. Lynch intend to carry it to Ispahan, and eventually on to its destination, a satisfactory arrangement having recently been made with the Persian Government respecting the duration of the time within which the road must be completed.

Since the date of the Anglo-Russian Convention an option has been obtained by a British syndicate for an important railway from Mohammerah to Khoremabad. Under the terms of this option a survey shall be made of the country through which it is proposed that the line shall pass, in order that a correct estimate may be formed of the probable cost of construction. As soon as this work is completed negotiations will be resumed with the Persian Government, which under the conditions of the option pays for the cost of the survey, and the syndicate will either construct the railway for the Persian Government and administer it for a fixed number of years or the syndicate will be given a concession conferring upon it the right to build the line on its own account. The work of the survey has been carried through as far as Dizful, but had to be suspended at that place last spring because the attitude of the tribesmen in Luristan made it unwise to endeavour to proceed further. It is hoped that it will be possible to conduct the surveying party through to Khoremabad in the autumn.

An arrangement was reached last year under which the Arabistan telegraph line is being reconstructed by the Indo-European Telegraph Department for the Persian Government, which has bound itself to entrust any further work of the same nature that may require to be done in south-western Persia to the same department. By the same agreement the duration of the telegraph conventions now existing between the Indian Telegraph Department and the Persian has been prolonged from 1925 to 1945.

The concession conferring the right to carry out mining operations over a large area in the provinces of Kerman and Fars has been much delayed, in consequence of a Russian protest on behalf of the Société d'Études against the granting of rights that may affect securities required for the Trans-Persian Railway. The question has been taken up again quite recently, in consequence of Persia's crying want of the loan of 100,000*l.* which is promised by the syndicate seeking the concession. Every possible form of opposition has been brought to bear upon the Government to prevent the concession being granted, but there is still some reason to think that it may go through before the coronation and the assembling of a new Medjliss, which might entail an entire reconsideration of the question. I have gone at some length into the question of the British interests connected with the neutral zone, in order that it may be realised that it would be difficult for His Majesty's Government to agree to any readjustment of the zones, that would not incorporate in the British sphere almost all Persia outside the present Russian zone. Certain portions of the provinces of Ispahan and Yezd and the Kainat have alone not been definitely earmarked by the creation of British commercial interests. In the case of the latter district there are, I believe, strategical reasons which make it undesirable that the region should pass under Russian control. It should also be borne in mind that Shaukat-ul-Mulk, the Governor, has always shown himself a good friend to British interests. For this reason he is not well looked upon by the Russians, as was clearly seen upon the occasion of his recent visit to Tehran. The fact that various British loans and advances are secured on the southern customs and revenues should not be overlooked in any examination of the extent of British interests in the neutral zone.

It is not necessary to go at length into the nature of the interests Russia has acquired in the northern sphere. It will suffice to point out that they are paramount, and that, in addition to the large legitimate commercial interests acquired, large landed estates have passed into the hands of Russians and Russian-protected persons, or have been mortgaged to the Russian Banque d'Escompte, in violation of the clause in the bank's concession, to which the Russian Minister recently called my attention, which forbids the mortgaging of landed property. The fact that so much real estate has passed into the hands of Russians will make it very hard for the Russian Government to ever relinquish its hold upon the five northern provinces, but more especially upon Azerbaijan. Russian troops may be withdrawn, but as long as the lands owned by Russians are not subject to Persian administration and justice, it will be impossible for the Persian officials to be again masters in their own house.

To come to the Administration of the country, we find the executive in the hands of a weak Cabinet, and consequently much influenced by the action of the two Governments who have been shown to possess such large interests in the south and north. During the Shah's minority the Regent has been the nominal head of the

State, but he has always refused under the wording of the Constitution to accept any executive authority, and has confined himself to acting as an adviser. Advice coming from a man disowning any executive authority has naturally not carried much weight, and it is doubtful if the presence of the Regent has been of any real value. During the last two and a half years the Government has also been without the constitutional support of the National Assembly. Under such circumstances, it is marvellous that any progress has been made, and one can hardly wonder that Ministers have spent a large portion of their time quarrelling among themselves. With the future shrouded in uncertainty, and without any definite guidance showing either the will of a Sovereign or the wishes of the people, one could hardly expect novices at constitutional government to put self-interest entirely on one side, even under the most favourable conditions. Much less could one look for it, when circumstances have placed Persia, temporarily at least, under the more or less open tutelage of two powerful neighbours, whose own interests have naturally come first, however genuine their intentions to assist Persia may have been.

The weakness of the Government has naturally engendered a certain independence of the orders of the central authority on the part of provincial Governors. Shuja-ed-Dowleh, the Governor-General of Azerbaijan, has been the worst offender, and it would be hard indeed for the Russian Government to make out a good case to show why they have consistently supported him in his insubordination to the Tehran authorities. One is reluctantly driven to the conviction that M. Korostovetz, when he boasts cynically that he is here only to serve Russian interests, without regard to those of Persia, is really voicing the unspoken policy of his Government, a policy which would appear out of keeping with the spirit of the Anglo-Russian understanding. The recent action of the Russian Government in instructing their consular authorities in north Persia not to pay the land taxes into the Belgian financial administration, but to pay them into the consulate, has constituted a violation of Persia's sovereign rights. It cannot, I think, be shown that anything the Treasurer-General has written to the Russian Minister could be construed into an acceptance or proposal of such a proceeding.

Before delivering this blow to public confidence in the ability of the present Administration, to properly defend Persia's national interests, the Russian Government had severely shaken its position in public opinion by the attitude adopted towards the gendarmerie which had been organised under Swedish officers. Until it was known that Russia was opposed to this force being employed in those parts of Persia from which Russian troops would one day be withdrawn, the public had grown to look upon the force as a purely Persian one, and confidently anticipated that public order would be gradually restored by its agency. From the day that it was seen that Russia was opposed to the natural development of the gendarmerie, the public made up its mind that this was one more proof that Russia did not desire to see order re-established. Public confidence has disappeared; the future of the gendarmerie is considered to be doomed; the Swedes themselves have lost heart in their work; brigands of the Naib Hussein type are again taking the field; and hope in the future has given place to despair and apathy.

People ask themselves if there is any use in endeavouring to fight an uphill battle any longer, when it is clear that Russia does not intend that the two administrations from which some hope in the future of Persia could be derived shall succeed. The Belgians are as discouraged as the Swedes. M. Mornard has already resigned the post of Treasurer-General, and the Belgian Minister is seriously considering the advisability of submitting to his Government the desirability of withdrawing its officials from Persia. Most unfortunately, both M. Poklewski and M. Sabline have let it be clearly understood at different times that the success of either of these European administered institutions would be distasteful to the Russian Government. This is remembered now, and people point out that, whether by coincidence or not, open Russian opposition only began to make itself felt when the influence of the gendarmerie had asserted itself, and when the Treasury administration could show an increase of about 500,000*l.* in the gross revenues of the country.

In spite of what at first sight might be taken to indicate a prosperous financial situation, the Treasury is empty, and it has not been found possible to balance income and expenditure. An estimated deficit of some 700,000*l.* has to be met, and it is hard to see how this can be done. For months past there has been much talk of a budget, and many Cabinet meetings have been devoted to the task, but, in default of a strong guiding hand at the helm, it has been found impossible to secure a genuine budget from any one department. All the Ministers are agreed that money can and must be saved, but no one is ready to suggest a curtailment, with consequent loss of patronage

and profit, for his own office. The chief increase of expenditure has been incurred on account of the military forces, gendarmerie and Cossack brigade, and of the financial administration. The first and last are productive items of expenditure which will give a handsome return for the money spent. The Cossack brigade is a leech that has for years sucked Persia's life blood and has made no return. The officers have been prominent among the grain cornerers and suchlike social pests, and have always been ready to lend a hand to Russian consuls in their oppressive policy, but a deaf ear has been turned, as recently in Azerbaijan, to orders to assist the representatives of the Persian Government. Under such conditions it is hardly to be wondered at that the Persian Government should prefer the prolonged occupation of the country by Russian troops, for which they do not pay, to their place being taken by a so-called Persian force for which they will have to pay. It is easily understandable that from the moment that Russia insists that the Treaty of Turkonanchai has been misinterpreted for close upon a hundred years, and that Russians have acquired large landed interests in Azerbaijan and elewhere, the need is felt for a genuinely pro-Russian force to assist the Russian consul in the protection of those interests when Russian troops are withdrawn.

One could hardly imagine a more gloomy outlook for the opening of a new reign, and yet I am convinced that if money can be found the situation is by no means a hopeless one, provided that the British and Russian Governments are still imbued by the same friendly feelings towards Persia as would appear to have inspired the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. All must necessarily depend upon whether or not both Governments are sincerely desirous to assist Persia within reasonable limits to assert and maintain her sovereignty, and to preserve her independence. I consider that the gradual development of the gendarmerie and of the financial administration is essential to the remaking of Persia, but that it will merely mean throwing good money after bad to give financial assistance to Persia unless both Governments genuinely intend to support these administrations. Both have made grave mistakes, but both, and more especially the Swedes, have much to learn, and are rapidly acquiring that knowledge of the ways and customs of Persia that is essential to success.

In proportion as these Persian organisations under European administrators are making themselves felt, the opposition to them grows on the part of those who foresee a lessening of their own position and chances of making money. This is evident in the south, where we see Kavam-ul-Mulk and Soulet-ed-Dowleh entering into a pact. The object of the reconciliation between these two chiefs, who are estranged by a blood fued, has been made sufficiently evident by the fact that they are suggesting to the Persian Government that they can quite well supply a force to maintain order much cheaper than the cost of the gendarmerie. To the obvious retort: Why, then, did you not keep order and save us the initial expense of the gendarmerie? they would doubtless reply that they had misunderstood their own true interests in quarrelling, but that now that they are friends, order can be secured quite easily. Take away the gendarmerie, and who knows how long this new friendship, based on the flimsiest foundations, and undoubtedly due indirectly to the presence of the gendarmerie, will last? I am of opinion that the gendarmerie, with all its faults and mistakes, has proved not alone its usefulness, but its necessity, and that Soulet and Kavam can only be coerced into doing good work for the Government as long as they feel the controlling power of the gendarmerie on the road between the respective districts over which each holds sway. British assurances, conditional upon their good behaviour and their genuine support of the gendarmerie, may help much in the preservation of order, but it is more than probable that the old fued would speedily break out again were there no military force capable of inspiring respect between them. If the situation became desperate, it might be possible to try some scheme under which the two chieftains could be made responsible for order under a Governor-General devoted to British interests, but it would be rather a risky experiment.

I have cited Fars because it is a part of Persia in which we are specially interested, but the gendarmerie is exercising a similar influence in other parts of the country. The question then resolves itself into one of the nationality of the officers who are to instruct and command the gendarmerie. I am as firmly convinced as ever that we shall not improve upon Swedish officers, provided that Great Britain and Russia are prepared to give them whole-hearted support, and that they are to be allowed to carry out their police duties throughout the country. They have made many grievous mistakes, and are probably less fitted for the duties they have to perform than British officers; but they are devoid of all political bias, as is shown by the fact that British consular officers in the south accuse them of hostile intentions towards British interests,

whilst the Russian Government considers them unsuitable in the north because of their pro-German tendencies. If British officers take their place, a long step forward in the direction of partition would be made. It would be hard to induce the Persian Government to accept them without taking action which might create a bad impression in the Mussulman world: a reverse might damage British prestige in the East; and loss of life might necessitate reprisals which would result in heavy expenditure. Yet if, as would appear to be foreshadowed in your telegram No. 91 of the 16th May last, not sufficient confidence is felt in the Swedes to entrust to them the carrying out of their duties in those parts where our interests are most vital, and Russia is imbued with the same spirit in the north, it is better that the Swedes should go. It would be unfair to both them and Persia to urge them to continue their work if we can only promise them half-hearted support.

The existence of the Belgians is closely connected with that of the Swedes. M. Mornard, who has resigned his post of Treasurer-General in consequence of the consistent Russian opposition to which his work has been exposed, has often told me that the Belgian administration could no longer continue if the Swedes were to be replaced by British and Russian officers. He has expressed his conviction, based upon the experiences of his representatives in the south, that his agents could not rely upon that cordial co-operation from British gendarmerie officers which is essential to the success of the Belgian mission. We should thus find ourselves face to face with a situation which would entail a recasting of the financial administration as well as of the military police.

It is anticipated in many quarters that the large financial stake that His Majesty's Government has engaged in the Anglo-Persian Oil Syndicate must in course of time, if not immediately, cause an alteration of Great Britain's policy regarding the neutral zone. It is felt that the valuable property acquired will require better protection than can be assured under the conditions prevailing to-day. It is pointed out that the oil-bearing districts are inhabited by turbulent tribes who have never known control, and that the safety of the oil wells and pipe lines will have to be secured by a more efficient force than is at present available. The question has formed the subject of much discussion in the Tehran press, and the opinion appears to be more or less general that a change in the status of the neutral zone is to be expected.

It is probable that the actual protection of the oil-bearing districts can be secured by interesting the several local tribesmen in the financial results of the undertaking, on somewhat similar lines to the arrangement made with the Bakhtiari khans. It may, however, be considered desirable that a protective barrier should be created on the north of the prospective oil-fields region against any possible future aggression from that direction. The warlike mountain tribes, composed of Lurs, Bakhtiaris, Kashgais, and Khamseh Arabs, that stretch from the Turkish frontier to the province of Kerman, could be made to constitute a formidable barrier, which it would be hard to break through if their good-will were secured. The moment would appear to be a favourable one for taking preliminary steps in this direction. There are signs that all these tribes are seeking to band themselves together in conjunction with the Sheikh of Mohammerah for some purpose, either against an anticipated northern danger, or because it is feared that a reactionary movement hostile to their interests may make itself apparent after the young Shah's coronation. It is generally said that this effort to effect a tribal union is directed against the gendarmerie. We have seen above that the pact made between Kavam-ul-Mulk and Soulet-ed-Dowleh may well have this object in view. It is also said that an anti-gendarmerie clause has been inserted into the compact that Soulet-ed-Dowleh is seeking to conclude with the Bakhtiaris. The khans deny this, and declare that they will not be parties to any agreement with such an object in view.

The treaty of peace and good-fellowship concluded a year ago between the Sheikh of Mohammerah and the Bakhtiaris has recently been renewed with much show of cordiality, and it is believed that the Sheikh has sounded the Vali of Pusht-i-Kuh as to his joining the confederation. All these elements have recently shown signs of a desire to enter into more friendly relations with Great Britain. Kavam and Soulet have made definite advances with a view to securing assurances of British good-will and support. The Bakhtiari khans are on terms of close intimacy with His Majesty's Legation, and are quite prepared to enter upon still closer relations, including the presence of British officers to form an effective force, provided that such a scheme would not cost them money. The loyalty of the Sheikh of Mohammerah is presumably assured, and the Vali of Pusht-i-Kuh has recently opened friendly negotiations with His Majesty's vice-consul at Ahwaz, with the apparent object of securing the control of the Lur tribes, with

Khoremabad as his headquarters. As the Vali is a friend of Nizam-es-Sultaneh, and Sardar Akram (the next most important Lur chieftain) is not, some arrangement may be made. It is hoped that in this way the safe passage of the railway survey may be secured.

It would appear possible that other important aims might be served by taking advantage of the present friendly dispositions of the tribes, should His Majesty's Government consider that the interests recently acquired on the Gulf littoral necessitate protection.

Sultan Ahmed Shah has given proof recently that he has been seriously considering the nature of the Government that will be formed after the coronation. It is generally believed that His Majesty will invite Mustaufi-ul-Mamalek to form his first Cabinet, and it is anticipated that he has secured the co-operation of Mushir-ed-Dowleh, Motamen-ul-Mulk, Shahab-ed-Dowleh, and Mukhber-es-Sultaneh, at the present moment Governor-General of Fars. It would have been difficult for His Majesty to have found five better men, all of whom enjoy the confidence of the general public. There is reason to hope that these men, should they form the Cabinet, will work harmoniously together.

Still, the outlook is discouraging enough, and even the best men that Persia can supply can do nothing without money, and without the genuine support of Great Britain and Russia. M. Korostovetz's recent utterances, and the action in Azerbaijan and elsewhere of the Russian consuls, have raised grave doubts in the Persian mind respecting Russian good-will. If Russia is determined to pursue a policy which has for its object the suppression of the Belgian financial administration, and with it the sovereign right of Persia to collect her own taxes, there can be no hope for the future. It is impossible for any self-respecting Government to continue a travesty of national administration, when Russian consuls collect the taxes and prevent the provincial governors from carrying out their duties, unless their ideas of how this should be done coincide with their own. Unless some definite arrangement of these questions is reached, Persian rule over the northern part of the country may be said to have ceased. This is not the opinion of one Englishman who may be accused of prejudice, but it is the openly-expressed conviction of every foreigner and Persian throughout the northern zone. The daily growing acquisition of landed property by Russians must increase the evil, as each property that passes by lease or purchase out of Persian hands passes automatically under Russian jurisdiction. If His Majesty's Government and the other foreign countries agree with the new Russian rendering of the Treaty of Turkomanchai, presumably other foreigners will acquire landed property in Persia, and the administration of the country will gradually fall into the hands of the various foreign consuls.

The next most important question is the financial one. Persia cannot carry on the administration of the country until a financial arrangement has been reached. The resources of the country, despite the improvement noticeable in the revenue returns, do not suffice to meet the annual requirements without assistance from outside. Economies can doubtless be made, but if the work of keeping order which has been productive of increased revenue is to be continued and perfected, additional expenditure must be incurred. All symptoms point to the fact that the Persian public can bear additional taxation, and the increased resources of the country make the situation more favourable to-day than it was two years ago. It is probable that one of the first acts of the new Cabinet will be to put forward proposals for a large loan. If this fails, recourse will have to be had to some other means for raising money. The Treasurer-General has advised the Cabinet that it would do well to negotiate the sale to Russia of the western portion of Azerbaijan, and of the Turcoman country lying to the north of the River Gurgan; and to Great Britain of the islands in the Persian Gulf. He estimates that such sales should produce about 10,000,000*l.*, possibly a somewhat optimistic estimate. As regards the districts to be acquired by Russia there is some irony in M. Mornard's proposal, as a large portion of them has already passed into Russian hands by purchase. Failing acceptance of this suggestion, M. Mornard has recommended the raising of a loan of 4,000,000*l.* or 6,000,000*l.* in Belgium or elsewhere.

The moment appears to me to have arrived when some definite decision must be taken. If the Swedes and the Belgians are to be maintained they must be genuinely supported in the exercise of their duties throughout Persia. If they are to meet with British or Russian opposition in the south or north, both had better go and be replaced by British and Russian administrations. In saying this I do not wish it to be inferred that I consider that either the Swedes or the Belgians have failed in their

task. On the contrary, I think that a short experience of less than three years has been highly satisfactory. It has in addition given an opportunity for the faults of the administrations to make themselves apparent. These are not of vital importance and can easily be rectified.

Any change in the system which would involve the administration of south and north Persia being taken over by Great Britain and Russia respectively would entail heavy responsibilities on His Majesty's Government, of which the serious nature has perhaps not been fully realised, and would in all probability lead to the ultimate partition of the country.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

[32688] No. 58.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 20.)

(No. 501.)

Sir, *Constantinople, July* 14, 1914.

WITH reference to Sir L. Mallet's despatch No. 461 of the 26th June, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the British delegate on the Turco-Persian Frontier Commission reporting on the delimitation of the frontier in the Nowsoud district.

I have, &c.
H. D. BEAUMONT.

Enclosure in No 58.

Mr. Wratislaw to Sir L. Mallet.

(No. 40.)

Sir, *Piran, June* 13, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to submit the following observations on the delimitation of the Nowsoud district :—

It will be remembered that, in order to obtain the consent of Turkey to the frontier proposed in the districts of Ab-i-Ser-i-Gadyr (Ushnou) and Tchoumi Gueli (Lahidjan), the original description of the Nowsoud district (contained in memorandum (B) enclosed in the Constantinople embassy's note to the Porte dated the 5th (18th) August, 1913) was modified in the Constantinople protocol. The original ran as follows :—

"Arrivée au pic de Kemadjar . . . . la frontière continue à suivre la crête magistrale jusqu'à sa ramification du côté ouest, s'élevant au nord de la vallée du Deré-Vouli, et laissant du côté persan le village de Khan Guermela et seize autres villages appartenant au district persan de Nowsoud (ou Avroman-i-Louhon) rejoint la rivière de Sirvan près de l'embouchure de Tchami-Zimkan au nord du mont Beyzel."

This clause ran as follows in the protocol :—

"Arrivée au pic de Kemadjar . . . . la frontière continue à suivre la crête magistrale jusqu'à sa ramification du côté ouest, s'élevant au nord de la vallée de Deré-Vouli, laissant du côté persan le village de Khan Guermela et de Nowsoud. Pour le reste de la frontière jusqu'au Sirvan, la Commission—à titre exceptionnel—délimitera le terrain en prenant en considération les changements qui ont pu s'y produire à partir de l'année 1848 jusqu'à l'année 1905."

This modification was intended to allow the Turks to profit by the absorption by them of certain villages in the district which was vaguely understood to have occurred subsequent to 1848 (the *status quo* year); 1905 was fixed as the limit, as being the year in which the recent Turkish movement on the frontier began. It also allowed the frontier to be fixed higher up the Sirvan than the junction of the Tcham-i-Zimkan.

It is worthy of note that both the Turkish and Persian commissioners, and *à fortiori* their British and Russian colleagues, were in almost complete ignorance of most details relating to the Khan Guermela-Nowsoud district, and in particular of the

position of six villages dependent on Khan Guermela, which were all supposed to lie in the same valley. As a matter of fact, three of them were quite outside this valley and well to the north-west of it, and another (Pish Jou) could never be found at all.

When the Turkish and Persian commissioners put forward their views regarding the frontier line they were, as usual, found to be widely divergent. The Turkish claim was moderate, and did not differ to any considerable extent from the line finally adopted, but that of the Persians was based on an exaggerated estimate of their rights. Prolonged discussion did not result in any approach to an agreement, so my Russian colleague and I proposed that we should suggest a line. This was agreed to, and we proposed that the frontier should start from the junction of the Tcham-i-Zimkan with the Sirvan, follow the latter river to a point nearly due south of Nowsoud, and then proceed along a watershed to the valley between the small Turkish town of Tavilé and the Persian village of Dizaver, turning subsequently north-west to pass between Khan Guermela and Biaré and mount the "ramification du côté ouest s'élevant au nord de la vallée de Deré-Vouli," and up that ramification to join the main Avroman chain. This left to the Turks all villages to which they could establish a claim, and only took from the Persians a tiny hamlet, Belkha Oulia (which was locally recognised as Persian territory, but which seemed more naturally a dependence of the Turkish village of Belkha), as well as the three villages, Guetchiné, Hanidend, and Darimer, which the protocol, as before stated, cut off from Khan Guermela by running the frontier along the "ramification" in question.

It is as well to mention here that the question of what was Deré-Vouli gave rise to much discussion. We found that the valley in which Khan Guermela is situated, though marked as Deré-Vouli on the original identic map, is not at the present day known locally by that name, and the Persian commissioner therefore propounded the theory that some other "ramification" of the Avroman range should be chosen so as to include in Persia the villages of Guetchiné, Hanidend, and Darimer. My Russian colleague and I held, however, that the authors of the protocol and of the previous notes on which it was based, who had no other map than the identic map to guide them, obviously meant by Deré-Vouli the valley so marked on that map, and that the probability of their having been under a misapprehension as to the exact position of the three villages in question could not avail to upset the clear sense of the protocol.

At the last moment—the day, in fact, before the Commission finally left the district—the Persian commissioner announced that he had found a "Deré-Vouli" some distance to the north-west of the Khan Guermela valley, and he asked the Commission to appoint a sub-commission to investigate the question. The Turkish commissioner naturally objected, and on the matter being referred to M. Belayew (acting as Russian commissioner) and myself, we decided *séance tenante* that the matter was closed and could not be reopened.

To return to the line proposed by the British and Russian commissioners. Aziz Bey made only trifling objections to it, but Itila-ul-Mulk was very discontented, and said he would prefer an arbitral decision. On our pointing out that, having gone very carefully into the matter, we had come to the conclusion that no other line would meet the exigencies of the case, and that consequently to refer to arbitration would only entail a loss of two days' time without altering the result, he eventually gave way, though very reluctantly. As a general rule, both the Turkish and the Persian commissioners prefer disputed points to be settled by the arbitration of the mediating commissioners, presumably to cover their responsibility in the eyes of their own Governments.

The demarcation between the villages of Khan Guermela and Biaré gave considerable trouble, as the orchards belonging to the inhabitants of either are much intermingled. This question too had to be referred to arbitration, but in this case, I am happy to say, the decision (which entailed a prolonged local enquiry) seemed fairly satisfactory to both parties.

The Commission left Khan Guermela after a stay in the district of a whole fortnight. They are at present encamped near Piran, north of the Avroman range.

I have, &c.
A. C. WRATISLAW, *British Commissioner, Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.*

[33160] No. 59.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 21.)

Sir,

India Office, July 21, 1914.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 13th instant on the subject of the Trans-Persian Railway.

2. The Marquess of Crewe agrees that, in view of the insistence of the Russian Government, and of the terms of the memorandum enclosed in Sir E. Grey's despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador, St. Petersburgh, dated the 4th October, 1912, it is difficult for His Majesty's Government not to agree to an immediate application, in general terms, for an option for a railway across Persia. But he doubts whether that course should be taken until an agreement has been arrived at between the Société and the two British syndicates regarding the claim to mining rights which has been put forward by the former since the date of the memorandum above referred to. Lord Crewe is afraid that British consent to an immediate application would destroy the one lever which His Majesty's Government possess to secure the recognition of British interests, and that when it is destroyed the Russian Government and the Société will be in no hurry to enter upon further negotiations with the syndicates. If there were any reason to suppose that the Persian Railways Syndicate were not in a position to take up at once any concession that it may obtain, Lord Crewe would advise that His Majesty's Government should withdraw their support from it in favour of the Société. But his Lordship believes that this syndicate as well as the Persian Mining Syndicate is a *bonâ fide* undertaking with a considerable stake in the country and a real interest in its commercial development, and in that respect also more entitled to the support of His Majesty's Government than the British group of the Société.

3. While, however, his Lordship is not prepared to advise that concessions should be made to the Société on this point, it may perhaps be possible to meet them in some other ways, and he is of opinion that it is a matter of urgent necessity to find some means of moving them from the *non possumus* attitude taken up in Sir W. Garstin's letter of the 3rd May and reaffirmed in his letter of the 3rd July. Otherwise, if and when the option is obtained, time, which is of vital importance to British interests, will be lost in settling all the other outstanding questions. He would therefore urge that discussions should at once be opened with the British group with that object in view.

4. So far as can be judged from the language of the former communication the difficulty felt by the British group (apart from the question of mining rights) is twofold:—

(i.) The limitation of the scope of the original proposals. This, it is thought, will prevent the project from appealing to the imagination of the investing public, negative the hope of obtaining financial guarantees from the associated Governments, and diminish its commercial possibilities. The British group evidently regard it in its present shape as one for which they would not care to attempt to raise capital.

(ii.) The unattractiveness of the project is enhanced by the alignment laid down by His Majesty's Government, which is not the most suitable even for local development.

5. These points must be taken together. If the scheme is to find support, as British interests urgently require that it should, it must be made attractive on purely commercial grounds. And if a Government guarantee in any shape or form is out of the question, His Majesty's Government must, as far as possible, withdraw conditions which deprive the line of a reasonable prospect of paying without a guarantee. From this point of view the alignment is of vital importance. The alignment last proposed by His Majesty's Government was recommended by the interdepartmental conference for reasons which were good, but were not absolutely conclusive, and were not mainly commercial. From the commercial point of view Lord Crewe believes that the correct alignment is viâ Kerman–Bam–Regan–Bunder Abbas, and he understands that Sir W. Johns regards this route as greatly preferable for engineering reasons also, since construction will be easier and very much quicker. In view, therefore, of the change of military opinion regarding the importance of Kerman itself, his Lordship does not think that exception need be taken to that alignment for strategical reasons, provided always that the condition that there shall be no extension to the coast east of Bunder Abbas be maintained, and he believes that this alteration would add greatly to the commercial attractiveness of the scheme. If it be adopted, the question of gauge will

require further consideration. It is understood that Sir W. Johns is of opinion that the adoption of the Russian gauge to the coast will be a heavy burden to the scheme, since it will be both expensive and unnecessary for the local development of the country. Further, it has always been stipulated by the Government of India that the break of gauge should be made at the point where the line enters the British sphere, which would be Kerman.

6. Sir W. Johns has now retired from active service and is in this country. Lord Crewe would suggest that Sir E. Grey should, as soon as convenient, consult him upon all technical aspects of the southern section of the railway, and then should invite the British group to confer and to state definitely whether they are prepared to proceed with the scheme upon such conditions as it may then be possible to put before them; and it would, in his Lordship's opinion, be advisable to allow them to discuss these conditions with Sir W. Johns. If they decline to proceed, it will then be urgently necessary to endeavour to find another group, such as the Persian Railways Syndicate, to take their place.

7. As regards the question of alignment, referred to at the end of the Russian Government's note, Lord Crewe would not object to the main line running through Yezd on the condition that the branch to Ispahan is constructed simultaneously, and not subsequently, as proposed by the Russian Government.

8. Copies of this letter are being sent to the War Office, Admiralty, and Board of Trade.

I am, &c.
T. W. HOLDERNESS.

[33217] No. 60.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received July 22.)

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Admiralty, July 21, 1914.

IN reply to your letter of the 13th instant, relative to the Trans-Persian Railway, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to request that you will inform the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that they appreciate the desire of the Russian Government to apply immediately for an option, and also the reasons which must weigh with His Majesty's Government against giving cause to the Russian Government to proceed independently with railway development in Northern Persia.

2. At the same time, it was distinctly understood that the outstanding questions between the Société d'Études on the one hand, and the Kerman Mining Syndicate and the Persian Railway Syndicate on the other, were to be settled prior to the option being applied for. So far the Société d'Études have done nothing (so far as my Lords know) to facilitate the arrangement of these questions, and they are still outstanding. If therefore the option be now obtained, the Société d'Études will be in a position to force the hands of these two syndicates in a manner favourable to itself, unless a very definite undertaking is given that a settlement will be reached shortly on an equitable basis. Consequently (subject to Sir E. Grey's judgment), my Lords are disposed to think that the understanding or reservation mentioned in your letter would not by itself be sufficient.

3. It has come to their Lordships' knowledge that Mr. Johns, the railway engineer deputed by the Government of India to survey the alternative routes, is now in England. In view of the doubt which was expressed at the meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee as to the best alignment, it might be well that first-hand information should be secured from Mr. Johns.

If it is Sir E. Grey's intention to reassemble the committee for the purpose of considering the latest development of the Trans-Persian problem, the opportunity might be taken of requesting Mr. Johns to meet them.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

[33315] No. 61.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 22.)

(No. 162.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, July 22, 1914.*

PRESIDENT of the Republic told me yesterday that he had discussed Persian question with Emperor and Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that both had given him most satisfactory assurances as to the instructions which have been sent to Russian consuls. Emperor had declared in the most positive terms that he would not allow Persia to cause division between England and Russia.

French President of the Council confirmed the above, and added that Minister for Foreign Affairs had admitted that Russian consuls were in the wrong.

[33326] No. 62.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 22.)

(No. 164.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, July 22, 1914.*

HEAD of Persian Department in Ministry of Foreign Affairs told me yesterday that he was anxiously awaiting our reply to note enclosed in my despatch No. 194, as Russian Government consider request for option should be presented at once. Bagdad Railway was making rapid progress, and it was therefore most important that construction of northern section of Trans-Persian Railway should be commenced without delay.

I said that we had not yet received final reply of Russian group with regard to alignment and other matters which M. Zveguintsef had promised me. His Majesty's Government were probably waiting for its receipt before replying to above-mentioned note.

M. Klemm said that Russian group were in negotiation with two other groups on these questions, but that agreement was not likely to be reached for some time to come. He therefore trusted that His Majesty's Government would agree to request for option being presented at once, leaving above-mentioned points to be settled within a year of its being granted. (End of R.)

According to this Russian proposal, alignment will run direct from Tehran to Yezd, with branch line to Ispahan, while question of alignment in south will be left open. In conversation yesterday French President of the Council spoke to me in favour of such an arrangement, and I trust that His Majesty's Government will see their way to accepting it. It is, I think, important that we should arrive at an agreement about railway at the same time as about other questions at present under discussion.

[33658] No. 63.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 290.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July 22, 1914.*

COUNT BENCKENDORFF asked me to-day if I had anything further to tell him about the Anglo-Persian oil concession.

I said that I could speak only privately of my own idea on the matter. We were not contemplating any steps in the neutral zone different from anything that we had done so far. We were certainly not going to develop at present oil wells north of the one already in use; on the contrary, we were going to spend money on developing the very promising prospects of oil in the islands, the British sphere, or near the south coast. If, as seemed a moral certainty, all the supply of oil that was required was found in one or other of these localities, or in all of them, I felt that it would be to our interest at any rate to lease the part of the concession in the north to some other company, which might be an Anglo-Russian company. But till we had proved the oil in the south we could not, while asking Parliament to vote money, dispose of any part of the concession. When once we had found that the oil we required was forthcoming in the south, in the islands, or near the coast, then I thought that it would

be a positive advantage that we should lease the development of oil wells in the north: Parliament would feel that the object for which it had voted money had been absolutely secured by the supply of oil in the south, and that by giving up development far inland in the north, and handing it over on terms of reasonable profit to another company, the Admiralty were positively avoiding the risk of having to send troops into the interior of Persia, which had been urged in Parliament as one of the great drawbacks of the concession.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[33483] No. 64.

Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received July 23.)

Sir, *Board of Trade, July 22, 1914.*

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 13th July, with its enclosures, on the subject of the proposal that an immediate request should be made to the Persian Government for an option for the construction of a Trans-Persian Railway.

In reply I am to state that, in the circumstances disclosed in the correspondence forwarded with your letter, the Board concur in Sir E. Grey's view that it would be difficult for His Majesty's Government not to agree to the presentation of an application for an option, having regard particularly to the arrangement with M. Sazonof in September 1912 and to the statement contained in paragraph 11 of the note communicated to the Russian Government in April last.

In view, however, of the fact that up to the present neither the Russian Government nor the Société d'Études nor the British group appear to have shown any great disposition to meet the essential requirements of His Majesty's Government as set out in their memorandum of April last, and especially in view of the hostile criticism of that memorandum contained in Sir W. Garstin's letter of the 8th May and reaffirmed in his letter of the 3rd July, the Board feel that it would be very dangerous for His Majesty's Government to join in any application for an option except upon the most stringent conditions that the option is not to extend beyond a year, unless within that time a settlement of all outstanding questions has been reached.

If this condition can be effectively secured, it appears to the Board that the draft application which was forwarded in the letter from the British group of the Société d'Études under date of the 3rd July is worded in sufficiently general terms to enable His Majesty's Government to deal satisfactorily with the various points raised in the memorandum to the Russian Government of April last.

On the point as to mineral rights which is referred to in your letter, the Board cannot but think that a demand for exclusive rights in a strip 45 miles wide on each side of the projected railway would be excessive; it will be borne in mind that the Bagdad Railway Company are only guaranteed a strip of 20 kilom. on each side of their line. The Board agree, however, with the suggestion in your letter that the whole question of mineral rights in the region adjoining the railway should be reserved for further consideration, and that the option to be applied for should be without mention of anything in the nature of a concession of mineral rights.

On the point as to a retrocession to a special company of any concession to the Société for the construction of a port, I am to say that the Board see no harm in this matter being arranged between the Société and the Foreign Office, provided that it be expressly stipulated that the consent of His Majesty's Government to the application for the railway concession proceeding is given on the distinct understanding that the conditions they have previously laid down in this regard are accepted and will be adhered to.

In the print of the Russian Foreign Minister's note to Sir G. Buchanan dated the 9th June it was suggested that there was an inaccuracy in paragraph 2 of the memorandum communicated to the Russian Government in April last in relation to the inclusion of Ispahan in the alignment of the proposed main line of the Trans-Persian Railway. Sir E. Grey is of course aware that the inclusion of Ispahan in the alignment proposed in the memorandum was intentional.

I am, &c.
GEO. J. STANLEY.

[33486] No. 65.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 23.)

(No. 203.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, July 23, 1914.*

YOUR telegram No. 153 of 14th July.

Viceroy of India's telegram of 11th June sums up situation in Southern Persia admirably, and puts forward a scheme for the protection of British interests with which, except in minor details, I am in complete accord, provided that His Majesty's Government are of opinion that the moment has arrived when the Persian question should be treated from the British Indian standpoint only, but I ask myself: Has that moment arrived? Is it finally and conclusively proved that Persian independence and integrity can no longer be maintained, and that British intervention in the south on the lines of Viceroy's telegram has become imperative? In a word, are we prepared to partition Persia? For, disguise it as we may, that is inevitable tendency of the measures proposed. The answer to this question is to be found in another query.

Can His Majesty's Government persuade Russian Government to so far abandon their present policy in Persia as to return to *status quo* existing at the time of the signature of convention of 1907? If the answer to this question is in the negative, and we know the answer before even the question is put, there would appear to be no alternative but to adopt policy which must lead to partition sooner or later. Russia cannot withdraw from the position she has created for herself in the north. Her subjects have acquired large landed interests impossible to abandon, unless Persia could buy them out. She cannot relinquish her claim to refuse Persian authorities permission to enter villages bought or leased without an intolerable loss of prestige.

Further, regeneration of Persia depended, in my opinion, upon the European-administered institutions. Attitude of Russia towards the gendarmerie and the Belgian financial administration has so discredited these institutions as to render their future utility more than problematical, unless they can be re-established in public esteem by some marked act of open support.

Therefore it would seem that the British Indian policy proposed is the only one to be adopted at the point we have now reached, but the less stress laid upon the integrity and independence of Persia the better. Even, however, after the sacrifice of that chimera, the 1907 convention seems to me to remain a working proposition, provided that the present areas can be maintained by an understanding between the two Governments as to what each can do in its own zone, and, above all, if the position of each in the neutral zone is absolutely and clearly defined.

Vital British interests concerned demand that this zone in its almost entirety should come under the preponderating influence of His Majesty's Government. Public opinion in Russia would probably never tolerate open avowal of this. It seems therefore essential that we gradually acquire tacit consent of Russia to protect our own interests. This could probably best be done by putting British officers on trade routes, in manner suggested in the Viceroy's telegram, in the place of Swedes, and by getting the various important tribal chiefs from Turkish frontier to Kerman to ask for loan of military advisers.

I propose to deal with the other points mentioned in India Office letter by despatch.

It would almost appear as if we have now reached point where a semblance of Persian independence can alone be maintained by means of a loan with a commission of control.

[33703] No. 66.

War Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 25.)

(Secret.)
Sir, *War Office, July 24, 1914.*

IN reply to your letter of the 13th instant, relative to the Trans-Persian Railway, I am commanded by the Army Council to state that they see no objection to an early application for the option being agreed to, subject to the definite proviso that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is satisfied that he is in a position to ensure

during the subsequent negotiations the safeguards which the Army Council consider essential to British interests for strategical reasons, viz.:—

1. A reasonably secure alignment.
2. The line to reach the sea within the entrance to the Persian Gulf.
3. British control of the port to be formed near Bunder Abbas.
4. British right to control construction of the line from Bunder Abbas northwards through Bahramabad (or neighbourhood of Kerman) towards Yezd to meet the Russian line advancing south about the latter place.
5. British control of the southern section of the railway.
6. The right of Great Britain to lay down the conditions attaching to any future extension of the line linking up Bunder Abbas with India.

With reference to the question of alignment, I am to enclose a copy of War Office letter of the 18th November last, addressed to the Under-Secretary of State for India.

I am, &c.
R. H. BRADE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 66.

War Office to India Office.

(Secret.)
Sir, *War Office, November 18, 1913.*

I AM commanded by the Army Council to forward herewith, in reply to India Office letter of the 19th July last, a memorandum containing the considered opinion of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff upon the effect on the defence of India of the alignment viâ Kerman of an international railway across Persia, with special reference to the considerations urged in the memorandum of the Chief of the General Staff, India, dated the 6th June last.

I am also to return enclosures Nos. 1 and 4 to the above quoted letter, as requested therein.

I am further to regret the delay which has unavoidably occurred in replying to the India Office letter.

I have, &c.
R. H. BRADE.

Enclosure 2 in No. 66.

Memorandum respecting effect on the Defence of India of an Alignment viâ Kerman of the Trans-Persian Railway.

1. THE India Office ask for the reasoned opinion of the Imperial General Staff upon the effect on the defence of India of the alignment viâ Kerman of an international railway across Persia, with special reference to the considerations urged in the memorandum of the Chief of the General Staff in India, dated the 6th June, 1913.

2. Before dealing with the precise reference made, it may be pointed out that any discussion on this subject seems to be now of a somewhat academic nature, seeing that the British and Russian Governments have agreed to a joint application to the Persian Government for an option for this railway on the understanding that when it reaches the Russian frontier of the neutral sphere, a "Russo-British Technical Commission" shall be appointed to examine the two routes (viz., that viâ Shiraz, and that viâ Kerman), and report to their respective Governments before any decision is taken as to the continuation of the line through the neutral sphere.

Since Russian commercial and strategical aims are clearly directed on an alignment viâ Kerman—and it is improbable that engineering difficulties on that alignment will be greater than on the alternative Shiraz route—it would appear self evident that the Russians, with a free hand as far as Yezd in their own sphere, will so align and construct the railway within that sphere as to leave no room for discussion as to the route to be followed southwards.

3. The main points referred to the Imperial General Staff by the India Office may be summarised as:—

Firstly, the effect on the defence of India of an alignment of the Trans-Persian Railway viâ Kerman; and

Secondly, whether any, and if so what, increase to the army in India is rendered necessary by such an alignment.

4. The question of a railway from the Russian frontier viâ Tehran aligned viâ Kerman may be treated from two main standpoints, viz. :—

(*a.*) That of a railway passing through Kerman; and
(*b.*) That of a railway ending at Kerman.

5. As regards such a railway passing through Kerman, whether to link up with the Indian railway system at Nushki or Karachi, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff is in complete agreement with the opinion against such a proposal expressed by the Chief of the General Staff in India.

He is also opposed for strategical reasons to any proposal to permit such a railway direct access to the sea at a port east of the neighbourhood of Bunder Abbas.

6. Regarding a railway reaching, but not passing east of Kerman or southwards to the sea east of the neighbourhood of Bunder Abbas, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff holds that the position is different, and that no cogent military objection can be urged to the construction of such a line, subject to certain essential provisos.

He is led to this conclusion by a consideration of the following factors :—

Kerman is some 350 miles from the Helmund, in Sistan, and some 600 miles from Nushki.

Granting a possible rate of Russian railway construction of 1 mile per day—a liberal estimate and one making every allowance for Russian potentialities—a Russian prolongation of the railway beyond Kerman would take approximately one year to reach the Helmund, in Sistan, or one and two-third years to reach Nushki.

The Chief of the Imperial General Staff is convinced that no war at the present day between two leading European Powers—whether the primary theatre of operations is on the north-west frontier of India or elsewhere—can be localised. Modern economic conditions and political considerations forbid such a possibility, and, in his opinion, render it certain that the pressure on India would be relieved, and a decision be reached in Europe within a year of the outbreak of war.

He holds therefore that Russia could not develop strength against India from an independent railhead pushed forward on the outbreak of war with Kerman in time to be of use to her in a general advance upon India. But this opinion, based on the existing situation, is subject to the following essential provisos :—

(*a.*) That for strategical reasons it be recognised and acted on as a cardinal point of British policy that any extension by the Russians of the railway eastwards from Kerman, or southwards to the sea east of the neighbourhood of Bunder Abbas, without express British concurrence, be treated as a *casus belli*; and

(*b.*) That before the railway from Tehran reaches Kerman, a British controlled railway shall have reached Kerman already from a port, similarly controlled, in the neighbourhood of Bunder Abbas, and thus form the sole through continuation from Kerman to the sea. This has been urged for commercial reasons, is necessary from considerations of British prestige, and is advisable for strategical reasons.

The Chief of the Imperial General Staff therefore thinks that should diplomacy fail to gain Russian acceptance of the more westerly alignment from Tehran viâ Yezd and Saidabad to the neighbourhood of Bunder Abbas, which from the strategical point of view is regarded as the one least objectionable, the Kerman alignment may be agreed to in so far as military considerations are concerned, subject to the express conditions referred to above.

7. Regarding the question of whether any, and if so what, increase to the army in India would be rendered necessary by the construction of a railway from the Russian frontier viâ Tehran to or beyond Kerman, the essential principle to be observed appears to be that the army in India should be strong enough to delay any hostile advance sufficiently long to enable the diplomatic, economic, and military resources of the Empire to be brought to bear in order to relieve the pressure on India and decide the issue elsewhere.

The Chief of the Imperial General Staff thinks that no addition to the present field army of nine divisions and eight cavalry brigades in India would be required so long as the conditions referred to in the preceding paragraph are observed, and provided these divisions and cavalry brigades are fully organised, their training and equipment in all respects maintained at a high standard of excellence, and the state of

peace preparation in India such as to ensure rapid mobilisation, concentration, and the ready execution of the necessary plans of campaign.

8. But should any extensions of the Tehran–Kerman Railway east of a north and south line through Kerman be forced upon us, he is of opinion that *pro tanto* an increase in the strength of the army in India (as defined above) would be necessary. For such extensions would, by providing Russia with a third—or (if the Alexandrof Gai-Charjui project matures, and a line be constructed southwards through Khorasan) possibly a fourth—independent line of railway approach to the Indian frontier, render the defence of that frontier a matter of such difficulty as to tax the military resources of the Empire to the utmost, owing to the enormous superiority of numbers which Russia would then be in a position to keep in the field.

In this connection it must be borne in mind that even two years would not suffice to produce an increase of any military value, *i.e.*, one of all arms with British and Indian troops in due proportion. Consequently any augmentation decided on would have to be made from three to five years in advance of such extensions.

General Staff, War Office,
November 18, 1913.

[33896] No. 67.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)

(No. 205.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, July* 26, 1914.

MY despatch No. 196 of 6th July.

At the conclusion of the Coronation festivities the Treasurer-General has again tendered his resignation to the Persian Government, with a request that he may be relieved of his duties as soon as possible. My Russian colleague tells me that the Treasurer-General has assured him that his resignation is in no way due to recent Russian action, but he has held very different language to me, and has given me to understand that he resigned in order to forestall a Russian demand for his dismissal. My Russian colleague told me some time ago that he expected to receive early instructions to insist upon Treasurer-General's dismissal.

It would appear to me desirable to retain Belgian administration if possible, and the occasion might be utilised to secure services of a more competent financier and administrator of a higher social and official standing. This would give a chance for a reform of the administration which is badly needed. Treasurer-General and other experts having knowledge of Persia would agree, I think, to work under such a chief. Treasurer-General has done much good work and would be very useful guide of early steps of a new man.

I have suggested to the Prime Minister that no progress is possible without a loan unless money can be found in other ways, and that it might be well to get out a capable Belgian specialist to examine into the financial resources of the country with the idea of remaining on as Treasurer-General if he gave satisfaction and liked the work.

I am very doubtful whether it will be possible to keep Belgians if Russians insist upon the taxation of their subjects and protégés being either carried on or controlled by their consuls. Apart from the clear infringement of sovereign rights over villages entailed by this procedure, one has to know conditions of Persia to realise how wide the door is opened by the same to high-handed consular action such as no foreigner could brook.

[33889] No. 68.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)

(No. 170.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, July* 26, 1914.

YOUR telegram No. 328 of 17th July : Reza.

Russian Government state that Russian consul at Ispahan denies having requested Governor to liberate Reza, who has not yet been captured. Russian consul adds that acts of brigandage continue because Governor prefers to appropriate money intended for road guards

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[34035] No. 69.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)

(No. 199.)

Sir, *Tehran, July* 14, 1914.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 192 of the 11th instant, I have the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a note which I addressed to the Persian Government on the same day protesting against the inaction of the Governor-General of Kermanshah with regard to the maintenance of security on the trade route between that town and the Turkish frontier, and saying that I should hold the Persian Government responsible for a state of affairs against which I have warned them repeatedly.

I also enclose copies of two despatches which I have recently received from His Majesty's consul at Kermanshah,* from which it is abundantly evident that, were it not for the Governor-General's intrigues and wilful obstruction, good order could quite well be maintained on the road.

I am now informed by the Prime Minister that on receipt of my note the Persian Government telegraphed to Farman Farma to the effect that Sardar Akram must leave the district at once, and that his Highness replied that he had transmitted the message of the Central Government to the Sardar.

I have, &c

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 69.

Sir W. Townley to Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

M. le Ministre, *Tehran, July* 11, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that I have to-day received telegraphic communication from His Majesty's consul at Kermanshah to the effect that Sardar Akram has entered the province at the head of a force; that 10,000 packages of merchandise are delayed at the frontier owing to the insecurity of the road; and that this stoppage of trade is likely to cause the bankruptcy of merchants who trade with Manchester. From the latest reports received it would appear evident that the Governor-General has wilfully incited opposition to certain local chieftains who were willing and able to secure the safety of the road, and that, but for his Highness's incapacity or intentional mismanagement of the situation, order could long ago have been established.

It has been my painful duty repeatedly to call the attention of the Imperial Government to the extremely unsatisfactory state of affairs that has prevailed in the Kermanshah district and on the important trade route to the Turkish frontier, to the great prejudice of British interests, for many months past. That the Imperial Government has taken no steps to remedy the evil to which its attention has been so frequently called cannot fail to make the worst possible impression upon the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and it is my duty, in awaiting instructions from Sir E. Grey, to whom I have reported the critical situation by telegraph, to hold the Imperial Persian Government responsible for any further losses that may be incurred by British trade interests.

I would venture meanwhile to suggest that Sardar Akram be ordered to leave the province at once, and also that the Customs Director be authorised to concert with the British and Turkish consuls with a view to endeavouring to arrange directly with the tribes to guard the trade caravans, the Governor-General having proved himself incompetent to cope with the situation.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

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* Not printed.

[33931] No. 70.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)

(No. 219.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, July* 18, 1914.

IN the course of a conversation which I had yesterday with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, I told his Excellency that the Governor-General of Ispahan was finding it impossible to carry on the administration in consequence of the intervention of the Russian consul-general. I then read to him certain passages from Sir W. Townley's despatch No. 163, Confidential, of the 10th June, and from Sir W. Townley's telegram No. 193 of the 13th July, recording the facts of which Samsam-es-Sultaneh had complained.

His Excellency replied by speaking in very disparaging terms of Samsam-es-Sultaneh, whom, he said, the Russian Government would not be able to tolerate much longer as Governor-General. He requested me, nevertheless, to send him an *aide-mémoire* embodying what I had told him, and I have accordingly done so.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[33932] No. 71.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)

(No. 220.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, July* 18, 1914.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 267 of the 14th instant, I have the honour to state that I yesterday took an opportunity of explaining to M. Sazonof that, though in the letter which he had addressed to M. Korostovetz M. Mornard had suggested that a special account might be opened at the Treasury, into which all the land tax due from Russian subjects throughout the northern provinces should be paid and the money thus collected deposited in the Russian Bank, M. Mornard had not mentioned the fact that the tax was to be collected by the Russian consulates. Though I assured M. Sazonof that my statement was founded on a memorandum which M. Mornard had himself drawn up for the use of the Persian Government, his Excellency disputed its accuracy and maintained that the suggestion that the land tax should be collected by the Russian consulates had been made originally by M. Mornard. As, however, his Excellency added that, as the collection of the land tax by the Russian consulates was now to be discontinued, the question had no longer any practical interest, I did not think it necessary to argue the point further.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[34032] No. 72.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)

(No. 206.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, July* 27, 1914.

YOUR telegram No. 161 of 23rd July: Disturbances at Kermanshah.

Farman Farma has been recalled and summoned to Tehran. It is intended to send him to Azerbaijan in lieu of Shuja as Pishkar for Valiahd, whom it is hoped to send later on.

[34053] No. 73

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)

(No. 207.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, July* 27, 1914.

SWEDISH officers are threatening to resign unless money is forthcoming by 1st August to enable them to carry on their work.

As Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed me verbally that 50,000*l.* advanced by His Majesty's Government are accepted by Persian Government, I have asked Imperial

Bank of Persia to transmit money urgently required at Shiraz and Kerman. I have informed gendarmerie officers that accounts must be rendered showing how money has been spent, and I have arranged with bank that no draft on fund is to be honoured without my previous sanction.

It is hoped that money impounded by Russian Legation out of the northern customs receipts (see my telegram No. 197 of 16th July) will be returned as an advance from Russian Bank. It is hard to see otherwise where money can be found, although revenues are beginning to come in.

[34226] No. 74.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)

(No. 208.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, July* 27, 1914.

PRIME Minister informed me yesterday that the Shah has expressed hope that he will carry on until Parliament meets. It is hoped that there may be a quorum in a month. As it is Ramazan, it is, I think, more likely to be six weeks or two months before the new Medjliss can assemble.

Minister for Foreign Affairs, who remained at his post at the Shah's express order until after the Coronation ceremonies, has now definitely resigned. Prime Minister is now busy endeavouring to get new blood into his Cabinet. He deserves to succeed.

[34233] No. 75.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)

(No. 210.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, July* 27, 1914.

MY telegram No. 194 of 13th July: Persian protest against Russian action.

Russian answer has now been presented to Persian Government.

Collection of taxes. No mention is made of granting of concession in return for a modification of procedure established, but it is laid down that the collection and expenditure of the land tax must be subject to superintendence of consuls.

Shuja. As reported, but no mention is made of Sardar Reschid in the note, though this was done verbally.

Possession of landed property. Russian Government refuses to recognise Persian interpretation of clause 5 of the Treaty of Turkmanchai.

Withdrawal of Russian troops. As reported, but no mention made of gendarmerie.

Note concludes with a pregnant paragraph calling the attention of Persian Government to the impropriety of allowing itself to be influenced by foreign advisers who are not concerned in a question which should be dealt with by Russia and Persia alone. Turkish Embassy and German Legation are specially meant, the latter, I think, unjustly.

[34037] No. 76.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(No. 201.)
Sir, *Tehran, July* 15, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Ahwaz, now in camp at Ispahan, dated the 5th instant, reviewing the situation as regards the survey of the Mohammerah-Khoremabad railway line, and making certain suggestions as to the line of policy which His Majesty's Government should pursue in the near future with a view to the continuance of the work.

Since writing the despatch enclosed herewith Captain Ranking has telegraphed to me, under date the 10th July, reporting an interview with the Governor-General of Ispahan, from which it is evident that all thought of taking the line by the Diz route must be abandoned. I had the honour to record the result of the above-mentioned interview in my despatch No. 197 of the 12th instant.

The Governor-General of Luristan, Nizam-es-Sultaneh, has now arrived at Burujird, and reports that he was warmly received by the townspeople. He has expressed confidence in his ability to see the survey party through this autumn.

I would be grateful for a reply by telegraph on the subject of Captain Ranking's proposals respecting visits to the Vali of Pusht-i-Kuh and Nizam-es-Sultaneh.

Should you approve his proposed course of action, I would beg to suggest that the Persian Railways Syndicate should be invited to send the necessary instructions to Dr. Young, also by telegraph.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 76.

Captain Ranking to Sir W. Townley.

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Camp Ispahan, July* 5, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to address your Excellency on the subject of the Mohammerah-Khoremabad Railway. Before dealing with the future it will not be out of place briefly to sum up the situation as it stands at present. In April, when I returned to Ahwaz to resume charge, the Railway Syndicate's survey party had returned from Dizful unsuccessful, and had taken up their residence in Ahwaz pending an improvement in the situation.

Owing to charge of the consulate being handed over in Mohammerah and to Captain Grey's hurry to catch at Basra the same mail-boat as I came up in, I had no conversation about railway affairs but from the file in this office it appeared to me eminently desirable that some active steps should be taken to relieve the *impasse* as soon as possible.

Considering that it might be possible to find an alternative route, I suggested and obtained your Excellency's permission to take Dr. Young and Mr. Douglas, both of the railway syndicate, with me on summer tour. I had in mind to attempt to find a feasible route viâ the Diz River Valley, but at the time had not yet been able to get into touch with the ilkhani of the Bakhtiaris, Sardar-i-Jang, who I believed would be willing to do his utmost to make such arrangements as would give us a reasonable hope of getting through safely.

I was particularly anxious that something should be done and a show of work maintained, in order to revive our prestige, which, I understand, had received a set-back by the failure of the party to get through in the spring from Dizful.

At the same time I had to consider what the results would be if we started off without sufficient guarantee and suffered another reverse. The element of personal danger weighed nothing, but the consequence of anything again going wrong would have been fatal to the whole project.

Meanwhile, during the time taken up in reference to His Majesty's Government, I had an opportunity of seeing the Sardar-i-Jang, which I seized.

I broached the matter to him on the 8th May, but he refused to undertake the responsibility for various reasons, *inter alia*, the lateness of the season and the unrest among the tribes; he, however, said he would bear the proposition in mind when making arrangements for Bakhtiari tribal administration in the high country, with a view to making the journey possible in the autumn.

We agreed to let the matter stand thus till we should meet in the high country.

In order to have a second string to my bow, I got into touch with a confidential servant of the Vali of Pusht-i-Kuh, to whom I sent a letter asking him if he were willing to see me through by yet another route which I had in mind, which, in the light of experience gained on a tour through Pusht-i-Kuh in 1908, I considered might prove a feasible solution of our difficulties. On sanction being accorded to Dr. Young and Mr. Douglas accompanying me, I suggested that they should join me some time in the summer in Ispahan, on the pretext of having obtained leave to come up for "a change of air;" our departure together in the autumn would appear natural as we would all be, ostensibly, heading for Arabistan.

I lay great stress on the point that the less publicity given to our intentions, the more unexpected will be our arrival on the route to the Luris in general, and the greater our chances of success and doing the journey cheaply.

Since leaving Arabistan I have been in communication with the Vali of Pusht-

i-Kuh, both directly and through His Majesty's Consul, Kermanshah, who has kindly forwarded letters and also communications sent to him in cypher for the Vali.

At the end of last month I learnt that Dr. Young and Mr. Douglas had received permission to join me in Ispahan and were leaving the oil fields on the 22nd June, and about the same time I received the Vali's reply, to the effect that he would undertake to see me through.

I am at present in difficulties for "toshakhana," none being left over from last year and the present year's supply not having yet arrived; moreover the present supply is most unsuitable for Lurs, comprising such things as silver coffee spoons and walking sticks, things for which they would not trouble to say "thank you." I have telegraphed to His Majesty's Political Resident, Bushire, asking for suitable articles or authority to buy locally and await his reply. I should prefer not to have to buy locally, as it would doubtless cause comment.

Such is the position as it stands at present.

Now, as regards the future, which has two sides, what I propose to do and how I propose to do it.

I had in mind two routes—the Diz route and the Pusht-i-Kuh–Luristan route. The practicability of visiting the former depends on my being able to make satisfactory arrangements for the safety of the party through the Sardar-i-Jang, ilkhani, whom it will be necessary to meet and consort plans with.

At present he has his hand more than full with the Kuhgilu campaign, and at the present moment is engaged in investing Likkak Fort in the low country.

The latter is arranged, and it only remains to decide on details. I shall continue to perfect my plans for the Pusht-i-Kuh–Luristan route, pending the return of the ilkhani to the high country.

When my plans are perfected I propose to leave Ispahan, accompanied by Dr. Young and Mr. Douglas, of the Railway Syndicate, ostensibly for Arabistan, taking care to have my muleteers' agreements so worded that I can go where I please on daily rate.

I shall give out that I am going viâ the Nejafabad route to the Chahar Mahal, and once out in the district I shall strike off towards Kermanshah.

As I have already said, I have not arranged minor details, but my present intention is to go to Kermanshah, where the Vali's sowars will meet me and conduct me to wherever he may be, either in Deh Bala, Gunjian Chamm, or Khoremabad; thence I shall go with him himself or his accredited agent—his son or some such person—to wherever the Nizam-es-Sultaneh, Governor-General of Luristan, may at the moment be.

There I shall try to arrange for Western Luristan to be handed over to the Vali of Pusht-i-Kuh to administer on behalf of the Nizam. (*Vide* my telegram No. 9 of the 23rd June, 1914, and your Excellency's reply thereto, No. 20 of the 25th June, 1914.)

I am of opinion that this move would be the quickest means of securing tranquillity in Luristan, and would be productive of the greatest practical and political benefit to the railway project.

It may be asked, Why go and see the Vali first? Why not see the Nizam-es-Sultaneh *en route* to Kermanshah?

For two reasons. The first: I must know definitely what conditions the Vali would impose to his undertaking the responsibility for the administration of Western Luristan, so that I can treat the matter in detail with the Nizam, and, if arranged to the satisfaction of all parties, having the Vali or his agent with me, arrange the matter on the spot; and, secondly, it will be easier to get to the Nizam under the Vali's escort, and will give us an opportunity of seeing the intervening ground.

The Nizam-es-Sultaneh may be in Khoremabad. If so, well and good; if not, I propose to go there, and thence viâ the route I have in mind to Shush and Dizful, over which route the Vali has undertaken to see the party safely through.

I am unable to give the names of the stages, but it passes in the vicinity of Saimarra, and for the sake of brevity I shall call it the Saimarra route.

Now with regard to the route in question, its pros and cons.

I will deal with the question in two parts, "financial" and "political."

As regards the first.

It is true that this route is rather longer than the one already surveyed, but I think it is more than probable that the extra length will be compensated for by facility in construction. The route already surveyed has some extremely heavy mountain work to be done, which will be consequently very costly, whereas this route is comparatively

free from difficulties; money which would have to be spent in overcoming difficulties of mountain configuration in the one would probably not be exceeded on the extra length in the other. The nearer we approach to Pusht-i-Kuh the lower the altitude and more rounded the conformation of the mountains.

This as regards initial expenditure; now as regards recurring expenditure after the line has been built.

The extra length will entail a larger cost for upkeep and consequent higher freights, but I am hopeful that the extra length will not be such as to make any appreciable difference under this head.

It is as regards the "political" side of the question that the great advantages of this route are apparent.

The route already surveyed passes through country in the hands of numerous Lur tribes, with whom it would be necessary to treat and make agreements for fodder, supplies, protection, &c.

These tribes are notoriously rapacious and unreliable, as we have already discovered to our cost, and their constitution so essentially democratic that in actual practice agreements would have to be made with an extremely large number of headmen, whose rapacity it would take an enormous sum of money to satisfy—these headmen, *bien entendu*, without authority over their tribesmen or the power to enforce it even had they got it.

It is unnecessary for me to dilate on this subject, past reports speak for themselves.

Over the proposed route, given that it is possible to arrange for the administration of Western Luristan to be handed over to the Vali, we should have to deal with one man only—the Vali—a man who has authority over his tribesmen and the power to coerce them. Even supposing the arrangement which I propose does not come off, we should still only have to treat with at most two men—the Vali and Nazar Ali Khan, Salar Akram. It is unnecessary for me to point out how much easier it would be to satisfy even two men and to make agreements with them, than the hoard of rapacious scoundrels on the other route.

The Vali, I feel sure, will do all in his power to meet our wishes, particularly if your Excellency deems fit to concur in the suggestions, which I shall now submit for your approval. When in Pusht-i-Kuh in 1908, the question of a caravan road was broached to the Vali, who expressed himself ready to do his utmost, only asking in return that when the project had reached a successful issue, His Majesty's Government should give him some decoration "like Sheikh Khazaa'l of Mohammerah," who is regarded in Luristan as the quintessence of a successful man.

What decoration I leave to superior authority to decide, but I most strongly recommend that I be authorised to tell the Vali confidentially, that in the event of his giving us his whole-hearted support, on the railway project reaching a successful issue His Majesty's Government will give him some decoration as a reward, in the same manner as it has deemed fit to reward the Sardar Arfa's services, and whole-hearted support.

The Vali's support which will be no mean asset in the Luristan, would be cheaply bought at the price of a decoration, and meanwhile the promise of it will enable us, I hope, metaphorically to wind him round our little fingers.

My other suggestion is that I be authorised to tell the Vali that on the railway being built, whether administered as a State railway or by a private company, we will use our good offices to try and obtain for him some percentage of the shares, on the analogy of the Bakhtiari Khans' shares in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

This will interest him in the successful working of the line. By these means I hope to secure his co-operation both during the preliminary stage of survey, and also during construction and maintenance of the line.

This brings me to another aspect of the question. I would premise the remarks I am going to make by assuring your Excellency that they are not actuated by any wish to be "the only pebble on the beach," but merely by the sincere desire to make this mission a success in the best interests of the railway syndicate, and by the knowledge, born of experience, that unless we adopt the means I suggest, we shall be running grave risks of not attaining the fullest measure of success, let alone any possibility of failure or disaster.

My suggestion is with regard to the defining of the relative spheres of Mr. Douglas, Dr. Young and myself. Only by a clear definition of our respective duties will possibilities of friction be avoided and the best results obtained.

First of all I propose to give this mission as little railway colour as possible

outwardly. I propose to let it be said that it is merely a consul making a tour in the ordinary course of events, accompanied by a doctor (Dr. Young) and a friend (Mr. Douglas) who is interested in photography, geology, "drawing pictures," &c. With this end in view I have ordered my sub-assistant-surgeon in Ahwaz to sent up two field panniers and intend, if my general suggestion is approved, to ask Dr. Young to attend to any sick Lurs, who may present themselves in camp for treatment.

By this means I hope to be able to do the journey cheaper than if it is openly stated to be a railway survey party.

Moreover, if it were to be given out that this was a survey party connected with the railway, it is quite possible that the Bairanwand, Dirakwand or other Lurs, might attempt to give vent to their spleen, where they would not bother their heads about a consular party under the escort of a brother Lur chief.

Of course with the Vali we shall deal otherwise, and shall of necessity tell him confidentially as to the nature of our visit, and its real object; even so I must strongly deprecate his being allowed to get any idea that he can deal with anyone except the consular representative. He must understand that there is one man and one only with whom he has to deal.

I have sufficient experience of negotiations both in this country and on the Indian frontier, and of Oriental character to know that anything else will spell if not failure, at least a large increase in ths price we shall have to pay for what we are treating for.

Mr. Douglas's position is easy, he is the syndicate's representative charged with the surveying duties of the mission.

Dr. Young is their representative, who is coguisant with their general policy, and I suggest that he should occupy the position of adviser, in matters where the syndicate's interests are directly concerned, to His Majesty's consular representative, who would, as far as possible, be guided by this advice—except in cases, which I trust will never arise, where it would obviously jeopardise the safety or the success of the mission.

In pursuance of this general policy all payments should be made through His Majesty's representative, who, as above, would be guided as far as possible by the syndicate's adviser. Similarly any agreements, if drawn up, would be done in consultation with him.

I have known Dr. Young for many years and we have been associated in many negotiations in the relative positions of His Majesty's representative conducting the negotiations and adviser on behalf of the British interest for whom the negotiations were being put through, and our relations have always been of the happiest.

I have a very high opinion of Dr. Young and absolute confidence in him and feel sure that I can rely on his common sense should ever any case arise, in which we do not see eye to eye; but the relative positions must be defined. I have always laid stress on this point and to its having been put into force I attribute the absence of friction and happy relations, which have been a characteristic of past negotiations.

There is yet another matter which requires defining—the general policy of the mission, and broadly, its scope.

Its primary object is to traverse and make a preliminary survey, &c., of a certain route, which I have defined elsewhere in this despatch.

Is it considered desirable—as I consider it to be, besides being necessary—to make a preliminary agreement with the Vali in regard to supply, protection, &c., "should it be decided to bring the main survey party by this route"; the guiding policy in framing which agreement would be to secure the passage of the main survey party as cheaply as possible compatible with safety, at as early a date as possible after the arrival of this mission—always presupposing a favourable report on the route by Mr. Douglas --in Arabistan.

Having in view the urgency of the case and the fact that the sooner we start work, the less it will cost the syndicate ultimately, I would request that I may be favoured with a reply to this despatch at the earliest possible date, so as to enable me to start directly my arrangements are perfected.

I have, &c.

J. RANKING, *I.A., His Majesty's Vice-Consul and Assistant Resident, Ahwaz.*

[34453] No. 77.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(No. 211.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, July 28, 1914.*

MY telegram No. 206 of 27th July: Recall of Farman Farma.

Following from consular officer at Kermanshah:—

"My Russian colleague has forbidden Governor-General to leave, and has endeavoured to obtain closing of bazaars as protest against recall of Governor-General. Majority of shops have not done so."

[34454] No. 78.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(No. 212.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, July 28, 1914.*

ST. PETERSBURGH telegram No. 170 of 26th July: Reza.

Reference to my telegram No. 196 of 16th July will show that it was never claimed that Reza had been captured.

Charge against the Governor-General easy one to make against any Persian official, but is, I have reason to believe, unfounded in present case.

[34483] No. 79.

Mr. Howard to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(No. 15.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Stockholm, July 28, 1914.*

PERSIAN gendarmerie.

Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that the French Minister here has received a telegram from the French Minister at Tehran, who has charge of Swedish interests there, asking for authorisation to present an ultimatum to the Persian Government on behalf of the Swedish gendarmerie officers in following terms: "Unless the gendarmerie receive the pay due to them by 1st August, Swedish officers would return home at once." Minister for Foreign Affairs replied to French Minister that Swedish Government could not authorise such an act, as they had promised His Majesty's Government that Swedish officers should remain until 1st March next.

[33896] No. 80.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 164.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 28, 1914.*

YOUR telegram No. 205 of 26th July: M. Mornard.

I hope you may induce M. Mornard to remain in office for the present. The question cannot be dealt with adequately at St. Petersburgh at the moment.

[34458] No. 81.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 389.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 28, 1914.*

SIR W. TOWNLEY'S telegram No. 197 of 16th July: Russian seizure of northern customs receipts.

You should point out to Russian Government that it is most desirable to avoid a financial collapse in Persia; that we are advancing 50,000*l.* to prevent gendarmerie under Swedish officers breaking down in Kerman and Fars; that we have many pecuniary claims of our own against Persia, but are not pressing them, and that I hope

Russian Government will not choose this moment to press claims upon Persian Government and withhold money from them. The method described in Sir W. Townley's telegram does not seem to be in accord with the statement in last Russian memorandum that no taxes collected and paid into the Russian Bank are withheld from Persian Treasury.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 165.)

[34640] No. 82.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(No. 213.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, July 29, 1914.*

MY telegram No. 211 of 28th July: Recall of Farman Farma.

Following from consular officer at Kermanshah, 28th July:—

"I learn that, on receipt of recall, Governor-General sent a verbal message to my Russian colleague, asking for his assistance. Yesterday, at the palace, my Russian colleague sent Cossack to summon merchants, and told them that he would not let Governor-General go, and they must assist him in this.

"If this Governor-General remains my Russian colleague will be practically Governor.

"Every day Governor-General remains is dangerous, as he may incite disorder. Directly he departs Sardar Motizid can take steps to preserve order. My Russian colleague attributes the recall of Governor-General to director of customs, whom he says he has reported."

Russian Minister told me yesterday that orders to prevent Governor-General leaving Kermanshah were sent direct from St. Petersburgh. He said that he has received no instructions in the sense of communication made by Russian Ambassador as contained in your telegram No. 161 of 23rd July.

He promised to telegraph to St. Petersburgh that I consider Governor-General personally responsible for disorders, and Sardar Motizid more capable of restoring order.

[34674] No. 83.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(No. 183.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, July 29, 1914.*

YOUR telegram No. 389 of 28th July: Russian seizure of northern customs receipts.

Russian Government state that Russian Minister's action described in Sir W. Townley's telegram No. 197 of 16th July was taken to meet pressing requirements of Cossack brigade, whose pecuniary position was like that of Swedes. Statement mentioned in Russian memorandum referred to taxes collected through Russian consulates, and has no connection with northern customs.

Russian Government are negotiating an early advance to Persian Government which will more than cover sum impounded.

[34453] No. 84.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 401.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*

SIR W. TOWNLEY'S telegrams Nos. 211 of 28th July and 213 of 29th July: Recall of Farman Farma.

Situation at Kermanshah is most prejudicial to British interests (see Tehran telegram No. 192 of 12th July) and Russian consul's attitude prevents improvement.

Please urge Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to send stringent orders on the subject.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 168.)

[34792] No. 85.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 30.)

(No. 214.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, July 30, 1914.*

MY telegram No. 207 of 27th July: Gendarmerie.

I am now in receipt of official acceptance by Persian Government, under the conditions of control stipulated, of advance of 50,000*l.* on account of gendarmerie of Fars and Kerman. Indian moiety has been already placed to my account at the Imperial Bank of Persia.

[34880] No. 86.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 30.)

(No. 186.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, July 30, 1914.*

YOUR telegram No. 401 of 29th July: Kermanshah.

As Minister for Foreign Affairs is engrossed with the European crisis, I have written a private letter to the head of the competent department requesting immediate despatch of stringent instructions and expressing my regret that, at a moment when we are doing all we can to assist Russia in her dispute with Austria, Russian consuls in Persia should adopt so unfriendly an attitude towards us.

[34892] No. 87.

Major Knox to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 30.)

(No. 4.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bushire, July 30, 1914.*

PLEASE refer to "India Office to Foreign Office," No. 25231, dated 5th June, just received. On 17th July I received information from Biscoe that Mr. Langdale, of Anglo-Persian Oil Company, had arrived at Kishm, and commenced drilling operations near Salagh. I asked Trevor for particulars, and learn that Anglo-Persian Oil Company lately have been rushing Greenwood, manager of Mohammerah branch, to expedite operations, which are described as more ambitious than prospecting. It is said that Admiralty instructed Admiral Peirse to give all assistance in landing stores at Henjam. In view of letter first quoted it appears of prime importance at once to stop all operations, or, better, work in such a way that experiment proves failure and is abandoned in despair. I suggest that urgent orders be issued to Admiral to instruct Langdale to carry out whichever course appears to His Majesty's Government more expedient.

(Addressed to Government of India; repeated to Naval Commander-in-chief and Senior Naval Officer, Biscoe, Karachi, Mohammerah, and Foreign Office.)

[34996] No 88.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

(No. 216.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, July 31, 1914.*

STOCKHOLM telegram No. 15 of 28th July: Persian gendarmerie.

Chief Swedish instructor, having received no answer to telegram sent to Stockholm by French Minister, presented ultimatum to Prime Minister two days ago. Gist is that if about 120,000 tomans (12,000*l.*) are not forthcoming to-morrow, Swedes will refuse responsibility for discipline of the gendarmes and ask Swedish Government to recall them. As previously reported, I have relieved tension at Shiraz and Kerman, but the necessary money is most urgently required elsewhere, as there is grave danger of the gendarmes revolting and taking to highway robbery. It is but natural that Swedes should seek to dissociate themselves from all blame should their men get out of hand.

I have been strongly pressed to alienate portion of 50,000*l.* advanced by His Majesty's Government to relieve immediate pressure, but I have refused on the ground that your instructions to me forbid me to take such a step. Moreover, assurances of early repayment are not good enough. Unless money can be found situation will become serious.

[36881] No. 89.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)

(No. 196.)
(Telegraphic). R. *St. Petersburgh, August* 1, 1914.

MY telegram No. 186 of 30th July: Kermanshah.

Head of competent Department of Ministry for Foreign Affairs states that Russian Minister at Tehran and consular officer at Kermanshah have been instructed to contribute in every possible way to restoration of order in that province.

Acting consul has replied that detachment of Cossacks have been called in to restore order from Hamadan. (End of R.)

Acting consul has complained of attitude of His Majesty's consul at Kermanshah, and begs that latter may be instructed to examine situation with him and concert as to measures to be taken.

Head of Department urges that instructions in the above sense be sent to His Majesty's consul at Kermanshah.

Minister for Foreign Affairs, to whom I spoke yesterday, promised to have categorical instructions sent to Russian consuls in Persia to maintain correct attitude.

[34996] No. 90.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Howard.

(No. 11.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 1, 1914.

SIR W. TOWNLEY'S telegram No. 216 of 31st July: Gendarmerie.

I appreciate reply of Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs to French Minister. His Majesty's Government have just advanced 50,000*l.* for gendarmerie purposes, and I much hope that at this critical moment officers may be induced to remain.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 430, and Tehran, No. 172.)

[36883] No. 91.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 3.)

(No. 221.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, August* 3, 1914.

MY despatches Nos. 197 of 12th July and 201 of 15th July.

Captain Rankin telegraphs that he has received a letter from the Vali of Pusht-i-Kuh, from which it appears that he is being appointed Vali of Luristan. Rankin considers this proposal favourable to the scheme he has in view.

Vali has asked Rankin to abandon Burujird. He will thus be able to see Nizam at the same time and arrange matters direct.

I suggest that Rankin's proposals be sanctioned with the least possible delay, as the season is advanced.

[36885] No. 92.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 7.)

(No. 225.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, August* 7, 1914.

RUSSIAN Minister told me to-day that he had received instructions from St. Petersburgh to demand dismissal of Samsam-es-Sultaneh as Governor-General of Ispahan on grounds that he has been consistently hostile to Russian interests. He asked whether I had any objection.

I replied that Russian Government are free to take what steps they like in the Russian zone, but I added that, as far as I could gather, Samsam-es-Sultaneh's only fault has been that he has endeavoured to maintain Persia's rights against the policy of Russian aggression in Central Persia, which would, I felt, be sure to lead some day to trouble between our two Governments.

I had occasion to inform Russian Minister that the Russian consul-general is accused of seeking to win over Sardar Jang, the present ilkhani of the Bakhtiaris and custodian of the Ahwaz road, by means of bribe, action which it seemed to me, if confirmed, His Majesty's Government might well resent in view of our old-established friendly relations with Bakhtiaris.

Russian Minister said he personally much disapproved of this forward policy in Central Persia, which has its origin at St. Petersburgh.

[37414] No. 93.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 8.)

(No. 226.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, August* 8, 1914.

MY telegram No. 213 of 29th July.

Governor-General of Kermanshah left on 5th August leaving Sirdar Mutizid in charge.

[36885] No. 94.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 472.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 9, 1914.

SIR W. TOWNLEY'S telegram No. 223 of 7th August: Governor-General of Ispahan.

Your Excellency should bring substance to notice of Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and point out that while the two countries are making common cause in Europe, it is a matter of sincere regret to His Majesty's Government to find this continuous hostility of Russian authorities in Persia towards the Bakhtiari in whom His Majesty's Government are known to be greatly interested.

I trust I may rely on M. Sazonof to check it effectively.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 176.)

[38994] No. 95.

Captain Wilson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 14.)

(No. 12.)
Sir, *Camp Belkha, May* 26, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your information, a copy of a despatch which I have to-day addressed to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, giving cover to a declaration made by M. Minorsky and myself (whilst acting for Mr. Wratislaw) regarding the rights of the Persian Sanjabi tribe in the Lut-i-Baghchah lands, situated south of the Elvend River, and submitting explanations regarding the circumstances under which the declaration came to be made by us.

I have, &c.
A. T. WILSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 95.

Captain Wilson to Sir L. Mallet.

(No. 37.)
Sir, *Camp Belkha, May* 26, 1914.

WITH reference to paragraphs 3 to 5 of my despatch No. 32, dated the 1st May, I have the honour to enclose, for your Excellency's information, and for such action as may be deemed necessary, a copy of a declaration made by M. Minorsky and myself (whilst acting for Mr. Wratislaw) regarding the rights of the Persian Sanjabi tribe in

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the Lut-i-Baghchah lands, situated between the Elvend River and latitude 33°. I also enclose, for convenience of reference, extracts from the *procès-verbaux* of the Commission, showing the circumstances under which the declaration in question came to be made.

2. The documents are self-explanatory, and no detailed comment on my part seems to be called for. M. Minorsky and I, when the question was first raised, were of opinion that, failing express stipulations in any particular case to the contrary, the demarcation of the frontier did not prejudice the existing grazing rights of Persian or Turkish tribes across their respective frontiers. This view was tacitly accepted by both the Turkish and Persian commissioners in the case of the Bani Lam, a very large tribe of Arabs, Turkish subjects, many thousonds of whom enter Pusht-i-Kuh annually.

When, however, the Persian commissioner claimed similar treatment for the Sanjabi, his Turkish colleague procrastinated, and finally refused, on the ground that the said tribe had, according to information furnished to him by local officials, no right to graze in the lands in question.

3. In point of fact, as mentioned in our declaration, everything goes to show that they have for many years been the sole occupants of the Lut-i-Baghchah lands, which were regarded as Persian territory until awarded to Turkey as a result of the negotiations of 1912–1914 at Constantinople, Mahmud Shevket Pasha having shown much anxiety to secure them for his Government.

4. The Sanjabi are a small but influential tribe: if the Turks try to prevent them from returning in the autumn across the frontier to their grazing grounds, or attempt to levy taxes from them, they will probably meet force by force; their only alternative is to find winter grazing grounds elsewhere in the Zohrab district, restricted as it now is by the cession of large areas to Turkey, and the sanguinary disputes with their tribal neighbours, which will necessarily ensue, could only have an adverse effect on British commercial interests, which have already suffered almost irreparable injury by the deplorable condition of the Bagdad–Karmanshah road.

I understand that M. Minorsky is making similar representations to his embassy, and I venture to hope that your Excellency will feel able, in communication with the Russian Ambassador, to urge upon the Porte the expediency of permitting the Sanjabi to remain in enjoyment of their pasturage rights in the Lut-i-Baghchah district south of the Elvend River.

In order to save time I am sending a copy of this despatch, with enclosures, to His Majesty's Foreign Office.

I have, &c.
A. T. WILSON.

Enclosure 2 in No. 95.

Declaration.

SE rapportant à la discussion qui a eu lieu à la séance du 16 mai, concernant les droits des Sindjabis sur les terrains près de la montagne de Baghtché, les commissaires britannique et russe croient devoir exposer le résultat de leurs investigations personnelles à ce sujet:

1. D'après Dervich Pacha (chapitre 29 de son rapport), du temps de la visite de la première Commission (1849–52), les hivernages des Sindjabis s'étendaient sur les plaines: entre Khanékine, Kyzyl Robat, la rive droite de l'Abi-Naft et la rive gauche du Guilan; les Sindjabis regardaient ces yaylas comme leur propriété personnelle et ne payaient pas d'impôts à Bagdad.

2. Les rapports récents des représentants officiels britanniques et russes confirment également la présence des Sindjabis en hiver sur les territoires s'étendant jusqu'à Kyzyl Robat.

3. Les soussignés ont pu constater personnellement la présence des nombreux campements Sindjabis à l'est de la montagne de Baghtché entre l'Abi-Naft et l'Elvend. On nous a également confirmé le fait que les Sindjabis échangent et vendent exclusivement entre eux-mêmes leurs pâturages à Baghtché. Il est surtout à noter qu'actuellement il n'a pas d'autres tribus qui viennent aux pâturages susmentionnés près de Baghtché et qui puissent en contester la possession aux Sindjabis.

Vu ce qui précède, nous croirions juste que la tribu des Sindjabis restât en pleine jouissance de tous leurs droits de pâturages sur les territoires à l'est de Baghtché transférés à la Turquie à la suite de la présente délimitation basée sur le protocole final.

V. MINORSKY.
A. T. W.

Balkha, le 13 (26) *mai*, 1914.

Enclosure 3 in No. 95.

Extract from Procès-verbal of Thirty-second Sitting of Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

M. LE COMMISSAIRE persan demande qu'on reconnaisse aux Sindjabis le droit de profiter, comme par le passé, de leurs pâturages restés du côté ottoman. Ce droit, dit-il, a été reconnu pour les tribus turques venant à Dalamper.

M. le commissaire ottoman fait observer que, lors de la rédaction du protocole final, il avait proposé une formule générale disant que les deux parties reconnaîtront aux tribus le droit de profiter de leurs pâturages restés de l'autre côté de la frontière. Cette proposition n'avait pas été, dit-il, agréée. Si, ajoute-t-il, on tient à ce que les Sindjabis profitent de leurs pâturages restés du côté ottoman, il ne pourra répondre qu'après s'être informé auprès des autorités de Khanékine s'ils ont ce droit.

M. le commissaire russe convient que lors de la discussion du protocole on avait jugé préférable de ne pas généraliser explicitement ce qui a été reconnu pour Dalamper. On avait pensé, ajoute-t-il, que c'était une chose sous-entendue.

M. le commissaire persan ajoute que le droit de pâturage des Sindjabis ne peut être mis en doute et que le fait de la délimitation de frontière entre deux États ne peut porter atteinte aux droits privés.

Enclosure 4 in No. 95.

Extract from Procès-verbal of Thirty-sixth Meeting of Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

LA question des droits de pâturage des Sindjabis dans les terrains de Baghtché et Katar en territoire ottoman a occupé d'abord la Commission.

M. le commissaire ottoman fait savoir qu'il a reçu de son Gouvernement la réponse que cette question devra être traitée par voie diplomatique entre les deux Gouvernements intéressés, et que son règlement n'entre donc pas dans les attributions de la Commission.

M. le commissaire persan cite comme précédent le cas de Dalamper (mentionné dans le protocole de Constantinople), qu'il considère comme une preuve de ce que la Commission est chargée de la discussion des droits de pâturage.

M. le commissaire britannique, appuyé par son collègue russe, propose que les commissaires des deux Puissances intéressées adressent à la Commission des déclarations en forme exposant leurs points de vue, après quoi il serait disposé à exprimer son propre avis. De cette façon les vues des commissaires se trouveraient résumées au procès-verbal de la séance, dont des copies pourraient être remises immédiatement aux quatre Gouvernements. Cette proposition a été agréée par MM. les commissaires persan et ottoman. M. le commissaire persan exige toutefois que les Sindjabis soient laissés en jouissance des pâturages jusqu'à ce qu'une décision définitive ait été prise.

Enclosure 5 in No. 95.

Extract from Procès-verbal of Thirty-ninth Meeting of Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

ON a fait lecture ensuite des déclarations présentées par MM. les commissaires persan et ottoman conformément à la résolution prise à la trente-sixième séance concernant le droit de pâturage des Sindjabis. Ces déclarations se trouvent annexées au présent procès-verbal. MM. les commissaires britannique et russe font savoir qu'il émettront un exposé de leur vue sur cette question à une prochaine séance.

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Enclosure 6 in No. 95.

Declaration communicated to Mediating Commissioners by Persian Commissioner.

LE droit de pâturage des tribus persanes et particulièrement les Sindjabis dans les territoires cédés à la Turquie est chose incontestable : Dervich Pacha et Khourchid Pacha l'affirment dans leurs rapports,* et MM. les commissaires ont pu s'en informer et constater surtout l'existence des quartiers divers de cette tribu dans les territoires cédés.

Ceci étant, il est, je crois, trop difficile, sinon impossible à la Commission de se rallier à la déclaration de M. le commissaire ottoman, suivant laquelle la Commission n'aurait pas de compétence pour solutionner la question du droit de pâturage des Sindjabis. Car la mission même de délimiter la frontière comporte celle de solutionner les questions subsidiaires qui surgiraient à cet effet.

Des précédents essentiellement frappants existent dans les annales—si l'on peut ainsi dire—de notre Commission. En effet, le protocole de Constantinople a solutionné la question de pâturage des Kader Vyssi à Dalamper. La Commission elle-même a déjà pris une décision relativement aux droits privés des Filis et du Vali de Poucht-i-Kouh à Bagsaye.

Bien plus, si M. le commissaire ottoman ne se croyait pas compétent pour réglementer la question du droit de pâturage des Sindjabis, comment l'aurait-il abordée et discutée dans les séances tenues à l'Abi-Naft et à Kanibuz ?—séances dans lesquelles il n'a nullement soulevé son incompétence et a seulement demandé du temps pour se renseigner à Khanékine.

Dans ce cas je ne puis donc nullement me rallier à son opinion et laisser en suspens le règlement définitif de cette question.

En conséquence, je prie MM. les commissaires des Puissances médiatrices de vouloir bien, conformément au principe d'après lequel le transfert d'un territoire par un État à un autre ne peut porter aucune atteinte aux droits des habitants, reconnaître formellement et au sein de séance l'existence, comme par le passé, du droit de pâturage des Sindjabis et autres droits privés (propriété, &c.) que les tribus persanes peuvent avoir dans les territoires cédés.

Je dois en terminant ajouter que si malgré l'invraisemblance de décliner la compétence, MM. les commissaires des Puissances médiatrices croiraient devoir se rallier à l'opinion de mon collègue ottoman et remettre la solution définitive de la question à des négociations diplomatiques, la Commission devra au moins décider que l'état des choses actuellement existant sera respecté jusqu'au règlement définitif de la question par voie diplomatique.

ETELA-OL-MULK.

Kasr, le 13 *mai*, 1914.

Enclosure 7 in No. 95.

Declaration communicated to Mediating Commissioners by Turkish Commissioner.

JE soussigné, commissaire Impérial ottoman, déclare que j'ai reçu de mon Gouvernement des instructions me prescrivant de communiquer à la Commission que la question du pâturage des Sindjabis ne figurant pas parmi les attributions de la Commission, la solution doit être réservée à des négociations ultérieures entre les deux Gouvernements.

AZ. SAMIH.

Kasr-i-Chirine, le 19 *mai*, 1914.

Enclosure 8 in No. 95.

Extract from Procès-verbal of Forty-second Meeting of Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

LECTURE a été donnée de l'exposé de MM. les commissaires britannique et russe de leur point de vue au sujet des droits de pâturage des Sindjabis. Il a été décidé d'annexer cet exposé au présent procès-verbal.

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* Chapitre 29, Rapport Dervich Pacha.

[39258]

No. 96.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 15.)

(No. 282.)
(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburgh, August 14, 1914.

DISMISSAL of Governor of Ispahan.

I spoke to Minister for Foreign Affairs some days ago and left with him an *aide-mémoire* embodying your telegram No. 472 of 9th August and Tehran telegram No. 225 of 7th August.

Reply now received is too long to telegraph. It recapitulates all the grounds of complaint which Russia has against Samsam, whose hostile attitude against everything Russian fully justified demand for his recall. It states in a postscript that Sir W. Townley has expressed his readiness to advise Samsam to resign, and desires that thanks of Imperial Government may be conveyed to you for this.

It declares that Russian Government cherish no unfriendly feelings towards Bakhtiari, and states that Russian consul-general categorically denies having offered bribes referred to. It also expresses regret that activity of Russian subjects at Ispahan, in Russian sphere, should be viewed with alarm by His Majesty's Legation at Tehran.

I personally think that it is a mistake to make strong representations about such matters as reported bribes, which we are apparently unable to prove, or Samsam's recall.

If we are ready to advise him to resign, representations lose all their force if constantly repeated, and I only trust that it may be found possible, before war is over, to try to arrive at some definite understanding with Russia on all those questions in Persia which cause friction between the two Governments.

[39561]

No. 97.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 15.)

(No. 229.)
(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 15, 1914.

KHAN of Maku, who is at the same time Governor of the district, has been arrested by order of Russian consul and carried off with his son under escort to Tiflis, where his life is in danger. Prime Minister, who seeks your good offices to secure Khan's release, complains that this arbitrary arrest of a Persian Governor on Persian soil was carried out without any reference to Persian Government, apparently on the order of the Viceroy of the Caucasus.

Russian Minister disclaims all responsibility, and says that he is powerless to prevent these infringements of Persia's sovereign rights.

Russians are also reported to have set up a police administration at Tabriz without reference to Persian Government at Tehran, while Shuja has made a public announcement that the taxes should be paid to the Russian consulate-general and that no attention should be paid to the Treasury agents.

I understand from the British consul that the Russian consul-general has informed him that police officers have come for the purpose of watching certain undesirables from the Caucasus now at Tiflis.

[39521]

No. 98.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 15.)

(No. 230.)
(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 15, 1914.

YOUR telegram No. 180 of 14th August : Advance to Persia.

Reference to my telegrams Nos. 216 and 217 of 31st July and No. 219 of 2nd August will, I think, serve to show that the Persian Government have for some time been in sore need of money for the gendarmerie. The 50,000*l.* recently advanced by His Majesty's Government were to meet pressing needs of the gendarmerie in Fars and Kerman. Money has been and will be devoted to that purpose, but meanwhile no funds have been found to meet wants of the remainder of the gendarmerie, who are twice as numerous in the north as in the two above-mentioned southern provinces. Reference to my despatch No. 107 of 14th April will show that the gendarmerie

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budget now amounts to over 40,000*l.* a month. There is now some hope that loan alluded to in my telegram No. 217 may be negotiated, as the Russians have modified their conditions, but the financial situation remains very serious.

[38291] No. 99.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 530.) R.
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 15, 1914.

DISMISSAL of Samsam-es-Sultaneh.

My telegram No. 472 of 9th August.

Russian Embassy inform me that Governor-General at Ispahan is openly hostile, and refuses to entertain just demands of Russian consul. Russian Government therefore demand his recall, and desire support of British Legation.

Past events at Ispahan and our special interests in Bakhtiaristan make me reluctant to support on the meagre particulars at present available a Russian demand of this grave nature. If His Majesty's Government were to associate themselves with this demand for the dismissal of the principal Chief of the Bakhtiaris, who has, moreover, hitherto done his best to keep order among his tribesmen and on the southern trade routes, our position in southern Persia would be seriously imperilled. This is a danger of such magnitude, especially at the present critical state of affairs, that, with the best will in the world, His Majesty's Government cannot consent to having their hands forced in this manner. It is quite clear from our information that the troubles at Ispahan are directly due to the action of the Russian consuls, and His Majesty's Government desire to make an earnest appeal to the Russian Government not to allow their subordinate officials by any rash action or advice to stir up further trouble in Persia. It is a matter of great regret that the Russian Government did not instruct their Minister at Tehran to discuss the situation with Sir W. Townley before putting forward their demand, which may now render it exceedingly difficult for the two legations to suggest a satisfactory solution of the existing difficulties.

His Majesty's Government trust it is not too late to urge that the Russian Minister at Tehran should be directed to refrain from pressing a demand which cannot but aggravate the difficulties to which vital British interests in southern Persia are at the present moment exposed.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 181.)

[40434] No. 100.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 317.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 15, 1914.

I TOLD Count Benckendorff to-day that Samsam-es-Sultaneh, whom the Russians were asking to have removed from his post at Ispahan, was the chief of the Bakhtiaris, his influence extended into the neutral zone, his removal would disturb the southern trade route, and for Russia at this moment to press such a step would be very wrong. The Russian consuls were apparently working up a case against Samsam at Ispahan, as if they thought that he should be as amenable as a Governor at Azerbaijan, but they really must not take this opportunity to push their influence further south into the neutral zone and upset trade there.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[39838] No. 101.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 17.)

(No. 231.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, August* 16, 1914.

PRIME Minister has asked me to inform you that a Turkoman deputation has come to Tehran to complain to the Shah of the tyranny and persecution of the Russian consul at Astrabad. It is stated that for the last eight months, as I have already

reported, Russian consul has been seizing their lands and those of the State through certain traitors, and has forced them to sign contracts selling these lands to Russian subjects and protected persons.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 555.)

[40201] No. 102.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 17.)

(No. 233.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, August* 17, 1914.

RUSSIAN action in Persia.

St. Petersburgh telegram No. 282 of 14th August.

Samsam will resign at a word from me. I told my Russian colleague that it appeared to me better that I should secure his resignation, if Russian Government were determined upon it, rather than that Russia should increase her unpopularity in Persia by demanding dismissal of a man who has occupied post of Prime Minister, and whose chief fault is that he refuses to recognise unjustifiable contention of Russian officials that representatives of Governor-General have no right to penetrate into villages leased or administered by Russians. This holds good in neutral as well as in Russian zone, and makes it very hard to hold the Governor-General responsible for maintenance of order on the roads, the security of which is seriously threatened in district between Kashan and Ispahan.

Samsam has not been very diplomatic in his handling of very awkward question, which has been created solely by Russian methods, for which Zil-es-Sultaneh's sons are in no small measure responsible. It is desirable, in the interests of peace on Bakhtiari road and south of Ispahan, that a Bakhtiari should be for the present Governor-General of Ispahan, but I am doubtful whether Russians will agree to the appointment of anyone but a creature of their own. Sardar Bahadur, the eldest son of Sardar Assad, is the best and most reliable candidate. He should prove more capable than Samsam of coping with the situation. His name will be proposed by the Persian Government, but will probably meet with Russian opposition.

(Confidential.)

Russian Minister has told me that Russian consul-general categorically denies the story of a bribe, but Captain Ranking has quoted long list of reliable persons in support of his report. In telling my Russian colleague what I had heard, I said I could not believe that story until I had more proof, but it served to show that policy pursued by Russia has created a belief that they would stick at nothing in order to damage British interests in Southern Persia.

(Addressed to Foreign Office; repeated to Ispahan.)

[40202] No. 103.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 17.)

(No. 294.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, August* 17, 1914.

RUSSIAN action in Persia.

I spoke to Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning in the sense of your telegram No. 530, and gave him *aide-mémoire* embodying its contents.

He could not give me definite answer, as he wanted to look up telegrams which he had recently received from Tehran, one of which had stated that Sir W. Townley had expressed his readiness to support request for Samsam's recall. With regard to Bakhtiaris, he said that it was but natural that Russia should object to their influence being exercised in Russian sphere.

In the course of conversation I mentioned arrest of the Khan of Maku, reported in Tehran telegram No. 229 of 15th August. Minister for Foreign Affairs said that khan had been repeatedly warned that he must stop intriguing with Turks. This was thing which Russia could not tolerate, more especially at the present moment when there was grave reason to fear that Turkey was contemplating seizing some of Persian frontier districts. As there was clear proof of khan acting in collusion with Turkey, he had been arrested, and as he had refused to go to Tehran he had been taken to Tiflis.

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[40937] No. 104.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 19.)

(No. 301.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, August* 19, 1914.

RESIGNATION of Samsam-es-Sultaneh.

My telegram No. 294 of 17th August.

Following is translation of telegram, dated 12th August, from Russian Minister at Tehran to Minister for Foreign Affairs:—

"Sir W. Townley, with whom I have had a conversation, has declared his readiness to meet our wishes as to replacing Samsam-es-Sultaneh by another official. He will to-day advise Samsam to resign. Choice of a successor may cause delay."

[41088] No. 105.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 19.)

(No. 236.)
(Telegraphic) *Tehran, August* 19, 1914.

FINANCIAL situation in Persia.

Mustaufi-el-Mamalek has succeeded in forming a Cabinet after much difficulty. Ala-es-Sultaneh, who takes Ministry for Foreign Affairs, is the only member of the old Cabinet remaining. Cabinet is not a strong one, but the new Prime Minister found it impossible to persuade the men he wanted to join him in the face of the hopeless financial situation and of the fact that Russia has practically annexed civil and financial administration of five northern provinces and Ispahan. With a certain heavy fall in the customs receipts in consequence of war and a large proportion of the northern revenues collected by Russian consuls without any control of the Persian authorities, it is impossible for the Government to even guess at what they may have to spend.

New Prime Minister has expressed fervent hope that His Majesty's Government may come to the assistance of Persia to relieve financial stringency.

Unless help is forthcoming, it seems as if collapse is inevitable.

Further details will follow when I have seen Prime Minister.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 573.)

[40201] No. 106.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 564.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 19, 1914.

DISMISSAL of Governor of Ispahan.

Your telegram No. 294 of 17th August and Sir W. Townley's telegram No. 233 of 17th August.

While I will of course await definite reply of Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, I earnestly hope that he will not press for removal of Samsam, since, as his Excellency is aware, His Majesty's Government attach great importance to the retention of a leading Bakhtiari khan at Ispahan, which affects the neutral zone so much. Should Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs insist on his removal, it is imperative that Sardar Bahadur should be appointed, and not some incompetent figure-head.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 188.)

[42454] No. 107.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 24.)

(No. 230.)
Sir, *St. Petersburgh, July* 28, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of an *aide-mémoire* from the Russian Government in reply to the *aide-mémoire* which I handed to M. Sazonof embodying the various complaints with regard to the actions of the Russian consulate-general at Ispahan, mentioned in Sir W. Townley's despatch No. 163, Confidential, of the 10th June last and telegram No. 193 of the 13th instant.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 107.

Memorandum.

A LA suite de l'aide-mémoire de l'Ambassade britannique en date du 6 (19) juillet courant, le Gouvernement Impérial a invité la Légation Impériale à Téhéran à examiner les plaintes du Gouverneur général d'Ispahan et de donner les ordres nécessaires au consulat Impérial dans cette ville, si ces plaintes se trouvaient être bien fondées.

Quant à la démission éventuelle de Samsam-es-Saltaneh, l'attitude de ce fonctionnaire envers le consulat Impérial ayant été de tout temps malveillante, le Gouvernement Impérial verrait sa retraite non sans satisfaction.

Saint-Pétersbourg, le 14 (27) *juillet*, 1914.

[42433] No. 108.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 24.)

(No. 557.)
Sir, *Constantinople, August* 13, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith two despatches from the British commissioner on the Turco-Persian Frontier Commission, transmitting the Commission's *Procès-verbaux* Nos. 45 to 51, and reporting on the work of demarcation from Khan-Guermela to Kouh-i-Koce Rescha.

I have, &c.
H. D. BEAUMONT.

Enclosure 1 in No. 108.

Mr. Wratislaw to Sir L. Mallet.

(No. 41.)
Sir, *Halousa, June* 19, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Excellency herewith copies of the *Procès-verbaux* of séances Nos. 45 to 51 of this Commission.

I have, &c.
A. C. WRATISLAW.

Enclosure 2 in No. 108.

Procès-verbal of Forty-fifth Meeting of Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

SÉANCE tenue à Belkha, le 31 mai, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire persan.

Étaient présents tous les commissaires.

Le procès-verbal de la quarante-troisième séance a été signé.

MM. les commissaires médiateurs, conformément à la décision prise à la séance précédente, donnent lecture de leur proposition pour le tracé de la frontière entre le Sirvan et la ramification ouest des montagnes d'Avroman s'élevant au nord de la vallée de Khan-Guermélé. Cette proposition est comme suit:

"La ligne frontière, du point près de Beyzel spécifié dans le Procès-verbal No. 41, remontera le Sirvan jusqu'à l'endroit vis-à-vis de la chaîne de Kalagha, qui s'approche de la rivière à une distance d'à peu près 2 milles à l'est de l'embouchure de son tributaire droit venant de Tavilé, Palani et Hawar.

"De là la frontière, quittant le *medium filum aquæ*, montera sur la crête de Kalagha et ensuite de Palani. Puis, suivant toujours le partage des eaux, elle passera entre les villages de Chouchmé et de Sousekan et montera sur le pic de Souni, d'où elle descendra dans la vallée de Tavilé au point à être établi par la Commission et correspondant à la frontière actuellement reconnue entre les terrains de Desaver et de Tavilé.

"De là la ligne montera sur la crête de la colline s'élevant à un demi-mille de distance au nord-est du village de Tavilé, puis descendra jusqu'à la jonction du ravin venant de la grande chaîne d'Avroman avec l'autre ravin formant la ramification nord de la vallée de Tavilé. Ensuite la frontière suivra le chemin passant du côté gauche de ce dernier jusqu'au col conduisant au ravin dont les eaux se déversent dans le ruisseau de Khan-Guermélé à un et quart mille au sud dudit village. Après le susdit col la frontière

(qui laissera du côté turc le village de Dega-Cheikh-Khan) sera établi après la fixation sur les lieux du point séparant les terrains de Khan-Guermélé de ceux de Biaré.

" De ce dernier point la frontière montera sur la ramification ouest des montagnes d'Avroman s'élevant au nord de la vallée de Khan-Guermélé pour se diriger vers le nord par la grande chaîne.

" La frontière précitée :

" 1. Laissera du côté turc le village de Belkha-Oulia, appartenant comme propriété privée aux sujets persans, mais donnera à la Perse un petit terrain qui pourra servir de communication entre Desaver et Khan-Guermélé ;

" 2. Laissera du côté turc les trois villages de Darimar, Khanideng et Guetchine, qui sont les dépendances de Khan-Guermélé, appartiennent aux sujets persans et ont été occupés par les troupes ottomanes après 1905. Les commissaires médiateurs exposeront leur témoignage définitif à ce sujet après leur visite sur les lieux.

" Il est bien entendu que le principe du maintien des droits de propriété privée déjà existants sera appliqué dans le cas des susdits villages de Belkha-Oulia, Guetchiné, Khanideng et Darimar.

" Fait à Belkha, le 18 (31) mai, 1914.

" A. C. WRATISLAW."
" V. MINORSKY."

Après sa lecture, MM. les commissaires ont longuement discuté le tracé proposé.

M. le commissaire persan déclare qu'il lui est absolument impossible de s'écarter du *statu quo* de 1905, étant donné que ses instructions ne le lui permettent pas, et il est prêt à référer l'affaire à l'arbitrage.

MM. les commissaires médiateurs font remarquer qu'ayant attentivement examiné la situation, la frontière qu'ils proposent leur paraît la seule possible. Ils engagent donc leurs collègues ottoman et persan à accepter ce tracé, et à éviter ainsi une perte de temps inutile en ayant recours à l'arbitrage.

Dans ces conditions MM. les commissaires persan et ottoman déclarent s'incliner devant l'inévitable et accepter le tracé proposé.

M. le commissaire persan demande à son collègue ottoman si le Gouvernement ottoman à l'intention de faire des difficultés à la libre circulation sur la route de Belkha. M. le commissaire ottoman répond qu'il ne le croit pas.

On constitue une sous-commission chargée de faire ériger des bornes aux endroits précisés dans les instructions qui leur furent remises.

On decide en outre que MM. les commissaires se rendront à Tavilé pour fixer sur les lieux la frontière actuellement reconnue entre les terrains de Dezaver et de Tavilé et y faire ériger des bornes.

M. le commissaire russe, devant partir pour Pendjevine, déclare que pendant son absence M. le commissaire-adjoint le remplacera.

En conséquence, on a arrêté pendant cette séance la frontière entre le Sirvan et les montagnes d'Avroman au nord de la vallée de Khan-Guermélé.

Fait à Belkha, le 31 mai, 1914.

V. MINORSKY.
A. C. WRATISLAW.
AZIZ SAMIH.
ETELA-OL-MULK.

Enclosure 3 in No. 108.

Procès-verbal of Forty-sixth Meeting of Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

SÉANCE tenue à Tavilé, le 1er juin, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire ottoman.

Étaient présents les commissaires britannique, persan et ottoman et le commissaire-adjoint russe.

Conformément à la résolution prise à la séance précédente, MM. les commissaires se sont rendus sur les lieux pour déterminer la limite actuellement reconnue entre les terrains de Tavilé et de Dezaver. Ils ont consulté les notables des deux villages, lesquels leur ont désigné un mur correspondant à la limite de leurs terrains respectifs. Ce mur commence sur la pente de la vallée de Tavilé, à gauche en descendant, à la

lisière des terres cultivées. Descendant au cours d'eau, il le traverse et remonte la pente en face jusqu'à ce qu'il atteigne la route qui va de Tavilé à Dezaver. Ce mur a été accepté par MM. les commissaires comme la frontière des deux États. Deux bornes ont été érigées, l'une au commencement du mur et l'autre à l'endroit où il atteint la susdite route.

MM. les commissaires ont ensuite suivi la route dans la direction de Tavilé, et ont constaté qu'à partir de la deuxième borne les propriétés des habitants des deux villages situées au nord de la route étaient entremêlées les unes avec les autres sur une certaine distance, cinq jardins étant la propriété des habitants de Dezaver et cinq la propriété des habitants de Tavilé.

M. le commissaire ottoman avance qu'il serait naturel que la frontière parte directement de la borne érigée sur la route pour se diriger au sommet d'une colline située au nord et formant un partage des eaux, les habitants de Dezaver n'ayant, dit-il, que cinq jardins du côté ottoman.

M. le commissaire persan soutient, au contraire, que la section occupée en commun appartient au village de Dezaver, que l'eau lui est fournie de Dezaver, et que même les habitants de Tavilé qui y possèdent des jardins paient la taxe de cette eau à Djaffar Sultan. Pour ces raisons il réclame comme frontière le ravin situé au côté sud du dernier jardin appartenant à un habitant de Dezaver, et distant d'à peu près un demi-mille de la borne érigée sur la route.

Aucune frontière raisonnable moyenne entre celles réclamées par les parties intéressées n'étant trouvable, MM. les commissaires médiateurs ont recommandé la ligne proposée par M. le commissaire persan. M. le commissaire ottoman déclare accepter dans un esprit de conciliation cette ligne, à condition, toutefois, que son collègue persan garantit le maintien des droits privés des habitants de Tavilé dans la section susmentionnée. M. le commissaire persan fait une déclaration dans le sens voulu. La frontière telle qu'elle a été établie suit donc la route vers Tavilé pour une distance d'à peu près un demi-mille à partir de la seconde borne susmentionnée jusqu'au ravin situé entre les collines de Demi Schenan à l'ouest et de Kouvitch à l'est, l'intersection de la route avec le ravin étant marquée par une borne érigée par l'ordre de la Commission.

Ensuite MM. les commissaires se sont rendus à Avi-Sar pour marquer l'endroit où la frontière, après avoir remonté le susdit ravin jusqu'à sa tête et traversé les collines appelées Demi Schenan, descend en ligne droite pour atteindre le sentier qui conduit de Tavilé à Khan-Guermélé, laissant ainsi des sources d'eau à la Turquie. A cet effet un grand rocher de 5 mètres de hauteur, situé à environ 20 mètres au nord-est du sentier, a été reconnu comme borne.

Finalement, MM. les commissaires ont chargé une sous-commission de se rendre à l'endroit où le susdit sentier traverse le col de Nel-i-Keminé et de marquer ce point par l'érection d'une borne.

M. le commissaire ottoman, devant partir pour Alefdjé, déclare qu'en son absence son adjoint le remplacera.

En conséquence, cette séance a été vouée à la démarcation de la frontière près de Tavilé.

Fait à Tavilé, le 1er juin, 1914.

AZIZ SAMIH.
D. BELAIEF.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
A. C. WRATISLAW.

Enclosure 4 in No. 108.

Procès-verbal of Forty-seventh Meeting of Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

SÉANCE tenue à Biaré, le 2 juin, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire britannique.

Étaient présents :

Pour la Grande-Bretagne : Mr. Wratislaw.
" Perse : Etela-ol-Mulk.
" Russie : M. Belaief.
" Turquie : Abdul Hamid Bey.

Le procès-verbal de la quarante-quatrième séance a été lu et approuvé

MM. les commissaires ont ensuite considéré la ligne que la frontière doit suivre en passant entre Biaré et Khan-Guermélé.

M. le commissaire persan relève que les propriétés des habitants de chaque village s'étendent jusqu'au delà de l'autre village, ce qui empêche de trouver une ligne qui ne laisserait pas des jardins turcs du côté persan et *vice versâ*. Aussi il propose qu'on recherche la frontière déjà reconnue entre les deux États.

M. le commissaire britannique y répond que le principe de délimitation accepté pour cet endroit est que la frontière devra suivre la limite séparant les terrains de Biaré et de Khan-Guermélé. Il s'agit de vérifier cette ligne le mieux possible.

Il a été convenu, en conséquence, que MM. les commissaires ottoman et persan feront aussitôt des recherches pour constater ladite limite et que la Commission procédera à la demarcation de la ligne-frontière le lendemain, la séance étant fixée pour 8 heures du matin.

M. le commissaire britannique prie qu'on amène deux individus de parmi les principaux villageois des deux côtés pour donner témoignage.

M. le commissaire-adjoint ottoman attire l'attention de la Commission à la nouvelle qu'il a reçue, que Djaffar Sultan, accompagné d'une suite nombreuse et armée, est en route pour Khan-Guermélé, quoique la garnison ottomane n'a pas encore reçu des ordres pour évacuer la place. En vue de la possibilité d'un incident regrettable, MM. les commissaires médiateurs prient leur collègue persan de prendre toutes les mesures possibles afin d'empêcher l'arrivée de cette force, en lui promettant de ne pas quitter le district avant que la question de l'évacuation de Khan-Guermélé ait été réglée. En conséquence, M. le commissaire persan s'est engagé à prendre les mesures nécessaires.

Enfin, une sous-commission a été constituée pour ériger des bornes des deux côtés du chemin qui conduit de Dega-Cheikh-Khan vers l'est.

Fait à Biaré, le 2 juin, 1914.

A. C. WRATISLAW.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
D. BELAIEF.
A. HAMID.

Enclosure 5 in No. 108.

Procès-verbal of Forty-eighth Meeting of Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

SÉANCE tenue à Khan-Guermélé, le 3 juin, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire persan.

Étaient présents :

Pour la Grande-Bretagne : Mr. Wratislaw.
" Perse : Etela-ol-Molk.
" Russie : M. Belaief.
" Turquie : Abdul Hamid Bey.

Le procès-verbal de la quarante-cinquième séance a été lu et approuvé.

La séance a commencé par la lecture, au nom du commissaire-adjoint ottoman, de la déclaration suivante :

" *Déclaration.*

" Les autorités Impériales ottomanes de Hanikine, se basant sur l'article 6 du protocole final, avaient dernièrement envoyé à Tchiga-Surkh un détachement de gendarmes pour y maintenir l'ordre et la sécurité publique. Ce détachement a été empêché, par les autorités persanes de la localité, de s'installer à Tchiga-Surkh, et afin d'éviter un accident grave il a dû rentrer à Hanikine.

" Le Gouvernement Impérial ayant, conformément aux stipulations du protocole, plein droit d'établir des postes sur la frontière définitivement établie, la conduite des autorités persanes ne peut s'expliquer.

" Je soussigné, commissaire-adjoint Impérial ottoman, déclare par conséquent qu'avant l'évacuation complète des terrains déjà délimités et revenant à la Turquie, le Gouvernement Impérial ne pourra, à son grand regret, retirer ses troupes de Khan-Guermélé.

" Pour prévenir un arrêt fâcheux des travaux de délimitation, qu'il faut absolument éviter, je prie M. le commissaire Impérial persan instamment de recourir

d'urgence aux moyens propres à faire respecter auxdites autorités les stipulations du protocole.

" Le Commissaire-Adjoint Impérial ottoman,
" *Biaré, le 3 juin*, 1914." " A. HAMID.

M. le commissaire-adjoint ayant développé sa déclaration, M. le commissaire persan réplique qu'il ne voit pas de similitude entre la question de l'occupation ottomane de Tchia-Sourkh et celle de l'évacuation de Khan-Guermélé. Tchia-Sourkh ayant été transféré à la Turquie, il demande par quel droit le Gouvernement ottoman refuse d'évacuer Khan-Guermélé.

M. le commissaire-adjoint ottoman répète que la gendarmerie ottomane a été empêchée de s'installer à Tchia-Sourkh et dit qu'il veut savoir s'il y a dans cette région des autorités ou des soldats réguliers persans.

M. le commissaire britannique appuie également sur la nécessité d'avoir des renseignements précis à ce sujet. Si les personnes qui se sont opposée à la gendarmerie ne sont pas des autorités régulières, il trouve que les deux cas, de Tchia-Sourkh et de Khan-Guermélé, ne sont point du même ordre.

M. le commissaire persan répond qu'il ne peut pas dire s'il y a, ou non, des autorités persanes à Tchia-Sourkh. En tout cas il n'y a pas là de soldats régulièrs. Samsam-ol-Mamalik est Gouverneur de Kasr-i-Chirine, mais MadjidKhan et les tribus kurdes du district ressortissent du Gouverneur général de Kermanchah.

M. le commissaire britannique dit que, puisque la question de l'évacuation de Khan-Guermélé ne saurait nullement influencer les tribus kurdes de Tchia-Sourkh, il semblerait superflu de différer l'évacuation.

M. le commissaire-adjoint russe soumit alors la proposition que M. le commissaire persan fasse une déclaration dans le sens ci-après indiqué, en adressant en même temps un télégramme au Gouverneur de Kasr-i-Chirine, et qu'en revanche M. le commissaire ottoman s'engage à faire des démarches pour amener l'évacuation de Khan-Guermélé.

Cette proposition est appuyée par M. le commissaire britannique, et M. le commissaire-adjoint ottoman l'accepte en disant qu'une telle déclaration, appuyée par la dépêche dudit télégramme, répondrait aux nécessités de la situation.

A la fin d'une courte discussion M. le commissaire persan a fait lecture d'un télégramme adressé au Gouverneur de Kasr-i-Chirine et de la déclaration suivante :

" Le commissaire persan déclare qu'il n'a aucune raison de croire que le Gouvernement Impérial de Perse ait donné des ordres pour empêcher l'occupation de Tchia-Sourkh par le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman. Il est cependant prêt à télégraphier à Samsam-ol-Mamalik et au Gouverneur général de Kermanchah en leur confirmant le transfert de Tchia-Sourkh et des parties de Zohab (transférées) à la Turquie et en les invitant à prendre des mesures nécessaires pour qu'aucune difficulté n'y soit créée à l'installation des autorités ottomanes.

Quant à la suspension de l'évacuation de Khan-Guermélé jusqu'à l'occupation de Tchia-Sourkh, il déclare que ce sont deux choses absolument différentes et qu'il ne peut nullement croire que le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman veuille recourir à de tels actes de représailles.

" ETELA-OL-MULK."

MM. les commissaires médiateurs ont enfin exposé leur point de vue en faisant la déclaration qui suit :

" En vue des déclarations ci-haut énoncées des commissaires des deux pays limitrophes, les commissaires des Gouvernements médiateurs saisissent l'occasion pour émettre leur avis qu'il n'y a plus de raison pour retarder l'évacuation par les troupes ottomanes du village persan de Khan-i-Guermélé (Khan-Guermélé).

" A. C. WRATISLAW.
" D. BELAIEF.

" *Khan-i-Guermélé, le* 21 *mai* (3 *juin*), 1914."

En conséquence, on a discuté pendant cette séance l'évacuation de Khan-Guermélé et l'occupation de Tchia-Sourkh par le Gouvernement ottoman.

Fait à Khan-Guermélé, le 3 juin, 1914.

ETELA-OL-MULK.
A. C. WRATISLAW.
D. BELAIEF.
A. HAMID.

Enclosure 6 in No. 108.

Procès-verbal of Forty-ninth Meeting of Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

SÉANCE tenue à Khan-Guermélé, le 5 juin, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire-adjoint russe.

Étaient présents MM. les commissaires britannique, persan et ottoman et M. le commissaire-adjoint russe.

Le procès-verbal de la quarante-quatrième séance a été signé, et ceux des séances 46, 47 et 48, ainsi que les rapports des deux sous-commissions nommées respectivement aux séances 45 et 46, ont été lus et approuvés. Ces rapports se trouvent annexés au procès-verbal.

M. le président engage ses collègues à discuter la question du passage de la frontière entre les villages de Biaré et Khan-Guermélé.

M. le commissaire persan veut attendre l'évacuation de Khan-Guermélé avant qu'on se livre aux recherches sur les lieux. M. le commissaire ottoman également croit utile d'attendre. M. le commissaire britannique, cependant, proteste vivement contre la perte de temps que ceci imposerait, et on décide de procéder dès maintenant à l'œuvre, tout en réservant l'érection des bornes jusqu'à ce que la question de l'évacuation aura été réglée. Toutefois, les témoins locaux ne s'étant pas présentés, on a dû différer les recherches sur les lieux à l'après-midi.

M. le commissaire ottoman désigne comme frontière naturelle une ligne passant à quelque distance de l'endroit où se trouve le campement de la Commission persane. Cette ligne, dit-il, correspondrait à la limite des derniers jardins de Biaré et laisserait à celui-ci la tête d'un canal qui fournit l'eau à plusieurs villages en bas.

M. le commissaire persan répond que les jardins se trouvent entremêlés à un tel degré qu'il vaudrait mieux rechercher la frontière reconnue entre les deux États.

La séance a été reprise à 3 heures du soir à un endroit se trouvant au-dessus du village de Biaré.

La Commission a procédé immédiatement à l'interrogatoire des témoins, qui ont donné leur témoignage ainsi que suit :

Q. Où se trouve la limite entre les propriétés de Biaré et de Khan-Guermélé ?

R. (Biaré). Les propriétés sont entremêlées ; nous ne pouvons pas dire où est la limite.

R. (Khan-Guermélé). Tout ce qui est en haut des deux canaux latéraux est à Khan-Guermélé. Les terrains compris entre les canaux sont à Biaré. Le col du versant gauche marque le point où la frontière descend de la montagne dans la vallée.

Q. A qui sont les maisons en haut du canal de la rive droite ?

R. (Biaré). A la Perse.

Q. Jusqu'où s'étendent les propriétés des deux côtés ?

R. (Khan-Guermélé). Les propriétés de Khan-Guermélé vont jusqu'en aval de Biaré ; celles de Biaré jusqu'au campement persan (à moitié chemin entre Biaré et Khan-Guermélé).

Q. A qui appartient la majorité des propriétés situées entre le campement persan et Biaré ?

R. (Khan-Guermélé). La majorité à Khan-Guermélé. Trois sont aux habitants de Biaré.

R. (Biaré). Sept ou dix sont à Biaré.

Q. Combien y a-t-il ?

R. Environ cinquante.

Q. Est-ce qu'il y a des propriétés en haut du canal qui appartiennent à Biare ?

R. Non.

On demande à plusieurs habitants de Biaré s'ils paient de l'argent pour l'eau des canaux qui arrose leurs propriétés. Tous répondent qu'ils ne paient rien. Les quatre témoins de Khan-Guermélé et de Biaré se retirent ensuite pour compter plus exactement les jardins entre Khan-Guermélé et Biaré appartenant aux deux parties. Le résultat de leur compte est comme suit :

A Biaré, quinze jardins ; à Khan-Guermélé, cinquante-sept jardins.

M. le commissaire ottoman déclare que l'individu qui a servi d'interprète aux témoins est un homme de Djaffar Sultan. Les gens de Biaré ont eu peur de dire la

vérité quand ils ont vu que l'homme de Djaffar Sultan était là et que c'était par son entremise qu'on les questionnait. Il fait observer que dans ces conditions la déposition ne peut pas être considérée impartiale et par conséquent valable. Il ajoute que d'après ses enquêtes la majorité des jardins doit appartenir aux habitants de Biaré. Le malentendu provient de ce qu'il y a des gens de Biaré qui ont plusieurs propriétés à la fois. Il semble qu'on compte les propriétaires et mon les jardins. On devrait en outre prendre en considération l'étendue de ceux-ci pour pouvoir faire un calcul sérieux et juste. Il y a encore un point, dit-il, une vingtaine de maisons appartiennent à des gens venus de Khan-Guermélé et domiciliés depuis un grand nombre d'années à Biaré. Si on prend en considération tout ceci, la grande majorité des jardins appartient incontestablement à Biaré. M. le commissaire déclare enfin que, ne comprenant pas les langues kurde et persane, il n'a rien compris de toutes les questions et réponses.

M. le commissaire persan répond que le témoin appelé de Biaré a dit, au contraire, que ce sont les autorités gouvernementales turques qu'il redoutait. Quant à l'interprète, celui-ci était un simple guide pris de Balkha.

M. le commissaire russe ne croit pas que les témoins craignent de donner témoignage véridique. On devrait accepter leur témoignage.

M. le commissaire britannique insiste sur la nécessité d'assurer aux villageois turcs la liberté de se servir de l'eau des canaux.

Un accord ne pouvant pas s'établir entre les commissaires des Gouvernements intéressés, on décide d'avoir recours à l'arbitrage.

En conséquence, la Commission a fait pendant cette séance des recherches sur les lieux afin de déterminer la limite entre les propriétés de Khan-Guermélé et de Biaré.

Fait à Biaré, le 5 juin, 1914.

D. BELAIEF.
A. C. WRATISLAW.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
AZIZ SAMIH.

Enclosure 7 in No. 108.

Rapport.

CONFORMEMENT aux instructions ci-annexées, nous, soussignés, sommes rendus sur la crête de Kalaga, du mont Palani et sur le col situé entre Sousekan et Chouchme et avons fait ériger trois bornes dont suit la description :

1. Une borne sur la crête de Kalaga, située à une distance de 1¼ mille du bord du Sirvan en suivant la ligne de partage des eaux. Cette borne d'une hauteur de 1·50 mètre, à la base 1·30 mètre de diamètre.

2. Sur le sommet du mont Palani au sud-ouest du village de ce nom et à une distance d'environ 1 mille de celui-ci. Cette borne est d'une base et d'une hauteur de 1 mètre.

3. Sur le col par où passe la route Tavilé-Chouchme à environ 40 mètres au sud de ladite route. Hauteur, 1·70 mètre ; base, 1·50 mètre.

Toutes ces bornes, qui portent respectivement les Nos. 70, 71 et 72, sont construites avec de la pierre liée par le gypse.

Fait à Biaré, le 2 juin, 1914.

MANSOUR-OS-SALTANAH.
Capitaine ALIEF.
MEHMED NAMI.

Enclosure 8 in No. 108.

Instructions.

LA Commission a chargé :

M. Mansour-os-Saltanah,
M. le Capitaine Alief,
M. le Capitaine Mehmed Effendi,

d'ériger les bornes sur les crêtes de Kalaga, de Palani et sur le col entre les villages de Sousekan et Chouchme.

V. MINORSKY.
A. C. WRATISLAW.
AZIZ SAMID.
ETELA-OL-MULK.

Balkha, le 18 (21) *mai*, 1914.

Enclosure 9 in No. 108.

Rapport.

CONFORMÉMENT aux instructions annexées de la Commission, nous, soussignés, sommes rendus sur le col de Nali-Kamine, situé sur la route allant de Tavilé à Khan-Guermélé, et avons construit une borne sur un petit rocher à environ 10 mètres à l'est de la route. La hauteur de cette borne est à 2 mètres et la base 3 mètres y compris le rocher qui a servi de base de construction. La borne construite en pierres liées avec du gypse porte le No. 77.

A. HAMID.
MOUZAFFER.
Capitaine TSKHAKAYA.

Abi-Sar, le 1er *juin*, 1914.

Enclosure 10 in No. 108.

Instructions.

LA Commission a chargé :

M. Salar Mozaffer,
M. le Capitaine Tskhakaya,
M. Abdul Hamid Bey,

de se rendre à l'endroit où la route de Tavilé à Khan-Guermélé traverse le partage des eaux de ces deux villages et y faire ériger une borne.

A. S.
A. C. W.
D. B.
E. M.

Abi-Sar, le 1er *juin*, 1914.

Enclosure 11 in No. 108.

Procès-verbal of Fiftieth Meeting of Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

SEANCE tenue à Biaré, le 10 juin, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire ottoman.

Étaient présents MM. les commissaires britannique, persan et ottoman et M. le commissaire-adjoint russe.

Les cartes ci-après énumérées ont été signées :

Carte identique :

Feuille No. 4 : Exemplaire ottoman, dernière série.
" 5 : " "
" 6 : " "
" 7 : Deux exemplaires ottomans et trois exemplaires britanniques.

Carte supplémentaire :

Feuille No. 6 : Exemplaires russe et ottoman.
" 7 : " britannique et ottoman.
" 8 : " ottoman.
" 9 : " russe et ottoman et original.

Les procès-verbaux des séances 46, 47 et 48 ont été signés et celui de la dernière séance lu et approuvé.

M. le commissaire ottoman porte à la connaissance de la Commission que les troupes ottomans ont évacué le village de Khan-Guermélé.

M. le commissaire britannique donne lecture, au nom des commissaires médiateurs, de leur décision arbitrale au sujet de la frontière entre Khan-Guermélé et Biaré. Cette décision, ainsi que les exposés des deux parties intéressées, se trouve annexée au présent procès-verbal. Il est décidé d'annexer, en outre, un plan des jardins de Khan-Guermélé et de Biaré, levé par les soins du corps technique persan.

M. le commissaire persan lit ensuite la déclaration suivante :

"J'ai l'honneur d'attirer l'attention de MM. les commissaires des Puissances médiatrices sur ce qui suit :

"Conformément au Protocole de Constantinople, la ligne-frontière, arrivée au pic de Kamadjar, doit suivre les crêtes magistrales de la chaîne d'Avroman jusqu'à la ramification ouest de celle-ci située au nord de Déré-Vouli. Or, dans la ligne proposée par MM. les commissaires médiateurs on n'a tenu aucun compte de l'emplacement de Déré-Vouli (qui, par erreur, sur la Carte identique est confondu avec la vallée de Khan-Guermélé), et l'on a ainsi laissé à la Turquie le village de Guetchiné, dépendant de Khan-Guermélé et situé au sud de Déré-Vouli.

"Cette situation ayant été créée par l'inexactitude de la Carte identique d'une part, et étant absolument contraire au texte du Protocole de Constantinople, qui fait passer la frontière par la ramification ouest d'Avroman située au nord de Déré-Vouli d'autre part, je crois absolument indispensable que la rectification en soit faite au moment de l'application en détail de la ligne proposée par MM. les commissaires médiateurs sur le lieu de manière à faire passer la frontière, conformément au Protocole de Constantinople, par le nord de Déré-Vouli.

"Pour plus de clarté, j'ai l'honneur de soumettre à la Commission la carte des lieux dressée à l'échelle de $\frac{1}{16000}$.

"La Commission pourra, d'ailleurs, pour compléter ses renseignements, nommer une sous-commission de corps technique afin d'examiner ces lieux et donner son rapport, pour que le tracé définitif de la frontière soit faite en conformité du Protocole de Constantinople.

"Cette déclaration est appuyée par un levé du district en question dressé par les officiers techniques persans."

Après quelque discussion, il est décidé de soumettre l'objet de la déclaration persane à l'arbitrage des commissaires médiateurs, séance tenante.

MM. les commissaires médiateurs, après consultation, emettent la décision suivante :

"Les commissaires médiateurs se voient obligés de rejeter la rectification de frontière demandée par M. le commissaire persan dans la déclaration qu'il vient de présenter, vu que :

"1. Les rédacteurs du Protocole final, en parlant de Déré-Vouli, se basaient certainement sur la Carte identique, qui représente sous ce nom la vallée où se trouvent situés Khan-Guermélé et Biaré ; et

"2. La frontière a déjà été arrêtée par une décision de la Commission de manière à suivre les crêtes s'élevant au nord de la vallée de Khan-Guermélé."

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La Commission a fixé ensuite l'emplacement des bornes à faire ériger entre Khan-Guermélé et Biaré, et a décidé de s'y rendre dans l'après-midi pour surveiller leur érection. Une sous-commission a été chargée de faire construire une borne sur le chemin entre Khan-Guermélé et Khanédenk à l'endroit où il traverse le partage des eaux.

Il a été résolu que la Commission se transportera à Piran, où la prochaine séance aura lieu le 13 courant.

La Commission s'est rendue dans l'après-midi sur la rive droite de la vallée nommée Déré-Tekkiyé, et a fait ériger une borne (No. 81) sur ladite rive près du chemin qui conduit à Golpe. Une autre borne (No. 82) a été construite dans la même vallée, sur la prolongation de la ligne de la ramification ouest d'Avroman, s'élevant au nord de Khan-Guermélé. La Commission a fait ériger enfin une troisième borne (No. 80) à 5 mètres au-dessus du moulin d'Aciab Berzé.

Les dimensions de ces bornes sont comme suit :

No. 80 :	Hauteur,	1½	mètre ;	diamètre à la base,	1½	mètre.
No. 81 :	„	1·20	„	„ „	1	„
No. 82 :	„	2·20	„	„ „	2	„

Toutes les bornes sont construites de pierres liées avec du ciment.

En conséquence, au cours de cette séance MM. les commissaires médiateurs ont arrêté par décision arbitrale la frontière entre Khan-Guermélé et Biaré, et la Commission a entrepris le bornage de cette section de frontière.

Fait à Biaré, le 10 juin, 1914.

AZIZ SAMIH.
A. C. WRATISLAW.
D. BELAIEF.
ETELA-OL-MULK.

Enclosure 12 in No. 108.

Exposé communiqué par M. le Commissaire persan aux Commissaires des Puissances médiatrices.

QUOIQUE la Commission eût, d'avance, décidé que la démarcation de la frontière entre Biaré et Khani-Guermélé se ferait en se basant sur le témoignage de quelques notables pris parmi les habitants des deux villages, et qu'après ce témoignage il n'y eût plus de raison pour réjeter cette décision et référer la solution définitive à l'arbitrage ; cependant, ayant pleine confiance au bien-fondé de mes réclamations d'une part, et à l'esprit de justice et d'équité de MM. les commissaires arbitres d'autre part, et voulant enfin donner une nouvelle preuve de mon esprit de conciliation, je me suis rallié au désir de mon collègue ottoman pour référer à l'arbitrage l'objet de notre litige.

Ceci étant, je dois faire remarquer que malgré le témoignage si clair et si probant des deux notables de Biaré qui, dans la séance d'hier, ont sur tous les points confirmé les dires des notables de Khani-Guermélé, c'est-à-dire malgré la confirmation de ma réclamation par la partie adverse, je n'y devrais rien ajouter dans cet exposé et laisser la solution du litige à la conviction consciencieuse de MM. les arbitres. Toutefois, pour dissiper tout doute pouvant être né des prétentions de mon collègue ottoman et pour montrer que la frontière désignée d'un commun accord par les notables de Biaré et de Khani-Guermélé (frontière qu'ils ont déclaré avoir reconnue de père en père) concorde avec la réalité des faits, je crois nécessaire de joindre à cet exposé une liste complète des jardins situés au sud de Khani-Guermélé et commençant à partir du premier jardin qu'un habitant de Biaré possède sur le territoire du village persan. (Voir liste ci-annexée.)

En analysant cette liste, il ressort clairement que ces jardins sont en nombre de 72 et se divisent de la façon suivante :

(*a.*) Propriété de sujets persans habitant Khani-Guermélé ..	57 (environ 80 pour cent).
(*b.*) „ „ „ Biaré ..	7 („ 10 „).
(*c.*) Propriété de sujets persans habitant Khani-Guermélé, mais ayant une seconde résidence Biaré à cause d'une seconde femme qu'ils y ont épousée	4 („ 5 „).
(*d.*) Propriété de sujets turcs habitant Biaré	3 („ 4 „).
(*e.*) Propriété Wakf à la mosquée et au Khan-Ghah communs ..	1 („ 1 „).
Total	72 et 100 „).

On voit donc que les témoins cités tant par moi que par mon collègue ottoman avaient déjà compté parmi les jardins appartenant aux habitants de Biaré non seulement ceux possédés par les paysans de Khani-Guermélé qui habitent Biaré, mais même ceux possédés par les habitants de Khani-Guermélé qui ont une simple résidence à Biaré, à cause d'une seconde femme qu'ils y ont épousée.

Ainsi en comptant même tous ces derniers jardins parmi ceux possédés par les habitants de Biaré, ceux-ci n'entrent en compte que pour 20 pour cent seulement, tandis que les habitants de Khani-Guermélé possèdent de nombreux jardins en dehors de la limite indiquée par les notables et sur le territoire de Biaré.

Accepter les prétentions de M. le commissaire ottoman ne serait en réalité que reconnaître à la Perse le nom seulement de Khani-Guermélé, ce dernier ayant déjà à pleurer la perte de ses plus belles dépendances, comme Guetchiné, Derré-Mer et autres.

Je suis donc persuadé que MM. les commissaires arbitres, déjà convaincus par les témoins qu'ils ont entendus des deux côtés et dont les témoignages ont concordé d'une manière éclatante, ne changeront en rien au *statu quo* de la limite que les plus âgés des notables des lieux ont déclaré avoir toujours reconnue comme frontière entre les deux villages et par conséquent entre les deux États. Et le désaveu que mon collègue ottoman a voulu faire des témoins cités par lui-même ne doit que produire une influence défavorable à sa cause.

Voici, d'ailleurs, la description du *statu quo* susmentionné :

A partir de la borne érigée sur la colline au nord de Diga-Cheikh-Khan, la frontière suit la ligne de partage des eaux vers le sud jusqu'à l'endroit où un petit canal nommé Djoubi-Moro-Berri, et prenant sa source en face du village de Khani-Guermélé vient couper cette ligne de partage. De là elle descend dans la vallée et rejoint un plus grand canal portant le nom de Djoubi-Aciab-Berzé et qui dérive de la rive gauche de la rivière à quelque distance au sud du cimetière de Khani-Guermélé (250 mètres environ). Ensuite elle suit ce canal en amont jusqu'au près du moulin connu sous le nom d'Aciab-Berzé. De ce point elle coupe directement la vallée en largeur jusqu'au canal de Djoub-Kouh, qui dérive de la rive droite de la rivière et que la ligne frontière atteint au bas de quelques maisons faisant partie de Khani-Guermélé et situées presque immédiatement au nord des maisons de Biaré. Ensuite elle suit en aval ce dernier canal et va atteindre la ramification ouest de la chaîne d'Avroman située au nord de Déré-Vouli et en suivant la ligne de partage des eaux de cette ramification.

En terminant, je crois nécessaire d'ajouter que le *statu quo* ci-haut énoncé ayant toujours été reconnu par les habitants des deux villages, le moindre changement que pourrait y être apporté ne ferait que créer une inimitié entre les paysans des deux côtés et, peut-être, aboutir à la fin à des incidents fâcheux et regrettables dont personne ne voudrait certes pas que la responsabilité pèse sur sa conscience.

ETELA-OL-MULK.

Khani Guermélé, le 6 juin, 1914.

Enclosure 13 in No. 108.

Complete List of Gardens situated to the South of Khani-Guermélé.

No. d'Ordre des Jardins.	Nom du Propriétaire.	Son Origine.	Sa Résidence.
1	Mohammed Hamlé	Khani-Guermélé ..	Khani-Guermélé.
2	Seuounir Chérif	„ ..	„
3	Kader Mostafa	„ ..	„
4	Behram Hassan Bey	„ ..	„
5	Ali Hadji Aziz	„ ..	„
6	Yar Ahmed Hadji Aziz	„ ..	„
7	Behram	„ ..	„
8	Chérif Mohammed	„ ..	„
9	Khalifa Mohammed Hussein.	—	—
10	Mohammed Mohamed Mirza ..	Khani-Guermélé ..	Khani-Guermélé.
11	Kader Mohammed Medjnoun ..	„ ..	„
12	Aba-Bekr	„ ..	„

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No. d'Ordre des Jardins.	Nom du Propriétaire.	Son Origine.	Sa Résidence.
13	Mohammed Rahim Mostapha ..	Khani-Guermélé ..	Khani-Guermélé ..
14	Aba-Bekr Mohammed Medjnoun .	" ..	"
15	" " " ..	" ..	"
16	Nadir	" ..	" P.D.*
17	Fathollah Bey	" ..	"
18	" "	" ..	Chauchmi.
19	Agha Bey	..	Khani-Guermélé, P.D.*
20	Mahmoud Mohammed Mirza ..	Khani-Guermélé ..	"
21	Hussein Bey Mahmoud Bey ..	" ..	"
22	Fattah Rostam	" ..	"
23	Vahal Rostam	" ..	"
24	Omar Mohamed	" ..	"
25	Mohammed Kerim Aba-Bekr ..	" ..	"
26	Hadji Rahman	" ..	"
27	Behram Hassan Bey	" ..	"
28	Mohammed Perver	" ..	"
29	Fathollah Mohammed Morad ..	" ..	"
30	Osman	" ..	"
31	Nessa Khanom	" ..	"
32	" "	" ..	"
33	Hussein Mohammed	" ..	"
34	Ali Mohammed Mahmoud ..	" ..	"
35	Baktcha Ramazan	" ..	"
36	Sahral Mahmoud	" ..	"
37	Mostapha Bey	" ..	"
38	" "	" ..	"
39	Fathollah Cheikh Rahim	" ..	"
40	Ahmed Mohammed	" ..	"
41	Mohammed Hussein Fattah ..	" ..	"
42	Hassan Bey	" ..	"
43	Mohammed Bey	" ..	"
44	Mohammed Gholam Bey	" ..	"
45	Ostad Gholam	" ..	"
46	Fettah Bey	" ..	"
47	Mohammed Kerim Mirza	" ..	"
48	Feredj Khod Dost	" ..	"
49	Nader Mohammed Madjnoun ..	" ..	"
50	" " " ..	" ..	"
51	Mohammed Rahim Mostapha .	" ..	"
52	Seyed Rahim	" ..	"
53	Aba Bekr	" ..	"
54	Hadji Rehman	" ..	"
55	Mohammed Kerim Aba Bekr ..	" ..	"
56	Aziz Fattah	" ..	"
57	Mahmoud Mohammed Mirza ..	" ..	"
58	Ostad Rahman	" ..	"
59	" "	" ..	"
60	Ostad Rahim	" ..	"
61	" "	" ..	"
62	Mohammed Mahmoud	" ..	"
63	Ali Bey	" ..	"
64	Ostad Mohammed Mahmoud ..	" ..	Ceux-ci restent tantôt à Biaré tantôt à Khan-Guermélé, ayant épousé une seconde femme à Biaré.
65	Ostad Mohammed Mahmoud ..	"	
66	" " " ..	"	
67	Aziz Fettah	"	
68	" "	"	
69	Ostad Abdol Kerim	Biaré	Biaré.
70	Mohammed	"	"
71	Aziz	"	"
72	Khanegah et mosquée administré par Cheikh Nadjm-ud-Din.		

* P.D. veut dire Pouchté-Djoul et indique les quelques maisons de Khani-Guermélé situées près de Biaré et au délà de Djoub-Kouh.

Enclosure 14 in No. 108.

Exposé communiqué par M. le Commissaire ottoman aux Commissaires des Puissances médiatrices.

J'AVAIS déclaré à la dernière séance que les dires des villageois, à propos de la frontière des villages de Biaré et de Khani-Guermélé et du nombre de leurs jardins n'étaient pas du tout impartiaux et exemptes de pression quelconque, et j'avais affirmé que les jardins de Biaré sont et en nombre et en superficie plus grands que ceux de Khani-Guermélé.

1. Les jardins situés entre les deux villages ont été visités un à un. Deux croquis et listes on été dressés pour montrer le nombre, les noms des propriétaires et des villages qu'ils habitent ainsi que l'étendue approximative des jardins sur la rive droite d'une part et sur la rive gauche de l'autre, du petit ruisseau.

Des jardins de Biaré n'existant presque pas au delà du campement persan et les jardins des habitants de Khani-Guermélé situés à l'ouest de Biaré étant hors de cause, l'examen a été limité à la partie des deux rives se trouvant entre Biaré et ledit campement.

Ainsi, quand en prend en considération séparément les jardins situés sur la rive droite et ceux de la rive gauche, montrés sur les croquis et les listes, on remarque bien de différences.

Ainsi, des jardins se trouvant sur la rive droite :

Ceux de Biaré sont au nombre de vingt-quatre et leur superficie 102,622 mètres carrés.

Ceux de Pich-Djougué (quartier de Biaré) au nombre de dix et leur superficie de 17,750 mètres carrés.

Ceux de Khani-Guermélé au nombre de onze et leur superficie de 57,450 mètres carrés.

La proportion entre les nombres est de $\frac{1}{2}$.
La proportion entre leur superficie est de $\frac{1}{2}$.

Sur la rive gauche :

Ceux de Biaré sont au nombre de vingt-huit et leur superficie de 299,100 mètres carrés.

Ceux de Khani-Guermélé sont au nombre de vingt-huit et leur superficie de 114,900 mètres carrés.

La proportion des nombres est de $\frac{1}{1}$ et celle de la superficie de $\frac{1}{3}$.

Si on additionne le nombre des jardins :

	Biaré a	Pich-Djougé a	Khani-Guermélé a
Rive droite	24	10	11
Rive gauche	28	..	28
Total	52	10	39

Si on additionne d'autre par les superficies :

	Biaré a	Pich-Djougé a	Khani-Guermélé a
Rive droite	102,622	17,750	57,540
Rive gauche	299,100	..	114,900
Total	401,722	17,750	172,530

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Pich-Djougué étant un quartier de Biaré, si on ajoute ses jardins à ceux de Biaré on voit que les habitants de Biaré ont soixante-deux jardins et d'une superficie de 419,472 mètres carrés. La proportion entre les nombres est de $\frac{1}{1 \cdot 9}$, et entre les étendues de $\frac{1}{3}$.

D'après moi, il ne suffit pas de prendre en considération le nombre seul des jardins, il faut de plus considérer l'étendue de chacun. En effet, comme on relèvera des croquis, les trois jardins de Biaré numérotés 10, 11, 21 ont autant de superficie que quatorze de ceux de Khani-Guermélé, portant les numéros 27, 28, 29, 30, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, sur le croquis No. 2.

Les jardins de Biaré sont plus compacts aux environs du village, tandis que ceux de Khani-Guermélé sont parsemés. Aux environs de ce dernier la situation est le contraire.

Les témoins avaient soutenu appartenir à la Perse, le quartier de Pich-Djougué, composé de sept maisons.

Si on prend en considération la distance qu'il y a entre cet endroit et le village de Biaré, sa situation, on convient, qu'il fait partie de ce dernier. Jusqu'à présent, aucune frontière entre le Gouvernement ottoman et la Perse aux environs des deux villages en question n'ayant été arrêtée, le Gouvernement Impérial considérait tout le temps comme la frontière des deux États, la grande chaîne d'Avroman et l'existence de koulés au nord du village Diskoul est sur les pentes d'Avroman prouvent la justesse de cette considération. Maintenant il serait puéril et peu sérieux de proposer comme frontière, un petit canal qui passe du haut de Biaré.

Il a été arrêté à la quarante-cinquième séance, que la frontière passera de façon à séparer les terrains de Khani-Guermélé et de Biaré. A Tavilé, ne prenant pas en considération la frontière reconnue entre les villageois, la frontière fut poussée presqu'au delà du dernier jardin de Disaver. Ici, du moins, la frontière que les villageois ont été contraints, de la part de Djaffar Sultan, à désigner par force et sous menace, ne peut être acceptable.

3. Les canaux qui partent des deux rives du ruisseau arrosent un grand nombre de terrains, villages et jardins. Il est indispensable que les têtes de ces canaux restent en territoire ottoman. Autrement, il serait impossible de garantir le cours de l'eau.

Les différends qui ont surgi aussitôt après le départ de la Commission à Zorbatié et à Mendéli sont autant de preuves qui démontrent cette impossibilité. Le nombre et la superficie des jardins nous donnent le droit de maintenir à notre côté les canaux jusqu'à leur tête.

Si on coupe en deux la distance entre les deux villages en proportion avec l'étendue et le nombre des jardins des deux côtés, nos jardins resteront en territoire ottoman.

5. Dans le cas où les deux collines dominant Biaré sont laissées à Djaffar Sultan, le village sera tout à fait découvert aux attaques de toute sorte et il sera impossible de la défendre et d'y maintenir ordre et tranquillité.

En conséquence, je prie MM. les commissaires arbitres de vérifier personnellement le nombre, les propriétaires et la superficie des jardins marqués sur les croquis ci-annexés, d'étudier la question par l'entremise de drogmans honorables et consciencieux, comme les fils du Cheikh Nedjmeddin de Bairé, et avec l'assistance de MM. les commissaires seuls, de statuer à qui revient le droit.

Je demande, en outre, qu'on se rapporte aux registres de propriétés de Alebdjé pour se renseigner d'une façon sûre au sujet du nombre, des propriétaires et de l'étendue des jardins de Biaré. Ces documents étant des registres d'État destinés à enregistrer les propriétés de chacun, et n'ayant rien à faire avec la délimitation, doivent être consultés avec toute confiance pour établir la justesse des calculs ci-haut exposés.

Le Commissaire Impérial ottoman,

AZIZ SAMIH

Biaré, le 7 juin, 1914.

Enclosure 15 in No. 108.

List of Properties situated on the banks of the Canal

PROPERTIES situated on the right bank.

No.	Nom du Propriétaire.	Village.	Étendue en Mètres carrés.
1	Hame Selim-bin-Hame Chari	Biaré	1,400
2	Fethoullah Bey	Pich-Djougué	625
3	Keuhe Moustapha	Biaré	2,200
4	Fethoullah Bey	Pich-Djougué	625
5	Mehmed Saïd	Biaré	625
6	Hame Adi	Pich-Djougué	625
7	Feth Hame Kerim	Biaré	2,600
8	Fettah Agha	"	3,600
9	Mirza Rahm	"	1,750
10	Mehmed Ousta	"	5,850
11	Hama Mahmoud	"	2,800
12	Ferajullah Bey	Pich-Djougué	600
13	Cheikh Nedjmeddin	Biaré	2,400
14	Ousta Rahm	"	8,400
15	Ali Bey	"	2,700
16	Ousta Rahman	"	3,000
17	Eba-Bekr	Pich-Djougué	3,000
18	Abdurrahman Ahmed	Biaré	3,025
19	Nadir	Pich-Djougué	2,200
20	Cheikh Nedjmeddin	Biaré	2,800
21	Hama Mahmoud	"	5,100
22	Cheikh Mouhieddin	"	2,000
23	Nadir Eba-Bekr	Pich-Djougué	2,500
24	Kadir Hame	Khani-Guermélé	4,000
25	Ousta Abdurrahman	Biaré	5,950
26	Hama Assi	Pich-Djougué	5,600
27	Hama Rahim	"	1,575
28	Cheikh Nedjmeddin	Biaré	4,400
29	Chérif Hamelé	Khani-Guermélé	5,400
30	Ousta Allam	"	6,750
31	Molla Kadir	Biaré	3,000
32	Vakouf de la mosquée	"	2,400
33	Cheikh Nedjmeddin	"	28,900
34	Ali Miche	Khani-Guermélé	4,225
35	Bare Miche	"	4,225
36	Yele Miche	"	5,625
37	Kale Metche	"	6,400
38	Chelpe	"	6,800
39	Hamele Salih	"	6,600
40	Houda Kerem	"	6,900
41	Molla Kadir	Biaré	4,950
42	Houda Kerem	Khani-Guermélé	550
43	Molla Kadir	Biaré	2,400
44	Kadir	Pich-Djougué	400
45	Ousta Hama Mourad	Biaré	1,225

PROPERTIES situated on the left bank.

1	Keuhe Hama Riza	Biaré	10,000
2	Mehmed Emin	"	8,000
3	Faradj Moustapha	"	2,000
4	Aivaz	"	34,000
5	Fettah Rustem	"	2,800
6	Ahmed Kourbani	"	14,000
7	Abdurrahman Molla Ibrahim	"	5,400
8	Vakouf de la mosquée	"	10,000
9	Cheikh Mouhieddin	"	7,600
10	" Nedjmeddin	"	52,900
11	" Kadir	"	45,000
12	Abdurrahman Molla Ibrahim	"	2,000
13	Mahmoud Kourbani	"	2,000
14	Mehmed Saïd	"	2,000
15	Aziz	"	2,000
16	Eumer	"	2,000

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No.	Nom du Propriétaire.	Village.	Étendue en Mètres carrés.
17	Fettah	Khani-Guermélé ..	600
18	Bairam	" ..	2,000
19	Mahmoud	" ..	2,700
20	"	" ..	3,000
21	Cheikh Kadir	Biaré	40,600
22	Kerim Taple	Khani-Guermélé ..	1,000
23	Nissé Hanim	" ..	9,500
24	Hadji Rahim	" ..	42,000
25	Mehmed Hussein	" ..	2,100
26	Hadji Rahim	" ..	4,000
27	Aziz Fettah	Biaré	4,800
28	Beheha	Khani-Guermélé ..	6,400
29	Hadji Rahim	" ..	1,000
30	Mehmed Kerim	" ..	1,500
31	Kerim	Biaré	1,000
32	Mehmed Hussein (celui-ci l'a acheté avant une semaine de Seid Moustafa de Biaré)	Khani-Guermélé ..	1,000
33	Aze	Biaré	1,200
34	Fettah et Osman	Khani-Guermélé ..	2,800
35	Aboul	" ..	300
36	Hamele Salih	" ..	1,000
37	Vakouf de la mosquée	Biaré	2,500
38	Ali Mahoul	Khani-Guermélé ..	1,800
39	Bahcha	" ..	1,800
40	Abdurrahman	" ..	2,500
41	Moustapha Bey	" ..	5,000
42	Faraj et Mahmoud Karim	" ..	4,000
43	Hamlav Bey	" ..	1,600
44	" "	" ..	800
45	Hassan Bey	" ..	1,000
46	Mehmed Mourad	Biaré	5,000
47	Buyuk Molla Kadir	"	6,500
48	Mehmed Bey	Khani-Guermélé ..	5,500
49	" "	" ..	1,200
50	Ousta Abdul Kerim	Biaré	3,600
51	Halife Mehmed Hussein	Khani-Guermélé ..	4,800
52	Aziz Agha	Biaré	4,900
53	Mehmed Kerim	Khani-Guermélé ..	4,000
54	Hame	Biaré	3,200
55	Séid Rahim et Séid Moustappa	"	14,700

Enclosure 16 in No. 108.

Décision arbitrale du 9 juin, 1914.

LES commissaires des Puissances médiatrices, ayant examiné attentivement les exposés des commissaires persan et ottoman concernant la frontière entre le village persan de Khan-Guermélé et le village turc de Biaré, et ayant eux-mêmes entrepris des recherches sur les lieux, formulent leur décision arbitrale comme suit :

La ligne-frontière, quittant la borne No. 79, suit le contrefort dominant le village de Biaré jusqu'à un point au-dessus du moulin d'Aciab-Berzé. De ce point elle descend en ligne directe jusqu'à l'endroit où le canal du même nom tourne vers le moulin. De là la frontière remonte la rive gauche dudit canal jusqu'au point où il se sépare de la rivière de Khan-Guermélé. De ce point elle suit en amont le *medium filum aquæ* de cette rivière jusqu'à l'endroit où le canal nommé Djoubi Kouhi quitte sa rive droite. Elle suit la rive droite de cette canal en aval jusqu'au ravin de Déré-i-Tekiyé, situé à environ 250 mètres au delà de la groupe de maisons connue par le nom de Poucht-i-Djoub. La ligne-frontière monte par ce ravin (en laissant à la Perse les jardins qui s'y trouvent) et là où il tourne vers le nord-ouest, elle se dirige sur la ramification des montagnes d'Avroman s'élevant au nord de la vallée de Khan-Guermélé pour se diriger vers le nord par la grande chaîne.

Cette décision laisse à la Turquie les deux canaux d'Aciab-Berzé et Djoub-i-Kouhi.

Il est bien entendu que les droits de propriété privée sont maintenus des deux côtés.

Fait à Biaré, le 27 juin (9 juillet), 1914.

A. C. WRATISLAW.
D. BELAIEF.

Enclosure 17 in No. 108.

Rapport.

CONFORMEMENT aux instructions ci-annexées de la Commission, nous, soussignés, sommes rendus sur la route allant de Déga-Cheikhan à Tavilé et avons construit une borne sur le sommet d'une montagne située à l'ouest de cette même route à une distance d'un demi-mille du col à l'est de Déga-Cheikhan et une autre borne à un demi-mille de distance à l'est de la même route sur la ligne du partage des eaux. L'azimut constaté entre la première borne et la seconde est de 105°. La première borne portant le numéro 78 est d'une hauteur de 1½ mètre sur une base de 1 mètre. La seconde est de la hauteur de 1½ mètre sur une base de 1 mètre et porte le numéro 79. Toutes les deux bornes sont construites en pierres liées avec du ciment.

Capitaine ALIEF.
ABDARRAZAK.
M. NAMI.

Le 3 juin, 1914.

Enclosure 18 in No. 108.

Instructions.

LA Commission a chargé une sous-commission composée de :

M. Abdurrazak Khan,
M. le Capitaine Mehmed Effendi,
M. le Capitaine Alief,

d'ériger deux bornes sur les collines à droite et à gauche de la route qui va de Déga Cheikhan à l'est, aux endroits qui leur ont été indiqués sur la carte.

A. C. W.
E. M.
A H.
D. B.

Biaré, le 20 mai (2 juin), 1914.

Enclosure 19 in No. 108.

Rapport.

CONFORMÉMENT aux instructions de la Commission en date du 23 mai (5 juin), 1914, la sous-commission composée des soussignés s'est rendue à Ber-Ervaz le 10 juin, et a fait ériger une borne en haut d'un monticule à 30 mètres à l'est du chemin menant de Ber-Ervaz à Khanédenk à l'endroit où ledit chemin traverse le partage des eaux entre ces deux villages.

Cette borne consiste en un amoncellement de grandes pierres liées avec du ciment.

Dimensions :

Hauteur, 3 mètres.
Diamètre à la base, 3 mètres.

Fait à Biaré, le 10 juin, 1914.

DJALIL-OL-MULK.
G. E. HUBBARD.
Capitaine TSKHAKAYA.
H. BASRY.

Enclosure 20 in No. 108.

Instructions.

UNE sous-commission composée de :

M. le Capitaine Tskhakaya,
M. Basry Bey,
M. Hubbard,
M. Djalil-ol-Molk,

est chargée d'ériger une borne à l'endroit où la route de Ber-Ervaz à Khanédenk traverse le partage des eaux entre ces deux villages ("la ramification ouest d'Avroman").

AZ. SAMIH.
D. B.
A. C. W.
E. M.

Khan-Guermélé, le 23 mai (5 juin), 1914.

Enclosure 21 in No. 108.

Procès-verbal of Fifty-first Meeting of Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

SÉANCE tenue à Piran, le 14 juin, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire britannique.

Étaient présents tous les commissaires.

Les procès-verbaux des séances 45 et 49 ont été signés et celui de la dernière séance lu et approuvé. Les rapports des deux sous-commissions nommées respectivement aux séances 45 et 50 ont été lus ; ils se trouvent annexés au présent procès-verbal.

M. le président donne lecture du passage suivant du Protocol final :

"De là, la frontière suit en aval le courant du ruisseau de Khalil-Abad jusqu'à sa confluence avec le Tchami-Kyzyldja, puis suit en amont cette dernière rivière jusqu'à l'embouchure de son affluent gauche coulant du village de Bnava-Souta, remonte ce ruisseau de Bnava-Souta et par les cols de Keli-Navé-Sar et Keli-Piran atteint le col de Sourène, connu, à ce qu'il paraît, sous le nom de Tchigan (Tchakan)."

M. le président prie ses collègues de déterminer sur les lieux les endroits mentionnés dans ce passage et de tracer la frontière.

M. le commissaire ottoman déclare que Sourène et Tchakan désignant deux endroits différents, la frontière doit passer de Keli-Piran à la chaîne de Sourène.

M. le commissaire persan fait observer que Tchakan est situé sur Sourène, qui est la prolongation de la chaîne d'Avroman. On ne connaît pas Keli-Peran ni Keli-Navé-Sar.

MM. les commissaires examinent la carte du district dressée par le corps technique.

M. le commissaire persan relève que les noms mentionnés dans le protocole n'existant pas sur les lieux, il est nécessaire de se rapporter au *statu quo* de 1848.

M. le commissaire britannique est d'avis qu'il faut déterminer les endroits correspondants à la description dans le protocole.

M. le commissaire russe dit que les noms mentionnés dans le protocole pour définir la partie de la frontière près de Khalil-Abad et Bnava-Souta sont connus actuellement. Khalil-Abad est le nom d'une cultivation dépendant du village de Massod. Quant au col de Tchakan, il est incertain qu'il soit le même que le col de Sourène.

M. le commissaire persan, se rapportant à la correspondance de Dervich Pacha, dit que le col de Tchakan et Sourène désignent le même endroit et que les villages de Piran et de Toutman ont été en possession persane lors de la conclusion du Traité d'Erzeroum.

M. le commissaire ottoman fait observer qu'en 1848 il y avait plusieurs villages qui s'appelaient Piran. Celui dont parle Dervich Pacha se trouvait entre le village actuel de Piran et Kani-Kav.

MM. les commissaires, après une longue discussion, décident de se rapporter au

témoignage local pour déterminer la position de Keli-Piran. On constate, en effet, que le col de Keli-Piran est situé derrière le village actuel de Piran.

M. le commissaire russe fait remarquer que, d'après le livre du Général Tchirikof, la possession ottomane de Piran est douteuse, tandis que Toutman était à cette époque sous la domination ottomane. Le col de Tchakan étant, d'autre part, un col de quelques kilomètres de longueur et ne pouvant constituer un endroit précis pour le passage de la frontière, il fait la proposition suivante :

La frontière devrait suivre Keli-Navé-Sar et Keli-Piran et traverser la petite vallée située entre ceux-ci et les montagnes de Sourène de manière à laisser Toutman à la Turquie et Piran à la Perse. Elle devrait suivre la limite des champs de ces deux villages et se diriger sur la crête la plus au nord de Sourène. La ligne ainsi définie serait conformé à la description du protocole et laisserait à la Perse le village de Piran, et à la Turquie celui de Toutman ainsi que le col de Tchakan avec le chemin qui le traverse.

Après de longues délibérations, le tracé suivant a été arrêté :

La frontière suit la crête magistrale de la chaîne d'Avroman jusqu'au pic qui s'élève au-dessus de Kani-Sef à environ 1 mille au nord-est du col de Tchakan. Laissant en territoire ottoman le chemin qui passe par le col de Tchakan à Pendjevine, elle descend au ruisseau nommé Tcham Berzé (Gowgue-Sour) qu'elle traverse et remonte le versant de la petite chaîne au nord de Piran de manière à laisser à la Perse le village de Piran avec tous ses champs, et à la Turquie le village de Toutman avec tous ses champs. Ayant atteint le partage des eaux entre le Tcham Berzé et le Tchénaran, elle descend ledit partage des eaux jusqu'au Tchénaran, qu'elle traverse en amont des têtes de deux canaux, lesquels restent en territoire ottoman.

De là, la frontière monte sur le contrefort qui mène à Sékouh (Siah-Kouh) et le suit jusqu'à Sekouh même.

En conséquence, on a arrêté pendant cette séance la frontière entre la chaîne d'Avroman et Sékouh, passant entre les villages de Piran et Toutman.

Fait à Piran, le 14 juin, 1914.

A. C. WRATISLAW.
V. MINORSKY.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
AZIZ SAMIH.

Enclosure 22 in No. 108.

Mr. Wratislaw to Sir L. Mallet.

(No. 42.)

Sir,

Halousa, June 19, 1914.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 40 of the 13th instant, I have the honour to report that the frontier has now been demarcated as far as Kouh-i-Kocé Rescha, about latitude 35° 41′.

The line follows the Avroman range north-west from Khan Guermela as far as the Tchigan Pass (which is left entirely in Turkish territory), thence across the valley of the Gowguesour on to the western end of the Keli Piran (leaving the village of Piran in Persia and the village of Toutkan in Turkey). From the Keli Piran it passes over the Keli-Navé-Sar into the Benava Souta valley and down the stream of the same name to the Kyzyldja River.

Half a mile down the right bank of the Kyzyldja River a stream flows into it from the north which we identified as the brook of Khalil-Abad mentioned in the protocol, though no village of Khalil-Abad now exists. The frontier follows this brook up stream for about 2 miles, till it reaches the small valley above Masoud, (Mased) when it turns westward on to a spur along which it passes on to Mount Kouh-i-Kocé-Rescha. Masoud remains in Turkey and Khanoumabad in Persia.

There were several questions in dispute between the Turkish and Persian commissioners, which were, however, settled without a formal reference to arbitration.

The Identic Map continues to prove defective, and a practically continuous series of supplemantary maps have to be prepared.

I have, &c.
A. C. WRATISLAW.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[42529] No. 109.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 24.)

(No. 238.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, August 24, 1914.*

MY despatch No. 197 of 12th July.

Following from His Majesty's representative in Bushire:—

"Crosthwaite arrived at Bushire 20th August. His idea for Mohammerah-Khoremabad Railway is that construction from Mohammerah to Dizful should be commenced, and question of further survey deferred. He sees no advantage in proposed detour through Pusht-i-kuh territory. There seems, therefore, no immediate prospect of employment for him unless the Persian Railways Syndicate decide to undertake construction at once. In the meantime I propose to allot him to Major Trevor to assist temporarily with Abadan, and send him there as soon as convenient opportunity presents itself.

"An additional political officer at Mohammerah might be at any moment exceedingly valuable.

"Please telegraph if you approve."

(Addressed to Government of India; repeated to Tehran.)

[43056] No. 110.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 25.)

(No. 244.)
Sir, *St. Petersburgh, August 16, 1914.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith translation of a communication which I have received from the Russian Government in reply to the *aide-mémoire* which I addressed to the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs in accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram No. 472 of the 9th instant regarding the demand put forward by the Russian Government for the dismissal of Samsam-es-Sultaneh from the post of Governor-General of Ispahan.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 110.

Memorandum.

THE Imperial Minister at Tehran was, in fact, instructed to demand the recall from Ispahan of Samsam-es-Sultaneh, the local Governor-General, and the Government of the Shah were informed that they would be held responsible for losses which might be incurred by Russian subjects through actions of the above-named Persian official. The Imperial Ambassador in London was instructed to notify the British Government to this effect, and to request that steps taken in this respect by M. Korostovets might be supported by their representative in Tehran.

The motive which induced the Imperial Government to take this decision is the openly hostile attitude of Samsam-es-Sultaneh to everything Russian, and his provocative conduct towards the Imperial consulate in Ispahan. In his efforts to undermine the interests of Russian subjects in the province entrusted to him, he has taken under his special protection the well-known German protégé and adventurer, Dr. Pugen, who has been endeavouring by the leasing of land to create extensive German interests in this part of Persia. Further, by raids on properties leased by the Russian subject, Karapetof, and others, as also by the groundless arrest of the peasants on these estates, he is inflicting heavy losses on those Russian subjects. Finally, he systematically refuses to deal with any law suits of Russian subjects. In particular, in the case of the purchase by the Russian subject, Mekhdief, of the harvest crop on the "wakuf" estate, Melavedjir, Samsam-es-Sultaneh gave orders for the harvesting of this crop by Government "mamurs," and when the Ministry for the Interior instructed him to deal with this case conjointly with the Russian consul, he refused to do so, and declared that "the Government of the Shah evidently did not know that the interests of a Russian subject were involved."

The Imperial Government have grounds for fearing that this state of affairs may finally lead to measures of self-defence on the part of Russian subjects not finding actual protection and support of their lawful claims in the consulate. The result of this would be sanguinary collisions between the people and the Administration, which would be especially dangerous and undesirable at the present time.

The Imperial Government see no other way, therefore, out of the situation than the removal of Samsam-es-Sultaneh and his replacement by another.

The Imperial Government, at the same time, consider it necessary to mention that they do not in the least cherish any unfriendly feelings towards the Bakhtiaris in general. In particular, the rumoured intention of the Russian consul to purchase Sardar Jang or Sardar Ashd, who, it is alleged, have been offered a bribe of 30,000 tomans, has already been categorically denied by M. Preobrajensky, who, it may be stated, has no such means at his disposal.

The Imperial Government cannot but note with regret that the activity of Russian subjects in Ispahan, which is, however, within the Russian sphere of influence, is viewed apparently with certain alarm by the British Mission in Tehran, which affirms that this activity will be detrimental to British interests. The Imperial Ministry have already instructed M. Korostovets to discuss this matter with Sir W. Townley in order to ascertain precisely the wishes of the British Government, and to endeavour to find a compromise equally guaranteeing the interests of both parties. It is very desirable that similar instructions be given to Sir W. Townley.

St. Petersburgh, July 31 (August 13), 1914.

From a telegram just received from the Russian Minister at Tehran, the Imperial Ministry learn with gratification that Sir W. Townley, in meeting the wishes of the Imperial mission, has expressed his readiness to advise Samsam-es-Sultanteh to give in his resignation. The Imperial Government consider it their duty in this respect to convey their sincere appreciation to the British Government.

St. Petersburgh, July 31 (August 13), 1914.

[43019] No. 111.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 25.)

Sir, *India Office, August 25, 1914.*

IN reply to your letter of the 9th instant, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of telegrams that have been exchanged with the Government of India regarding the suggested purchase of the five islands at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, together with a statement showing the present indebtedness of the Persian Government to His Majesty's Government and the Government of India.

The Marquess of Crewe will take an early opportunity of discussing the question with Sir E. Grey.

I am, &c.
T. W. HOLDERNESS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 111.

The Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *August 12, 1914.*

THE financial embarrassment of Persia is now extreme. It is suggested by Minister at Tehran that if the islands are worth 2,000,000*l.* and if we promise an immediate advance of 300,000*l.* on account, it should be possible to effect their purchase. Your views on question of price and purchase are requested by Foreign Office.

I shall be glad of earliest possible reply by telegraph.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Enclosure 2 in No. 111.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *August* 19, 1914.

PURCHASE of islands in Persian Gulf.

Please see your telegram of 12th.

If it is impossible to acquire the five islands for a less sum, Government of India are prepared to share the cost, whether they are bought for 2,000,000*l.* or leased at 100,000*l.* for a 99 years' lease. In the former case we would be ready to contribute half of the 300,000*l.* which is desired as an advance as soon as the bargain is complete. But when this is done we must stipulate that the whole sum due to Great Britain by Persia on account of loans should be set off against the purchase price. Treasury and Government of India would retain each the specific amount which they have contributed respectively to the loans in question. The remainder of the purchase price of islands should be paid by annual instalments of convenient size to Government of Persia.

If it is decided to lease, we think we might advance three years' rent, and are ready to contribute half such advance.

Acquisition by lease has the advantage that it would be less open to political misinterpretation, and would be more convenient financially. But, on the other hand, as it is possible that, as soon as German war is over, Great Britain may have to settle with Russia the question of Persia, it might be more advantageous to be in complete possession of the islands in question.

The decision of this point we leave to His Majesty's Government.

Enclosure 3 in No. 111.

Indebtedness of the Persian Government on account of Anglo-Indian Loans.

—	Due to Indian Government. £ s. d.	Due to Imperial Government. £ s. d.
1. Consolidated Anglo-Indian Loan of 1903–4—		
Capital	272,020 15 7	
Arrears of interest on the 8th March, 1913 ..	22,681 11 9	
	294,702 7 4	
2. Anglo-Russian advance of February 1912	50,000 0 0	50,000 0 0
3. Anglo-Indian advance of August 1912..	12,500 0 0	12,500 0 0
4. Anglo-Indian advance of November 1912	7,500 0 0	7,500 0 0
5. Anglo-Russian advance of April 1913	100,000 0 0	100,000 0 0
6. Anglo-Indian advance of May 1913	50,000 0 0	50,000 0 0
7. Anglo-Indian advance of July 1914	25,000 0 0	25,000 0 0
Total on the 8th July, 1914, the last date to which instalments of repayment or interest were received	539,702 7 4	245,000 0 0
Add interest for 44 days to the 21st August on—		
294,702*l.* 7*s.* 4*d.* at 5 per cent.	1,776 5 9	
440,000*l.* at 7 per cent	1,856 8 9	1,856 8 9
Total liability of the Persian Government on the 21st instant.	543,335 1 10	246,856 8 9
Deduct commission on amounts included above which will be retained by the Imperial Bank—		
One-fifth of 22,681 11 9 = 4,536 6 4 ..		
" 1,776 5 9 = 355 5 2 ..		
One-seventh of 1,856 8 9 = 265 4 1 ..		
	5,156 15 7	265 4 1
Total sums due to the British and Indian Governments	538,178 6 3	246,591 4 8

One-half of any loss on loan No. 1 is guaranteed by the Imperial Government.

No interest has been received on account of loan No. 7, but nothing is included above in respect of accrued interest to date, as the date of the actual advance to the Persian Government is not at present known.

August 21, 1914. W. B.

[43190] No. 112.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 25.)

(No. 239. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, August* 25, 1914.

I HAVE had a long conversation with my Russian colleague upon situation. He displayed a conciliatory spirit quite foreign to his previous attitude. If his assurances were genuine, and he does not change his mind, much may yet be done towards re-establishment of a state of affairs less intolerable to Persian Government. Certain rich landed proprietors claiming Russian protection owe large sums of money representing unpaid taxes to Treasury. From fear of action that Russian Legation might take, these persons have never been energetically pressed to pay. Russian Minister assured me that such persons would never receive support from him, in their refusal to pay taxes and suggests that claims against Persian Government and their counter-claims against Russian Government should be examined by a commission on which the two legations would be represented. Idea appears to me to offer possible settlement of a grievance and would probably be acceptable to Government if His Majesty's Legation as well as Russian Legation is represented on commission. Sum involved is about 200,000*l.*

Russian Minister assured me that collection of taxes by Russian consul from Russian subjects and protected persons in Russian zone is a purely temporary measure, and will be handed back to Treasury officials as soon as an arrangement has been reached establishing an equitable basis of taxation for all. Meanwhile, accounts are kept, and Persian Government could be told in a fortnight if they sought the information how much has actually been collected. Russian Minister hinted that delivery of money might be made conditional upon wishes of Russia being met on certain points, presumably concessions granted, but he said he had no instructions. Such a condition, before paying over to Persia what is clearly her own, would seem to be a little unjust and arbitrary.

He also said he was quite ready to co-operate in an arrangement under which provincial Governors should not be hindered in execution of their duties by restriction against interfering in villages owned or leased by Russians.

This was with special reference to Ispahan.

Russian Minister said he had no objection to Sardar Bahadur, but suggested that he should come here and talk over situation with us before taking up his post. He complained that his hands are much tied by M. Klem, who thinks that he knows much more about Persia than he (Russian Minister) does.

[42420] No. 113.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 195.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 25, 1914.

YOUR telegram No. 233 of 17th August: Samsam.

In consequence of my representations, Russian Government will not insist on Samsam's recall at present. They hope you will support your Russian colleague in steps he will take to cause Persian Government to urge Samsam to modify his actions, and that you will use your influence with Samsam to modify his attitude towards Russian subjects.

Russian Government think it very desirable that you and your Russian colleague should discuss question of successor to Samsam if such a step becomes essential.

(Confidential.)

You will doubtless emphasise, if it becomes necessary, importance which you attach to Sardar Bahadur's selection.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[43435] No. 114.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 26.)

(No. 240.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, August 26, 1914.*

I TOLD Prime Minister yesterday that it appeared to me desirable that Governor-General of Fars should be changed. Mustaufi, who is close personal friend of Mukhber-es-Sultaneh, demurred on ground that it would be very hard to find a better man for post. His Excellency seemed to think that Prince Nusrat-es-Sultaneh, an uncle of Shah, would perhaps do well with a capable adviser. The Prince is only about 22 years old, but he is intelligent and very keen to serve his country. Prestige of his birth would carry much weight, and he should prove conscientious Governor-General, but he is a valuable influence in Shah's immediate surroundings. Mukhber's transfer would be facilitated if Mustaufi could feel sure that Russian Legation would not oppose his inclusion in Cabinet. It was only from fear of incurring Russian displeasure that Mustaufi did not offer him a portfolio. Russia still resents Mukhber's attitude when Governor of Tabriz, and he is accused of being a Germanophil. In this he is not singular here at present moment, when every Persian hopes that Germany will beat Russia.

[43705] No. 115.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 27.)

(No. 242.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, August 27, 1914.*

I HAD discussed situation at Ispahan with the Prime Minister before receiving your telegram No. 195 of 25th August. He is of opinion that Samsam had better go, but considers it most desirable that he should appear to do so of his own free will. A couple or three months' respite will enable his resignation to be carried out in a suitable manner. Prime Minister is of opinion that Sardar Bahadur is his only possible successor, and concurs in suggestion of Russian Minister that he should come here and discuss situation with us before taking up his post.

Russian Minister has promised to telegraph to St. Petersburgh that he sees no objection to appointment of Sardar Bahadur.

I will impress on Samsam that he must be more conciliatory during remainder of his tenure of office at Ispahan, and will support representations Russian Minister may make to Persian Government.

[43190] No. 116.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 196.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 27, 1914.*

YOUR telegram No. 239 of 25th August: Situation in Persia.

Provided that labours of proposed commission are confined to enquiry into claims of Persian Government against Persian subjects, whether Russian protected or not, and counter-claims by the latter, I see no objection to course proposed.

(Confidential.)

Commission should avoid dealing with claims of Russian subjects. His Majesty's Government have always assured British claimants that when claims of other nationalities receive consideration the British shall be treated equally, and the present moment is not suitable for a general claims enquiry.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 613.)

[43435] No. 117.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 199.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 28, 1914.*

GOVERNOR-GENERAL of Fars.

Your telegram No. 240 of 26th August.

I must leave the question to your discretion.

[44905] No. 118.

Captain Wilson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 31.)

(No. 14.)
Sir, *Camp Belkha, May 26, 1914.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 13 of to-day's date, I have the honour to enclose, for your information, a copy of a despatch with enclosures, which I have addressed to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, giving cover to a statement, with explanatory maps, signed by M. Minorsky and myself, describing the old frontier between latitudes 34 and 35, as understood by us.

Printed copies of the enclosed maps are in course of preparation and will be forwarded as soon as possible, in the meantime I beg that I may be informed by telegraph how many copies are required by His Majesty's Foreign Office.

The managing agent of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, when at Qasr-i-Shirin, begged me to ask that a number of copies of this map might be supplied to the company by His Majesty's Foreign Office, and I beg to commend this request to your favourable consideration.

I have, &c.
A. T. WILSON, *Captain, I.A.,*
British Deputy Commissioner, Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

Enclosure 1 in No. 118.

Captain Wilson to Sir L. Mallet.

(No. 38.)
Sir, *Camp Belkha, May 26, 1914.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 37 of to-day's date, I have the honour to enclose, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a statement signed by M. Minorsky and by myself (in the absence of Mr. Wratislaw), setting forth in detail the result of our personal investigations as to the frontier as locally observed between latitudes 34 and 35 by Turkey and Persia previous to present delimitation.

The area included between this line and the frontier as now delimitated constitutes, according to our view, the "transferred territories" mentioned in Annex B of the protocol of the 18th November. North of the Elvend River the question is, I imagine, not open to serious dispute, whilst the territories south of the Elvend defined above have already been described in our declaration of even date regarding the Sanjabi (made during the 42nd seance of the Commission), as "territories transferred to Turkey as a result of the present delimitation."

I am sending a copy of this despatch, together with the maps to which reference is made (of which only one copy is available) to His Majesty's Foreign Office.

Printed copies of the maps, showing the two lines, are in course of preparation and will be forwarded to your Excellency as soon as possible.

I have, &c.
A. T. WILSON, *Captain, I.A.,*
British Deputy Commissioner, Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Enclosure 2 in No. 118.

Statement by M. Minorsky and Captain Wilson.

SE rendant compte de l'importance qu'il y aurait à enregistrer des renseignements précis concernant la frontière turco-persane entre les parallèles 34° et 35°, telle que celle-ci était reconnue de fait antérieurement à la délimitation de la frontière actuelle, et ayant en vue de définir avec plus de précision "les territoires à l'est de Baghtché," auxquels mention a été faite dans leur déclaration en date d'aujourd'hui, les représentants britannique et russe croient utile d'exposer le résultat de leurs investigations personnelles à ce sujet.

Après avoir quitté le Sirvan, l'ancienne frontière susdite se dirige vers le sud pour atteindre le sommet du mont Beyzel; elle en suit la crête dans la direction de l'ouest et descend ensuite au Zimkan à la jonction de celui-ci avec le Poucht-i-Gerrav. (Jusqu'à ce point la ligne indiquée ne diffère nullement de la frontière établie par la Commission de Délimitation.)

Ensuite la ligne remonte le ruisseau de Poucht-i-Gerrav jusqu'au confluent du ruisseau d'Arkhawandoul et le suit pour monter au col de Kargamil. De là, elle suit le Zimna-Kouh (Zamin) et rejoint le Sirvan au défilé de Derbend-i-Khan. Le Sirvan constitue ensuite la frontière jusqu'au premier poste ottoman ("birinje kullé"), qui est situé à environ 4 milles en aval de la jonction de la rivière de Kourétou avec le Sirvan; à partir de là, elle suit la ligne des postes dans la direction du sud-sud-est jusqu'au poste connu sous le nom de "kullé yahudi," qui est près de Kani-Bez.

La ligne suit en aval la rivière d'Elvend jusqu'au confluent du ruisseau de Palkana, où elle la quitte pour remonter le contrefort nord de Djebel Louti Baghtché, qui constitue le partage des eaux occidental du Palkana. Arrivée au sommet, elle suit le contrefort sud du Djebel Louti Baghtché, qui forme le partage des eaux occidental de l'Ab-i-Naft (Naft-Déressi), et continue le long dudit partage des eaux jusqu'à ce qu'elle tombe dans l'Ab-i-Naft au point où le chemin de Mendéli à Kasr-i-Chirine le traverse (endroit marqué par la borne No. XLVI de la frontière actuelle).

La ligne ci-haut décrite se trouve indiquée par une ligne rouge coupée sur les Cartes supplémentaires Nos. 9, 10 et 11 ci-annexées.*

V. MINORSKY.
A. T. WILSON, *Captain.*

Le 23 *mai*, 1914.

[44982] No. 119.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 31.)

(No. 246.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, August* 31, 1914.

GOVERNOR of Ispahan.

Your telegram No. 195 of 25th August.

Russian Minister tells me that his Government has been strengthened in their opposition to Sardar Bahadur by the advice of ex-Regent, who is at St. Petersburgh. He is personal enemy of the Sardar. It will be great pity if this mischievous person is listened to whilst he is in Europe. He is animated solely by personal spite and aspirations, and deserves only a frigid reception. Whilst in office he was largely responsible for discord which reigned, and performed no duty of which he has reason to be proud. He is a specious talker but a useless doer, though probably most capable Persian statesman of to-day, especially in financial matters. Personal cowardice and a dread of assuming responsibility, combined with innate love of intrigue, have spoilt a valuable man.

[44982] No. 120.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan

(No. 654.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 1, 1914.

SIR W. TOWNLEY'S telegram No. 246 of 31st August.

In view of the importance to His Majesty's Government to secure the best Governor-General possible for Ispahan, your Excellency should strongly support the candidature of Sardar Bahadur, and show the ex-Regent's opposition to be biassed.

* Not reproduced.

I leave it to your Excellency's discretion to convey to the ex-Regent, if an opportunity presents itself, an expression of my surprise and regret that, having vacated the Regency, he should run counter to the wishes of His Majesty's Government.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 204.)

[45397] No. 121.

Mr. Howard to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 2.)

(No. 41.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Stockholm, September* 1, 1914.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs tells me that he has caused Persian Government to be informed that during the war no more Swedish officers are to be sent to Persia. Swedish Government, however, desire those now there to remain, and hope that officers at Shiraz will continue their work there.

At my request, Minister for Foreign Affairs promised to instruct their representative in London to communicate to you direct any further information respecting gendarmerie.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 205, and St. Petersburgh, No. 661.)

[46049] No. 122.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 3.)

(No. 248.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, September* 3, 1914.

YOUR telegram No. 164 of 28th July.

Without any reference to two legations that I am aware of, the Minister of Finance yesterday informed M. Mornard that his resignation is accepted, and that M. Heynssens, Director-General of Customs, has been temporarily entrusted with direction of treasury.

Moment appears to be most inopportune for making changes, and manner in which it has been done is most improper.

I spoke seriously to Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject yesterday afternoon, and pointed out that I should be glad to be favoured with some idea as to how the Government propose to cope with financial situation. I said I had no reason to suppose that any of M. Mornard's subordinates would prove capable of dealing with the difficulties of the moment, and added that it appeared to me unfortunate that his resignation should have been accepted before a successor was secured.

I reminded his Highness that His Majesty's Government is a creditor of Persian Government, and I pointed out that a sum of 67,000 tomans is due 8th September for service of various loans and advances secured upon southern customs receipts. To meet this sum only about 8,000 tomans has so far been encashed, and it would appear improbable that deficit would be made up in the course of a few days. Actual figures are: 16,000 tomans due to effect of Indian loan, 33,000 tomans for 1911 bank loan, and 18,000 tomans as interest on recent Anglo-Indian advances; 16,700 tomans have been actually encashed to date, from which 7,500 tomans have to be deducted to make up small deficits which occur in July and August.

Manager of Imperial Bank of Persia would be greatly obliged if these figures could be communicated to London branch. Director of the Persian section of the Indo-European Telegraph Department has a sum of about 400*l.* at the disposal of the Persian Government on account of international traffic receipts. Telegraphs are pledged as an additional security for Indian loan. It would therefore seem fair to sequester this money, and I have requested director not to pay it until I am in receipt of your instructions.

Decision of Cabinet accepting M. Mornard's resignation and appointing Heynssens to succeed him temporarily contains provisions at variance with law of the Medjliss still in force.

[46089]

No. 123.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 4.)

(No. 356.)
(Telegraphic.)

Petrograd, September 3, 1914.

YOUR telegram No. 654 of 1st September: Governor of Ispahan.

Ex-Regent left for England on 31st August, so I have been unable to say anything to him.

Minister for Foreign Affairs, to whom I spoke this morning, said that Sendar was a very bad character, and that we had at one time admitted this and had been openly hostile to him. His Excellency added that unfavourable view which he took of Sendar had been confirmed by what the ex-Regent had recently told him.

I replied that the latter's opinion was entitled to no consideration, as it was that of a personal enemy, and I urged his Excellency to consent to the appointment in view of importance which His Majesty's Government attached to it. At his Excellency's request I am sending him an *aide-mémoire* on the subject.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 208.)

[46721]

No. 124.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 5.)

(No. 251.)
(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 5, 1914.

MY telegram No. 184 of 28th June.

Shuja-ed-Dowleh has been dismissed from Tabriz, and Sardar Reshid appointed Vice-Governor to act as Governor until arrival of Vali Ahd.

It is reported that Shuja has refused to accept his dismissal until it is notified to him by Russian consul-general. Reshid has been in telegraphic communication with Prime Minister, and appears to be convinced he can assume reins of office without difficulty.

Russian Minister has approved transfer, but it is said that Russian consul-general still supports Shuja.

[47388]

No. 125.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 8.)

(No. 212. Very Confidential.)

Sir,

Téhran, July 25, 1914.

THE allusion contained in my telegram marked "Private" of the 13th instant respecting the possible sale of Persian territory to Great Britain and Russia respectively was due to a statement made to me by the Treasurer-General to the effect that he had laid such a proposition before the Council of Ministers in reply to a request from them that he would furnish a statement of the financial situation, with some suggestion as to how it could be met.

M. Mornard has supplied me with a copy of the document he drew up on the spot which I have the honour to transmit to you, Sir, herewith. The proposal to sell portions of the country was acclaimed with horror at first, but I have reason to believe that the idea appears less repugnant at the present moment. Even such flippant politicians as the Persians are beginning to realise that the conditions prevailing to-day are impossible, and that something radical must be done to put the country on a more solid basis than can be achieved by means of short advances or doles, which can even no longer be counted upon for certain.

The question naturally arises: What can be done? A popular outcry against a sale is still too much feared to admit of the immediate adoption of such a drastic method; but the idea is sinking in, and there are thoughtful people who are asking themselves whether Persia could not shake herself free from all her troubles at the cost of the sacrifice. If it were possible to make a bargain with Russia, it would be made to include a public recognition of the fact that foreigners cannot hold or lease landed property in Persia and the withdrawal of all the Russian troops. It may be argued that with the help of the money that Persia would get from such a deal she could both

free herself from her more irksome foreign liabilities and still have enough money to carry out herself many urgently needed internal public works, such as short railways that would pay. It is also recognised that the territory it is proposed to alienate in the north has already passed for ever out of Persian control, whilst the southern islands are of little value to Persia, whatever their importance may be to Great Britain.

I had previously discussed with M. Mornard the possibility of obtaining money by means of territorial cessions to the neighbouring Powers, but I had no idea that he would submit such a suggestion to the Council of Ministers, and I think that he can only have done so at a moment of great irritation when he found himself attacked bitterly for a situation which he had repeatedly warned the Cabinet was inevitable unless serious steps were taken to put a stop to a multitude of abuses.

The idea of a loan is not very popular, because much fear is expressed of the powers that the foreign Commission of Control that would be inevitable would demand. A clean sale implying free money is more attractive to many.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 125.

M. Mornard to Kawam-es-Sultaneh.

Excellence,

Téhéran, le 7 juillet, 1914.

J'AI l'honneur d'exposer à votre Excellence que depuis plus de trois mois le Trésorier a en quelque sorte suspendu le service des payements, à cause du manque de fonds disponibles.

Les payements que le Trésorier a effectués depuis le Nourouz ont été très irrégulièrement faits, pour le motif qu'ils étaient subordonnés aux encaissements d'impôts très peu importants à cette époque de l'année et aux quelques avances de fonds que la Banque Impériale et la Banque d'Escompte ont bien voulu faire à la Trésorerie.

A l'heure actuelle la Trésorerie se trouve en face d'un arriéré considérable et d'avances à rembourser à brève échéance, pour l'apurement desquels deux korours ne sont pas suffisants.

Les principaux payements à effectuer sont:

	Tomans.
1. Deux mensualités de la gendarmerie	260,000
2. Les arriérés des Cosaques	103,000
3. Deux mensualités de la Cour	60,000
4. Les dépenses du couronnement	60,000
5. Certains services de l'armée et les services ministériels à Téhéran ..	100,000
6. Autres dépenses, telles que pensions, créances diverses	100,000
7. Remboursement aux deux banques à la date du 14 juillet	400,000
	1,083,000
A ajouter les avances réclamées par les provinces et celles que les banques leur ont déjà faites (par Kerman, Chiraz, Boroudjerd, Kermanchah) .	100,000
Total	1,183,000

Les chiffres que j'indique sont fixés de mémoire globalement, mais ils ne représentent qu'un minimum des payements urgents qui incombent à la Trésorerie.

Il y a environ deux mois, j'avais insisté vivement au Conseil des Ministres afin que des mesures soient prises sans délai pour éviter la crise actuelle. Laissant de côté la rentrée des impôts, qui n'a lieu que plus tard, j'indiquais à l'honorable Conseil qu'il fallait présentement avoir recours à des ressources extraordinaires pour tirer d'embarras la Trésorerie; je rappelais que l'année dernière, à pareille époque, le Gouvernement avait trouvé 500,000*l.* dans un emprunt à court terme et que néanmoins un déficit de 750,000 tomans avait été constaté à la fin de l'exercice Oud-Il.

J'ajoutais que, vu l'accroissement progressif des revenus gouvernementaux, joint à la possibilité de créer de nouveaux impôts, la Trésorerie parviendrait à atteindre peut-être la fin de l'année Bars-Il, si elle pouvait disposer d'une ressource extraordinaire de 1,500,000 tomans, que je proposais de rechercher:

(1.) Dans la concession des mines de Kermán;
(2.) Dans la vente d'une partie des bijoux de la couronne;
(3.) Dans un petit emprunt (avances à courte échéance); ou,
(4.) Dans un grand emprunt important à l'étranger.

L'honorable Conseil me fit entendre qu'il n'était pas possible de réaliser les bijoux de la couronne, mais que la concession des mines de Kerman susceptible de rapporter au Gouvernement, sous forme d'avance, une somme de 100,000*l.* serait sérieusement examinée.

Quant aux emprunts, le Conseil s'abstint de donner une réponse catégorique.

Aujourd'hui j'apprends qu'il n'est pas possible que la concession des mines de Kerman soit accordée de sitôt. Les bijoux restent en suspens et, en ce qui concerne les emprunts, nulle démarche n'a été jusqu'ici entamée en vue de connaître les chances qu'aurait le Gouvernement d'emprunter avantageusement.

Il est à peine besoin de dire que, dans ces conditions, la crise actuelle ne tardera pas à devenir aiguë et à provoquer des troubles dans tous les rouages de la machine gouvernementale.

Selon moi, il est plus que temps de trouver de l'argent, car les hommes qui ont la responsabilité du pouvoir encourent la responsabilité des conséquences du manque de fonds et des retards prolongés dans le payement des diverses dépenses.

Si les mines de Kerman ne sont pas à concéder pour le moment et si les bijoux de la couronne ne peuvent être ni vendus ni déposés en gage dans une banque, c'est à l'emprunt qu'il faut recourir, à moins que le Gouvernement, désireux d'échapper aux difficultés insurmontables qu'il rencontre dans le gouvernement de certaines régions, ne consente à céder aux Puissances voisines, moyennant équitable indemnité, certaines parties de son territoire situées à l'ouest de l'Azerbaïdjan, au nord du Gourgan et dans les îles du Golfe Persique.

On sait que la partie de la Turcomanie située au nord de la rivière Gourgan s'est depuis longtemps dérobée à la souveraineté du Schah, qui n'y perçoit aucun impôt et n'est représenté par aucun agent officiel. La terre y est riche et féconde et commence à être occupée par des propriétaires russes, qui s'y trouvent comme en pays conquis.

Dans la partie ouest de l'Azerbaïdjan, les convoitises du pays voisin sont telles que le Gouvernement persan ne fait plus d'opposition sérieuse aux empiétements successifs des agents politiques étrangers sur les pouvoirs administratifs comme sur les propriétés elles-mêmes.

Quant à certaines îles du Golfe Persique, voisines de Bender Abbas, le Gouvernement persan a cessé depuis longtemps de s'y intéresser administrativement, tandis qu'elles seraient d'une grande utilité à l'Angleterre pour ses dépôts de charbon et pour le facile exercice de sa police dans les eaux du Golfe Persique.

Peut-être l'honorable Conseil trouvera-t-il ma proposition étrange et de prime abord inadmissible. Mais je convie votre Excellence d'y prêter une attention particulière en considérant les bienfaits qui résulteraient pour le Souverain et pour le peuple si, en échange d'une bande de territoire depuis longtemps improductive, la Perse recouvrait son indépendance et trouvait en même temps, pour prix de la terre cédée, une somme de 50,000,000 à 60,000,000 de tomans, qui suffirait à rétablir l'ordre partout, à créer des voies de communications et outiller le pays pour le développement de son industrie.

Au moment où l'existence de la Perse paraît être sérieusement en jeu, j'estime que le Gouvernement accomplirait un grand acte d'humanité en sauvant la presque totalité du territoire persan au prix d'une faible partie de ce territoire.

Quant à l'emprunt, je ne crois pas trop m'avancer en disant que les ressources du pays permettent d'escompter un accroissement progressif des impôts et autres revenus gouvernementaux, pour autant que ceux-ci continuent à être gérés par l'administration qui vient d'être organisée avec tant de succès sur des bases modernes. Or, un pays qui prospère est toujours capable d'emprunter, surtout s'il est à même de placer les fonds d'un emprunt dans des entreprises productives. Je proposerai donc éventuellement de contracter un emprunt de 20,000,000 à 30,000,000 de tomans, soit en Belgique exclusivement, soit chez un consortium de banquiers qui consentiraient à placer l'emprunt dans des conditions favorables au point de vue de l'indépendance du pays.

Je me permets d'insister vivement afin que votre Excellence puisse convaincre l'honorable Conseil des Ministres que le moment est grave et qu'il y a urgence d'entamer les démarches en vue de réaliser l'un des deux grands projets que j'ai l'honneur de lui soumettre pour le salut du pays.

Je prie, &c.

MORNARD, *Trésorier général.*

[47390]

No. 126.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 8.)

(No. 214.)

Sir,

Tehran, July 30, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a note which I addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 17th instant offering him on behalf of His Majesty's Government a further advance of 50,000*l.* for the maintenance of the gendarmerie forces in the provinces of Fars and Kerman.

In an *aide-mémoire* of the same date, copy of which I also have the honour to enclose, I explained to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the conditions attaching to the expenditure of the money.

I have the honour to enclose herewith copy of a note which I have now received from the Prime Minister, who is holding the portfolio of Foreign Affairs at the present moment, officially accepting this new advance under the conditions of control as stipulated.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 126.

Sir W. Townley to Vossukh-ed-Dowleh.

M. le Ministre,

Tehran, July 17, 1914.

WITH reference to my note addressed to your Excellency on the 16th April, 1913, in which I informed you of the conditions under which His Majesty's Government was prepared to make an advance of 100,000*l.* to the Persian Government, the money to be devoted to the maintenance of the Government gendarmerie, in the province of Fars, I have now the honour to state that I am authorised by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to make a further advance of 50,000*l.* to the Imperial Government, the money to be devoted to meeting the expenses incurred in the maintenance of the gendarmerie forces in the provinces of Fars and Kerman. It is proposed to place this fresh advance to a separate account at the Imperial Bank of Persia entitled "Trésorier général, Gendarmerie de Fars et Kerman."

It is understood that this advance will be repayable out of any large loan that may be negotiated; that it will be secured upon the surplus of the southern customs and upon the opium and excise revenues of Southern Persia; that it will bear interest at 7 per cent. per annum; and that, in the event of no loan being negotiated, it will be repayable from the above-named sources of revenue in due course, and in the same manner as the earlier advances made by His Majesty's Government, amounting in all to 440,000*l.*

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 2 in No. 126.

Memorandum.

WITH reference to his note of to-day's date, His Britannic Majesty's Minister has the honour to inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs that he has received instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to take steps to secure that the advance of 50,000*l.* made to the Persian Government for the maintenance of the gendarmerie forces in the provinces of Fars and Kerman is really devoted to the purpose for which the money has been lent, and that it is properly expended.

In order that this end may be attained, Sir E. Grey is of opinion that the money should be placed to a special account at the Imperial Bank of Persia entitled "Trésorier général, Gendarmerie de Fars et Kerman," and that it should be operated upon in the following manner:—

When money is required the commanding officers at Shiraz and Kerman respectively shall make requisition to the financial agents at those places, stating for what

purpose the money is needed. The financial agent, if he approves the expenditure, will then make application to the Treasurer-General who will instruct the Bank to make the remittance, if he is satisfied that the expense to be incurred is a justifiable one.

Sir E. Grey also makes a condition of the advance that the Swedish officers responsible for the expenditure of the moneys shall render accounts to the financial agents showing how the same have been spent.

July 17, 1914.

Enclosure 3 in No. 126.

Ala-es-Sultaneh to Sir W. Townley.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency, [*Undated.*]

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 17th July, 1914, enclosing a memorandum bearing the same date regarding an advance of 50,000*l.* for the gendarmerie of Fars and Kerman. I have to express my sense of gratitude for this mark of the friendship of the Government of His Majesty the King of England which is always so gratifying to the Persian Government. This advance will be paid in the manner set forth in the reply of the Foreign Office dated the 23rd Jemadi I, 1331 (1st May, 1913,), and it will be expended in the manner proposed in the above-mentioned memorandum from His Majesty's Legation.

I avail, &c.

ALA-ES-SULTANEH.

[47394] No. 127.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 8.)

(No. 218. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tehran, August* 1, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch, as marked in the margin,* which I have received from His Majesty's vice-consul at Ahwaz, actually in camp at Ispahan, respecting Russian intrigues with the Bakhtiari khans.

The subject will be dealt with in an accompanying despatch upon the general situation created by the recent forward Russian policy adopted in Persia, but I would add that I have received a friendly warning from the khans here that it is probable that they will find themselves forced, if Ispahan is handed over to any Governor-General with pro-Russian leanings at variance with Bakhtiari interests, to make their own terms with the Russians in the same manner as the Zil-us-Sultan and others have found themselves constrained to do. It is unnecessary for me to insist upon the gravity of the situation for our important interests in Arabistan, which will be created should the Bakhtiari khans waiver in their allegiance to us.

As I have had the honour to inform you, Sir, I have always foreseen from the moment that the properties of the Zil-us-Sultan were handed over to be administered by the manager of the Russian Bank, an overwhelming increase of Russian influence in the Ispahan district that could not fail to react upon our position in the neutral zone. I shall call the attention of my Russian colleague to this unfriendly policy of the Russian consul-general in endeavouring to suborn a tribe whose friendship for Great Britain is traditional, but if we are to keep that friendship, which is, in my opinion, more vital to us to-day than ever, on account of the newly acquired oil interest, we shall probably have to give more than mere assurances of goodwill. For this reason I have missed no opportunity of late in assisting the khans when I legitimately could.

The khans are so divided among themselves that one has to discount what the one says of the other, and it is possible that the report which has reached Captain Ranking may have been coloured by personal spite, but it is clear to me that there has been some move made to endeavour to detach the khans from their allegiance to us.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

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* Not printed.

[47396] No. 128.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 8.)

(No. 220.)

Sir, *Tehran, August* 1, 1914.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 156 of the 16th ultimo upon the subject of Major O'Connor's statement that the Treasurer-General had not properly allocated to the Administration of Fars the entire sum of 30,000*l.* earmarked for the purpose out of the last British advance of 200,000*l.*, I have the honour to transmit copies of despatches which were addressed to me by Major O'Connor during his recent visit to Tehran, giving details of an arrangement reached between him and the Treasurer-General respecting the financial administration of Fars. It will be seen that under this arrangement the practice hitherto observed of transmitting all the revenues of the province to Tehran will be discontinued.

It will appear from the figures given that the provincial administration of Fars did indeed benefit to the extent of about 18,500*l.* from the 30,000*l.* earmarked for the purpose out of the 1913 advance of 200,000*l.*, but that the remaining 11,500*l.* destined for the special service was not applied thereto. When questioned last August (a year ago) upon the subject, M. Mornard assured me that the entire sum had been remitted to Fars, and I can only believe his word that such was the case, although it is clear that, if this was done, a large portion of it came back to the Central Treasury in the form of revenue, so that the actual figures for the year remain as stated above. I am myself not quite clear whether or not it was the intention of His Majesty's Government that the entire sum of money should have been actually expended in Fars over and above the revenues of the province, or whether they would not have been satisfied with the knowledge that the local stringency was so greatly relieved at the commencement of the last financial year by the use of the 30,000*l.* that no real harm was done by the surplus that was not required for the civil administration being devoted to other purposes. For instance, the sum of 100,000*l.* advanced by His Majesty's Government for the upkeep of the gendarmerie in Fars did not suffice for that purpose, and a considerable additional sum of money had to be provided out of the funds at the disposal of the Central Treasury.

From the perusal of the correspondence on the subject of the fresh advance of 50,000*l.* made by His Majesty's Government for the use of the gendarmerie in Fars and Kerman, it would be seen that there is no danger of any portion of that money being diverted to any other purpose than that for which it was lent. It has appeared to me that 40,000*l.* of the above-named sum may fairly be allotted to Fars and 10,000*l.* to Kerman, where the force is very much smaller and the financial situation more encouraging. Major O'Connor is of opinion that 40,000*l.* added to the revenues of the province should enable the expenses of the gendarmerie to be met until the end of the current Persian financial year, which terminates on the 20th March next. Special care will be taken to see that the money lent by His Majesty's Government for the upkeep of the gendarmerie will be devoted solely to that purpose, as will be duly shown in the accounts to be presented. Having a controlling influence upon the expenditure of this money, Major O'Connor will be in a position to ensure that gendarmerie orders for supplies are made in India and the United Kingdom. As long as the present state of war exists in Europe it will be impossible to procure supplies from any other source.

A perusal of Major O'Connor's despatches will, I think, show that the arrangement made is the best possible under the peculiar conditions prevailing in Persia at the present moment. It may be argued that it makes for financial decentralisation. This appears to me to be a small drawback compared with the importance to British interests in the province that the financial administration should be conducted in such a manner that the provincial revenues will be always available for the wants of the provincial administration. It will be noticed that the collection and distribution of the revenues of the province remain invested in the hands of the Belgian agents of the Central Government, and that no attempt has been made to establish any form of control outside that agency.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 128.

Major O'Connor to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 1 c.) *Tehran, July* 4, 1914.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform you that, in accordance with permission received from you, I had a long conversation yesterday with M. Mornard on the subject of the financial administration of the province of Fars.

As your Excellency is aware, the present system under which the revenues of the province are remitted by the Imperial Bank automatically to Tehran on receipt has not proved very satisfactory from the point of view of the efficiency of the provincial administration. The Controller of Finances in Fars is obliged to deposit all the money he collects in the bank, and these deposits are at once remitted to Tehran; and he has no authority to incur any expenditure, even under the provisions of the sanctioned budget, but is dependent upon the precarious and uncertain supplies which he may receive from time to time from the Treasurer-General. This system may no doubt suit the convenience and the necessities of the Central Government, but from the point of view of the provincial administration it has proved itself highly unsatisfactory.

I began the conversation by laying before M. Mornard the figures which I had already submitted to your Excellency, showing that, according to the books of the Imperial Bank, the Treasurer-General had remitted to Fars during the year 1913–14 a sum of 102,000 taels (or about 18,500*l.*) in excess of what he had received from the province; and that he therefore still owes to Fars 11,500*l.* out of the 30,000*l.* especially earmarked for the province out of the 200,000*l.* loan of last year; and I also reminded him that he had borrowed from the Imperial Bank the sum of 116,442 tomans (about 20,000*l.*) on the security of the Fars revenues; and that the Central Treasury had therefore benefited from the province of Fars to the extent of some 31,000*l.* during the course of the last year or so. (The real figure is considerably greater than this, but I confined myself to extracts from the bank's books as supplied to me by the chief manager, which can of course be verified).

M. Mornard admitted the correctness of these figures, and was indeed, I think, relieved to find that I had understood the case; and he is no doubt under the impression that I am unacquainted with the other transactions whereby he has extracted revenue for the use of Central Treasury from the money lent by His Majesty's Government for the assistance of the administration and the gendarmerie of the province of Fars.

I then said that in view of the circumstances as indicated by these figures, and of the fact that a fresh loan of 50,000*l.* was projected by His Majesty's Government, a part of which at any rate was intended for the gendarmerie of Fars, it seemed desirable that some more satisfactory method should be devised for regulating the finances of Fars so as to ensure that the money actually collected, or lent by His Majesty's Government for expenditure in the province, should really be expended for the benefit of the provincial administration; and that it had occurred to me that the best way of securing this result would be by leaving the provincial revenues in the Shiraz branch of the Imperial Bank, in the name of the controller of finance at that place, to be expended there by him under the provisions of the budget sanctioned by the Central Government. This simple expedient will do away with the confusion and uncertainty which exist under the present system, and would enable the controller to adjust his receipts and expenditure, and to derive the fullest benefit from the revenues of the province.

After the discussion of some technical points, M. Mornard agreed that this system might with advantage be adopted, provided that the Imperial Bank had no objection; but he hinted that the proposed arrangement would make Fars semi-independent as regards its financial administration, and would have the effect of diminishing the interest of the Central Government and of the Treasurer-General in the welfare of the province.

I replied that, as far as I could see, no such result need follow. The Central Government and the Treasurer-General would still retain the fullest control over the finances of the province. No expenditure could be incurred except such as had previously been sanctioned by the Central Government under the provisions of the provincial budget estimates; and the accounts of the expenditure would of course be submitted monthly to the Treasurer-General, and any irregularities could at once be

detected and checked. All that was proposed in essence was that the actual money collected by the controller should remain in the province instead of being remitted to Tehran.

Finally M. Mornard agreed to my proposal (which I informed him met with the approval of your Excellency), and he expressed a wish to discuss with me the Fars budget estimates in detail next Sunday. During the course of that discussion I hope to be able so to adjust the expenditure of the province (a question which I have already thoroughly thrashed out with M. Stas), including the cost of the gendarmerie, as to bring these expenses within the limits of the provincial revenues—reinforced during the current year by, at any rate, a portion of the new loan projected by His Majesty's Government.

Experience will show whether or no the provincial revenues will alone be sufficient to meet the entire cost of the administration including the gendarmerie, and it is not imposible that a small additional subvention may be required during the first two or three years—especially in view of the losses caused by the plague of locusts from which Fars is now suffering. But at least the new arrangement should enable the Controller of Finances and the British consul between them to evolve some kind of order out of the present chaos; and it will, moreover, have the advantage of giving all the officials (including the Swedish officers), who are in any way concerned in the administration of the province, a personal interest in the success of the administration as a whole, and will encourage them to work for the increase of the revenue on the one hand, and its economical expenditure to the best advantage on the other.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to the political resident in the Persian Gulf for information.

I have, &c.
W. F. O'CONNOR.

Enclosure 2 in No. 128.

Major O'Connor to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 3 c.)

Sir, *Tehran, July* 7, 1914.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 1 c. dated the 4th July, I have the honour to inform you that I had a further conversation with M. Mornard yesterday morning during which we discussed the various headings of the Fars budget estimates, and that M. Mornard has approved an arrangement under which, it may be hoped, the expenses of the provincial administration may, in future, be limited to a sum which will lie within the estimated provincial revenues—reinforced during the current year by a loan from His Majesty's Government for the use of the gendarmerie.

In my telegram to your Excellency, No. 190 of the 22nd May, I had already indicated roughly the nature of the proposals prepared by M. Stas and myself to secure this object. Since the despatch of that telegram, however, circumstances have changed considerably in Fars. We have seen that the arrangement under which Colonel Merrill was sent to Shiraz to reorganise the local troops, and under which he was only an instructor without real powers of command, cannot be worked successfully; and as I have already reported, the whole scheme has broken down and the so-called army has relapsed into its former condition of inefficiency. In view of this fact, and also of the consideration that the provincial revenues would be insufficient (even with the help of a 40,000*l.* advance) to meet the cost of the gendarmes when brought to their full strength under the sanctioned programme, plus a local military force and the other expenses of the provincial administration, it seemed best (and in this view M. Mornard heartily concurred) that the local force should be abolished altogether (except a small bodyguard of about 100 men for the Governor-General), and that the allotment so saved should be transferred to the gendarmerie (including the roadguard on the main road), so as to bring their monthly grant up to a total of 40,000 tomans—which sum will probably suffice to meet all their expenses, at any rate until the end of the current year. Other details also were discussed, and finally the main budget headings were fixed by M. Mornard as follows (in round figures):—

	Tomans.	
Governor-General and Staff	3,000	a month.
Gendarmerie and road guards	40,000	"
District road guards	3,000	"
Governor-General's bodyguard	1,200	"
Police	2,300	"
Repairs to Government buildings	500	"
Pensions	6,500	"
Finance Department administration..	10,000	"
Monthly total..	66,500	
Total for eight remaining months of current year ..	532,000	
Add for outstanding debts of the gendarmerie and army department to a British firm, say	50,000	
Grand total to end of current year.. ..	582,000	
Estimated revenue during current year	600,000	
Add advance of (say) 40,000*l*...	220,000	
	820,000	
Deduct for probable losses caused by locusts	100,000	
Net estimated revenue	720,000	

There should thus, if these figures work out approximately correct in practice, be a balance of some 138,000 tomans (say 25,000*l.*) remaining at the end of the current year to carry on the Administration during the early months of next year. Whether a further subvention will be required or not next year depends upon factors which cannot at present be forecast with any certainty.

During the course of our conversation I discussed with M. Mornard the important question of the appointment of district Governors. This is a much-vexed question which has already been the cause of a good deal of difficulty in Fars. Under the new régime the agents of the finance administration are expected to perform several of the most important functions of the old district Governors (notably the collection of revenue), with the inevitable result that the two authorities must often clash. Moreover, a double expense is involved in the way of salaries to a double set of officials, with a double set of staffs, guards, &c. The Mukhbir-es-Sultaneh in this, as in most questions which concern the finance department, has adopted an obstructive attitude, and has from the very first endeavoured to embarrass and hamper the finance agents in the execution of their duties by open opposition and by subterranean intrigues, conducted generally through the medium of his nominees, the district Governors. The dual system involved, in fact, a quite unnecessary expense and is prejudicial to real progress and efficiency.

M. Mornard, to whom I expressed this view, was in most cordial agreement. He quoted various instances of similar friction between his agents and local Governors elsewhere, and he informed me that the Cabinet as a whole shared his opinions on the subject. It is proposed, therefore, that in future the duties of district Governors and of finance agents should be united in the person of a single official (assisted by a suitable subordinate), to be selected by the Governor-General and the provincial Controller of Finances in consultation, who, if they differ, will refer the appointment for a decision to Tehran. It will probably take some little time before this new arrangement can be worked with entire success in Fars, where special difficulties exist in certain districts which require special treatment, and also because of the lack of suitable personnel. But at any rate the principle now accepted is a sound one, and will work for economy and efficiency.

This particular question, however, is one regarding which the Mukhbir-es-Sultaneh has always shown himself particularly troublesome and exacting, and it will, I fear, be difficult to bring the new system into proper working order as long as he remains at Shiraz.

I discussed a number of other minor points with M. Mornard, regarding which I need not trouble your Excellency, but regarding which it was useful to know his opinion, and to let him understand the local point of view.

A copy of this despatch is being forwarded for information to the political resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have, &c.
W. F. O'CONNOR.

[47397]

No. 129.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 8.)

(No. 221.)

Sir,

Tehran, August 1, 1914.

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch upon the subject of the financial arrangements reached between the Treasurer-General and Major O'Connor, during the latter's recent visit here respecting the administration of the province of Fars, I have the honour to submit herewith a copy of a report upon the maintenance of order in the above-named province, which Major O'Connor addressed to me before his departure for his post.

It will be seen that Major O'Connor has expressed a decided opinion that the present Governor-General has ceased to be a useful agent, and that he should be recalled forthwith. This opinion he has confirmed in a telegram which I have received since he reached Shiraz, and after he had seen both Kavam-ul-Mulk and Soulat-ed-Dowleh, both of whom appear to have lost all faith in the Governor-General. Under the circumstances there would appear to be no other course open but to urge that his Excellency should be recalled. It is unfortunate, as Mukhber-us-Sultaneh is certainly much above the average of Persian officials, and had a good reputation for honesty, a reputation that he would appear to have somewhat tarnished at Shiraz. At the present moment there is such confusion in Government circles that it does not appear advisable to press immediately for his recall, but I will lose no time in discussing the situation with the Prime Minister.

The organisation of the financial administration is dealt with in my preceding despatch and requires no further comment.

Acting on the instructions contained in your telegram No. 129 of the 18th June last, and after discussing the situation with Major O'Connor, I decided that it would be advisable that assurances couched in the language suggested by the Government of India in their telegram of the 11th June should be given to Kavam-ul-Mulk and Soulet-ed-Dowleh. I have the honour to submit to you, Sir, copies of the letters which I instructed Major O'Connor to hand to the two chieftains. Although there is perhaps no very sound reason for anticipating that the pact lately concluded between these two important factors in the Fars situation will be of very long duration, it still seemed to me desirable that we should be assured of the goodwill of men whose friendly co-operation may at any time be of use to us in the furtherance of British interests. I have urged upon Major O'Connor that it is desirable that Kavam and Soulet should realise that the Central Government can make itself respected, and that for that reason it is necessary that the gendarmerie should continue to have the open support of the consulate, and that he should be prepared, in the event of the Swedish instructors being recalled, with some organisation that can take their place, at least temporarily, if possible.

In the present state of painful uncertainty prevailing in Persia it is hard to foreshadow what may happen in the immediate future in a province such as Fars somewhat removed from the direct influence of the Central Government, and where the situation is to a large extent dominated by two chieftains, naturally jealous of each other, and separated at heart by a blood feud. Much must depend on the way in which affairs are handled by the local agent, to whom must be entrusted the delicate task of conciliation without committing His Majesty's Government to the one more than the other, or to a policy that may weaken the chieftain's allegiance to the central authority. The task at Shiraz is complicated by the presence of an intriguing Governor-General who can do much harm if so minded.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 129.

Major O'Connor to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 6 c. Confidential.)

Sir,

Tehran, July 17, 1914.

BEFORE leaving Tehran for Shiraz I would venture to address you with a few remarks on the general situation in Fars.

As your Excellency is aware the principal object of the various proposals which I have submitted to you from time to time for some months past, and which I have discussed personally with you here, is to place the administration of that province upon

a more stable and satisfactory footing. From the day when it became known that His Majesty's Government did not propose to advance further funds for the Fars gendarmerie, it became apparent that, as far as the provincial finances were concerned, the province was advancing rapidly and certainly towards bankruptcy; and that bankruptcy, implying as it would inability to pay the gendarmerie and the road guards, would inevitably involve Fars again in the anarchy from which it has emerged only during the course of the last eighteen months or so.

There is no need, I think, to lay emphasis on the consideration that the recrudescence of serious disorders in Fars would be a misfortune of special gravity, and one which would involve His Majesty's Government in special difficulties and embarrassments. Owing to the peculiar nature of the population of Fars, and to the existence of the two great nomad tribal groups, this province is one which is always liable at any moment to fall into a state of almost complete anarchy; and such a situation at once raises in an acute form the question of what policy His Majesty's Government should follow in the internal portion of the neutral zone. The recent history of this region has showed how easily and quickly a critical situation may be produced, and nothing could be more deplorable than a reversion to the conditions which prevailed two years ago. I personally am a strong opponent of any scheme involving the introduction of British troops into inland Persia. It appears to me that although our interests in the gulf littoral (including the lower valley of the Karun) may be safeguarded with comparative ease, and that our troops might be employed in those regions again, as they have been in the past, without necessarily involving us in any undesirable responsibilities, and without exciting any very acute Persian or Mohammedan susceptibilities, the case presents an entirely different aspect once it is a quostion of the areas further inland. The occupation of Fars, in fact, would be a formidable undertaking, which would necessitate the employment of a very considerable force (probably 20,000 to 30,000 men), and which would involve Great Britain in a vast and probably permanent extension of her existing responsibilities, and would excite Mahommedan opinion all over the Moslem world. The ill-fated experiment of introducing an Indian cavalry regiment into Fars indicated faintly what embarassments might be created by such a policy; and indeed it is one which no one who has studied local conditions, or considered the Persian question as a whole, can contemplate without the most serious misgivings. My object, then, in submitting proposals regarding the Fars administration for the favour of your Excellency's consideration has been to avert such a situation as only recently existed in that province, and so to shape our policy there that even in the event of a serious crisis occurring at Tehran, or in the north, order and an orderly administration might still be maintained in Fars. With this object in view I have submitted to you three principal proposals:—

1. The removal of the present Governor-General. As your Excellency is aware, the Mukhbar-es-Sultaneh, who on the whole has not done badly, has never at heart been a cordial supporter of the European-directed administrations such as the finance and the gendarmerie, and he has recently been displaying his animus so openly that his presence at Shiraz has become a source of very serious embarassment; and his conduct in other respects has been unsatisfactory. He has, in fact, outlived his utility, and his early replacement is, in my opinion, essential if we wish to pursue a programme of reform and to create a more stable situation.

2. The organisation of the financial administration of the province on such a basis as to render it independent (or almost independent) of grants from the Central Government. In my despatches Nos. 1 c. and 3 c. to your Excellency, I have endeavoured to explain how a budget can be prepared which will render the province practically self-supporting. The figures as given in my despatch No. 3 c are only very rough estimates and certain important items (such, for example, as public works) are omitted altogether. But on the whole there is reason to think that a very fair system of administration (including gendarmerie or some other local force) might be conducted without extraneous aid under the conditions outlined.

3. But this, as indeed any other system of administration which cannot provide a large regular armed force capable of maintaining order all over the province, must depend to a great extent upon the goodwill and support of such magnates as the Kavam-ul-Mulk and the Soulat-ed-Dowleh. Most of the disorders which have occurred in Fars during the last few years may be attributed, directly or indirectly, to the dissensions and jealousies between these two personages, and to their inability to control their respective tribal groups; and these conditions of instability and uncertainty

have been much aggravated by the intrigues of successive Governors-General. It seems very desirable, therefore, to inspire Kavam and Soulat with confidence, to enlist their sympathy and support in any policy approved by His Majesty's Government, and to render them practically independent of the whims and intrigues of the Governor-General for the time being, so long as they behave themselves well and fulfil certain conditions. Such, indeed, is the view now accepted by His Majesty's Government, and the letters which your Excellency has entrusted to me for the Kavam and the Soulat will inform them of the conditions on which they will receive the moral support and the good offices of His Majesty's Government.

The groundwork seems, therefore, to have been laid for the pursuance of a policy in Fars which should, it may be hoped, have the effect of staving off anarchy and disorder whatever may be the weakness or financial straits of the Central Government. It will necessarily depend very much for its successful execution upon the personal influence of His Majesty's consul on the spot, whose task it will be to reconcile and to secure the co-operation of all the various elements which can affect the situation.

A copy of this despatch is being sent for information to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, and to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have, &c.
W. F. O'CONNOR.

Enclosure 2 in No. 129.

Letter to the Kawam, dated July 18, 1914.

MAJOR O'CONNOR has given me the message which you confided to him before his departure from Shiraz, and has informed me that you have given him repeated assurances of your desire and intention to support the various Government Departments in Fars, and I therefore take this opportunity of writing to you to thank you for these assurances, and to convey to you my appreciation of the services which you have rendered the Persian Government by the expeditions which you have successfully undertaken during the last year and a half.

As no doubt you are aware, the policy of His Majesty's Government in Persia is to secure the maintenance of order and to support the various administrations approved by the Persian Government; and they therefore welcome the assistance of all the local chiefs in the pursuance of this policy. I have informed them of your efforts to restore order amongst the Shamseh tribes and in Eastern Fars; and also the fact that you and Soulat-ed-Dowleh have recently entered into friendly relations with one another.

His Majesty's Government regard the improved condition of things in Fars with satisfaction, and they trust that it will continue. They are of opinion that you, as chief of the Khamseh tribe, may be of great service in the maintenance of law and order, and they suggest that you should continue to work for that end by the following means:—

1. That you and Soulat-ed-Dowleh should undertake to keep the peace towards one another.
2. That you should maintain order among the Khamseh tribes.
3. That you should preserve satisfactory relations with British representatives, and pay due regard to British interests.
4. That you should pay your lawful revenue regularly to the Finance office at Fars, and should support the various Government Departments.

I commend these suggestions to your careful attention, and I may inform you that in the event of your undertaking to follow this line of conduct, I am authorised by His Majesty's Government to give you certain assurances on their part, which will be communicated to you by Major O'Connor.

Enclosure 3 in No. 129.

Letter to Soulat, dated July 18, 1914.

THE British consul at Shiraz has informed me from time to time of the various messages which you have sent to me, and I am taking this opportunity of sending you this letter by him to say that I have very carefully considered your assurances of goodwill and your offers to render some special service to His Majesty's Government; and that I have communicated on the matter with His Majesty's Government.

As no doubt you are aware the policy of His Majesty's Government in Persia is to secure the maintenance of order and to support the various administrations approved by the Persian Government; and they therefore welcome the assistance of all local chiefs in the pursuance of this policy. I have informed them already that during the last year and a half the conduct of the Kashgai tribe under your ilkanship has shown a marked improvement, and also that you and your brothers are now on good terms with one another and that you have recently entered into friendly relations with Kavam-ul-Mulk. His Majesty's Government regard this state of affairs with satisfaction, as also the fact that you have declared to the British consul that you are prepared cordially to support the Government administrations in Fars.

I take this opportunity therefore of explaining to you more fully the various respects in which His Majesty's Government consider that you may assist in the execution of their policy in Fars:—

1. That you and the Kavam-ul-Mulk should undertake to keep the peace with one another.
2. That you should maintain order among the Kashgai tribes.
3. That you should preserve satisfactory relations with British representatives and pay due regard to British interests.
4. That you should pay your lawful revenue regularly to the Finance office in Fars, and should support the various Government Departments.

I should be glad to learn from you whether you are prepared to undertake to follow this line of conduct. In the event of your so agreeing, Major O'Connor will discuss the matter with you further.

[47398]

No. 130.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 8.)

(No. 222.)

Tehran, August 5, 1914.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the usual monthly summary of events in Persia for the past four weeks.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 130.

Summary of Events in Persia for the four weeks ending August 5.

Tehran.

The Coronation.

THE Shah proceeded to the palace in town from his country seat on the 20th July. The following day the coronation took place. In the morning the Shah proceeded in State to the Medjliss where he took the oath of allegiance to the Constitution, as set down in article 39 of the Fundamental Law of October 1907. A number of the deputies of the last Medjliss were in their accustomed seats, and it is stated that a quorum was present. In the afternoon the coronation ceremony took place in the museum room of the palace. The Corps diplomatique was present at both ceremonies. The town was gaily decorated for the occasion, and there were illuminations and fireworks at night. On Wednesday night, the 22nd July, the Prime Minister gave a dinner at the Royal Garden of Sultanetabad, at which the Diplomatic Body attended in uniform. There was a display of fireworks afterwards. On Thursday the 23rd, the special envoys and their wives were entertained to dinner by the Shah, at his country palace. This is the first time a Shah of Persia has sat at table with the foreign representatives. On Sunday, the 19th July, His Majesty's Minister, attended by his staff, was received in audience by the Shah, to present his credentials as special envoy on the occasion of the coronation, and at the same time presented a pair of urns from His Majesty King George V. The Turkish Ambassador, the Russian, French, German, Belgian, Austrian, and Spanish Ministers presented similar credentials, and gifts or decorations. The decorations conferred on the Shah on this occasion were the Turkish order Khanedan Ala Osman, the Spanish Chain of Charles III. and the Belgian Grand Cordon de Leopold. The Russian Government also presented the ex-Regent with a gold snuff-box with the Emperor's portrait surrounded with diamonds.

The Cabinet.

The Foreign Minister, Vosouk-ed-Dowleh, who resigned as reported in the last Summary, subsequently consented to retain his portfolio until after the coronation when he resigned definitely, the portfolio of Foreign Affairs being taken over by the Mushavar-ul-Mamalek as acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. The present Cabinet, under the presidency of Ala-es-Sultaneh, is likely to remain in office until the new Medjliss assembles. The chances of a new Cabinet being formed with Mustaufi-ul-Mamalek and other good men in it, is now somewhat remote.

Finances.

The finances are in a very critical position and great embarrassments confront the Treasurer-General who has tendered his resignation to the Government.

G. P. CHURCHILL, *Oriental Secretary.*

Tabriz.

The coronation was fittingly celebrated on the 21st July, though it was not known by the population until the day before what the intentions of the Governor-General in this respect were. Once, however, these intentions were made known, the people lost no time in decorating the bazaars. There was a reception by the Governor-General of the Consular Corps in the morning, at which the Russian consul-general, to whose influence the proper celebration of the coronation is said to be largely due, made a short speech which is reported to have been very appropriate, and to have produced a favourable impression.

The municipality has issued a notice directing that all townspeople leaving Tabriz must be provided with a pass signed by the Beylerbey. No attempt has been made to make this new regulation applicable to British residents.

The Russian consular agent in the Maraghar district is busy endeavouring to induce Persian subjects to place themselves under Russian protection. The chief landowners in the same district have been officially informed that all taxes must in future be sent to the Governor-General.

There was trouble at Maku towards the end of June. A nephew of Ikbal-es-Sultaneh, the ruler of the district, was killed by his servant.

M. Tchirkof, hitherto Russian consul at Khoi, has been appointed acting Russian consul at Astrabad.

From Urmia it is reported that the collection of taxes by the Russian consulate from Russian subjects and protected persons is being extended so as to include all Syrian Christians. The Governor of Urmia is said to be even more subservient to the Russians than his predecessor in regard to this question.

Resht.

Deputies have been elected for Fumen and Lahijan; elections have been held in Enzeli but are to be held again owing to the small number of votes given the first time.

The Governor-General has requested the heads of the Armenian community at Resht to give him a list of all the Armenians in the town. The list is probably required in connection with the refusal of the Armenians to send a deputy to the Medjliss.

The coronation was fittingly celebrated by the Governor-General and the town was well illuminated and decorated.

Robberies and murders have been prevalent during the month.

The Sipahdar has seized all the Government villages at Astrabad and his agent has been selling or leasing them to Russians. A Russian official who visited Astrabad at the beginning of January to enquire into matters is said to have leased all the Government properties from the boundary of Mazanderan to the boundary of Nardin for ninety-six years: Russian peasants and their families will be settled on the lands in question. According to the Russian consul at Astrabad it was the Sipahdar who leased the properties to the above-mentioned Russian official with the consent of the Cabinet and over the signature of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Reports as to seizure of lands by Russians in Astrabad, Mazanderan, Goklan, &c., and colonisation of the same by Russian subjects, reach His Majesty's Legation frequently from Astrabad, and are confirmed by His Majesty's consulate-general at Meshed.

Meshed.

The result of the elections is disappointing to the Democrats, who are said to be contemplating lodging objections against the four successful candidates. If they succeed in disqualifying two of these, their own candidates may find a seat.

The elections at Turbat-i-Shaikh Jam have been declared void, and fresh voting papers have been sent to the district.

Nishapur has elected its deputy to the Medjliss.

The Governor-General has succeeded in settling the dispute between the Taimuris and the Berberis, and the armed sowars of both parties have dispersed. Any chance of serious disturbances on the Afghan frontier has thus been removed.

It appears likely that the Daragaz affair will be amicably settled.

Mirza Khalil Khan, the finance agent responsible for the troubles at Turbat-i-Haidari in June has been captured and brought back to Meshed for trial. He has been released on bail. The Russian consul-general has asked His Majesty's consul-general not to press for an immediate trial as he has written to Turbat-i-Haidari for further information and to Tehran for instructions. The matter is thus at rest for the present. The Persian staff of the Finance Department at Meshed have telegraphed to Tehran threatening to resign in connection with this case, their contention apparently being that no employé of the Finance Department should ever be called to account for any misdeeds. The threat is not likely to be carried into execution.

The Turcomans of Goklan recently prepared to raid the Tehran road in the neighbourhood of Shahrud. It is reported that the Chief of Bujnurd attacked them and killed some.

Ispahan.

The notorious brigand, Reza Joozani, attacked the Tehran post cart on the 15th July, some 15 miles north of Ispahan, taking some parcels and destroying all letters. The Governor-General immediately sent sowars from Ispahan in pursuit, but Reza is said to have taken shelter with Naib Hussein at Kashan.

The representative of the German Legation, who was instructed to examine the affair between the "Russian" rayots at Qumisheh and the "German" ragots at Pudeh, has examined the question on the spot. He is convinced that the former were the aggressors, but he has experienced great difficulty in persuading the Russian consul to discuss the question with him. After returning to Tehran on a brief visit the German representative has gone back again to Ispahan.

Agha Najafi, Chief Mullah of Ispahan, died on the 5th July. The bazaars were closed a whole week as sign of mourning.

The new members elected for the Medjliss have not yet left Ispahan, as one of the members of the "Anjuman of Overseers" has refused to sign the document authorising their election. A Russian intrigue is suspected.

The condition of the town is reported quiet, but the immediate surroundings to be becoming more and more disturbed.

Seistan.

The 700 rifles and ammunition sent to the Shaukat-ul-Mulk reached Birjand safely on the 12th July.

The news of their arrival seems to have spread everywhere, and to be creating an excellent impression on the Baluchis.

Two of the most redoubtable Baluchi raiders have written to the Deputy Governor, Seistan, tendering their submission "on condition that they are not ill-treated." Their communication has not yet reached Shaukat-ul-Mulk. It remains to be seen whether any satisfactory settlement can be arranged without some demonstration of force. There is no doubt that the Baluchis have grown very nervous since their encounter with the gendarmerie of Kerman. It seems most unlikely, if negotiations are entered upon now, that the Indo-European Telegraph Department's officials in these districts will be in any danger of molestation for some months to come.

Yezd.

The district is reported quiet, and caravans are passing freely; 163 caravans were reported for the week ending the 21st June, 169 the next week, and 176 the following week, numbering 3,300, 2,400, and 2,500 camels respectively.

Shiraz.

Major O'Connor reached Shiraz on the 28th July on his return from a brief visit to Tehran.

A terrific explosion occurred at the arsenal on the 24th July, the cause being supposed to be the dropping of a lighted cigarette on some loose gunpowder. It is estimated that the losses by destruction of arms and ammunition and damage to buildings amount to about 10,000*l*. Casualties are given as 10 killed, 20 wounded, and 5 or 6 missing.

Kerman.

The non-receipt of funds for the gendarmerie has been causing much anxiety, which has been partially allayed by the despatch of a certain sum out of the recent advance of 50,000*l*. made by His Majesty's Government to the Persian Government for gendarmerie purposes in Kerman and Fars.

It is said that all the groups of "bastis" in the telegraph office at Bam have now been reassured, and that they have returned to their homes. Much excitement at Bam is, however, reported on account of the elections for the Medjliss. Kerman has polled, but the result is not yet known.

Kermanshah.

Disturbances broke out on the 10th July as a result of the Governor-General's intrigues and misgovernment. The voting station was closed by ruffians in his Highness's pay, and the bazaar was also closed. The Democrat leaders succeeded, however, in restraining their partisans, the bazaar reopened, and the counting of votes was recommenced on strict orders from Tehran. Sardar Akram, lately at enmity with the Governor-General, entered the province with a force, presumably to attack a local reliable chieftain who had guaranteed the security of the road; 10,000 packages of goods were delayed at the frontier owing to the insecurity of the road and failure of merchants trading with Manchester was feared. The Central Government took vigorous action, and telegraphed to Sardar Akram to withdraw from the province. General insecurity and tribal unrest, however, prevail, and traffic on the road is greatly disorganised to the detriment of British trade.

The Governor-General informed His Majesty's consul, on the 22nd July, that he had sent in his resignation to the Persian Government, who have decided to send him as Acting Governor-General of Azerbaijan. The Russian consul has, however, forbidden his Highness to leave Kermanshah. Presumably he will eventually leave. The Russian candidate for the succession, Sardar Ijlal, a local noble, is weak and incapable, and would be merely a Russian tool. The Central Government has, however, other more suitable candidates.

The Russian commercial attaché to the Russian Legation in Tehran recently visited Kermanshah, interviewed merchants, praised Russian goods and advised them not to deal with the Imperial Bank of Persia. He subsequently left for Kurdistan. He told people in Kermanshah that the Russian railway would soon be completed to Urmia, and thence would be extended to Kurdistan and Kermanshah when they would be able to get their goods by rail.

It is stated that the Russians are about to collect taxes due by their subjects and protégés and deposit them in the Russian Bank; the Russian consul has informed the Karguzar verbally in this sense.

Polling has been concluded; the counting of the votes shows a huge majority for each of the democrat candidates, but the result has not yet been officially announced. The Moderates are trying to find means of cancelling the elections. There would thus appear to be still a danger of disorders at Kermanshah in this connection.

The coronation was celebrated in the same way as elsewhere in the provinces.

Bushire.

Captain Lundberg left for Shiraz on the 26th April. Twenty-five gendarmes only, under a Persian officer, now remain at Bushire. Their conduct is said to be unsatisfactory.

At the instance of the financial agent at Shiraz an embargo was placed early in July on wheat exported from Dashti and Dashtistan. This was highly detrimental to British interests, and quite unnecessary. Representations in this sense were made to the Central Government, who have removed the embargo.

Ahwaz.

Numerous complaints were received that the Sheikh of Mohammerah had impressed for his army operating in Arabistan mules under contract with Lynch on the Lynch road; no mules were therefore available for the transport of merchandise, and British trade was greatly hampered. Representations have been made to the Sheikh.

The absence of mules is now said to be due to muleteers not coming in for fear of impressment. An arrangement would appear to have been made to bring them in under escort.

Sardar Jang, Ilkhani of the Bakhtiari, has been conducting operations against Hussein Khan, Bahmai of the Kuhgelus, for some time past. He had some difficulty in bringing these to a successful conclusion on account of lack of heavy guns for bombarding the forts. Latest advises are that Hussein Khan has submitted, and has proceeded to Bakhtiari country to discuss tribal affairs.

Mohammerah.

M. Bouckaert, Belgian director of customs at Mohammerah, died at Bushire on the 5th June.

Disturbances broke out at Dizful and Shuster at the end of June. Sheikh Ghazban, of the Beni Lam tribe, appeared with some following and raided the Ahwaz district of which the Sheikh of Mohammerah's son is Governor. The Sheikh of Mohammerah himself proceeded to Ahwaz with a large force. According to the latest news received, Sheikh Ghazban has been defeated with considerable loss, and has withdrawn across the Kharkha River, whither the Sheikh of Mohammerah has pursued him.

The cause of the trouble is said to be the deposition by the Sheikh of Mohammerah in the spring of the Sheikh of Hyder from the leadership of the Kasir Arabs of Dizful. Sheikh Ghasban took up arms on the Sheikh of Hyder's behalf.

[47400] No. 131.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 8.)

(No. 224. Very Confidential.)

Sir, *Tehran, August* 3, 1914.

IN my despatch No. 212 of the 25th ultimo, I had the honour to submit to you a copy of a financial statement laid before the Cabinet by the Treasurer-General, in which a suggestion was made that a solution of the present financial embarrassments might be found in the sale of certain territories to Great Britain and Russia respectively.

I was surprised, in the course of a long conversation which I had on the 26th ultimo with the Prime Minister, to see that the suggestion put forward by M. Mornard has had a favourable reception in Ministerial circles. Ala-us-Sultaneh

explained that people are in despair, and are so heartily sick of the situation that has been created by Russia's steady encroachments upon Persia's prerogatives that they are prepared to jump at any solution, however heroic, that might offer a chance of reaching a clear understanding. His Highness said that the manner in which Russia has laid hands upon the collection of revenue in the north from her subjects and protected persons, who are becoming countless, and is insidiously taking possession of the administration of the country through her consuls, has become so intolerable that he believes that a Medjliss would welcome even such a drastic solution as a sale of territory, provided that such conditions were attached to such a sale as would safeguard Persia from a continuance of Russian intervention in her internal affairs, and would guarantee her liberty of action in her own house.

I would respectfully venture to submit that the scheme appears to me to offer a possible solution of the Persian question, which, without some such radical step which will clearly define the true position and intentions of all parties, seems to me destined, sooner or later, to lead to serious differences between the British and Russian Governments. It may in justice be said that the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, in so far as it concerned Persia, has done a great work. It has undoubtedly preserved Persia from total disruption, but it has done its work, and if persevered in, will eventually prove a failure. If it be granted that both Governments were genuinely imbued with a desire to maintain the integrity and independence of Persia at the time of the signature of the convention, it cannot, I think, be gainsaid that circumstances have caused Russia to in a measure, at least, overlook the underlying principle of the convention, and that the recent action of the Russian legation and consuls has been of a nature to endanger the continued existence of Persia as a sovereign independent kingdom.

As co-signatory of the convention of 1907, Great Britain would appear bound to use her best endeavours to remind Russia of her undertaking under the said convention; but constant reminders of this nature are likely to produce friction, and it may, perhaps, be rightly held that the protection of Persia's rights under the joint guarantee of the two Governments is not of sufficient importance to risk jeopardising the good relations which it is of the first importance to maintain. There is, however, another side to the picture which cannot be lost sight of: the steady encroachment of Russia by means of the leasing of properties, and the intervention of Russian consuls which that entails, is rapidly spreading southwards from Ispahan into the neutral zone, in which, under the letter of the convention, Russia has equal rights with ourselves. It would appear to me inevitable that some day—and that day is not far distant at the present rate of progress—Russian interests will clash with old-established British rights in South Persia, and a quarrel may ensue. Already, I understand, at Ispahan the British and Russian residents pass each other as strangers.

Under such conditions, would it not, I venture to suggest, be well to take under careful consideration the question whether or no the scheme of zones of influence has been proved sufficiently successful to justify its continued maintenance? It appears to me to threaten to-day dangerous complications. Russia's aspirations in the north have been so far satisfied that either she or zealous consuls who are seeking their own self-advancement are looking for fresh fields in which to make her influence felt. It is hard to see how this tendency can be checked, unless the zones are delimitated afresh in such a manner as to give almost the entire neutral zone to Great Britain. It is improbable that Russian public opinion would accept such an arrangement.

Were the Persian Government to propose to the two Powers a sale of certain territories as sketched in M. Mornard's memorandum a condition would doubtless be attached that the system of zones should be abolished, in order that Persia might have complete liberty of action in what remained to her, all due assurances being of course given for the proper protection of the British and Russian interests already established. I am of opinion that such an arrangement would be greatly to our advantage as things stand to-day. We could easily make our own terms to protect our various interests and we should no longer feel that the steady Russian pressure from the north is jeopardising our rights which under the convention are very vulnerable. Our position in the Gulf would be rendered unassailable by our possession of the islands, quite apart from the possible future value they may have as oil-producing units or for purposes of storage.

I presume that His Majesty's Government are of opinion that British interests are best served by a Persia sufficiently strong to act as a buffer between Great Britain and Russia in the Middle East. Such a Persia can never, it has been clearly demonstrated, be created under the 1907 convention. Half the country is directly under Russian influence, a portion is undecided, and the insignificant remainder from the point of view

of Tehran politics, owns British allegiance. Meanwhile, the Central Government has no authority and never can have any authority so long as its hands are tied by the necessity of considering the wishes of one or other Power, or of both. A frank protectorate would afford the country a better chance of making progress than the present most unsatisfactory system.

If Russian aspirations in Azerbaijan or elsewhere could be satisfied by a sale of territory, Persia could be rendered free to look after her own affairs; she would have money with which to pay her most pressing creditors, and she would still have money over with which to carry out public works and maintain a sufficient force to guarantee law and order. Given a chance to manage their own affairs themselves, there are plenty of men in Persia to-day capable of doing so, and I feel convinced that, if she were given a fair start, Persia could not only rise again, but she could become a much more enlightened and useful State than she has ever been before. The position at Ispahan could be settled with a stroke of the pen. If the arrangement made between the Zil-es-Sultan and the manager of the Russian Bank were cancelled, the situation would become normal again as far as the interference of the Russian consul-general in the administration of the province is concerned.

This question of Ispahan is one that is likely to be fruitful of much trouble for our interests if the Russians are to be allowed to maintain the paramount position they have acquired there. The Bakhtiaris are closely identified with Ispahan. For the last four or five years the Governor-General has been a Bakhtiari. Should a Russian nominee, other than a Bakhtiari, be appointed, it is more than probable that the chiefs of this fickle and money-loving tribe would make up their minds to come to terms with the Russians much in the same way as the Zil-es-Sultan has done. All Persians are prone to side with the stronger, more especially if pecuniary advantage is likely to result therefrom. We have seen from recent reports from Ispahan that there is good reason to believe that the present Russian consul-general, inspired doubtless by the manager of the bank, who knows the local conditions thoroughly, has made overtures to the Bakhtiaris through the representative at Ispahan of the Haji ilkhani family, whose fidelity to British interests is perhaps less well assured than that of the ilkhani family. At the same time certain of the khans residing at Tehran have warned me that, if it is seen that the British Government means to abandon Ispahan to the Russians, we shall lose their allegiance. This would mean that the important Ahwaz–Ispahan trade route would pass under a foreign influence inimical to the penetration of British commerce into Central Persia, and that a hostile wedge would be driven down into Arabistan. We should, moreover, lose an invaluable link in the chain of that rampart of protection by local levies which seems to me essential for the protection of the British oil interests now established along the Gulf littoral.

Ever since I have been at Tehran I have been at great pains to maintain the cordial relations I found existing between this legation and the Bakhtiari khans. I think that I have had some measure of personal success, but I feel that the position is ephemeral and that for that reason it is most desirable that some means should be found of forging a stronger and more durable chain binding together our own and Bakhtiari interests. Much might be done by the presence of British officers as advisers among the Bakhtiars, but it is probable that such a step would arouse resentment at St. Petersburgh, more especially if, as would appear to be the case from the policy of the Russian consul-general, reported from Ispahan, it is intended to endeavour to alienate the khans from their tacit allegiance to us.

Again, the situation that must be created in Luristan, if the British railway enterprise, to which His Majesty's Government and that of India appear to attach great importance, is to be carried through successfully, may well be productive of friction between Great Britain and Russia in the future. In order to succeed, not only in the execution of that undertaking but in its subsequent smooth working, it will be essential to create a pro-British atmosphere. A start has already been made in that direction by enlisting the sympathies of the Vali of Pusht-i-Kuh, but there is small doubt that the Russians are watching developments, and are likely to favour any move that may be calculated to render the railway scheme abortive. This was clearly evident when Nizam-us-Sultaneh was in Tehran.

For the above reasons, and for others of a more remote nature that will only mature if our aims in Luristan and Bakhtiaristan are frustrated, it would appear to me highly desirable that a limit should be set to Russian penetration into the neutral zone. A total abolition of the same could, in my opinion, only be effected at a sacrifice of interests of great value to us, and would also entail the eventual partition of the Kingdom. Under the purchase scheme, if Russia could be induced to buy under certain

essential conditions what she has already acquired, Russian penetration south might be effectively checked. It is possible that the best means of inducing Russia to adopt the idea of purchase would be for His Majesty's Government to carry through the purchase of the islands in the Gulf first. Russia would then probably demand a *quid pro quo* in the north, and the desired result would have been achieved.

It may possibly seem that the procedure suggested has a "tricky" appearance among friends, but I would venture to point out that despite reiterated assurances, Russia's policy in Persia, more especially in the matter of the Ispahan arrangement and Kermanshah, has not been marked with whole-hearted sincerity towards a friend who has loyally carried carried out the terms of the bargain made in 1907.

It is of course by no means certain that any Persian statesman would be found sufficiently courageous to take a step which would involve the alienation of a portion of the national territory, but the brusqueness of recent Russian action has awakened the semi-somnolent Persian to a realisation of the fact that certain parts of what is still called Persia have already passed into Russian hands never to be returned, and that, if a halt is not called to the present insidious policy of grab on Russia's part, Great Britain, whom the majority of Persians still look upon as a friend, whose good intentions towards Persia are inspired by the greatest of incentives, self-interest, will find herself forced in sheer self-defence to adopt a similar policy, in order to preserve her interests and position. Nothing can stop the development of what is in full swing to-day but the adoption of a scheme which would not only enable Persia to treat for freedom in the management of her own affairs, but would also put her in possession of funds with which to put her house in order and make a start upon a programme of public works which will immensely improve the economic situation of the country.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

[47401] No. 132.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 8.)

(No. 225.)

Sir, *Tehran, August* 11, 1914.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 214 of the 30th ultimo, I have the honour to forward to you herewith copy of correspondence exchanged between the Treasurer-General and myself on the subject of the control to be exercised by His Majesty's consular officers at Shiraz and Kerman and by this legation over the expenditure of the 50,000*l.* recently advanced by His Majesty's Government exclusively for the maintenance of the gendarmerie in the provinces of Fars and Kerman.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 132.

Sir W. Townley to M. Mornard.

M. le Trésorier général, *Téhéran, le* 30 *juillet*, 1914.

J'AI l'honneur de vous transmettre par la présente copie d'une correspondance échangée entre la Légation de Sa Majesté britannique et le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères au sujet d'une nouvelle avance de 50,000*l.* que mon Gouvernement a consenti à faire au Gouvernement Impérial pour subvenir aux besoins de la gendarmerie de Fars et de Kerman.

Vous verrez par la lecture de ces documents que les arrangements convenus pour cette avance sont les mêmes, en ce qui concerne le taux d'intérêt et le système de remboursement, que pour les avances préalables.

J'ai prié le directeur de la Banque Impériale d'ouvrir un crédit intitulé "Trésorier général, gendarmerie de Fars et Kerman." J'ai fait verser à ce crédit l'équivalent en krans de la somme de 50,000*l.* Pour faire suite aux ordres de mon Gouvernement, il a été convenu que le mode d'opérer ce crédit sera le suivant:

Le commandant de la gendarmerie à Chiraz ou à Kerman s'adressera à l'agent financier de l'une ou l'autre de ces villes quand il aura besoin d'argent. L'agent financier examinera la requête, en donnera communication au consul d'Angleterre et

vous en avisera. Le consul me préviendra et vous donnerez les ordres nécessaires à la banque de transférer à l'un ou l'autre endroit la somme d'argent sanctionnée par votre agent local.

Vu l'urgence de faire remettre de l'argent à Chiraz et Kerman, et n'ayant pas encore en main l'acceptation du Gouvernement Impérial, je me suis permis de prier le directeur de la banque de télégraphier sur les premières 25,000*l.* versées au susdit compte 50,000 tomans à Chiraz et 16,000 tomans à Kerman, ce qui a été fait comme il est établi par le bilan que j'ai l'honneur de joindre à cette lettre.

Veuillez, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 2 in No. 132.

M. Mornard to Sir W. Townley.

M. le Ministre, *Téhéran, le 2 août*, 1914.

J'AI l'honneur de vous accuser réception de votre lettre du 30 juillet écoulé, accompagnée de trois annexes ayant trait à la nouvelle avance de 50,000*l.* que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique a consenti à faire au Gouvernement persan en vue d'assurer l'entretien de la gendarmerie de Fars et de Kerman.

Le remboursement de cette avance sera effectué sur le premier grand emprunt qui sera ultérieurement négocié à l'étranger; en attendant, il sera garanti par les excédents des recettes des douanes du sud et par les revenus des accises et de l'opium dans les provinces du sud de la Perse. Cette avance portera un intérêt de 7 pour cent l'an.

Dans le cas où un emprunt ne serait pas contracté, le remboursement de l'avance sera effectué au moyen des revenus indiqués ci-dessus de la même manière que les avances antérieures accordées par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique et s'élevant à 440,000*l.*

D'autre part, le mode d'emploi de ce crédit sera comme suit:

Le commandant de la gendarmerie à Chiraz ou à Kerman s'adressera à l'agent financier de l'une ou l'autre de ces villes quand il aura besoin d'argent. L'agent financier examinera la requête, en donnera communication au consul d'Angleterre et avisera la Trésorerie générale. Le consul d'Angleterre préviendra la Légation d'Angleterre et la Trésorerie donnera les ordres nécessaires à la Banque Impériale de Perse de transférer à l'une ou l'autre place la somme d'argent approuvée par son agent local.

Veuillez, &c.
MORNARD.

[47402] No. 133.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 8.)

(No. 226.)

Sir, *Tehran, August* 10, 1914.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 210 of the 27th ultimo, I have the honour to forward to you herewith translation of the memorandum presented to the Persian Government by the Russian Legation on the 25th July, in reply to the Persian memorandum of the 27th June, embodying the grievances of the Persian Government against the Russian Government.

It is not clear to whom allusion is made in the last paragraph. I understand that the "Russkoe Slovo," of Moscow, in publishing the Russian reply has stated that His Majesty's Legation is meant. The French Minister tells me that, having learnt from one of his staff, who has close relations with the Russian Legation, that he and I were accused of having drafted the note, which we had subsequently caused to be presented to the Persian Government by the German Minister. He spoke very strongly to M. Korostovetz upon the subject, pointing out that it was intolerable that he should have allowed his staff to give credence to and circulate such an outrageous story. M. Lecomte has also complained of the incident to the French Government.

As far as I am aware, there is no reason whatever to suppose that the Persian Government sought the advice or assistance of any foreigner in the matter of the

drafting of the memorandum, though it is possible that the document may have been shown to the German Minister, and perhaps also to the Austrian Minister and the Turkish Ambassador, before it was presented to M. Korostovetz. My French colleague, I am sure, had no previous knowledge of its contents, and, acting on your instructions, Sir, I refused to discuss the matter. I kept my Russian colleague informed of the preparation of the memorandum and of the attitude I had adopted throughout.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 133.

Memorandum communicated to Persian Government by Russian Legation, dated Ramazan 1, 1332 (*July* 25, 1914).

IN reply to the memorandum dated the 23rd June, presented by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, I am instructed by the Imperial Russian Government to bring the following points to the notice of the Persian Government.

1. There is no objection to the abolition of the arrangement come to with the Treasurer-General respecting taxes due from Russian subjects and protégés, provided that the proper collection of such taxes from such persons continue to be supervised by the Imperial Russian consulates; provided that the whole of the taxes of the northern provinces of Persia be paid over at once to the Banque d'Escompte in such a way as may be acceptable to the said bank; and provided that Russian consulates have the right to control expenditure of the taxes in question.

2. As Shuja-ud-Dowleh wishes, for reasons of ill-health, to resign, the Imperial Russian Government, in order to meet the wishes of the Persian Government, agrees to the appointment of his Royal Highness the Heir-Apparent as Governor-General of Azerbaijan, but only on condition that (to avoid his entourage interfering in the administration of the province, with the difficulties and troubles of all kinds that would ensue) His Royal Highness should not proceed to Tabriz, but be content with his nominal appointment to the Governor-Generalship. To meet the wishes of the Persian Government the Imperial Russian Government agree to the appointment of Prince Farman Farma as acting Governor of Azerbaijan.

3. The Imperial Russian Government is utterly unable to accept the construction put by the Persian Government on article 5 of the Treaty of Turcomanchai, viz., that Russian subjects have not the right to acquire landed property in Persia.

4. The Imperial Russian Government consider the recall of the Russian troops from Persia inopportune as yet, and they further state that the ultimate withdrawal of those troops depends largely upon the increase of the Imperial Cossack Brigade and a recognition of the brigade's right to maintain law and order. The Russian Government will shortly be in a position to improve and to reform the brigade.

In conclusion, the Imperial Russian Government draws the attention of Persian Ministers to the impropriety of the Persian Government having recourse to unsuitable quarters for assistance in matters which concern the Persian Government alone. The latter must have learnt by past experience that the Imperial Government do not allow anyone to interfere with their relations with Persia, and such action (on the part of Persia) only prevents the friendly solution of difficulties between the two Governments.

[47403] No. 134.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 8.)

(No. 227. Very Confidential.)

Sir, *Tehran, August* 3, 1914.

IN accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram No. 153 of the 14th ultimo, I dealt in my telegram No. 203 of the 23rd ultimo with what appeared to me to be the most important points touched upon in the letter from the India Office of the 29th June last, upon the subject of the rehabilitation of British interests in South Persia, which you did me the honour to forward to me with your despatch No. 169 of the 1st ultimo.

In my above-mentioned telegram I expressed my concurrence with the broad lines of the telegram from the Viceroy of India of the 11th June last if His Majesty's Government had made up their mind that British intervention in the south has become imperative, and that Persian independence and integrity can no longer be maintained even in effigy. It is true that recent Russian actions in Northern and Central Persia have robbed those sonorous words of any effective meaning; but it appears to me hard to shut one's eyes to the fact that the policy advocated must inevitably lead to a partition, at a sooner or later date. It is possible that the Marquess of Crewe may be right when his Lordship expresses the opinion that the proposed measures, carried out in the spirit which animates His Majesty's Government, would in reality tend actively to promote the independence and integrity of Persia. It is clear that such would not be the impression made upon the average mind, and I think that it would be fairly safe to assert that such would not be their actual result. It is probable that this desirable aim might be achieved were His Majesty's Government alone in the field to grapple with the Persian question, but it is clear that the Russians would not understand such a policy in this light, and that they would adopt an attitude in Northern Persia that would force the hand of His Majesty's Government, and leave but little left of the phantom of Persian independence and integrity.

The Russian reproach that His Majesty's Government would appear to be seeking the monopoly of railway construction in the neutral zone made it amply clear, though I have been more than once assured to the contrary by M. Korostovetz, that the Government of St. Petersburgh is by no means prepared to let Great Britain have a free hand in that zone, in which all our most important commercial interests are concentrated. Such being the case, it would appear most desirable that no revision of the zones should be attempted, but that the tacit consent of the Russian Government should be secured by diplomatic methods to our taking the necessary measures to protect our interests already long established before the convention of 1907.

It is the difficult problem of how to safeguard British interests in the neutral zone, in face of steady Russian penetration southwards, which has caused me to cast about in an effort to discover some alternative scheme acceptable to both parties which might obviate a consideration of the awkward question of the neutral zone. The subject has been gone into fully in an accompanying despatch, and I need only add here, in connection with the neutral zone difficulty, that it would appear to me that it will be very hard to secure our position in the Gulf and lands bordering thereon unless some arrangement is reached with Russia under which she agrees not to push her influence further south. Persians are very susceptible to external influences, and, as long as Russia appears to hold a predominant position in Central Persia, we shall never be able to rely with any amount of confidence upon the loyalty of tribal friends, unless we take practical steps to bind them to us by more than moral ties.

As regards the attitude that should be adopted towards Sheikh Khazal and his heirs in order to strengthen our position in Arabistan, I feel that I am not qualified to give an opinion, and that His Majesty's Government can be much better guided in this matter by the local authorities in the Gulf region. I would merely observe that it would appear to me that, in dealing with the nature of protection that can be properly accorded to the Sheikh, it would be well to bear in mind that the Bakhtiaris have some claim upon our good-will, and that their estrangement from the British cause might be followed by unfortunate consequences for our position in Central and South-Western Persia. There has always appeared to me to exist a tendency at Bushire and Mohammerah to consider the Sheikh can do no wrong, and that he must always be right in his differences with the Bakhtiaris. I do not think that this is always the case. Quite recently we have seen the Sheikh supporting Hussein Khan, Bahmai, secretly in his rebellion against the Bakhtiaris. The action was taken at the instigation of Amir-i-Mujahed, Bakhtiari, one of the worst and most troublesome of the khans, who is a close friend of Sheikh Ehasal.

As regards the suggestion contained in the India Office letter that the Anglo-Persian Company should be required to maintain at its own expense a corps of local levies, it is not quite clear whether the Oil Company or the Railway Company is meant. As far as the affairs of the latter company are concerned, I am inclined to the opinion that an arrangement can well be made with some powerful local chieftain, such as the Vali of Pusht-i-Kuh, under which the safety of the railway works can be secured and at the same time an effective native barrier established in the mountains of Luristan, which should serve as an invaluable check to any unexpected pressure from the north that might at any time bear down disadvantageously upon the oil-bearing districts and the important interests that, it is hoped, will be created by the railway. It should not

be beyond the power of diplomacy, exercised both locally and at Tehran, to effect such an arrangement with the knowledge and the approval of the Persian Government, which would not, I think, raise any objection to measures, even if they included a subvention, intended to strengthen Persia's position in those districts. It is a feature of the situation that requires careful attention, because there is small doubt that this British railway venture is regarded with very jealous eyes in Russia. We have recently had ample proof at Kermanshah that Russian friendship is not deep enough to resist the temptation to encourage a state of local disturbance that is inimical to British trade entering Persia. We may certainly expect that every possible obstacle will be put in the way of the execution of the Mohammerah–Khoremabad Railway. The fermenting of local disorders it one of the easiest methods of blocking the enterprise. We may be sure that it will be resorted to in such a favourable district as Luristan unless we can assure the position beforehand by binding a really strong element to our side, such as the Vali of Pusht-i-Kuh, by some arrangement of a remunerative nature to himself and to the Governor-General.

The question connected with the lease or purchase of the islands in the Persian Gulf has been dealt with elsewhere and does not appear to call for comment here. Nor does that of the Trans-Persian Railway, which has not, so far, been handled otherwise than academically here. I am of opinion that it would not be impossible to secure Persia's consent to the commencement of the southern survey immediately. Russia could hardly raise objections, and it would appear to have been established that a Russian survey has been made of the northern section, though I have been unable to find any evidence in the archives of this legation in support of the contention.

To come to the gendarmerie. This is to-day an even more difficult question to solve than it was some time ago, when the chances of the gendarmerie under Swedish instructors proving a success were rosier than is the case at the present moment. The India Office letter states that Lord Crewe cannot endorse my opinion as to the success that has actually been achieved. Perhaps his Lordship does not look at the measure of success to which I have referred from quite the same standpoint. He may perhaps be thinking more especially of what has been done in those parts of Persia in which British interests are specially engaged. I grant that, either from climatic reasons or from the greater liberty enjoyed at a distance from headquarters, the Swedes have been less successful in their task in the south than they have been in the north, but, nevertheless, their coming has had a salutary effect and their presence on the important trade route from Ispahan to Bushire has made itself felt advantageously for British trade interests. Their escutcheon has been dimmed by the unfortunate incident at Kazerun, for which no excuse can be found unless it be that some tolerance may be felt for two very young and inexperienced officers who found themselves in command of a semi-trained force without categorical instructions to suppress looting at all hazards. All travellers on the Bushire–Ispahan road agree that conditions have been much improved since the arrival of the gendarmes, and the greater regularity of the postal service tells the same story. Unfortunately many faults can be pointed to, more especially a certain recklessness in spending money and a want of consideration for local conditions.

In the north the good work done by the Swedes is more apparent. The road from Hamadan to Kazvin, which was infested by robber bands, is now safe, and little has been heard for some time past of disorders round Tehran. As far as the radius of the gendarmerie extends, there is perfect order. The road from Tehran to Kum and from the latter place to Sultanabad has been only occasionally troubled by a band of robbers, whose chiefs have been killed and themselves dispersed. Posts have been established on the road from Sultanabad to Burujird, a district that was last year harried by Lur raiders, and the presence of the gendarmes at Burujird and on the road to Khoremabad has enabled Nizam-es-Sultaneh to inaugurate measures for the pacification of Luristan under much more favourable conditions than could have been anticipated a year ago, when no Governor-General would have been found to undertake the task. This improved state of affairs may have valuable results for the safety of the British railway survey party which it is hoped to take through this autumn from Dizful to Khoremabad.

The question of the replacing of the Swedish by British officers in the neutral and British zones has been fully dealt with in preceding despatches. At the present moment the position of the Swedes is a precarious one. Their prestige was sorely shaken by the announcement made by M. Korostovetz soon after his arrival here that they did not enjoy the confidence of the Russian Government, which did not wish to see the scope of their duties extended into the north of Persia. From the day of that

announcement they have felt no security in the continuation of their mission in Persia and their work has suffered. Now Persia is confronted with the difficulty of finding the necessary funds for the upkeep of the gendarmerie, and the Swedes not unnaturally refuse to be held responsible for the good conduct of their men when they no longer receive their pay regularly. It would appear to me that a collapse of the gendarmerie under the conditions prevailing in Europe, which make it improbable that either Great Britain or Russia would be able to spare officers to take the place of the Swedes, would be a catastrophe. It is impossible to foretell what may happen should the gendarmes get out of hand or should the gentry who recently made the roads unsafe realise that the iron hand of order has been relaxed.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

[47227] No. 135.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 8.)

(No. 253.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, September 7, 1914.*

GOVERNOR of Ispahan.

I have failed to trace assertion made by Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, contained in Petrograd telegram No. 356 of 3rd September, that we had at one time admitted that Sardar Bahadur was a very bad character and had been openly hostile to him.

He has always been represented to me as the most promising of young khans. He was away in Europe when I arrived at Tehran. He showed some natural impatience at the time of the gendarmerie incident, but he seems to me the most capable of the khans, and though young has acquired considerable influence among his elders.

Sardar Mohtashem, now at Kerman, would be next best candidate if Russian opposition to Sardar Bahadur is maintained, but the worthless Ashjaa is the Russian choice.

[47579] No. 136.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 8.)

(No. 254.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, September 8, 1914.*

MY telegram No. 251 of 5th September: Dismissal of Shuja-ed-Dowleh.

Latest advices seem to indicate Shuja is still receiving strong Russian support, although Russian Minister has informed Minister for Foreign Affairs that there is no objection to his recall. New Cabinet express their determination to make it life or death question, and it seems rather hard that they should still be thwarted in their desire to get rid of an insubordinate Governor-General after having obtained Russian sanction to his dismissal and after having appointed a Russian nominee to succeed him.

[47227] No. 137.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 714.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 8, 1914.*

GOVERNOR of Ispahan.

Sir W. Townley's telegram No. 253 of 7th September.

You should not mention any alternative candidate to Sardar Bahadur if Minister for Foreign Affairs renews the subject.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 216.)

[48269] No. 138.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 11.)

(No. 257.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, September 10, 1914.*

I MADE a communication in the sense of your telegram No. 215 of 8th September to Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday. His Highness promised me an early answer, but said that intentions of the Persian Government had been entirely misunderstood. He instanced the granting of the Seistan–Robat telegraph extension as a proof of Persian good-will.

I would respectfully venture to suggest that the reinstatement of Mornard should not be insisted upon. I much doubt whether we could secure Russian co-operation, and Mornard would not himself consent to resume office unless a considerable sum of money were placed at the disposal of the Persian Government with which to face an almost hopeless situation.

There appeared to be a danger that the powers of the Acting Treasurer-General would be curtailed, and he himself made entirely subservient to the Ministry of Finance. Thanks to the representations made, this has, I think, been remedied.

Mornard will probably resume his post as Director-General of Customs, at least, until the expiration of his contract at the end of March next, I would like to support his desire to do so if need be.

I have ascertained that southern customs receipts will be more than sufficient to meet service of 1911 loan, which alone carries the second guarantee of the telegraphs. I was slightly misled on this matter, and do not now see that we should have any justification for withholding the money due to Persian Government on account of international troubles. Total deficit on the service of the loans due on 8th September amounted to 6,724*l.* 5*s.*

[48270] No. 139.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 11.)

(No. 258.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, September 10, 1914.*

OFFICER commanding gendarmerie announced three days ago that the disbanding of the 1st and 2nd regiments (Tehran and Kum districts) would commence 12th September, as no funds to pay men were available.

Danger has been averted temporarily, but it is hard to see how the future calls are to be met. It would be a disaster for us if the gendarmerie were to be disbanded at the present moment. In consequence of war trade with the north is at a standstill, and there is a fair chance of our recovering our lost ground if the roads can be kept open from the south. Tehran houses are already making preparations to order from India. We have money enough to keep Fars and Kerman going for a few months, but the danger zone is between Ispahan and Tehran, on which road Naib Hussein is beginning to make himself felt again.

There are persistent rumours that Russians are about to give this arch-offender protection for himself and his property. Russian Legation returns evasive answers, but manager of Russian Bank at Ispahan has owned to the acting British consul-general that the matter is being negotiated. Persian Government has advised Russian Legation that it could not recognise Russian protection over these properties, which are stolen, and do not therefore legally belong to outlaw or his sons.

It would, in my opinion, be greatly to our interest if we could guarantee upkeep of gendarmerie on its present footing until the end of the war, in order to maintain through communication between Tehran and the Gulf.

[48558] No. 140.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 11.)

(No. 261.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, September 11, 1914.*

AT request of both Bushire and Shiraz consulates, I have agreed that gendarmes should be withdrawn from Bushire–Daliki section of road, and maintenance

of order be entrusted to local khans under the responsibility of Governor of Bushire. Only point of difference is that officer commanding at Shiraz suggests having Persian officers at posts to assist in work of keeping order, whereas resident is not entirely favourable to the idea.

Unless you see any objection, I propose to concur in the scheme, and am of opinion that it would be better to withdraw Persian gendarmerie officers, who have presumably no connection with men of the local khans. Their presence might, it seems to me, be a cause of future difficulty.

[48900] No. 141.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 12.)

(No. 262.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, September 12, 1914.*

MY telegram No. 254 of 8th September.

Question as to Shuja's dismissal appears to have been arranged. He has left Tabriz for an adjoining village, and Sardar Rechid assumed office yesterday.

Russian Minister tells me that he had great difficulty in overcoming opposition of consul-general.

[48270] No. 142.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 736.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 12, 1914.*

SIR W. TOWNLEY'S telegram No. 258 of 10th September.

At an opportune moment your Excellency should inform Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs of report that has reached His Majesty's Government regarding Naib Hussein, and state that, in view of Russia's recent assurances regarding the abuse of protection, His Majesty's Government feel confident that a notorious brigand who before now has flouted Russian authority will not receive such a favour.

Your Excellency should at the same time enquire views of Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding the financial outlook, and see whether his Excellency would view favourably the retention of the gendarmerie in its present state until the end of the war. Such an act could not fail to impress favourably the Persian Government.

[48558] No. 143.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 219.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September 12, 1914.*

YOUR telegram No. 261 of 11th September: Gendarmerie on Bushire–Daliki road.

I approve.

[48269] No. 144.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 220.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 12, 1914.*

YOUR telegram No. 257 of 10th September.

If you consider now that situation does not warrant the action which I authorised on the strength of your telegram No. 248 of 3rd September, which was my only guide, you may disregard it.

(Repeated to Petrograd, No. 740.)

[49556] No. 145.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 222.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September 14, 1914.*

YOUR telegram No. 257 of 10th September.

Persian Minister enquired wishes of His Majesty's Government regarding Treasurer-General's resignation, stating that you had made representations to Minister for Foreign Affairs but had at same time spoken depreciatorily of M. Mornard's financial ability.

In the circumstances he was informed that matter was being dealt with at Tehran and had better not be discussed also in London.

[49724] No. 146.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 15.)

(No. 265.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, September 15, 1914.*

FOLLOWING from His Majesty's representative at Tabriz, No. 58 of 9th September:—

"Following statement has been made to my French colleague by my Russian colleague, with request to communicate it to me:—

"1. That he, Russian consul-general, had some days ago a telegram from Bureau of International Commission stating that Ottoman commissioner on Frontier Delimitation Commission was about to resign, and that this must mean signal for war.

"2. That he, Russian consul-general, had now received the news that commissioner in question had resigned. He consequently begged M. Nicolas to inform his subjects in Urmia that it was dangerous for them to remain there, as they would only be protected by brigade of Persian Cossacks."

"I have heard nothing from British commissioner of the resignation above referred to, but there is growing uneasiness among Christian part of the population respecting the possibility of war between Turkey and Russia."

Following also from British consul at Tabriz, No. 62 of 14th September:—

"Russian consul-general has given the same advice to compatriot with regard to families of his nationals as that reported in my telegram No. 58. My Russian colleague further stated that withdrawal from Urmia to Khoi had been decided upon by Viceroy of the Caucasus, that Armenian families were already leaving Tabriz, and that merchants were transferring their goods to other side of lake. He added that a slight encounter had taken place on Maku frontier between Turks and Russians, in which an officer of latter had been wounded and two of their soldiers killed. Casualties on Turkish side unknown.

"Shedd of the American and Spearing of the English mission at Urmia have written confirming the state of alarm amongst the Christians there, and both agree that the withdrawal of the Russian troops would be calamitous. These are not concerned for their own safety, but both dwell on danger from fanatical Kurds in case of war between Turkey and Russia.

"I hardly think danger is immediate, but there can be no doubt that retirement of troops in question will create a very critical situation, and it would be well if even now the order could be countermanded."

Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that Turkish commissioner has refused to continue delimitation of frontier, which entails under the protocol the surrender of some nineteen villages in Kodok district to Persia, on the ground that all the male inhabitants of these villages are away, having joined colours under the Turkish mobilisation order.

I have made enquiry from British commissioner and am waiting his reply.

As regards Tabriz telegram No. 62, my Russian colleague tells me that it has been decided at Petrograd against his advice to withdraw large portion, if not all, of Russian troops from north of Persia. He fears that this may be taken as a sign of

weakness and may lead to Turkish aggression, which would endanger relations between Russia and Turkey. He added that consuls would also be withdrawn from places where it would be dangerous for them to remain without the protection of Russian troops.

Manager of Imperial Bank of Persia here also learns that Armenians of Urmia are in state of panic.

[49732] No. 147.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 16.)

(No. 413.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Petrograd, September* 15, 1914.

YOUR telegram No. 736 of 12th September: Persian gendarmerie.

I spoke this morning to Minister for Foreign Affairs as instructed.

His Excellency said that he knew nothing about Naib Hussein and reported offer of Russian protection of life and property.

On my dwelling on the importance of maintaining an efficient gendarmerie for preservation of order so long as war lasted his Excellency said he entirely concurred, provided that we did not ask him to provide money necessary for its upkeep. He would, he said, discuss various questions to which I had called his attention with M. de Klemm, and let me know his views later.

[50057] No. 148.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 16.)

(No. 268.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, September* 16, 1914.

MY telegram No. 265 of 15th September.

Following from British commissioner, Frontier Delimitation Commission 14th September:—

"Following is the present position, as far as I am aware, of the frontier delimitation:—

"Turkish Government are said to have demanded that Kodok frontier be marked on the map, but villages concerned not to be evacuated pending delimitation.

"British and Russian Ambassadors apparently refused, whereupon Ottoman Government ordered Turkish commissioner to cease work.

"Negotiations apparently proceeding, but I have no information from tantinople.

"No local reason to think that Turks will declare war."

[51109] No. 149.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 19.)

(No. 273.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, September* 19, 1914.

PETROGRAD telegram No. 413 of 15th September.

Gendarmerie question is becoming most complicated owing to recent irregularities in punctual payment of the men; excesses have been committed by them and discipline of the force has suffered. Swedish officers who have gone home have been replaced by less efficient men, and the absence of General Hjalmarson has been much felt, his temporary successor being an officer of small value. I regret to have to report that there are signs that the force has deteriorated, whilst the officers no longer appear to have their heart in a work which it is generally expected will come to an end next March. It would be well if all doubts upon this point could be dissipated as soon as possible.

Being all strongly Germanophil, Swedes have drifted out of our control since the war began, and there is much ill-feeling between them and the Belgians, whom they accuse of purposely obstructing the supply of funds. There is of course no foundation for such a charge, no money being available, a fact for which Belgians are not responsible.

Swedes have in several ways shown themselves less satisfactory recently than in the past, but I still consider them essential to the maintenance of order, and their disappearance, unless they were replaced by officers of some other unbiassed nation, would constitute step further towards the peril of inevitable dismemberment of Persia.

[51153] No. 150.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 19.)

(No. 274.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, September* 19, 1914.

YOUR telegram No. 221 of 14th September.

Persian Government is quite unable, as the manager of the Imperial Bank of Persia here is well aware, to make necessary payment to meet coupon on the 1911 loan due to-day. This payment is included in the sum mentioned in the last paragraph of my telegram No. 257 of 10th September as being a deficit of southern customs on 8th September to meet service of loans. There is reason to suppose that receipts would have sufficed to meet the service of the loans but for the war, since the outbreak of which trade has been at a standstill. There are no other sources of revenue from which payment could be made, and, if punctual discharge of such liabilities is to be insisted on, result will be disastrous.

[51132] No. 151.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 19.)

(No. 275.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, September* 19, 1914.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Financial situation, which has been well-nigh hopeless for some months, has reached critical stage, and it seems impossible for Persia to escape bankruptcy and administrative collapse unless she receive foreign assistance. Persia has for long been struggling against inability to make her revenue cover her expenditure. There has perhaps been some culpable carelessness, and Persia's appearance of suffering from a hereditary inability to cope with finance, but much of her recent expenditure has been forced upon her. Budgets of Cossack brigade and gendarmerie have been largely increased, whilst it has been impossible to curtail on a sufficiently large scale the expenditure incurred on account of local troops insisted on by provincial Governors. Budget of brigade has been increased without reference to Persian Government, and is paid out of northern customs receipts equally without reference. That of the gendarmerie has been allowed to swell in the confident belief that neighbouring Powers would find money, as has been done in the past. I have frequently warned Ministers against trusting to foreign assistance.

At present moment gendarmerie pay is 18,000*l.* in arrears, police of Tehran, 10,000*l.*, and gendarmerie construction (barracks, posts on the roads, &c.) account, 72,000*l.* Many of the Government offices have received no payment for four or five months, and Court remains unpaid.

The almost entire drying up of customs receipts in the north and south is a most disquieting feature of the situation. Inland revenues from Russian zone have largely diminished owing to the fact that those payable by Russians, Russian protected persons, and in some places by Persians, are collected by Russian consuls and paid into Russian Bank, whence they do not emerge. Inland revenues had shown satisfactory increase, but cost of collection has also increased largely.

Prime Minister spoke to me at great length two days ago upon the financial situation, and implored the assistance of His Majesty's Government directly or through the Imperial Bank of Persia. I replied that I did not think that His Majesty's Government would entertain any proposals unless both Governments were approached simultaneously, and I held out small hope of any help being forthcoming under existing circumstances. I said that any application for assistance should be accompanied by a clear statement of financial situation.

Present Cabinet and Acting Treasurer-General express firm determination to cut down expenditure and so improve the situation, which is due in large measure to the blind faith of previous administrations in a sudden happy turn of fortune's wheel

based on no reasonably sound probability. It was childish, but Persian, and the late Treasurer-General in this respect was more Persian than the Persians.

If no help from outside is forthcoming, I can only foresee total collapse of the Administration and of the gendarmerie, followed by anarchy throughout the country at a moment when we can ill take steps to remedy situation.

[51629] No. 152.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 22.)

(No. 276.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, September* 22, 1914.

MY telegram No. 242 of 27th August: Resignation of Samsam-es-Sultaneh.

After going fully into the question with the Prime Minister, I have advised Samsam-es-Sultaneh to resign. Prime Minister is on close terms of intimacy with Bakhtiaris and knows their desires. He agrees that Bahadur would probably make the best Governor, but thinks that his mission would be doomed to failure. For this reason he favours the appointment of Mohtashem, but proposes to give Samsam-es-Sultaneh some other appointment.

[52085] No. 153.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 22.)

(No. 277.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, September* 22, 1914.

ANOTHER robbery by Reza's band is reported to have occurred at Gavpecseh, on borders of Ispahan province and Bakhtiari country. Swedish officer at Ispahan has proceeded to spot with a view to seeing if gendarmerie post can be established there. Local authorities are powerless to punish brigand, who is given protection in Zil-es-Sultan's villages under Russian administration.

[51980] No. 154.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 22.)

(No. 437.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Petrograd, September* 22, 1914.

MY telegram No. 413 of 15th September: Persian gendarmerie.

Russian Government state that they have no intention of protecting Naib Hussein. Moreover, the latter, though formerly guilty of acts of brigandage, had for two years not only given no cause for complaints in this respect, but had even, in conjunction with his son, greatly contributed to the maintenance of order on Tehran–Ispahan road. He had given Imperial Government no reason for anticipating a return to his former lawless pursuits.

As regards gendarmerie, Imperial Government consider its utility is incontestable, and they have already offered to the Persian Government, on far from onerous terms, a loan of 300,000 tomans for its upkeep, an offer which has not yet been accepted. Russian Government add that in present circumstances it would hardly be possible to advance a larger sum.

[51132] No. 155.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 231.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 22, 1914.

YOUR telegram No. 275 of 19th September: Financial situation in Persia.

We cannot advance money under present circumstances, and Persian Government must face the financial situation by such methods as are open to them.

Sale of Crown jewels is one such method. Another resource would be to lease or sell to us the islands off Bunder Abbas as we proposed a few months ago, and as Mornard suggested to the Persian Government.

(Repeated to Petrograd, No. 779.)

[51132] No. 156.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 780.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 22, 1914.

SIR W. TOWNLEY'S No. 275 of 19th September and my telegram No. 231 of 22nd September to Tehran: Financial situation in Persia.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs very confidentially, and say that we can see no other way in which the Persian Government can get financial assistance. The islands do not affect the mainland in any way; the administrative connection of these islands with Persia scarcely exists, and we do not regard them as giving us any more footing in Persia itself. British subjects hold concessions in them.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 232.)

[52061] No. 157.

Mr. Greenway to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 23.)

Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London,
September 21, 1914.

Sir,

I BEG to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 12th instant passing on a copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran communicating a message from Mr. Maclean.

As regards the portion of this telegram referring to the survey in Luristan, I am replying in the affirmative.

As regards the portion referring to the mining concession, I regret that it would not in the present financial situation be practicable for the Persian Mining Syndicate to arrange for the loan of 100,000*l.* which they had undertaken to make to the Persian Government on the granting of the concession.

In view, however, of the favourable opportunity for securing the concession which is now presented by the Persian Government's financial difficulties, and of the importance to British interests of securing the concession as soon as possible, I am desired by my colleagues to ask if His Majesty's Government can see their way to affording assistance in the matter until such time as the financial position will permit of the syndicate making other arrangements.

The proposal was that against the loan of 100,000*l.* the Persian Government should issue 5 per cent. bonds (for 100*l.* each) secured by the 20,000 1*l.* shares which they hold in the First Exploitation Company (Limited), and by all rents, royalties, and profits accruing to them under the D'Arcy Oil Concession.

This security is of course ample and in ordinary circumstances there would be no difficulty in arranging the required loan, but owing to the general restriction of finance at the present time such a transaction is not practicable at the moment by the ordinary channels.

As affecting the consideration of this question I would desire to draw the attention of His Majesty's Government to the negotiations which were proceeding some years ago between a syndicate representing the Shell group and the Persian Government, the object of which was a loan of a much larger amount on the security of the oil shares and royalties. Having already failed to obtain an advance from either His Majesty's Government or from the Imperial Bank of Persia, it is therefore probable that the Persian Government may in their present great needs, if they also fail to obtain this 100,000*l.* from the Persian Mining Syndicate, seek again to obtain the money they so urgently require from the Shell group, or even from the Russian Government, on the basis of the same security.

In view of the above circumstances it is hoped that His Majesty's Government may see their way to affording the assistance asked for.

I am, &c.
C. GREENWAY, *Chairman,*
Persian Mining Syndicate.

[51629] No. 158.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 234.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 23, 1914.*

YOUR telegram No. 276 of 22nd September: Governor of Ispahan.

I gather that you no longer wish me to support Sardar Bahadur's candidature at Petrograd, and I shall therefore take no further action.

Would not our position with the Bakhtiari be strengthened if Samsam went to Shiraz?

(Repeated to Petrograd, No. 784.)

[52635] No. 159.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 24.)

(No. 280.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, September 24, 1914.*

YOUR telegram No. 234 of 23rd September.

Bakhtiaris are quite satisfied with arrangements made, which will probably result in Sardar Mohtashem going to Ispahan, Zaffar to Kerman, and Samsam's son to Yezd. For tribal reasons no Bakhtiari could go to Shiraz.

[52061] No. 160.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 236.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 24, 1914.*

KERMAN concession.

Mr. Greenway states present financial situation renders it impracticable for syndicate to make the advance of 100,000*l.*, and enquires whether His Majesty's Government will give assistance.

I am replying in the negative.

He fears that if Persian Government fail to obtain advance from His Majesty's Government or syndicate they may turn to Russian Government or to "Shell" group, who conducted negotiations once before for a considerable loan, on security of oil shares and royalties.

You will doubtless watch eventualities.

[52656] No. 161.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 25.)

(No. 281.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, September 24, 1914.*

I COMMUNICATED to Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday the contents of your telegram No. 231 of 22nd September. His Highness, who, in spite of reiterated warnings, has always assured both the last and the present Cabinets that His Majesty's Government would never desert Persia in her hour of dire financial need, was prostrated. He said that the Cabinet must resign, and that no one would be found to take their places.

His Highness considered that sale of Crown jewels would be insufficient to-day, as they could not be sent abroad, and probably no purchaser would be forthcoming. He said that he would talk over the question of the islands with Cabinet, and seemed to think it a possible way of raising money if the British offers were made more attractive than that submitted to his predecessor, but said that it would have to be sanctioned by the Medjliss.

Prime Minister, to whom I spoke on the subject some days ago, replied in the same sense.

Road robberies on a larger scale are recommencing, and, if disorders ensue upon the disbandment of the gendarmerie, it is probable that Russian troops will have to be called in to preserve peace.

At the same time it is impossible to recommend upon economic grounds that more money should be lent, and I cannot conscientiously say that I feel sure that if lent it would not be wasted.

Conditions attached to loan of 300,000 tomans, to which allusion is made in Petrograd telegram No. 437 of 22nd September, entail Persian Government taking over a debt of 2,000,000 tomans due to Russian Bank. The soundness of the securities given for this debt is being examined.

[52712] No. 162.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 25.)

(No. 448.)
(Telegraphic.) *Petrograd, September 24, 1914.*

IN conversation yesterday, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he had heard from Tehran that even in such centres of Russian influence as Resht and Tabriz 50 per cent. of Maliat was to be paid into Imperial Bank. He could not, he said, consent to an arrangement so humiliating to Russian prestige.

I explained that Imperial Bank had the right by charter to conduct financial transactions all over Persia, and as its terms were far more favourable than those of the Russian Bank, the Persian Government naturally preferred to have dealings with it.

His Excellency reverted to the subject again this morning, when I handed him an *aide-mémoire* embodying Tehran telegram No. 275 of 19th September, and first paragraph of your telegram No. 231 of 22nd September to Tehran. As his Excellency had mentioned the fact that Russian Bank had been foolish in advancing considerable sums to Persians who were more or less insolvent, I said that reason why Persian Government objected to proceeds of taxes being paid into Russian Bank was the fact that these funds were used for recouping bank for its bad debts or to satisfy other claims. This objection might be got over if Russian Government would guarantee that taxes paid into bank should not be used for such purposes, but should be remitted integrally to Persian Treasury. His Excellency contended that nearly all the loans made by Russian banks to individual Persians had been made with the approval of the Persian Government, and that the latter were therefore responsible for them. I argued that so long as the war lasted, and until we had time to discuss the whole Persian question thoroughly, we ought not to increase Persia's financial difficulties by pressing the claims of our respective subjects, and I suggested that Russian Bank might be instructed to make over to Persian Treasury all the sums paid into it on account of taxes. His Excellency said that he would examine this question as well as the *aide-mémoire* which I had given him, and send me a written answer.

As the conversation then turned on the Persian situation, I took the opportunity of reading certain notes which I had made on Sir W. Townley's despatches Nos. 237 and 238, in order to show that, in spite of assurances which I had received last June, conduct of Russian consuls had not changed for the better. On my repeating what I have so often said before, that North Persia was fast becoming a Russian province, his Excellency retorted that Southern Persia and the Gulf districts were virtually British. I replied that they were not in the occupation of our troops, and that, while we did all we could to act up to both the letter and the spirit of the 1907 agreement, Russian consuls were acting in such flagrant opposition to the principle on which it was founded, that I was afraid that Russia might one day be accused of having as little respect for a written agreement as Germany. I knew it was difficult to do anything at present moment, but I trusted that at close of war we should be able to arrive at some definite agreement that would remove all possible misunderstandings in future.

His Excellency expressed his entire concurrence and asked me to send him a copy of notes which I had read out to him. I promised to do so on understanding that it was to be regarded as a private communication, as despatches in question had not yet reached you.

[52652] No. 163.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 25.)

(No. 449.)
(Telegraphic.) *Petrograd, September 24, 1914.*

YOUR telegram No. 780 of 22nd September and second paragraph of your telegram No. 231 of 22nd September to Tehran: Persian finances.

I spoke very confidentially to Minister for Foreign Affairs as instructed.

His Excellency said he had no objections to our purchasing islands or to anything which we liked to do in Southern Persia if only we would keep quiet about North Persia.

[53419] No. 164.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 26.)

(No. 282.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, September 26, 1914.*

PERSIAN Government learn that villages of Seer and Sadik, allotted to Persia by the Frontier Commission, have been reoccupied by the Turks, and that the Persian customs officer placed there has been driven out.

My Russian colleague says that Turks have thrown down quantity of frontier pillars erected, and are turning the work of the Commission into a farce. He has represented here on instructions from Petrograd that the fifteen villages in the Kotur district should remain in Turkish hands until after Turkish mobilisation is over and the villagers can return.

(Very Confidential.)

My Russian colleague, who is of a cynical nature, does not think that the Turks will abide by decision of Commission, and appears to think that all Minorski cares about is the honour and glory which will accrue to him in consequence of a line drawn on the map.

(Repeated to Constantinople and Captain Wilson.)

[53804] No. 165.

Captain Wilson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 28.)

(No. 20.)
Sir, *Camp Urmi, August 14, 1914.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your despatch No. 4, dated the 24th July, 1914, giving cover to correspondence with the Turkish Ambassador with regard to oil-fields in the transferred territories, and to submit, in case it may be of use when replying to him, the following further information in amplification of the maps and reports submitted in my despatches and telegram marginally cited.*

2. So far as I am aware, the only districts in the vicinity of the frontier between latitude 34° and the Sirwan in which traces of oil have been observed are the following:—

(1.) Shamiran (Turkish territory), latitude 35° 5′, longitude 45° 45′.

Small springs north-west of the Kargamil pass to the south of the Shamiran–Pishkaif road.

(2.) Chia Surkh ("transferred territories"), latitude 34° 49′, longitude 45° 35′.

The works at this place have, I understand, been closed down, and no further developments are likely at present.

(3.) Naft Muqatassi ("transferred territories"), latitude 34° 2′, longitude 45° 27′.

Already reported on in enclosure to my despatch No. 7, dated the 1st May, 1914.

* No. 7, May 1; No. 13, May 26; and No. 13, Telegraphic, July 12, 1914.

(4.) Tangab (Persian territory), latitude 34° 18′, longitude 45° 37′.

Slight traces of oil.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople.

I have, &c.
A. T. WILSON, *Captain, I.A.,*
British Commissioner, Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

[47403] No. 166.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September 29, 1914.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 29th June last regarding possible means of rehabilitating British interests in South Persia, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before the Marquess of Crewe, a copy of a telegram and of a despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran on the subject.*

Lord Crewe will no doubt concur in Sir E. Grey's opinion that the international political situation which has since arisen renders undesirable, if not impossible, the adoption of many of the measures advocated by Sir W. Townley; but he considers that, with a view to strengthen the British position in Arabistan, the present opportunity might well be taken to give to the Sheikh of Mohammerah the amended assurances proposed by Sir P. Cox in paragraph 17 of his despatch to the Government of India, of the 7th December, 1913.

If Lord Crewe is of the same opinion, Sir E. Grey hopes that his Lordship will cause the necessary instructions to be sent to His Majesty's consular officers at Bushire and Mohammerah without delay.

Sir E. Grey does not think it necessary to make any communication to the Persian Government on the subject at present. He would, however, propose to make a confidential communication to the Russian Government as soon as the assurances shall have been given to the sheikh.

I am, &c.
EYRE A. CROWE.

[55374] No. 167.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 291.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, October 2, 1914.*

SIR G. BUCHANAN'S telegram No. 448 of 24th September.

None of the maliat of Azerbaijan has been paid into the Imperial Bank of Persia since Shuster left, and only a small portion of that of Resht.

I understand that the Persian Government have proposed scheme in connection with a plan for abolition of the collection of taxes by the Russian consuls, under which half of the maliat of Tabriz and certain other towns of the north would be paid through the Russian Bank and half through other banks which are not specified. As the Russian Minister jumped to the conclusion that the Imperial Bank of Persia was meant, it is probably to this last the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs referred.

Prime Minister is most anxious not to give an undertaking that all the maliat in the Russian zone shall be paid through the Russian Bank because he does not wish to accentuate line of zone of demarcation.

In my opinion, to accept such an arrangement would be a distinct infringement of the right of the Imperial Bank of Persia, but, as it is most desirable in the interests of all parties that a friendly arrangement should be reached, it appears to me reasonable that the maliat of the five northern provinces, where Russian influence is paramount, be paid through the Russian Bank and that of the remainder of the provinces in Russian zone, where British interests are considerable, through the two banks equally. The 100,000*l.* loan secured on northern revenues made to Persian Government

* Nos. 55 and 134.

by the Imperial Bank of Persia in 1913 would, of course, have to be paid off before any such agreement could come into force. A scheme has been proposed under which Russian Bank would advance 1,000,000 tomans to pay off this loan, leaving 400,000 tomans in the hands of the Persian Government, and Russian Minister tells me he has asked Russian consuls to supply figures of the maliat collected, and asserts that he is ready to hand over money to the Persian Government at once. He says that if an agreement is made respecting the maliat he will at once instruct Russian consuls to cease its collection, and all that will be required will be that the financial agents shall keep Russian consuls informed of the deposit of the maliat due from each Russian subject. He says that undertaking would be given that all money would be paid in to the Persian Government and none deducted by bank to meet its own claims against the Government and private individuals, as was done in the past.

I have spoken in the sense of third paragraph to my Russian colleague and to Persian Government.

(Repeated to Petrograd.)

[55375] No. 168.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 292.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, October* 2, 1914.

IN view of critical Russo-Turkish situation on the frontier of Azerbaijan, being most desirous that Persian territory should not become theatre of war, Persian Government have decided at once to proclaim neutrality of Persia.

It is argued that Turks will hold that this neutrality must be [figures omitted] a farce as long as Russian troops remain in Azerbaijan. Russians will therefore be requested to withdraw their troops, and it is asserted that Turkish Ambassador has given formal assurance in the name of his Government that if Russian troops evacuated Azerbaijan Turkish troops will be withdrawn to a distance from Persian frontier and will possibly be demobilised.

In order to guarantee order in the regions to be evacuated, Persian Government propose sending Vali Ahd to Tabriz at once, and to create strong tribal force. For the latter purpose money is required, and I understand that it is proposed to ask the two Governments to make an advance of 200,000*l.* each under the special circumstances.

I have advised Persian Government that they would do well to seek money required for the Azerbaijan force elsewhere. I added that I am well aware that Russia is most desirous not to quarrel with Turkey, but that it appeared to me hardly reasonable to expect her to withdraw her troops and also find money to pay for a force to replace them. I suggested that perhaps the financial agreement sketched in my immediately preceding telegram might afford basis for obtaining money if the Imperial Bank of Persia could be persuaded to waive its claim to immediate reimbursement and agreed to transfer loan to some other security. Maliat collected by Russian consuls might also perhaps amount to useful sum.

As I gather from my Russian colleague that his Government is most anxious to avoid war with Turkey, in order not to raise Eastern question which might be accompanied by complications in Balkans, it has appeared to me desirable to render all the assistance that I could in the furtherance of peace.

Persian Government have so far behaved most loyally in calming public excitement and in throwing cold water upon Turkish and German incitements to Persians to join in a holy war against Russia.

(Repeated to Constantinople and Petrograd.)

[56171] No. 169.

Captain Wilson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 18.)
Sir, *Camp Ushnu, August* 1, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to enclose, for your information, a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople detailing the proceedings of the Commission since the 12th July.

I have, &c.
A. T. WILSON, *Captain, I.A.,*
British Commissioner, Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

Enclosure in No. 169.

Captain Wilson to Sir L. Mallet.

(No. 48.)
Sir, *Camp Ushnu, August* 1, 1914.

IN continuation of Mr. Wratislaw's despatch No. 43, dated the 12th July, I have the honour to submit, for your Excellency's information, the following report upon the proceedings of the Commission subsequent to that date :—

2. Boundary pillars having been erected by a sub-commission on the Kani Resch pass, the Commission left on the 13th for Schenie by a difficult track down the Wazneh Valley, and a meeting took place two days later at which, after considerable discussion, the boundary from Berde Aboul Fath to the Wazneh River east of Schenie was fixed by consent in such a way as to leave the latter village, with all its lands in Turkey, in accordance with the agreement previously arrived at.

3. At this meeting Mr. Wratislaw announced to his colleagues that, to his great regret, he was prevented by ill-health from continuing to take part in the labours of the Commission. The announcement was received with the liveliest regret by all present, particularly by the Ottoman and Persian commissioners.

4. On the following day an out-of-doors meeting was held to determine the point at which the frontier should leave the Wazneh River and ascend to the watershed. The question proved more difficult of solution than was anticipated, owing to the inaccuracy of the identic map and the vagueness of the protocol based thereon. After some hours of ineffective discussion had demonstrated that the parties were not likely to come to an agreement unaided, M. Minorsky proposed to me that we should endeavour to secure acceptance of a line which, whilst offering a geographically satisfactory frontier, was in fact a compromise between the claims of the respective parties. The line he proposed seemed to me to be somewhat less than fair to the Turks, and M. Minorsky agreed, on my proposition, that we should bear the fact in mind with a view to securing some concession to Turkey further north should occasion arise.

5. When, however, we submitted the proposition to our colleagues we were unable to secure its acceptance by the Turkish commissioner, and after some hours' further discussion the meeting was adjourned. During the evening, however, M. Minorsky and I discussed the question afresh with Aziz Bey over a cup of tea, and informed him privately of the mental reservation in his favour referred to above, with the result that he consented to the frontier we had originally proposed. The necessary pillars were erected on the following day by a sub-commission, the next meeting of the Commission being fixed for Wazneh, which we reached on the 17th.

6. It was not, however, till the 20th that a meeting was held, M. Minorsky having represented that he was mentally and physically exhausted and needed a complete rest. At this meeting a further section of the frontier up to the Kandil Dagh was settled and a number of boundary pillars agreed on, the line following an easily-recognised watershed throughout. The 21st July being the date of the coronation of the Shah of Persia no meeting was held, the usual complimentary calls being paid on the Persian commissioner in the afternoon. On the 22nd July a further meeting was held, which was devoted principally to a discussion of the grazing rights in Persia of certain tribes referred to in the protocol.

The 23rd July was Turkish "Constitution Day," and we were consequently obliged to stay at Wazneh to celebrate the occasion. On the 24th we all left for Lahijan, arriving on the 25th.

7. A decision of some importance was arrived at during this meeting with regard to the preparation of "supplementary maps" between latitude 36° and Mount Ararat; the identic map has not improved on acquaintance, and it has been found necessary to prepare supplementary maps for practically the whole extent of the frontier between Mohammerah and latitude 36°. These maps have, with one or two exceptions, been prepared by the British survey party on the same scale as that of the identic map.

M. Minorsky placed at the disposal of the Commission a series of maps, on the scale of 1″ = 2 versts ($\frac{1}{84000}$), extending along the Persian side of the frontier from latitude 36° 24′ to Mount Ararat, and suggested that these maps be accepted as a basis for further supplementary maps; the Persian and Turkish commissioners showed some hesitation in accepting these maps, partly because the scale is different to that of the identic map, making comparison difficult, and partly because their surveyors would in practice be ousted from the greater part of the topographical work, the

lettering being in Russian and the scale one to which they are unaccustomed. Itila-ul-Mulk, moreover, felt unable, without reference to Tehran, to agree to make use of a map of part of Persia made by Russian surveyors without the cognisance of the Central Government.

The saving of the time, however, was an undeniable advantage, and, M. Minorsky having promised that the 2-verst sheets should be completed by the addition of the necessary detail on the Turkish side of the frontier by his surveyors, it was agreed that the maps should be accepted as à basis for the preparation of a series of supplementary maps on this scale stretching from the Zab to Ararat.

8. On the 26th the Commission met in the Lahijan plain at Khaneh, and settled a further section of the frontier from the Kandil Dagh to near the Kele Shin pass; a sub-commission was appointed to erect pillars on each of the three intervening passes, viz., Zinni Shaikh, Barzin, and Boz.

9. It had been intended that the next meeting should take place on the 30th July at Ushnu, and on this understanding I proceeded to that place from Khaneh, viâ Paswah, arriving on the 28th. The other commissioners, however, finding themselves near the Kele Shin pass on the 29th, proposed a meeting for the 30th there; news of this change of plans arrived too late for me to be able to reach the pass in time, and Colonel Ryder, who was on the spot with a sub-commission, took my place.

10. On the pass itself an ancient monolith bearing a cuneiform inscription relating, I understand, to the boundary in Sassanian times, was accepted as the frontier, pillars being erected in addition on the watershed north and south of the road to show the direction of the frontier line, and also upon the Khrena col, a difficult and inaccessible pass some 7 miles to the north of Kele Shin. It was agreed that the next meeting should take place in the Margawar district, some 20 miles to the north of Ushnu, on the 3rd August, and we shall march thither to-morrow.

In order to save time I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Foreign Office.

I have, &c.
A. T. WILSON, *Captain, I.A.*,
British Commissioner, Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

[56172] No. 170.

Captain Wilson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 19.)
Sir, *Camp Margawar, August* 4, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to enclose for your information a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to His Majesty's Embassy, Constantinople, giving cover to the *procès-verbaux* of sittings Nos. 59 to 65 of this Commission.

2. Attached to *Procès-verbal* No. 63 is a provisional description of the frontier from Fao to the River Zab (latitude 36°) in the form which it is proposed to adopt for the final description for which provision is made in paragraph 15 of the "règlement" governing our proceedings.

3. It was originally elaborated by Mr. Hubbard, representing the "secrétariat," and Lieutenant-Colonel Ryder, representing the "corps technique," and circulated to all the Commissions for criticism; after a delay of six weeks, the draft was approved by the Persian and Turkish commissioners, with a few verbal alterations; but M. Minorsky declared himself too busy to look at it, and suggested that it should be laid aside for consideration after the work of demarcation had been completed.

4. The adoption of this proposal would have involved great delay at the end of the Commission, the labour of preparing, checking, and copying such a document being very considerable, and, on my proposition, M. Minorsky finally agreed that the description in question, in the form approved by his colleagues should be attached to the *procès-verbal*, he reserving his right to make suggestions thereanent at a subsequent stage.

As, however, it has already received the approval of a majority of the commissioners, he is unlikely, I think, to do more than propose a few verbal alterations.

5. My Persian and Turkish colleagues have begged to be supplied, on payment if desired, with twenty printed copies each of this description, and in commending this request to consideration, I would ask to be favoured with the same number of copies for the use of the British Commission. It would be convenient if these copies could

be printed and sewn apart from the text of the *procès-verbaux*, and sent to me by post to the care of His Majesty's consul at Tabriz.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
A. T. WILSON, *I.A.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 170.

Captain Wilson to Sir L. Mallet.

(No. 49.)
Sir, *Camp Margawar, August* 4, 1914.

IN continuation of Mr. Wratislaw's despatch No. 44 dated the 13th July, I have the honour to enclose for your Excellency's information, copies of the *procès-verbaux* of sittings Nos. 59 to 65 of this Commission.

In order to save time and with a view to expediting the receipt of printed copies, I am sending a copy of this despatch with enclosures direct to His Majesty's Foreign Office.

I have, &c.
A. T. WILSON, *I.A.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 170.

Procès-verbal of Fifty-ninth Meeting of Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

SÉANCE tenue près de Kandol, le 8 juillet, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire-adjoint britannique.

Étaient présents:

Pour la Grande-Bretagne: M. le Capitaine Wilson.
Pour la Perse: Etela-ol-Mulk.
Pour la Russie: M. V. Minorsky.
Pour la Turquie: Abdul Hamid Bey.

Le procès-verbal de la dernière séance a été lu et approuvé et celui de la cinquante-septième séance signé, ainsi que les exemplaires britannique et persan de la Carte supplémentaire No. 9 et l'exemplaire britannique du No. 10.

La Commission ayant repris la discussion de la ligne frontière à partir de la rivière Kialou, M. le commissaire russe exprime ainsi les vues des commissaires médiateurs:

"La proposition faite à la dernière séance par M. le commissaire persan, c'est-à-dire d'adopter la ligne proposée par lui-même pour le tronçon de frontière entre le Kialou et Tépé Salos et d'assigner, en revanche, le village de Chenié à la Turquie, nous semble une solution équitable et dictée même par deux considérations importantes: (1) les conditions géographiques, et (2) le conflit qui existe entre les termes du protocole et le *statu quo* d'aujourd'hui. En effet, si même près du Kialou (comme dans le cas de Déré Vouly) nous nous appuyons sur la Carte identique, la question présente toujours des difficultés au point de vue du *statu quo*. Également, dans le cas de Chenié les indications quant à la frontière puisées dans le livre de Dervich Pacha, &c., sont très défectueuses. Vu ce qui précède, il serait difficile de traiter les deux questions séparément et il est, en effet, préférable de les résoudre simultanément. Le compromis proposé par notre collègue persan nous paraît très satisfaisant et nous serions embarrassés de trancher la question autrement si même elle était référée à notre arbitrage."

A la suite de cette déclaration, MM. les commissaires persan et ottoman disent que, n'ayant d'autre choix que de mettre à exécution ladite proposition, ils s'accordent sur la ligne suivante: La frontière suit le *medium filum aquæ* du Kialou en aval jusqu'à l'embouchure du ruisseau qui s'y déverse au sud-sud-ouest de Tépé Salos; elle remonte ce ruisseau jusqu'à sa bifurcation où les deux ruisseaux (Chivé Kouzedol et Chivé Guerrav), qui contournent Tépé Salos des deux côtés, s'unissent, laissant ainsi à la

perse les villages de Herzéné et de Gaké. De ce point elle monte par le partage des eaux des deux ruisseaux susdits au sommet de Tépé Salos et continue le long du partage des eaux, en passant par le col de Zinvé-Ahmed-Khan et le rocher de Kani-Guvèze, jusqu'à la crête de Doulan, qu'elle suit toujours par le partage des eaux.

Pour la frontière au delà de ce point, on a décidé d'en remettre la discussion jusqu'à l'arrivée de la Commission à Kani-Resch, où la prochaine séance a été fixée pour le matin du 12 courant.

Une sous-commission fut enfin nommée pour surveiller l'érection de bornes sur le tronçon de frontière susdit; elle a été chargée de faire ériger une borne au col de Zinvé-Ahmed-Khan, une sur le sommet de Tépé Salos et une troisième à la jonction des deux ruisseaux qui contournent Tépé Selos.

En conséquence, on a arrêté pendant cette séance la frontière entre le Kialou et la crête du mont Doulan.

Fait le 8 juillet, 1914.

V. MINORSKY.
A. T. WILSON.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
A. HAMID.

Enclosure 3 in No. 170.

Procès-verbal of Sixtieth Meeting of Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

SÉANCE tenue à Kani-Resch, le 12 juillet, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire persan.

Étaient présents tous les commissaires.

Le procès-verbal de la dernière séance a été lu et approuvé et celui de l'avant-dernière séance signé, ainsi que l'exemplaire britannique de la Carte identique, feuille No. 8.

M. le commissaire russe relève que quant au nom de Donleri, mentionné dans le paragraphe du Protocole de Constantinople, où se trouve décrite la frontière entre Lagav-Ghird et Khan-Ahmed, il aurait été impossible au point de vue géographique d'appliquer une ligne passant par la crête en question, vu qu'elle se trouve située en dehors de la ligne du partage des eaux qui forme la frontière. Il est évident, ajoute-il, que le mot "Donleri" a été subsitué par erreur au lieu de "Doulan."

La frontière à partir du mont Doulan a été ensuite établie par MM. les commissaires à l'aide d'une carte préparée par le corps technique.

La ligne suit le partage des eaux en passant par le col de Lagav-Ghird et les crêtes de Glassoura, Rehan et Dou-Paza. Pour marquer ce tronçon de la frontière, on décide de faire ériger deux bornes: l'une sur le col de Lagav-Ghird et l'autre sur celui de Kani-Resch. Une sous-commission a été nommée pour en surveiller l'érection.

M. le commissaire ottoman ayant fait remarquer que ces tribus turques de Pichdir ont l'habitude de profiter de certains pâturages et sources près de Kani-Resch qui se trouveront dorenavant en territoire persan, MM. les commissaires britanniques et russe disent qu'ils ont constaté ce fait de leurs propres observations.

M. le commissaire persan déclare, toutefois, qu'il ne se croit pas compétent d'entrer en discussion sur la question soulevée par son collègue ottoman.

M. le commissaire britannique fait part ensuite à ses collègues d'une communication qu'il vient de recevoir de son Gouvernement lui annonçant que le Gouvernement ottoman a attiré l'attention du Gouvernement britannique sur le caractère peu permanent des bornes érigées par la Commission. M. le commissaire russe dit qu'il a également reçu une communication pareille de son Gouvernement. Là-dessus une discussion a eu lieu concernant la nature des bornes.

MM. les commissaires britannique et russe, tout en faisant ressortir les très grandes difficultés qui ont, jusqu'à présent, entravé l'œuvre de bornage, c'est-à-dire le manque de moyens de transport et de dépôts de matériel, ainsi que la certitude qu'à beaucoup d'endroits la population locale n'attendait que le départ de la Commission pour venir détruire les bornes, sollicitent cependant leurs collègues persan et ottoman de bien vouloir prendre toutes les mesures en leur pouvoir afin de rendre possible dès à présent l'érection de bornes plus solides et durables. La partie de la frontière qui reste à être délimitée étant moins déserte que la partie déjà parcourue, il serait peut-être à la portée

de la Commission de faire bâtir des constructions d'un caractère plus permanent que par le passé.

M. le commissaire ottoman déclare que son Gouvernement a fourni des fonds suffisants pour pourvoir aux depens de l'érection de bornes solides et durables; lui et son collègue persan s'accorderont pour faire venir des maçons et le matériel nécessaire.

La prochaine réunion a été fixée pour le 16, à Chenié.

En conséquence, on a arrêté pendant cette séance la frontière entre Doulan et le mont d'Aboul-Fath.

Fait à Kani-Resch, le 12 juillet, 1914.

ETELA-OL-MULK.
(Pour Mr. Wratislaw),
A. T. WILSON, *Captain.*
V. MINORSKY.
AZ. SAMIH.

Enclosure 4 in No. 170.

Procès-verbal of Sixty-first Meeting of Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

SÉANCE tenue à Chenié, le 15 juillet, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire russe.

Étaient présents tous les commissaires.

Le procès-verbal de la dernière séance a été lu et approuvé et celui de l'avant-dernière séance signé.

Lecture a été donnée des rapports des deux sous-commissions nommées aux séances 59 et 60 respectivement. Ces rapports se trouvent annexés au présent procès-verbal.

MM. les commissaires, se basant sur les cartes des environs de Chenié préparées par le corps technique, ont discuté la frontière depuis mont Aboul-Fath jusqu'à la rivière de Wezné. On constate que la ligne suit le partage des eaux passant par Berdé-spian (conformément au protocole) et la crête de Malimos et atteint un sommet saillant qui domine la vallée de Wezné. Comme, cependant, les renseignements concernant la position de Fakih-Babakr (Foka-baba-kyr) pris des habitants du pays se sont montrés assez contradictoires, on n'a pas pu établir définitivement la correspondance entre ces deux points, et MM. les commissaires, quoique certains que la ligne indiquée réalise le sens du protocole, décident d'attendre qu'on aura visité les lieux avant de donner une appellation définitive au sommet en question.

La délimitation à partir dudit sommet jusqu'à la rivière de Wezné a été ensuite considérée. M. le commissaire ottoman rappelle qu'à la cinquante-neuvième séance le village de Chenié a été reconnu comme appartenant à la Turquie. Les terrains de Zal, à l'est de Chenié, sont, dit-il, la propriété des habitants de Chenié, et doivent, par conséquent, être compris en Turquie. Il propose, donc, que la frontière suive le premier ravin qui passe à l'est de Zal pour descendre à la rivière de Wenzé. Après une discussion, au cours de laquelle MM. les commissaires britannique et russe ont émis l'opinion que Zal doit rester en territoire ottoman, M. le commissaire persan donne son assentiment à la ligne proposée. M. le président formule ainsi la décision de la Commission. La ligne frontière suit le partage des eaux passant par les monts Aboul-Fath, Berdé-spian et Malimos jusqu'à la crête se trouvant au-dessus de ruisseau qui s'appelle Khir-i-Nerzeng. De là, elle descend jusqu'à la jonction de ce ruisseau avec la rivière de Wezné, laissant à la Perse le village de Toujal, et la Turquie les terrains de Zal. De là, par le *medium filum aquæ* de la rivière de Wezné, la frontière descendra jusqu'à un point à être ultérieurement défini.

Une sous-commission a été nommée pour l'érection d'une borne sur le col de Malimos; on a chargé cette sous-commission en sus d'élaborer une description plus précise de la partie de la frontière entre Malimos et le ruisseau de Nerzeng.

Une seconde sous-commission a été constituée pour l'érection d'une borne à l'endroit où le chemin Chenié–Toujal traverse le ruisseau de Nerzeng.

Sur la proposition de M. le commissaire russe, la Commission a fait enregistrer la décision suivante: Il est laissé au corps technique, en faisant ses cartes de la frontière, à déterminer l'étendue de la zone comprise par chaque carte, ayant en vue la nécessité de bien illustrer la frontière.

M. le commissaire persan remercie son collègue ottoman de l'évacuation de Kani-

Resch ; il le prie en même temps de prendre des mesures pour amener l'évacuation de Berdé-spian.

A la conclusion de la séance M. le commissaire britannique dit que c'est avec le plus grand regret qu'il doit annoncer à la Commission que l'état de sa santé lui interdit de prendre plus part à ses travaux. C'est le Capitaine Wilson, commissaire-adjoint de la Grande-Bretagne, qui, en vertu de l'article 3 du protocole, le remplacera au sein de la Commission jusqu'à nouvelle disposition. On pouvait facilement comprendre, ajouta M. le commisaire, le chagrin qu'il ressentait à se voir empêché de partager avec ses chers collègues la tâche de la Commission jusqu'à sa conclusion ; mais quand, grâce à la mauvaise santé, on ne se trouve plus à la hauteur de ses devoirs, on n'a pas d'autre choix que d'y renoncer. Les trois autres commissaires ont ensuite exprimé envers leur collègue britannique le grand regret que son départ leur cause et l'assurance de leur sympathie et lui ont souhaité un prompte rétablissement de santé.

La prochaine séance a été fixée pour le lendemain, à 8 heures du matin, le rendez-vous étant à Bédélan.

En conséquence, on a arrêté pendant cette séance la frontière entre le mont Aboui-Fath et la rivière de Wezné.

Fait à Chenié, le 15 juillet, 1914.

V. MINORSKY.
A. T. WILSON, *Captain.*
ETELA-OL MULK.
AZ. SAMIH.

Rapport.

Conformément aux instructions de la Commission, nous, soussignés, nous sommes rendus sur le col entre Kandol et Achkan connu sous le nom de Zinvé-Ahmed-Khan et avons construit une borne à environ 60 mètres au nord de la route passant par le col même. Cette borne, ayant 2 mètres de hauteur et 1·90 mètre de base et portant le No. 106, est construite en pierres et chaux.

Ensuite nous nous sommes rendus sur le sommet de Tépé Salos et avons constaté que, vu la configuration prononcée de cette colline, il était absolument inutile d'y mètre une borne et qu'il serait indispensable de remplacer cette borne par une autre érigée sur la ligne de partage des eaux allant de Tépé Salos et Zinvé-Ahmed-Khan. C'est pourquoi nous avons construit une borne sur le col entre Achkan et Kouza-Dol tout près du sentier reliant ces deux endroits. Cette borne, construite entièrement en pierres et chaux, a 2 mètres de base et 1·50 mètre de hauteur, porte le No. 105.

Une troisième borne a été érigée sur la ligne du partage des eaux au sud de l'intersection de la route allant de Kouzedol et Kandol à Herzéné avec la ligne du partage des deux descendant du sommet de Tépé Salos vers le confluent des deux rivières au sud de cette colline et passant par le promontoire entre ces deux rivières.

La borne se trouve à environ 500 mètres au nord du confluent de ces deux rivières connues à cet endroit sous le nom de Schivé-Graw (celle du sud) et de Kouza-Dol (celle du nord), et portant le No. 104. Elle est construite en pierres et chaux d'une hauteur de 1·50 mètre et d'une base de 2 mètres.

SALAR MOZAFFER.
V. MINORSKY.
D. BELAYEW.
O. KADRI.

Le 8 juillet, 1914.

Instructions.

La Commission a chargé une sous-commission composée de MM. Belayew, Kadri Effendi, Mansour-os-Saltaneh, Salar Mozaffer, d'ériger les bornes suivantes :

1. Sur le col de Zinvé-Ahmed-Khan ;
2. Sur le sommet de Tépé Salos ;
3. A la jonction des deux ruisseaux qui contournent Tépé Salos des deux côtés ;

4. A tout autre endroit que la sous-commission pourra juger nécessaire pour marquer la ligne frontière établie.

V. MINORSKY.
A. HAMID.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
A. T. W.

Kandol, le 8 juillet, 1914.

Rapport.

I.

Conformément aux instructions de la Commission, nous, soussignés, nous sommes rendus sur le col de Lagawguir et avons construit une borne No. 107 sur le col même à environ 10 mètres au sud de la route allant de Kandol à Serdacht en passant par Kala-Racha. Cette borne, d'une hauteur de 2½ mètres et d'une base de 4 mètres, est construite entièrement en pierres et plâtre. Salar Mozaffer, représentant le Gouvernement persan, a proposé d'ériger deux autres bornes sur les cols de Konesp et de Kani-Reyhan mais les représentants des deux Gouvernements russe et ottoman ont déclaré que, vu le manque d'importance, il était absolument inutile de mettre ces deux bornes proposées.

SALAR MOZAFFER.
Capitaine TSKHAKAYA.
A. HAMID.

Le 13 juillet, 1914.

II.

Le même jour, nous, soussignés, nous sommes rendus sur le col de Kani-Resch et avons construit, après discussion sur la ligne exacte du partage des eaux et à la suite d'un arbitrage sur les lieux, des bornes distantes de 300 mètres l'une de l'autre, étant donné que le col avait une forme longitudinale. La première borne, située sur un monticule entre la route de Mamouret-ul-Hamidié–Serdacht (au nord) et le sentier passant par le pied de Berdi-Aboul-Fath (par un deuxième col au sud), porte le No. 108, et est construite en pierres et plâtre d'une hauteur de 1·50 mètre et d'une base de 2 mètres. La deuxième borne No. 109, située à 300 mètres au nord-est de la première, est construite en pierres et plâtre d'une hauteur de 2 mètres et d'une base de 3 mètres.

MANSOUR-OS-SALTANEH.
V. MINORSKY.
A. T. WILSON, *Captain.*
A. HAMID.

Instructions.

La Commission a chargé la sous-commission composée de MM. le Capitaine Wilson, Salar Mozaffar Khan ou Mansour-os-Saltaneh, le Capitaine Tskhakaya, le Capitaine Abdul Hamid Bey, de faire ériger une borne au col de Lagav-Ghird et une seconde borne à Kani-Resch.

Fait le 12 juillet, 1914.

E. M.
A. C. W.
V. MINORSKY.
AZ. SAMIH.

Enclosure 5 in No. 170.

Procès-verbal of Sixty-second Meeting of Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

LA Commission s'étant rendue près de Kani-Bédélan, le 16 juillet, 1914, une séance sur les lieux a été tenue sous la présidence de M. le commissaire ottoman.

Étaient présents M. le commissaire-adjoint britannique et les commissaires des trois autres Puissances.

La détermination du point où la frontière doit quitter la rivière de Wezné a fait l'objet d'une discussion et il est constaté que les termes du protocole, étant basés sur les données trop défectueuses de la Carte identique, ne servent pas à donner une idée précise de la ligne projetée. Vu ceci, MM. les commissaires médiateurs expriment la proposition suivante :

" Ayant étudié la situation sur les lieux, nous avons constaté que :

" 1. Le pont de Pourdé-Berdan se trouve en aval de l'embouchure de la rivière de Souni-Jourou, c'est-à-dire à une distance très considérable en aval du village de Chenié, lequel est resté en Turquie ;

" 2. La montagne de Tchawrine peut être considérée comme correspondant au point astronomique de la chaîne de Djasousan, marqué sur la Carte identique ;

" 3. Le col de Bamine se trouve sur la prolongation de la chaîne de Djasousan, à l'est de Tchawrine ;

" 4. Le contrefort de Tchawrine à l'ouest de Kani-Kavatman partage en deux parties presque égales la distance de Bamine à Pourdé-Berdan et représente la meilleure frontière au point de vue géographique.

" Ayant égard à ces faits, nous voudrions proposer une ligne, la seule ligne trouvable, à notre avis, pour donner une solution juste. Cette ligne est la suivante : La frontière monte de la rivière de Wezné à la montagne de Tchawrine par un contrefort qui laisse du côté persan le chemin de Bamine, qui se détache du chemin principal Pichdir–Dolatou–Wezné près de Kani-Kavatman, ainsi que la source Kani-Bédélan, et du côté turc les terrains compris entre ledit contrefort et Pourdé-Berdan."

Cette proposition a été acceptée après une discussion détaillée, et une sous-commission a été nommée pour surveiller l'érection des deux bornes nécessaires pour marquer ce tronçon de frontière.

En conséquence, on a arrêté pendant cette séance la frontière entre la rivière de Wezné et la montagne de Tchawrine.

Fait à Kani-Bédélan, le 16 juillet, 1914.

AZ. SAMIH.
V. MINORSKY.
A. T. WILSON, *Captain.*
ETELA-OL-MULK.

Enclosure 6 in No. 170.

Procès-verbal of Sixty-third Meeting of Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

SÉANCE tenue à Wezné, le 20 juillet, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire-adjoint britannique.

Étaient présents M. le commissaire-adjoint britannique et les commissaires des trois autres Puissances.

Le procès-verbal de la soixante-unième séance a été signé et ceux de la dernière et de l'avant-dernière séance lus et approuvés. Lecture a été donnée également du rapport de la sous-commission nommée à la dernière séance pour l'érection des bornes sur le contrefort à l'ouest de Kani-Kavatman, lequel rapport se trouve annexé au présent procès-verbal.

MM. les commissaires ont ensuite signé les cartes suivantes : Carte identique, feuille No. 8, un exemplaire persan et deux exemplaires britanniques ; Carte supplémentaire No. 10, exemplaires britannique et ottoman ; Carte supplémentaire No. 13, feuille originale.

La direction de la frontière à partir de Tchawrine a été ensuite considérée, et la Commission a décidé que la ligne suivra vers le nord le partage des eaux qui passe à l'ouest de la vallée de Wezné.

Après une courte discussion, une sous-commission fut constituée pour faire ériger des bornes sur le sommet de Tchawrine, sur le col au nord de Tchawrine et sur celui de Zinvi-Khouar, afin de marquer le partage des eaux.

Une discussion s'étant entamée à propos de la répartition des travaux du corps technique et de la meilleure manière de représenter la partie de la frontière qui reste à être délimitée, M le commissaire russe fait une déclaration dans le sens suivant, dont il prie la Commission de prendre acte : A la disposition du corps technique russe il y a

des matériaux cartographiques à l'échelle de 1 : 84,000 pour toute l'étendue du côté persan de la frontière jusqu'au mont Ararat. Il s'engage de les utiliser si l'échelle susmentionnée est acceptée pour la zone de frontière depuis le Zab jusqu'au mont Ararat. Ceci facilitera au moins de moitié le travail cartographique de la Commission et on aura une idée générale de la frontière sans interruption ; tandis qu'un levé à l'échelle de la Carte identique ne permettrait pas d'utiliser ces matériaux importants. En même temps, continua M. le commissaire, il sera de la plus haute importance d'avoir d'autres cartes supplémentaires pour illustrer à une plus grande échelle les endroits où le terrain a un caractère plus compliqué. Les endroits donc des cartes seront ainsi levées seront marqués en lignes coupées sur la carte à l'échelle de 1 : 84,000 avec la mention " voir le plan détaillé No. ."

M. le commissaire persan annonce qu'il s'est référé à son Gouvernement en ce qui concerne le changement d'échelle. Il ne pourra pas donner son assentiment à la proposition de M. le commissaire russe avant la réception d'une réponse.

M. le commissaire-adjoint britannique fait observer que les nécessités du travail ont déjà plusieurs fois obligé la Commission de faire changer l'échelle des levés topographiques ; il ne croit donc pas qu'il y ait lieu à une hésitation de la part de M. le commissaire persan. A la suite de cette observation, M. le commissaire persan déclare adhérer à ladite proposition en attendant la réponse de son Gouvernement ; aussi la Commission a approuvé la proposition à l'unanimité.

M. le commissaire ottoman demande alors que la limite maxima de la carte qu'on propose de dresser sera déterminée. Sur la proposition de M. le commissaire-adjoint britannique, on décide de présenter cette question à l'examen du corps technique, lequel devra soumettre un rapport à ce sujet à la prochaine séance.

Ensuite M. le commissaire ottoman déclare qu'on a porté à sa connaissance qu'Agha Baïzi, de la tribu des Bilbas, sujet ottoman et propriétaire des terrains à Wezné devenus maintenant territoire persan, a été invité par un certain Bapir Agha à quitter Wezné sous menaces d'être chassé par lui. M. le commissaire demande, par conséquent, à son collègue persan qu'Agha Baïzi soit sauvegardé.

M. le commissaire persan répond que, quoique par ordre de son Gouvernement il ait été déclaré son incompétence au sujet des questions relatives aux droits privés des habitants, cependant il est nécessaire de déclarer qu'Agha Baïzi est sujet persan et la discussion entre lui et Bapir Agha est une affaire intérieure à être réglée par les autorités locales persanes. Aussi peut-il assurer que, vu les mesures déjà prises, aucun incident ne pourra avoir lieu.

M. le commissaire russe cite le livre du Général Tchirikof (p. 458), d'après lequel les " Bilbas Turcs " avaient de son temps l'habitude de camper à Wezné en considérant cette localité comme leur appartenant.

M. le président propose que la description de la frontière depuis Fao jusqu'à la rivière Kialou (Petit Zab) soit annexée au présent procès-verbal, cette description ayant été préparée par le secrétariat conformément à la résolution prise à la trente-neuvième séance. Cette proposition a été acceptée avec une réserve de la part de M. le commissaire russe, qui déclare que, tout en approuvant la description en principe, il se réserve de proposer plus tard des corrections dans sa rédaction.

La prochaine séance a été fixée pour le surlendemain, 22 juillet.

En conséquence, on a arrêté pendant cette séance la frontière depuis mont Tchawrine vers le nord et on a passé une résolution touchant les travaux topographiques dans la partie septentrionale de la frontière.

Fait à Wezné, le 20 juillet, 1914.

A. T. WILSON, *Captain.*
ETELA-OL-MULK.
V. MINORSKY.
AZ. SAMIH.

Rapport.

Conformément aux instructions ci-annexées, nous, soussignés, nous sommes rendus sur les lieux et avons fait construire les bornes suivantes, en pierres liées avec du mortier :

No. 113 à l'extrémité sud du contrefort à l'ouest de Kani-Kavatman à 200 mètres environ au sud de la route Souni-Dolatou, hauteur 1½ mètre, diamètre à la base 1½ mètre.

No. 114 sur la crête du même contrefort à 100 mètres environ au nord de ladite route, hauteur $1\frac{1}{4}$ mètre, diamètre à la base $1\frac{1}{2}$ mètre.

C. H. D. R.
M. S.
Capitaine JORDANOW.
O. KADRI.

Le 16 juillet, 1914.

Instructions.

La Commission a chargé le Capitaine Jordanow, le Capitaine Kadri Bey, le Colonel Ryder et Mansour-os-Saltaneh d'ériger les bornes suivantes :

1. A l'extrémité sud du contrefort, à l'ouest de Kani-Kavatman à 100 mètres environ au sud de la route Souni–Dolatou ;
2. Sur la crête du même contrefort, à 100 mètres environ au nord de ladite route.

AZ. SAMIH.
V. MINORSKY.
A. T. WILSON.
E. M.

Enclosure 7 in No. 170.

DESCRIPTION provisoire de la Frontière turco-persane depuis l'Embouchure du Chatt-el-Arab jusqu'à la Rivière le Petit Zab (latitude 36°).

(Annexée au Procès-verbal de la Soixante-troisième Séance de la Commission de Délimitation.)

Description de la Frontière. (1.)	Nos. des Bornes. (2.)	Position des Bornes. (3.)	Latitude. (4.)	Longitude. (5.)	Distance de la Borne précédente. (6.)	Azimut observé de la Borne précédente. (7.)	Description des Bornes. (8.)	Observations. (9.)
			° ′ ″	° ′ ″		Degrés.		
La frontière vient du large pour toucher la rive gauche du Chatt-el-Arab à un point situé à une distance de 2 milles en aval du fort appartenant actuellement au Cheikh Khazaal. La position de ce fort a été observée de la terrasse du bureau télégraphique Impérial ottoman de Fao, où son azimut avec le nord fut constaté être de 87 degrés. A partir de ce point, elle suit le niveau des eaux basses de la rive gauche du Chatt-el-Arab (rive d'Abadan) jusqu'aux deux îles situées devant Manyouhi (Mankouhi) qu'elle contourne de façon à les laisser à la Perse. Elle vient, immédiatement, rejoindre la ligne dudit niveau qu'elle suit jusqu'aux quatre îles situées entre Mouaouié (Maouiyé) et Choutait (Chetait). Ayant contourné ces îles de manière à les laisser en territoire persan, elle se confond de nouveau avec la ligne du niveau des eaux basses et la suit jusqu'à l'île de Mahallé (Mouhalla), qui fait partie du territoire persan avec les deux îles situées entre celle-ci et la rive persane. Après avoir contourné Mahallé, en suivant toujours le même niveau, elle vient au point où commencent le port et l'ancrage de Mouhammerah. Ce point, actuellement connu sous le nom de Touweidjat, est situé à une distance de 4,650 pieds (1,417 mètres) du point le plus avancé de la rive gauche du Karoun près de sa jonction avec le Chatt-el-Arab.								

Description de la Frontière. (1.)	Nos. des Bornes. (2.)	Position des Bornes. (3.)	Latitude. (4.)	Longitude. (5.)	Distance de la Borne précédente. (6.)	Azimut observé de la Borne précédente. (7.)	Description des Bornes. (8.)	Observations. (9.)
			° ′ ″	° ′ ″		Degrés.		
A partir de Touweidjat la ligne frontière se transfère en ligne directe au *medium filum aquæ* du Chatt, qu'elle suit en passant entre la rive persane et l'île qui porte le nom d'Oummer-Rassas dans sa partie orientale et d'Oumm-el-Khassasif dans sa partie occidentale, jusqu'à ce qu'elle arrive devant l'entrée orientale du Nahr-el-Khayin.								
	1	Située aux extrémités des deux rives du Nahr-el-Khayin à sa jonction orientale avec le Chatt-el-Arab	30 27 30	48 08 28	..	..	Deux bornes carrées en briques (portant en commun le No. 1). Hauteur, 2 mètres; largeur, 90 centim.	La latitude et la longitude des bornes Nos. 1 à 16 sont prises de la Carte identique, feuilles Nos. 1, 2, et 3 (Nos. 14, 13 et 12 d'après l'ancien numérotage).
La ligne frontière entre dans le Nahr et en suit le *medium filum aquæ* jusqu'à la borne No. 2.								
	2	Située sur la rive nord du Nahr-el-Khayin à 400 pieds (122 mètres) à l'ouest de la jonction du Nahr-Aboul-Arabide avec le Nahr-el-Khayin	30 29 00	48 03 00	..	..	Borne carrée en briques. Hauteur, 2 mètres; largeur, 90 centim.	
Partant de là, elle suit la crête d'un ancien amoncellement de terre sur lequel ont été érigées les bornes Nos. 3 et 4								
	3	Située sur un ancien amoncellement de terre	30 29 10	48 03 06	853 pieds (260 mètres)	23	Idem.	
	4	Située sur le même amoncellement de terre	30 29 28	48 03 12	1,378 pieds (420 mètres)	23	Borne carrée en briques. Hauteur, 1·60 mètre; largeur, 60 centim.	Bornes Nos. 4 et 5. La différence entre les longitudes données pour ces deux bornes s'explique par le fait qu'elles sont prises de différentes feuilles de la Carte identique dont les méridiens ne se correspondent pas exactement.
De la borne No. 4 elle va en ligne directe vers le vrai nord jusqu'à la borne No. 12								
	5	Située sur la ligne droite entre la borne No. 4 et la borne No. 12	30 30 22	48 03 00	7,147 pieds (2,178 mètres)	..	Amoncellement de terre. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre à la base, 3 mètres.	
	6	Idem	30 31 42	48 03 00	7,054 pieds (2,150 mètres)	..	Idem.	
	7	Idem	30 32 42	48 03 00	7,264 pieds (2,214 mètres)	..	Idem.	

	8	Située à une distance d'environ 24¼ milles géographiques (46½ kilom.) de la borne No. 7, et à une distance de 20,473 pieds (6,240 mètres) de la borne No. 12	30 56 50	48 03 00	Environ 24¼ milles	..	Amoncellement de terre. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre à la base, 3 mètres.	
	9	Située à une distance de 13,192 pieds (4,021 mètres) de la borne No. 12	30 57 57	48 03 00	..	..	Idem.	
	10	Située à une distance de 984 pieds (300 mètres) à l'est du centre de la façade septentrionale de la ruine de Kouchk-i-Basri, et à une distance de 9,900 pieds (3,017 mètres) de la borne No, 12	30 58 28	48 03 00	..	..	Idem.	
	11	Située à une distance de 4,620 pieds (1,408 mètres) de la borne No. 12	30 59 15	48 03 00	..	..	Idem.	
	12	Située sur le parallèle 31, à une distance de la borne No. 10 de 9,900 pieds (3,017 mètres), à savoir la distance (d'après la Carte identique) entre le parallèle 31 et la ruine de Kouchk-i-Basri	31 00 00	48 03 00	..	..	Amoncellement de terre. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre à la base, 5 mètres.	
De la borne No. 12 la ligne frontière suit le parallèle 31 vers l'ouest								
	13	Située sur le parallèle 31 ..	31 00 00	48 01 00	10,560 pieds (3,219 mètres)	..	Amoncellement de terre. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre à la base, 3 mètres.	
	14	Idem	31 00 00	47 59 35	8,448 pieds (577 mètres)	..	Idem.	
Elle continue à suivre le parallèle 31 jusqu'à l'intersection de celui-ci avec le méridien 47° 42′. Puis elle suit ledit méridien jusqu'à son intersection avec le parallèle 31° 24′. De ce point elle se dirige en ligne droit à la borne No. 15								
	15	Située à un endroit sec au bord du marais, entre deux branches du Chatt-el-Amma, à l'endroit dit Oumm-Chir	31 46 56	47 51 50	..	..	Amoncellement de terre. Hauteur, 4 mètres; diamètre à la base 6 mètres.	
La ligne frontière va ensuite en ligne droite à la borne No. 16								

Description de la Frontière. (1.)	Nos. des Bornes. (2.)	Position des Bornes. (3.)	Latitude. (4.)	Longitude. (5.)	Distance de la Borne précédente. (6.)	Azimut observé de la Borne précédente. (7.)	Description des Bornes. (8.)	Observations. (9.)
			° ′ ″	° ′ ″		Degrés.		
	16	Située à la jonction de deux branches du Chatt-el-Amma	31 48 10	47 51 15	8,100 pieds (2,469 mètres)	336	Amoncellement de terre. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre à la base, 4 mètres.	
A partir de cette borne elle suit le lit du Chatt-el-Amma jusqu'à la borne No. 17								
	17	Située à l'endroit où le Chatt-el-Amma se perd dans un marais desséché	31 49 15	47 50 05	..	318	Amoncellement de terre. Hauteur, 2½ mètres; diamètre à la base, 5 mètres	La latitude et la longitude des bornes Nos. 17 à 22 sont prises de la Carte supplémentaire No. 2.
De là elle va en ligne directe à la borne No. 18								
	18	Située à l'endroit où le lit du Chatt-el-Amma reparaît	31 49 55	47 95 25	5,600 pieds (1,707 mètres)	320	Idem.	
Elle continue à suivre le lit du Chatt-el-Amma, jusqu'à la borne No. 19								
	19	Située à l'endroit où le lit du Chatt-el-Amma disparaît de nouveau	31 53 45	47 46 50	Environ 5¼ milles	..	Idem.	
Elle va ensuite en ligne directe à la borne No. 20.								
	20	Située à l'endroit où le lit du Chatt-el-Amma reparaît	31 54 20	47 46 40	3,500 pieds (1,067 mètres)	355	Idem.	
La ligne frontière suit le lit du Chatt-el-Amma jusqu'à sa bifurcation, marquée par la borne No. 21.								
	21	Située sur une digue entre deux branches du Chatt-el-Amma	31 54 45	47 45 50	Environ 1 mille	293	Idem.	
Partant de là, elle atteint la plus grande des deux branches (celle qui passe à l'ouest de la borne No. 21) et la suit jusqu'à la borne No. 22.								
	22	Située sur une digue ayant 32 mètres de longueur et 3 mètres de hauteur, à une distance de 30 mètres de la rive gauche du Douveridj	32 03 40	47 38 40	Environ 13 milles	..	Amoncellement de terre. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre à la base, 4 mètres.	
La ligne frontière va en ligne directe à la rivière Douveridj, qu'elle remonte en en suivant le *medium filum aquæ* pour une distance								

de 1½ mille, jusqu'à l'endroit où la crête du Djebel Fokki la plus septentrionale aboutit à la rivière. Elle remonte cette crête et suit la chaîne la plus élevée (celle du nord) du Djebel Fokki jusqu'à sa jonction avec le partage des eaux ("chaîne transversale") qui la relie au Djebel Hamrine. Elle suit la crête de la chaîne transversale jusqu'à sa jonction avec le Djebel Hamrine, tourne ensuite vers le nord-ouest et suit la crête du Djebel Hamrine jusqu'à la borne No. 23.								
	23	Située sur un contrefort du Djebel Hamrine à une distance d'un quart de mille de la rive gauche du Tyb	32 27 33	47 11 30	..	..	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre à la base, 1 mètre	La latitude et la longitude des bornes Nos. 23 et 24 sont prises de la Carte supplémentaire No. 4.
Ensuite la ligne frontière descend en ligne directe à la rivière Tyb, suit en aval le *medium filum aquæ* de celle-ci jusqu'en face de la borne No. 24 et atteint ladite borne.								
	24	Située au pied des dernières collines les plus avancées vers la plaine, à une distance de 300 pieds (91 mètres) de la rive droite de la rivière Tyb	32 27 10	47 10 38	Environ 1 mille	241	Entassement de pierres et de terre. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre à la base, 1½ mètre.	
A partir de la borne No. 24, elle suit le pied des montagnes jusqu'à la borne No. 25.								
	25	Située à 656 pieds (200 mètres) de la rive droite du Khyr Zafarani au pied des collines	32 50 00	46 36 18	..	..	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre à la base, 3 mètres	La latitude et la longitude des bornes Nos. 25 et 26 sont prises de la Carte supplémentaire No. 5; celles des bornes Nos. 27 à 33 de la Carte supplémentaire No. 7.
Elle continue à suivre le pied des montagnes jusqu'à la borne No. 26.								
	26	Située à 161 pieds (49 mètres) de la rive gauche de la rivière Chengouleh sur la pente des collines les plus avancées vers la plaine	32 55 22	46 26 42	..	..	Idem.	
Ensuite elle traverse la rivière Chengouleh et vient de nouveau suivre la ligne du pied des montagnes jusqu'à la borne No. 27.								
	27	Située à 98 pieds (30 mètres) du côté droit du ravin Sarkhyr au pied des collines, et à 66 pieds (20 mètres) en aval de l'endroit où un petit ravin rejoint la rive droite du Sarkhyr	32 57 22	46 20 25	..	..	Construction de pierres et de ciment, érigée sur un ancien tombeau. Hauteur, 1 mètre; longueur, 5 mètres; largeur, 3 mètres.	

Description de la Frontière. (1.)	Nos. des Bornes. (2.)	Position des Bornes. (3.)	Latitude. (4.)	Longitude. (5.)	Distance de la Borne précédente. (6.)	Azimut observé de la Borne précédente. (7.)	Description des Bornes. (8.)	Observations. (9.)
			° ′ ″	° ′ ″		Degrés.		
Elle reprend ladite ligne jusqu'à la borne No. 28.								
	28	Située à 66 pieds (20 mètres) de la rive gauche du ravin de Palk (Park)—connu aussi chez les Arabes sous le nom de Khacheim Rattan—sur un monticule, à l'endroit où ce ravin débouche dans la plaine	32 58 38	46 05 41	..	..	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre à la base, 1 mètre.	
A partir de cette borne, elle suit le ravin de Palk en amont jusqu'à la borne No. 29.								
	29	Située sur un entassement de terre et de pierres à l'endroit où le chemin qui passe par le ravin de Palk pour aller à Seid Hassan atteint la crête du Djebel Hamrine	33 03 56	46 00 35	..	..	Idem.	
Ensuite la ligne frontière suit la crête du Djebel Hamrine (Carte identique, Kalaouzynan, Keleschire) jusqu'à la borne No. 30.								
	30	Située sur la crête du Djebel Hamrine	33 05 24	46 02 14	Environ 7½ milles	..	Idem.	
A partir de ce point elle va en ligne directe à la borne No. 31.								
	31	Située sur la rive gauche de la rivière de Bedrai à une distance d'environ 4 milles en aval de la jonction du Gavi et du Goundjiun-Tchem	33 07 17	46 02 56	Environ 2¼ milles	16	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre à la base, 2 mètres.	
De là, elle en aval le *medium filum aquæ* de la rivière de Bedrai jusqu'au point où le Gavi et le Goundjiun-Tchem s'unissent pour former la susdite rivière. A partir de ce point elle suit le *medium filum aquæ* du Goundjiun-Tchem jusqu'à l'endroit de la jonction d'un ravin marquée par la borne No. 32.								

	32	Située sur le côté droit d'un ravin profond à l'endroit où celui-ci rejoint la rive droite du Goundjiun-Tchem à environ 8¼ milles en amont de la jonction de ce dernier avec le Gavi	33 11 43	46 12 20	..	..	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre à la base, 1 mètre.	
Elle quitte le Goundjiun-Tchem et remonte ledit ravin jusqu'au pied des collines. Puis elle suit le pied des collines jusqu'à ce qu'elle atteigne un autre ravin marqué par la borne No. 33.								
	33	Située au pied des collines sur la rive gauche d'un autre ravin	33 11 58	46 10 40	Environ 1¾ milles	279	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diameter à la base, 1 mètre.	
Ensuite elle suit ce dernier ravin en prenant toujours la branche la plus à l'est jusqu'à ce qu'elle atteigne la crête du Bend-i-Koulik-Bouzurg. Elle suit le partage des eaux formé par cette chaîne jusqu'au défilé Déré Bagh-i-Seid Hassan (marqué Teng-i-Kan-i-Peleng sur la Carte identique). Elle traverse ledit défilé à l'endroit marqué par la borne No. 34.								
	34	Située dans un coude du ruisseau qui coule dans le défilé, à 100 pieds (30 mètres) de la rive droite de ce ruisseau. Cet endroit se trouve en face de l'extrémité est de la crête du Bend-i-Koulik-Koutchouk	33 24 50	46 02 20	..	..	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre à la base, 1½ mètre	La latitude et la longitude des bornes Nos. 34 à 40 sont prises de la Carte supplémentaire No. 7.
Ensuite elle suit la crête du Bend-i-Koulik-Koutchouk. Elle passe sur celle du Kouh-i-Getchan et la suit jusqu'à la rivière de Toursak, qu'elle traverse près de la borne No. 35.								
	35	Située à 60 pieds (18 mètres) de la rivière de Toursak, à une distance d'environ 5¾ milles de Tépé Toursak, sur une ligne d'azimut de 55° dudit Tépé	33 29 40	45 51 30	..	..	Idem.	
De là, elle monte en ligne directe au sommet le plus élevé de l'extrémité orientale de la crête du mont Meymik. Elle suit cette crête jusqu'à son extrémité nord-ouest, puis tourne vers le nord et descend le contrefort occidental. Après avoir traversé un ravin, elle atteint le Talkh-Ab à l'endroit marqué par la borne No. 36.								

Description de la Frontière. (1.)	Nos. des Bornes. (2.)	Position des Bornes. (3.)	Latitude. (4.)	Longitude. (5.)	Distance de la Borne précédente. (6.)	Azimut observé de la Borne précédente. (7.)	Description des Bornes. (8.)	Observations. (9.)
			° ′ ″	° ′ ″		Degrés.		
	36	Située à 30 pieds (9 mètres) de la rive gauche du Talkh-Ab, et à 70 pieds (21 mètres) en amont du point de départ du premier canal de la rive gauche	33 35 30	45 45 10	..	..	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre à la base, 1½ mètre.	
Ensuite la ligne frontière suit en amont le *medium filum aquæ* du Talkh-Ab jusqu'en face de la borne No. 37.								
	37	Située à 30 pieds (9 mètres) de la rive droite du Talkh-Ab, et à 200 pieds (61 mètres) en amont du point de départ du canal de Hazam	33 37 00	45 45 48	Environ 2 milles	18	Idem.	
Se dirigeant ensuite vers le nord-est, elle remonte la ligne des crêtes des collines de Kalalan la plus au sud et atteint la borne No. 38.								
	38	Située sur le sommet du premier pic de l'extrémité orientale de ladite ligne des crêtes	33 37 35	45 46 15	3,600 pieds (1,097 mètres)	33	Idem.	
A partir de là, elle se dirige vers le nord-ouest et remonte le sommet d'une colline marquée par un entassement de pierres déjà existant, lequel a été reconnu comme la borne No. 39.								
	39	Située au sommet de ladite colline	33 38 02	45 46 10	2,500 pieds (762 mètres)	0	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 1 mètre; diamètre à la base, 1 mètre.	
Ensuite elle suit la ligne des crêtes des collines principales de Kalalan, jusqu'à la borne No. 40.								
	40	Située dans le défilé de Kan-i-Cheikh à 150 pieds (46 mètres) de sa jonction avec un ravin venant du Djebel Kélé Chouvan	33 43 45	45 38 40	..	..	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre à la base, 3 mètres.	

De cette borne la frontière suit la crête du Djebel Kélé Chouvan (Kellé Schouvan) jusqu'à son extrémité occidentale. De là, en ligne droite, elle descend à la rivière Guenguir, la traverse et remonte à la borne No. 41.								
	41	Située dans une petite plaine sur la rive droite du Guenguir entre le Djebel Kélé Chouvan et le Djebel Kouhné-Rig, près d'un grand buisson isolé se trouvant du côté est du chemin Mendéli-Soumar	33 47 58	45 36 08	..	..	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre à la base, 2½ mètres	La latitude et la longitude des bornes Nos. 41 à 44 sont prises de la Carte supplémentaire No. 8.
Elle continue à suivre la même ligne jusqu'à la borne No. 42 érigée sur un monticule qui se lève entre les deux ravins situés au pied des crêtes septentrionales et méridionales du Djebel Kouhné-Rig.								
	42	Située sur ledit monticule ..	33 48 05	45 35 58	1,300 pieds (396 mètres)	309	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre à la base, 1½ metre.	
Ensuite elle va en ligne directe à un rocher isolé situé sur le sommet méridional de Kouhné-Rig lequel rocher a été reconnu comme la borne No. 43.								
	43	Située sur le sommet méridional de Kouhné-Rig	33 48 40	45 35 40	4,000 pieds (1,220 mètres)	335	En rocher composé de conglomérat. Sa surface supérieure a la forme d'un triangle équilatéral dont les côtés sont de 21 mètres.	
De là, la ligne frontière continue en ligne directe jusqu'à la borne No. 44.								
	44	Située au point le plus élevé de l'extrémité orientale du Djebel Kouhné-Rig	33 49 00	45 35 45	2,600 pieds (792 mètres)	5	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre à la base, 1½ mètre.	
Ensuite elle suit la crête du Djebel Kouhné-Rig et de Varboulend jusqu'à la borne No. 45.								
	45	Située sur la crête du Djebel Varboulend au point où le chemin principal de Mendéli à Kasr-i-Chirine la traverse	33 56 32	45 25 30	..	..	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre à la base, 1 mètre	La latitude et la longitude des bornes Nos. 45 à 50 sont prises de la Carte supplémentaire No. 9.
De cette borne elle suit le chemin de Mendéli à Kasr-i-Chirine jusqu'à la borne No. 46.								

Description de la Frontière. (1.)	Nos. des Bornes. (2.)	Position des Bornes. (3.)	Latitude. (4.)	Longitude. (5.)	Distance de la Borne précédente. (6.)	Azimut observé de la Borne précédente. (7.)	Description des Bornes. (8.)	Observations. (9.)
			° ′ ″	° ′ ″		Degrés.		
	46	Située sur la rive gauche de la rivière d'Ab-i-Naft (Naft Deressi) à l'endroit où le chemin de Mendéli à Kasr-i-Chirine traverse cette rivière. La borne se trouve du côté nord dudit chemin	33 58 15	45 23 44	Environ 2½ milles	319	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 1¼ mètre; diamètre à la base, 1½ mètre.	
Ensuite la frontière descend jusqu'à la rivière d'Ab-i-Naft et en suit le *medium filum aquæ* en amont jusqu'à un point se trouvant à un quart de mille en amont de sa jonction avec la rivière d'Ab-Baktchan, où le chemin (menant à Goumbed-i-Tchai-Hammam (marqué sur la Carte identique "Goumbed-i-Ab-Baktchan"), traverse l'Ab-i-Naft. A une distance d'environ 6 milles en amont de la borne No. 46, et en face des puits de pétrole se trouvant sur la rive droite de l'Ab-i-Naft, la frontière se dégage de la rivière pour une petite distance afin de contourner un puits de pétrole situé sur la rive gauche. La ligne qu'elle suit est ainsi déterminée; un cercle est tiré avec le puits pour centre et ayant un rayon de 30 mètres; l'arc de circonférence dudit cercle sur la rive gauche constitue la ligne frontière. A partir du point ci-haut mentionné, où le chemin menant au Goumbed traverse la rivière, la frontière suit ledit chemin jusqu'au Goumbed, d'où, tournant vers l'est, elle continue le long du chemin qui conduit du Goumbed au chemin principal Mendéli-Kan-i-Bez. La frontière prend ce chemin dans la direction de Kan-i-Bez en traversant la ligne du partage des eaux de l'Elvend et de l'Ab-i-Naft et en passant à 50 mètres à l'est de la colline de Tchigha Sourkh ainsi qu'à 200 mètres à l'est								

du cimetière Gauban, ou Beraz (Kabr-i-Ketcheka sur la Carte identique). Elle arrive au point de l'intersection dudit chemin avec un autre chemin, ce point se trouvant à 1¾ mille au nord du cimetière susmentionné. De ce point la frontière se dirige en ligne directe à la borne No. 47.								
	47	Située au sommet du Tépé Khirs à 1 mille à l'ouest de la rivière Guilan	34 18 00	45 35 07	..	..	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre à la base, 2 mètres.	
Ensuite elle va en ligne directe à la borne No. 48.								
	48	Située à l'extrémité orientale de Zeynel Kous	34 18 48	45 34 35	5,600 pieds (1,707 mètres)	326	Idem.	
De cette borne elle va, également en ligne directe, à la borne No. 49.								
	49	Située sur un plateau à ½ mille environ à l'ouest de la rivière Guilan, et distante de 3,500 pieds (1,064 mètres) environ de l'arbre dit l'arbre de Dardjik, son azimut audit arbre étant de 304°	34 19 44	45 33 52	6,600 pieds (2,011 mètres)	326	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre à la base, 1½ mètre.	
Ensuite elle descend en ligne directe jusqu'à un ravin qu'elle suit jusqu'à sa jonction avec la rivière Elvend. Cette jonction se trouve à 1 mille en aval de la jonction du Guilan avec l'Elvend et a été marquée par la borne No. 50.								
	50	Située sur la rive gauche dudit ravin à environ 300 pieds (92 mètres) en amont de sa jonction avec l'Elvend	34 20 55	45 32 18	10,700 pieds (3,261 mètres)	312	Un rocher de 5 mètres de hauteur et de 5 mètres de largeur à la base. Un grand orifice s'ouvrant à son côté occidental a été bouché avec des pierres et du ciment.	
Après la borne No. 50, la ligne frontière suit en aval le *medium filum aquæ* de l'Elvend pour une distance d'environ 1½ mille jusqu'en face de la borne No. 51 qu'elle va rejoindre.								
	51	Située sur la rive droite de l'Elvend entre les villages Halifé Saleh et Chir Zad, à 1,378 pieds (420 mètres) de la limite sud de celui-ci	34 19 56	45 29 44	..	..	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre à la base, 1½ mètre	La latitude et la longitude des bornes Nos. 51 à 60 sont prises de la Carte supplémentaire No. 10.
Ensuite elle se dirige sur la borne No. 53 en ligne directe.								
	52	Située sur la ligne droite entre les bornes Nos. 51 et 53	34 20 03	45 29 38	571 pieds (174 mètres)	309	Idem.	

Description de la Frontière. (1.)	Nos. des Bornes. (2.)	Position des Bornes. (3.)	Latitude. (4.)	Longitude. (5.)	Distance de la Borne précédente. (6.)	Azimut observé de la Borne précédente. (7.)	Description des Bornes. (8.)	Observations. (9.)
			° ′ ″	° ′ ″		Degrés.		
De là, elle va en ligne droite au poste-frontière ottoman No. 2, à partir d'où elle suit la ligne des postes-frontière ottomans jusqu'au poste qui précède celui qui porte le nom d'Omarova. Dudit poste elle va en ligne droite à la borne No. 54	53	Située sur la crête de la colline dite Sakyz Agatch	34 20 13	45 28 25	2,218 pieds (676 mètres)	309	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre à la base, 1½ mètre.	
Ensuite elle suit les crêtes des petites collines jusqu'à la borne No. 55.	54	Située en face (à l'est) du poste d'Omarova, à une distance de 15 mètres dudit poste	34 25 53	45 27 10	..	..	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 1 mètre; diamètre à la base, 1½ mètre.	
De cette borne elle descend dans un petit ravin qui passe entre le poste de Derbendjik et la borne No. 55. Elle suit ce ravin en aval jusqu'à son confluent avec un grand ravin portant le nom de ravin de Derbendjik. Elle suit ce dernier ravin en amont pour un parcours d'environ 656 pieds (200 mètres) jusqu'à la borne No. 56.	55	Située sur une colline se trouvant à 656 pieds (200 mètres) au nord-est du poste qui porte le nom de Derbendjik	34 26 03	45 27 02	..	..	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre à la base, 1 mètre.	
Ensuite la ligne frontière suit cette piste jusqu'à un point à peu près 500 pieds (153 mètres) au nord-ouest de la borne No. 56, où la piste rencontre un ravin venant du côté nord. Elle s'engage dans ce ravin et le suit en amont jusqu'à la borne No. 57.	56	Située sur la rive droite du grand ravin susdit à l'endroit où la piste qui relie les postes de Derbendjik et de Seyfieh le traverse	34 26 22	45 26 35	3,000 pieds (914 mètres)	309	Idem.	
De cette borne elle suit la ligne des crêtes d'une rangée de collines qui s'étend à l'est-nord-est de la susdite borne, et atteint la crête de l'Ak Dagh qu'elle suit jusqu'à la tête d'un ravin qui est marquée par la borne No. 58.	57	Située sur une colline se trouvant à environ 2,000 pieds (610 mètres) à l'est du poste-frontière ottoman de Karapoulé	34 27 59	45 26 39	10,000 pieds (3,048 mètres)	2	Idem.	
De là, elle descend ledit ravin jusqu'à sa jonction avec la rivière de Kourétou qui se trouve marquée par la borne No. 59.	58	Située sur le sommet de l'Ak Dagh à la tête d'un ravin. Ce point se trouve au sud-ouest du village de Kourétou	34 32 59	45 30 42	..	..	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre à la base, 1¾ mètre.	
Ensuite elle remonte le *medium filum aquæ* de la rivière de Kourétou jusqu'à l'embouchure d'un ravin à l'endroit dit Teng-i-Hammam. Ce point se trouve marquée par la borne No. 60.	59	Située sur la rive droite du susdit ravin à sa jonction avec la rivière de Kourétou. Cette jonction se trouve à environ 1½ mille en aval du village de Kourétou	34 36 01	45 31 45	Environ 3½ milles	16	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 1 mètre; diamètre à la base, 1½ mètre.	
De cette borne elle s'engage dans ce ravin et le remonte dans toute sa longueur jusqu'à l'extrémité méridionale de la crête d'Asenguéran. Elle continue le long de la crête qui constitue le partage des eaux des plaines de Tchia Sourkh et de Zohab et qui porte successivement les noms Asenguéran, Bishkan. Ensuite, en passant par le mont Bezinan et le col de Kel-i-Khouvan, elle suit toujours la même crête (qui forme ici le partage des eaux des rivières de Kourétou et d'Abbassan) jusqu'à un demi-mille à l'est de Kel-i-Tilakou. Là, la frontière diverge le long du partage des eaux des plaines de Hadjilar et de Tilakou qu'elle suit dans la direction du nord-nord-est jusqu'à la borne No. 61	60	Située sur la rive gauche de la rivière de Kourétou en face de l'embouchure du ravin susmentionné	34 32 20	45 44 30	..	..	Idem.	

Description de la Frontière. (1.)	Nos. des Bornes. (2.)	Position des Bornes. (3.)	Latitude. (4.)	Longitude. (5.)	Distance de la Borne précédente. (6.)	Azimut observé de la Borne précédente. (7.)	Description des Bornes. (8.)	Observations. (9.)
			° ′ ″	° ′ ″		Degrés.		
	61	Située au côté nord du chemin de fer Tilakou à Serkalé à l'endroit où ledit chemin traverse le partage des eaux	34 45 15	45 40 20	..	..	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre à la base, 3½ mètres.	Latitude et la longitude des bornes Nos. 61 à 69 sont prises de la Carte supplémentaire No. 11.
A partir de cette borne, la frontière suit toujours le même partage des eaux jusqu'à la borne No. 62	62	Située au côté nord du chemin de Hadjilar à Serkalé à l'endroit où ledit chemin traverse le partage des eaux	34 46 05	45 41 01	6,100 pieds (1,860 mètres)	36	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre à la base, 1½ mètre.	
Ensuite elle monte sur la crête du mont Schevaldyr, qu'elle suit jusqu'à son point le plus élevé (point astronomique sur la Carte identique). De là, elle va en ligne droite à un autre sommet de la même montagne et, descendant par le contrefort au nord-est, traverse la vallée jusqu'à la borne No. 63	63	Située sur un monticule à la rive gauche de l'Abbassan	34 49 53	45 42 40	..	..	Idem.	
De là, elle va en ligne droite, en traversant l'Abbassan, à la borne No. 64	64	Située au point de l'intersection du chemin entre Hourine et Serkalé avec un ravin, sur la rive droite dudit ravin	34 50 12	45 43 25	2,700 pieds (823 mètres)	46	Un amoncellement considérable de pierres connu sous le nom de Berd-i-Cheitan.	
Ensuite elle descend dans un ravin, qu'elle remonte dans toute sa longueur jusqu'à la crête de la petite chaîne qui se trouve au sud de Derbend	65	Située à la tête du ravin susdit, sur la crête de la petite chaîne qui se trouve au sud de Derbend	34 50 36	45 44 04	5,600 pieds (1,707 mètres)	63	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre à la base, 3 mètres.	
De là, elle suit ladite chaîne vers le sud jusqu'à la borne No. 66								

	66	Située à l'endroit où cette chaîne descend dans le ravin de Bavoussi (Babassi), au côté nord dudit ravin	34 50 04	45 43 56	3,400 pieds (1,036 mètres)	191	Idem.	
La frontière traverse le ravin de Bavoussi et va en ligne droite à la borne No. 67	67	Située sur une bosse du contrefort sud-ouest de Bamou	34 49 36	45 44 38	4,400 pieds (1,341 mètres)	128	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 2½ mètres; diamètre à la base, 3 mètres.	
Ensuite elle remonte le contrefort sud-ouest de Bamou jusqu'à ce qu'elle atteigne l'extrémité méridionale de la crête de Bamou. Elle suit cette crête dans la direction du nord jusqu'à l'endroit où le contrefort qui forme le partage des eaux de l'Abbassan et du Poucht-i-Gerrav y aboutit du côté est. La frontière descend sur ledit partage des eaux et le suit jusqu'à la borne No. 68	68	Située au côté ouest du chemin d'Azguélé à Poucht sur le partage des eaux sus-mentionné	34 53 25	45 49 51	..	..	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre à la base, 2½ mètres.	
Elle continue à suivre le partage des eaux jusqu'à la borne No. 69	69	Située sur la colline la plus élevée à l'est du plateau de Ban-i-dar	34 54 00	45 51 37	9,000 pieds (2,743 mètres)	83	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre à la base, 1½ mètre.	
Ensuite, tournant vers le nord, elle suit le partage des eaux du Poucht-i-Gerrav et du Zinkan qui aboutit au confluent de ces deux rivières. La frontière traverse le Zinkan à ce point et monte en ligne droite au sommet occidental de la montagne de Beyzel, dont elle suit dans la direction de l'est la ligne des crêtes jusqu'au sommet principal (environ 1,550 mètres de hauteur). Elle suit pour une distance d'à peu près 1 mille le contrefort nord-ouest de Beyzel, puis, en passant successivement par une colline isolée à pic, le cimetière de Khoki-Divane et un ancien koulé en ruines et en suivant enfin le promontoire situé entre les deux rivières, elle descend au confluent du Zinkan et du Sirvan. La frontière suit en amont le *medium filum aquæ* du Sirvan jusqu'en face d'un contrefort appelé Kalaga situé sur la rive droite, à 2 milles à peu près en amont de l'embouchure d'un tributaire du Sirvan qui descend de la vallée de Tavilé en passant par Palani et Havar. Elle remonte ledit contrefort et atteint la borne No. 70.								

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			° ′ ″	° ′ ″		Degrés.		
Elle continue ensuite le long du partage des eaux, et, montant à la crête de Palani, atteint la borne No. 71.	70	Située sur la crête de Kalaga, à 1¼ mille de distance du Sirvan en suivant le partage des eaux	35 08 01	45 07 58	..	..	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre à la base, 1·30 mètre	La latitude et la longitude des bornes Nos. 70 à 83 sont prises de la Carte supplémentaire No. 12.
Suivant toujours le partage des eaux, la frontière passe entre les villages de Chouchmé et Sousékan et arrive à la borne No. 72.	71	Située sur le sommet du mont Palani, à 1 mille environ au sud du village du même nom	35 10 50	45 07 00	..	..	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 1 mètre; diamètre à la base, 1 mètre.	
De là, elle monte sur la pic de Souni, d'où elle descend la pente des montagnes à gauche de la vallée de Tavilé jusqu'à la borne No. 73.	72	Située sur le col par où passe le chemin Tavilé-Chouchmé	35 12 04	45 08 33	Environ 2 milles	46	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 1·70 mètre; diamètre à la base, 1½ mètre.	
De la borne No. 73 elle descend, en suivant le mur séparant les terrains de Desaver et de Tavilé, à la rivière de Tavilé. Elle traverse cette rivière et remonte la pente gauche jusqu'à la borne No. 74.	73	Située sur la pente à l'extrême limite des terrains cultivés, à l'endroit où aboutit le mur qui sépare les terrains de Desaver de ceux de Tavilé	35 13 18	45 09 45	..	..	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 2½ mètres; diamètre à la base, 1¼ mètre.	
Ensuite elle suit le chemin Desaver-Tavilé dans la direction de Tavilé pour une distance d'à peu près un demi-mille, jusqu'à ce qu'elle	74	Située sur un rocher du côté nord de la route Desaver-Tavilé, près de l'endroit où le susdit mur la rejoint	35 13 26	45 09 47	800 pieds (244 mètres)	22	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 2¼ mètres (le rocher y compris); diamètre à la base, 1½ mètre.	

rencontre un petit ravin séparant les deux collines de Demi-Chenan et de Kouvitch. Ce ravin est marqué par la borne No. 75.								
De là, elle remonte ledit ravin jusqu'à la tête, d'où elle va en ligne droite, en traversant la crête de Demi-Chenan, à l'endroit où le chemin Tavilé-Khan-Guermélé se courbe pour tourner vers le nord-ouest. Ce point, marqué par la borne No. 76, se trouve au nord des sources d'Avi-Sar.	75	Située sur un rocher du côté nord de la route Desaver-Tavilé, à 20 mètres à l'est du du ravin susdit	35 13 30	45 09 16	..	284	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 1½ mètre (le rocher y compris); diamètre à la base, 2 mètres.	
La frontière suit le susdit chemin dans la direction de Khan-Guermélé jusqu'à la borne No. 77.	76	Située à 20 mètres au nord dudit tournant	35 14 19	45 08 58	..	..	Grand rocher. Hauteur, 5 mètres; base, 8 sur 6 mètres.	
Quittant ensuite ledit chemin, elle suit, vers le sud-ouest, le partage des eaux des vallées de Tavilé et de Khan-Guermélé pour une distance d'environ 1½ mille jusqu'à la borne No. 78.	77	Située à l'endroit où ledit chemin arrive au col de Keminé sur le partage des eaux de Tavilé et de Khan-Guermélé. La borne est construite sur un rocher à 10 mètres à l'est du chemin	35 14 57	45 08 15	5,400 pieds (1,646 mètres)	319	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 2 mètres (le rocher y compris); diamètre à la base, 3 mètres.	
Puis elle suit la crête qui passe au nord de Déga-Cheikh-Khan jusqu'au chemin Déga-Cheikh-Khan-Nel-i-Keminé. Elle traverse ce chemin et continue à suivre le partage des eaux pour une distance d'un demi-mille jusqu'à la borne No. 79.	78	Située sur ledit partage des eaux à un demi-mille à l'est du chemin qui va de Déga-Cheikh-Khan au col de Nel-i-Keminé	35 14 43	45 07 15	5,000 pieds (1,524 mètres)	70	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre à la base, 1 mètre.	
	79	Située sur un sommet au nord-est de Déga-Cheikh-Khan	35 14 52	45 06 13	5,300 pieds (1,616 mètres)	281	Idem.	

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			° ′ ″	° ′ ″		Degrés.		
Ensuite elle descend le contrefort dominant le village de Biaré jusqu'à une éminence se trouvant au-dessus du moulin dit Aciab-Berzé. De là, elle descend en ligne droite au canal dit Djoub-i-Aciab-Berzé, qu'elle atteint à l'endroit où celui-ci jette ses eaux vers le moulin en bas. Ce point est marqué par la borne No. 80.	80	Située sur la pente à 5 mètres en-dessus dudit point	35 14 52	45 04 56	..	..	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre à la base, 1 mètre.	
De là, elle suit en amont la rive gauche dudit canal. Arrivée au point où celui-ci dérive de la rivière de Khan-Guermélé, elle gagne le *medium filum aquæ* de cette rivière et le remonte jusqu'en face du commencement du canal dit Djoub-i-Kouh qui dérive du côté droit. Elle passe à la rive droite de ce canal et la suit en aval jusqu'à un point dans le ravin de Déré-i-Tekkiyé qui est marqué par la borne No. 81 et se trouve à environ 250 mètres au delà du groupe de maisons connu sous le nom de Poucht-i-Djoub.	81	Située du côté nord du susdit canal	35 15 04	45 04 38	..	..	Idem.	
Ensuite elle remonte le ravin de Déré-i-Tekkiyé, en contournant les vergers qui s'y trouvent de manière à les laisser en territoire persan. A partir du point où ces vergers cessent, elle suit le thalweg du ravin et atteint ainsi la borne No. 82.	82	Située sur la rive gauche du ravin susdit au pied d'un contrefort à l'endroit où le ravin tourne vers le nord-ouest	35 15 44	45 04 34	4,000 pieds (1,219 mètres)	353	Idem.	
De cette borne elle remonte le contrefort qui mène à la ramification ouest des montagnes d'Avroman s'élevant au nord de la vallée de Khan-Guermélé. Elle gagne la crête de cette ramification et la remonte jusqu'à la borne No. 83.	83	Située en haut d'un monticule à 30 mètres à l'est du chemin menant de Ber-Ervaz à Khanédenk à l'endroit où ce chemin traverse le partage des eaux entre les deux villages	35 17 30	45 05 45	..	..	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 3 mètres; diamètre à la base, 3 mètres.	
Elle continue à remonter la ramification de la chaîne d'Avroman susdite jusqu'à ce qu'elle atteigne la chaîne magistrale; puis elle suit la crête de la chaîne magistrale vers le nord-ouest et arrive à la partie de cette crête qui porte le nom de Sourène. A une distance d'environ 1 mille à l'est du col de Tchakan elle quitte la crête principale pour descendre un contrefort menant au col de Kani Sef, et aboutit à la borne No. 84.	84	Située sur le pic le plus septentrional dudit contrefort, à une distance d'environ 1 mille au nord-est du col de Tchakan	35 30 17	45 48 44	..	..	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre à la base, 2 mètres	La latitude et la longitude des bornes Nos. 84 à 95 sont prises de la Carte supplémentaire No. 13.
A partir de cette borne elle descend en ligne droite au Tcham Berzé (Gogasour), qu'elle atteint à l'embouchure d'un ravin qui le rejoint du côté droit à environ 1½ mille en aval du village de Piran. Ce point est indiqué par la borne No. 85.	85	Située à 50 mètres à l'est de l'embouchure du ravin susdit, du côté nord du chemin Piran-Toutman	35 31 05	45 59 25	6,100 pieds (1,860 mètres)	35	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre à la base, 1½ mètre.	
Ayant traversé la rivière de Berzé, la frontière remonte le ravin susdit jusqu'à la tête et atteint le partage des eaux du Tcham Berzé et du Tchenaran à la borne No. 86.	86	Située à la tête dudit ravin sur le partage des eaux du Tcham Berzé et du Tchenaran, à 40 mètres à l'ouest d'une éminence qui s'élève à ½ mille à l'ouest du chemin Piran-Serdach	35 31 14	46 00 41	7,100 pieds (2,164 mètres)	84	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre à la base, 1½ mètre. Deux petites bornes d'une hauteur d'un demi-mètre, érigées à 3 mètres de la borne principale indiquent la direction que prend la frontière.	

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			° ′ ″	° ′ ″		Degrés.		
Elle suit ledit partage des eaux vers le nord-ouest jusqu'au dernier sommet. De là, elle descend en ligne droite à la jonction des ruisseaux Tchenaran et Lev, endroit marqué par la borne No. 87.	87	Située sur la langue de terre comprise entre ces deux ruisseaux	35 32 33	45 59 37	..	..	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre à la base, 1½ mètre.	
Elle remonte ensuite le Lev pour une distance d'environ un demi-mille jusqu'en face de la borne No. 88.	88	Située sur la rive droite du Lev à 17 mètres en amont de la tête d'un canal qui en dérive	35 32 56	45 59 37	2,400 pieds (732 mètres)	0	Ancienne borne consistant en une grande pierre mise debout et recouvrant une quantité de charbon de terre. Hauteur, 1½ mètre.	
De ce point, elle remonte le contrefort qui mène à Sékouh (Siah Kouh) jusqu'à la crête qui forme le partage des eaux entre le Lev et le ruisseau de Bnava-Souta. Elle suit cette crête vers l'est jusqu'à la borne No. 89.	89	Située sur le col de Nave-Sar à 30 mètres à l'ouest du chemin Piran-Bnava-Souta	35 34 26	46 00 30	..	..	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre à la base, 1½ mètre.	
Elle continue à suivre le même partage des eaux, pour une distance d'environ 1¼ mille, jusqu'en-dessus d'un ravin qui descend le versant septentrional; elle s'engage dans ce ravin et le suit jusqu'à sa jonction avec le ruisseau de Bnava-Souta, endroit marqué par la borne No. 90.	90	Située sur la rive gauche du ravin à 30 mètres en amont du confluent et à ½ mille au nord-est du village de Bnava-Souta	35 35 33	46 00 35	6,800 pieds (2,073 mètres)	3	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre à la base, 1½ mètre.	

Ensuite la ligne frontière suit en aval le *medium filum aquæ* du ruisseau de Bnava-Souta jusqu'à la jonction de celui-ci avec la rivière de Kyzyldja, endroit marqué par la borne No. 91.	91	Située sur la rive droite du ruisseau de Bnava Souta à la jonction susdite.	35 37 50	46 00 25	..	..	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 2½ mètres; diamètre à la base, 1¾ mètre.	
Elle descend ensuite le *medium filum aquæ* du Kyzyldja, pour une distance d'environ 1¼ mille, jusqu'à l'embouchure du ruisseau de Khalil-Abad, qui est marqué par la borne No. 92.	92	Située sur la rive droite du ruisseau de Khalil-Abad près du confluent susdit	35 38 00	45 59 12	Environ 1¼ mille	280	Construction de pierres et de ciment, érigée sur un bloc de marbre blanc. Hauteur, 3 mètres; diamètre à la base, 2 mètres.	
De là, elle remonte le ruisseau de Khalil-Abad jusqu'au confluent d'une de ses branches qui descend de la première vallée à l'est de Massoud. Elle remonte ladite branche jusqu'au point où le chemin Pendjevine-Khalouza la traverse. Ce point est marqué par la borne No. 93.	93	Située du côté nord dudit chemin près du point où celui-ci traverse le ravin susmentionné	35 39 15	46 00 23	..	..	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre à la base, 1½ mètre.	
La frontière suit ce chemin vers le nord-est jusqu'au pied du contrefort qui forme le côté oriental de la première vallée à l'est de Massoud, endroit marqué par la borne No. 94.	94	Située sur la pente du contrefort à 10 mètres au nord du chemin	35 39 17	46 09 28	656 pieds (200 mètres)	60	Idem.	
Ensuite elle remonte ledit contrefort et gagne la crête de Kouh-i-Kocé-Recha. Elle suit vers le nord-est cette crête, qui forme le partage des eaux entre les rivières de Kyzyldja et de Chiler (Chirvan) jusqu'à la borne No. 95.	95	Située sur le col appelé Kal-i-Melaik à l'endroit ou le chemin Khalouzé-Kani Sard traverse le partage des eaux	35 41 34	46 04 50	..	..	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 2½ mètres; diamètre à la base, 3 mètres.	

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			° ′ ″	° ′ ″		Degrés.		
En suivant toujours le partage des eaux elle passe par les sommets de Hazar Mal et de Bali Keder à celui de Pouchti-Chehidan, tourne vers le nord en suivant la crête de Voul-Gouza et atteint la borne No. 96.	96	Située sur le col de Now-Khouvan, en haut d'un monticule qui se trouve entre les deux chemins qui traversent le col à cet endroit	35 49 06	46 20 09	..	..	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 1¼ mètre; diamètre à la base, 1½ mètre	La latitude et la longitude des bornes Nos. 96 à 99 sont prises de la Carte supplémentaire No. 14.
A partir de la borne No. 96 elle tourne vers l'ouest et, suivant toujours le partage des eaux, passe par les montagnes de Spi-Kani et Parajal à la borne No. 97.	97	Située sur le col de Doubéré au nord de Darou-Khan	35 51 51	46 05 10	..	..	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre à la base, 3 mètres.	
Elle suit toujours le partage des eaux jusqu'à la borne No. 98.	98	Située sur le col qui se trouve entre Venah et Nanour	35 50 30	46 01 05	..	..	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre à la base, 1½ mètre.	
Elle continue à suivre le partage des eaux, passant par les montagnes de Poucht-Hangajal jusqu'à la borne No. 99.	99	Située sur le col de Milleh Yovalan, à l'ouest du chemin principal reliant Pendjevine à Bané et passant par Mirawa	35 49 36	45 57 03	..	..	Idem.	
De la borne No. 99 la frontière continue à suivre le partage des eaux, en passant par Mont Berdi-Ketchel jusqu'à Mont Galasch. Arrivée au col qui se trouve à un demi-mille environ au delà de la grande falaise connue sous le nom de Berdé-Sour, elle quitte le partage des eaux pour s'engager dans le ravin qui descend de ce col au ruisseau de Tchamperaw. Elle gagne ce ruisseau et le descend pour une distance de 50 mètres jusqu'en face de la borne No. 100 qu'elle va ensuite rejoindre.	100	Située près d'un grand rocher à surface plate à l'est du chemin Siah-Guvéza-Tchamperaw, qui longe la rive droite du ruisseau susdit, à 20 mètres de distance de ce ruisseau	35 48 40	45 46 55	..	..	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre à la base, 1½ mètre	La latitude et la longitude des bornes Nos. 100 à 103 sont prises de la Carte supplémentaire No. 15.
De la borne No. 100 la frontière suit le chemin Siah-Guvéza-Tchamperaw dans la direction de ce dernier jusqu'à la borne No. 101.	101	Située du côté ouest du chemin Siah-Guvéza-Tchamperaw	35 48 48	45 46 45	656 pieds (200 mètres)	310	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 1¼ mètre; diamètre à la base, 1½ mètre.	
De là, elle va en ligne droite à un point milieu entre les deux sources qui portent en commun le nom de Tchiftekan, d'où elle monte en ligne directe à la crête du Mont Sourkew. Elle suit cette crête vers le nord-ouest jusqu'à la borne No. 102.	102	Située sur le col où le chemin Dunés-Moussek traverse la crête du Mont Sourkew, à 10 mètres au sud dudit chemin	35 56 28	45 38 07	..	..	Entassement de pierres, d'une forme triangulaire. Hauteur, 2 mètres; largeur de chaque côté, 3 mètres.	
Ensuite elle continue le long de la même crête jusqu'à la borne No. 103.	103	Située sur la crête du Mont Sourkew à un quart de mille du susdit col	35 56 40	45 37 58	1,200 pieds (366 mètres)	331	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 1 mètre; diamètre à la base, 1 mètre.	
La frontière quitte la crête à ce point pour s'engager dans un ravin, qu'elle descend jusqu'à sa jonction avec la rivière de Bané (Khilé Rech d'après la Carte identique). Elle suit en aval le *medium filum aquæ* de cette rivière jusqu'à sa jonction avec le Kialou (Petit Zab).								

Annexe.

Liste des Cartes portant le Tracé final de la Frontière turco-persane.

Numéro et Description de la Carte.	Échelle.	Région illustrée.	Bornes marquées.
Carte identique, feuille No. 1 ..	$\frac{1}{75000}$	Depuis le commencement de la frontière à l'embouchure du Chatt-el-Arab jusqu'au Nahr-el-Khayin, y compris l'ancrage de Mouhammerah	..
Carte supplémentaire No. 1 ..	"	Alentours du Nahr-el-Khayin et du Nahr-Daédji	1 à 4
Carte identique, feuille No. 2 ..	"	Du parallèle 30·30 au parallèle 31·15, y compris Kouchk-i-Basri	5 à 14
Carte identique, feuille No. 3 ..	"	Du parallèle 31·15 jusqu'à Oum-Chir ..	15 te 16
Carte supplémentaire No. 2 ..	"	D'Oum-Chir jusqu'au Douvéridj, y compris le Chatt-el-Amma	17 à 22
Cartes supplémentaires Nos. 3 et 4	"	Du Douvéridj jusqu'au Tyb	23 et 24
Carte identique, feuilles Nos. 4 et 5	"	Du Tyb jusqu'au ravin de Zafarani ..	..
Carte supplémentaire No. 5 ..	"	Baksai et ses alentours ; du ravin de Zafarani jusqu'à la rivière de Chengoulé	25 et 26
Carte supplémentaire No. 6 ..	"	Terrains de Saïd Hassan ; de Chengoulé jusqu'au Mont Bendi Koulik Bouzourg	27 à 33
Carte supplémentaire No. 7 ..	$\frac{1}{250000}$	Du Mont Bendi Koulik Bouzourg jusqu'à l'extrémité ouest du Djebel Kélé Chouvan	34 à 40
Carte supplémentaire No. 8 ..	$\frac{1}{75000}$	Plaine de Soumar et défilé de la rivière de Guenguir	41 à 44
Carte supplémentaire No. 9 ..	"	De la borne No. 44 jusqu'à l'Elvend, y compris les montagnes de Kouhné Rig et Var Boulend et la rivière Ab-i-Naft	45 à 50
Carte supplémentaire No. 10 ..	"	De l'Elvend jusqu'au parallèle 34·45, y comprises les montagnes d'Ak Dagh, et Acenguéran et la rivière de Kourétou	51 à 60
Carte supplémentaire No. 11 ..	"	Du parallèle 34·45 jusqu'au confluent du Zinkan et du Sirvan, y compris la plaine de Serkalé et les montagnes de Bamou et de Beyzel	61 à 69
Carte identique, feuille No. 7 ..	"	La rivière Sirvan depuis l'embouchure du Zinkan jusqu'en face du Mont Kalaga	..
Carte supplémentaire No. 12 ..	"	Du Sirvan jusqu'à la chaîne magistrale des montagnes d'Avroman	70 à 83
Carte identique, feuille No. 7 ..	"	La chaîne d'Avroman jusqu'à la partie appelée Sourène	..
Carte supplémentaire No. 13 ..	"	De Sourène jusqu'au col de Kal-i-Melaik ..	84 à 95
Carte supplémentaire No. 14 ..	"	De Kal-i-Melaik jusqu'au Mont Galasch ..	96 à 99
Carte supplémentaire No. 15 ..	"	De Mont Galasch jusqu'au Zab	100 à 103

Enclosure 8 in No. 170.

Procès-verbal of Sixty-fourth Meeting of Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

SÉANCE tenue à Wezné, le 22 juillet, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire persan.

Étaient présents :

Pour la Grande-Bretagne : M. le Capitaine Wilson.
Pour la Perse : Etela-ol-Mulk.
Pour la Russie : M. Minorsky.
Pour la Turquie : Abdul Hamid Bey.

Les procès-verbaux des séances Nos. 61 et 62 ont été signés et celui de la dernière séance lu et approuvé, ainsi que le rapport de la sous-commission nommée à la soixante-unième séance pour l'érection d'une borne dans le ravin de Nerzeng. Ce rapport se trouve annexé au présent procès-verbal.

M. le commissaire-adjoint ottoman demande que la Commission agisse pour mettre en vigueur les dispositions du Protocole de Constantinople touchant les pâturages des tribus turques qui ont l'habitude de passer l'été dans les vallées du Gadyr et du Lavène. Il prétend qu'on doit également faire profiter les tribus se trouvant dans les vallées des affluents du Kialou plus au sud, c'est-à-dire dans les vallées de Pourdanan, Khydyrava et Talkhatan, desdites dispositions du protocole.

M. le commissaire-adjoint britannique fait observer que le texte du protocole comprend seulement les tribus mentionnées en premier lieu.

M. le commissaire russe, ayant fait d'abord la narration des pourparlers qui ont eu lieu à ce sujet à Constantinople, expose son avis que, quant aux tribus habitant les vallées aux sources du Gadyr et du Lavène, la Commission n'a qu'à prendre acte des stipulations du protocole à leur égard. Pour ce qui concerne les tribus au sud du Lavène, la Commission pourra toujours, du reste, faire enregistrer son opinion que les droits de pâturage doivent être réservés à telle ou telle tribu, de même qu'elle l'a déjà fait à plusieurs reprises, et notamment dans le cas des Sendjabis.

M. le commissaire persan objecte que les tribus en question ne sont pas sur un pied d'égalité avec les Sendjabis, vu que ces derniers avaient leurs pâturages dans du territoire transféré de la Perse à la Turquie.

Enfin, sur la prière de son collègue britannique, M. le commissaire-adjoint ottoman s'engage à renseigner la Commission à une prochaine séance sur les tribus qui font pâturer leurs troupeaux dans les vallées de Pourdanan, Khydyrava et Talkhatan.

La prochaine séance a été fixée pour le 26 courant, à 10 heures du matin.

Fait à Wezné, le 22 juillet, 1914.

ETELA-OL-MULK.
A. T. WILSON, *Captain.*
V. MINORSKY.
A. HAMID.

Rapport.

Conformément aux instructions ci-annexées de la Commission, nous, soussignés, nous sommes rendus à l'endroit où la route principale de Toujal à Chenié traverse le ravin de Nerzeng, et avons construit une borne à une distance de 7 mètres au sud-ouest de la même route. La borne ayant 2 mètres de hauteur et 3 mètres de base, est construite entièrement en pierres et porte le No. 112. Pris de la borne l'azimut de la jonction est de 57° et celui du sommet de Kejar est de 217°.

Ainsi la ligne frontière quittant le sommet de Kejar, descend dans le ravin de Nerzeng, qu'il suit en aval jusqu'à sa jonction avec la rivière de Wezné, tout en suivant le *medium filum aquæ*. Entrée dans la rivière de Wezné, la ligne de frontière la suit en aval par le *medium filum aquæ* jusqu'en face de la borne No. 112.

A. HAMID.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
D. BELAYEW.

Le 15 juillet, 1914.

La Commission a chargé une sous-commission, composée de MM. Etela-ol-Mulk, D. Belayew et Abdul Bey, de faire ériger une borne à l'endroit où le chemin conduisant de Toujal à Chenié traverse le ravin de Nerzeng.

Enclosure 9 in No. 170.

Procès-verbal of Sixty-fifth Meeting of Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

SÉANCE tenue à Khané, le 25 juillet, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire russe.

Étaient présents M. le commissaire-adjoint britannique et les commissaires des trois autres Puissances.

Le procès-verbal de la soixante-troisième séance a été lu. Une discussion s'engagea à propos du passage relatif à la sujétion d'Agha Baïzi.

M. le commissaire ottoman relève que M. le commissaire russe avait bien déclaré que du livre du Général Tchirikof on peut déduire qu'Agha Baïzi doit être considéré comme sujet ottoman.

M. le commissaire russe, pour détailler son opinion à ce sujet, fait la déclaration suivante :

"1. On a toutes les raisons à croire que la plupart des Bilbas se trouvant à présent du côté persan avaient autrefois leurs hivernages du côté ottoman, à Pichdar, Bitwène, &c. (Livre de Tchirikof, p. 553.)

"2. A présent, toutes ces tribus (Mangour, Mamiche, Piran) se trouvent complètement établies sur le territoire persan, et ne peuvent plus être considérées comme des tribus habitant les deux pays.

"3. Agha Baïzi, chef de la division Odjak, dont la maison en hiver se trouvait autrefois du côté de Kala-Dizé, passe à présent toute l'année à Wezné et au village d'Alvatan, qui reste du côté persan.

"4. Dans ces conditions la sujétion de ces nomades n'est plus dictée par le fait de leur séjour sur les territoires des deux États. A présent, leur sujétion est un fait purement personnel, et dépend de leur choix dans les limites établies par les traités pour la conservation ou le changement de la nationalité. En tant qu'ils disent qu'ils ont été de tout temps sujets ottomans, ils peuvent être considérés comme tels après une vérification. Mais s'ils disent qu'ils désirent devenir sujets persans, il ne doit pas y avoir d'empêchements autres que ceux prévenus par les traités.

M. le commissaire persan déclare, de son côté, que la Commission n'a aucune compétence pour entamer et décider la question de la nationalité des Bilbas. Il ajoute que toutes les tribus habitant aujourd'hui le territoire persan ont, depuis 1848, et en exécution de l'article 8 du Traité d'Erzeroum, renoncé à passer l'hiver en territoire ottoman, et sont incontestablement des sujets persans.

On a ensuite décidé d'approuver le procès-verbal de la soixante-troisième séance et de passer dans le présent procès-verbal les remarques ci-haut citées.

On a donné ensuite lecture du procès-verbal de la soixante-quatrième séance, qui a été approuvé. On a également lu les rapports des sous-commissions Nos. 25 et 28. Ceux-ci se trouvent annexés au présent procès-verbal.

MM. les commissaires ont ensuite considéré l'application du protocol au tronçon de la frontière s'étendant à l'ouest de Kohné-Lahidjan. M. le commissaire ottoman fait observer que la position de Séri-Kélé-Kéline ne se trouve pas établie. M. le commissaire russe répond que le corps technique a examiné cette question et a trouvé qu'un sommet du tel nom est inconnu aux gens du pays. Neanmoins, on a constaté que l'endroit marqué sur la Carte identique par le nom "Séri-Kélé-Kéline" est un point astronomique correspondant exactement à un pic de la chaîne de Kandil connu actuellement sous le nom de "Bi-Kafkafan." On décide de prendre note de ce fait.

La Commission a ensuite décidé que la frontière, en suivant toujours le partage des eaux à partir du sommet de Bi-Kafkafan, passe par les crêtes de Séri-Koterel, Galalan, Chahi-Sova, Cheikh-Cher et le sommet du mont Kandil et atteint le sommet de Kévi-Hadji-Ibrahim. De là, elle suit toujours le partage des eaux formé par les crêtes s'élevant à l'ouest de Kohné-Lahidjan, passe par les pics de Berdé-pan et Serapa et traverse le col de Gauri-Chinké (situé entre les eaux de Rayat (Turquie) et Tamarchian (Perse). Ensuite, se dirigeant vers le nord, la frontière remonte le partage des eaux et suit les crêtes de Chivé-Rèche (Ser-Chivé) et de Koutchi-Gouma; puis, tournant à

l'ouest, elle arrive au mont Barzine et, par Berdé-Souran et Tchikhi-Déré (Boz), arrive au col de Guélé-Zerd (Zerdéguel).

Après une discussion sur les endroits où il faut ériger des bornes, on tombe d'accord sur les endroits suivants : (1) col de Gauri-Chinké, (2) col de Barzine, et (3) col de Guélé-Zerd.

Une sous-commission a été chargée de faire ériger ces bornes.

M. le commissaire ottoman déclare avoir soutenu à la séance précédente que le passage du protocole "lesdites vallées" comprend aussi les vallées des ruisseaux de Pourdanan, Khydyrava et Talkhatan, et avoir demandé qu'on enregistre les tribus turques qui viennent y passer l'été. Il dit qu'il a été décidé que la Commission ottomane communique une liste de ces tribus et il soumet la liste suivante : Agha Baïzi, chef de la tribu Odjak, passe l'été et l'hiver dans les vallées du Talkhatan et de Wezné ; Sofi Mehmed, passe l'été sur les collines situées à l'ouest de la rivière de Wezné, c'est-à-dire à Darmekon et Hadalan ; pendant l'hiver il vient s'installer dans ses villages près de Kala Dizé. Avant et durant l'occupation ottomane de Lahidjan, la tribu Mangour Guermian passait l'été dans les vallées de Pourdanan et de Hydyrava. Après l'évacuation, Baiz Pacha empêcha cette tribu de profiter de ces vallées.

En conséquence, il a été arrêté au cours de cette séance la frontière à partir de Zinvé-Khouar jusqu'à Guélé-Zerd.

Fait à Khané, le 25 juillet, 1914.

V. MINORSKY.
A. T. WILSON, *Captain.*
ETELA-OL-MULK.
AZ. SAMIH.

(Pour la teneur précise de ma déclaration précédente concernant les Bilbas, voir le Procès-verbal No. 63.—V. MINORSKY.)

Le corps technique s'étant réuni, le 21 juillet, 1914, a décidé, après une discussion détaillée, qu'il serait utile de faire les levés suivants du côté turc de la frontière :

1. A partir de Zinwi Cheikh jusqu'à Rayat ;
2. A partir de Kélé Schin jusqu'à Birjemma ;
3. A partir de la frontière jusqu'à Milan (latitude 37°).
4. Depuis Kélé Resch jusqu'à Masiro ;
5. Depuis Shaidan Gedik jusqu'à Spindaruk ;

Et depuis la frontière jusqu'à la première route praticable liant lesdits endroits l'un à l'outre.

La zone susdite doit être considérée comme étant un maximum et les topographes eux-mêmes doivent avoir le droit de restreindre leurs travaux dans une zone plus étroite dans le cas où ils trouveront des points de repère plus rapprochés à la frontière.

Colonel ANDRIEVSKY.
ABDUARRAZAGH.
C. H. D. RYDER.
O. KADRI.

Rapport.

Conformément aux instructions ci-annexées de la Commission, nous, soussignés, nous sommes rendus du côté de mont Sépian et avons construit une borne sur le col située entre cette montagne et la montagne de Dolarma entre les localités de Halcho (turc) et de Verdé (persan). Étant impossible, vu la route impraticable, d'y transporter de l'eau et du ciment, nous nous sommes contentés d'un entassement de pierres de 2 mètres de base et de 1½ mètre de hauteur, à quelques mètres au sud de la route passant par le col. La borne porte le No. 110.

Ensuite Salar Mozaffar, ayant suivi la route de Mazré à Halcho, a construit une deuxième borne sur le col situé entre les montagnes de Malimos et Walasséna (Bal-Hassana). Cette borne, consistant également en un entassement de pierres, est d'une hauteur de 1 mètre sur une base de 1½ mètre et porte le No. 111.

Par conséquent, la ligne frontière de ce tronçon peut se décrire de la manière suivante : Quittant le col de Kani-Resch, la ligne frontière remonte sur la crête de Berdé-Aboul Fath et la suit jusqu'à celle de Sépian, qu'elle longe également jusqu'au col où se trouve la borne No. 110. Ensuite, suivant le même partage des eaux entre les districts de Pouchder et Sardacht, elle passe consécutivement par les crêtes de Malimos, Dolarma, Walasséna (Bal-Hassana), Fakih Bâbakr pour atteindre le sommet au-dessus de la source du ravin de Nerzeng, connu, à ce qu'il paraît, sous le nom de Kodjar. De ce sommet elle quitte le partage des eaux pour descendre dans le ravin de Nerzeng, qu'elle suit en aval jusqu'à sa jonction avec la rivière de Wezné.

SALAR MOZAFFER.
Capitaine JORDANOW.
MEHMED NAMI.

Instructions.

La Commission a chargé une sous-commission, composée de MM. le Capitaine Jordanow, le Capitaine Mehmed Effendi, Salar Mozaffar, de faire ériger une borne sur le col entre Wardé et Alcho et d'élaborer une description plus précise de la frontière depuis Malimos jusqu'à la borne en question.

V. MINORSKY.
A. T. W.
A. S.
E. M.

Chenié, le 15 *juillet*, 1914.

Rapport.

Conformément aux instructions de la Commission ci-annexées, nous, soussignés, nous sommes rendus aux lieux et avons fait construire les bornes suivantes :

No. 115 : Sur le sommet de Djasoussan. Hauteur, 2½ mètres ; diamètre à la base, 4 mètres.

No. 116 : Sur le col de Zervinke. Hauteur, 2 mètres ; diamètre à la base 1½ mètre.

No. 117 : Sur le col de Zinvi-Khouar, entre la vallée de Khouar (Turquie) et la vallée d'Avélé (Perse). Hauteur, 2 mètres ; diamètre à la base, 2 mètres.

Toutes les trois bornes sont construites de pierres liées avec du mortier.

Par conséquent, la ligne frontière peut se décrire de la manière suivante : Ayant quitté la borne No. 114, elle remonte le contrefort pour atteindre le sommet de Tchawrine. De là, elle suit le partage des eaux en passant par les sommets de Djasoussan (borne No. 115), le col de Zinvinké (borne No. 116) et le col de Khouar (borne No. 117), d'où, toujours en suivant le partage des eaux, elle monte sur le mont Kotérel.

C. H. D. R.
SALAR M.
Colonel ANDRIEVSKY.

Instructions.

La Commission a chargé une sous-commission, composée de MM. le Colonel Ryder, Salar Mozaffar, le Colonel Andrievsky, d'ériger les deux bornes suivantes :

1. Sur le sommet de Tchwarine ;
2. Sur le col sur le partage des eaux au nord de Tchawrine, se trouvant à l'ouest de la plaine Vazneh ;
3. Sur le col de Zinvi-Khouar entre la vallée de Khouar (Turquie) et la vallée d'Avélé (Perse).

E. M.
A. T. WILSON.
V. MINORSKY.
AZ. SAMIH.

[55917] No. 171.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 229.)

Sir,

Tehran, August 26, 1914.

AS I have had the honour to report by telegraph, the Shah, shortly after his coronation, chose Mustaufi-ul-Mamalek to be his Prime Minister and entrusted him with the formation of a new Cabinet. I had been made aware of his intention some time before and had expressed my entire approval of his choice. Mr. Churchill had called on Mustaufi-ul-Mamalek and had sounded him privately as to those most suited, under present circumstances, to join his Cabinet. It was then in contemplation to strengthen the Cabinet by offering posts in it to Mushir-ed-Dowleh, Motamin-ul-Mulk, and Mukhber-us-Sultaneh, the present Governor-General of Fars. Unfortunately none of these are included in the present combination, as the first two, who are now in Tehran, absolutely refused to take office, and it has been known that the Russians object to Mukhber-us-Sultaneh as a Cabinet Minister.

The Cabinet formed on the 19th August is as follows :—

Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, Mustaufi-ul-Mamalek.
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ala-us-Sultaneh.
Minister of Finance, Mohtashem-us-Sultaneh.
Minister of War, Sahib Ekhtiar.
Minister of Justice, Zoka-ul-Mulk.
Minister of Education, Mohandis-ul-Mamalek.
Minister of Posts and Telegraphs and Public Works, Shahab-ed-Dowleh.

Mustaufi-ul-Mamalek was Premier of the Nationalist Cabinet formed on the 25th July, 1910, and dissolved in February 1911. He is patriotic and well-intentioned, but unfortunately very weak. In 1910 he was nominally the head of the Democratic or ultra-Nationalist party, but everyone knew that he was merely a puppet in their hands. My Russian colleague has not yet made his acquaintance.

Ala-us-Sultaneh, who goes back to the Foreign Office, with which he has had so long a connection, is well known to you, Sir, by reputation. His appointment has given general satisfaction. In spite of his advanced age, Ala-us-Sultaneh continues to render useful service to his country.

Of the four remaining Ministers, Prince Shahab-ed-Dowleh—Assadullah Mirza—who goes back to the Posts and Telegraphs, which post he held under Mustaufi-ul-Mamalek in 1910, is the only one whose appointment was originally contemplated and at which I can express some measure of satisfaction. He is well-educated and speaks English fluently. His relations with us have always been most friendly, and I hope that his appointment will facilitate certain negotiations at present on hand.

On the whole, I am afraid the Cabinet is not a very brilliant one or likely to be able to deal vigorously with the undoubtedly complex situation confronting it.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

[55921] No. 172.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 233.)

Sir,

Gulahek, September 1, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith the usual monthly summary of events for the past four weeks.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 172.

Summary of Events in Persia for Four Weeks ending September 1.

Tehran.

The Cabinet.—A new Cabinet was formed on the 19th August and is composed as follows:—

Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, Mustaufi-ul-Mamalek.
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ala-es-Sultaneh.
Minister of Finance, Mohtashem-es-Sultaneh.
Minister of War, Sahib Ekhtiar.
Minister of Justice, Zoka-ul-Mulk.
Minister of Education, Mohandis-ul-Mamalek.
Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, Shahab-ed-Dowleh.

The War.—A great number of German and French subjects left Tehran soon after the outbreak of war in order to join the colours.

News of the war, which reaches Tehran daily viâ India, is translated and published in the "Raad" newspaper. The Persian public eagerly follow the daily war news, but it cannot be denied that their sympathies are by no means in favour of Russia or her allies.

Finances.—The financial embarrassment of the Persian Government is as acute as ever.

G. P. CHURCHILL.

Tabriz.

The Khan of Maku, together with his son, were arrested by the Russian authorities early in August and conveyed to Tiflis. A relative named Nimet-ullah has been appointed to succeed the khan. The khan had for a long time been giving dissatisfaction to the Russians; the immediate cause, however, of his removal was that he had been mixed up in the importation of arms and in intrigues with the Turks.

The Russian authorities did not consult the Persian Government in any way before arresting on Persian soil and deposing a Persian Governor.

A Russian police administration is reported to have been organised at Tabriz without any reference to the Persian Government, the object being, it is said, to watch the movements of undesirable immigrants from the Caucasus.

Business at Tabriz is at a standstill on account of the war.

A proclamation has been posted up in Ushnu, under the Governor's signature, to the following effect:—

"In accordance with the orders of the Governor-General, and with the concurrence of the Russian consulate, notables and all who pay taxes are directed to remit revenue in future to Russian consulate through the Governor for payment to the Russian Bank."

Resht.

His Highness the ex-Regent passed through on the 13th August on his way to Europe.

The Sipahdar is said to view with misgiving the leasing to Russians of certain lands near his own estates.

On the 15th August the acting Russian consul at Resht proceeded to Talish, where he expelled the Governor, caused the Deputy-Governor of Kerganrud to be beaten and imprisoned, and caused a kadkhoda, occupied in collecting the maliat, to be beaten, fined, and imprisoned. The ostensible reason for the above acts is that the first-named official had spoken slightingly of the Russian army, the real reason is supposed to be that the taxes were being collected regularly.

The Russian troops at Astrabad, Gumbad Kabus, Karasu, Chatli, Maraveh Teppeh, and Meshed-i-Sar, and the Russian peasants who had come to Astrabad to cultivate the land, are all reported to have left for Russia. It is also said that a number of Russian Armenians engaged in commerce in Bender Gez and Astrabad have been compelled to go to the war. Russian troops have been arriving lately at Enzeli for Kazvin, where the garrison now numbers, according to Russian sources, [?] men.

Meshed.

Russian consul-general, under instructions from the Russian Minister at Tehran, has stopped the work on the Meshed–Bajgiran road at Kuchan, which had been undertaken by the Finance Department. The work is to be carried out by the Persian Government and the Russians jointly.

The Governor of Daragez has been making extensive preparations for defence there, and has been buying rifles, smuggling large quantities of cartridges from Russia, and enlisting sowars. The Treasurer-General has again asked the Governor-General to punish the man, but the Governor-General has wisely resolved to leave him alone, even though orders to a similar effect have reached him from the Minister of the Interior. Mirza Masud Khan is very strong, and if attacked will certainly be helped, directly or indirectly, by the Russians.

Russian troops have been withdrawn on account of the war; it is not anticipated that their withdrawal will lead to disorders; the roads in the province seem, however, insecure.

Ispahan.

Reza Khan Joozani, having left Kashan, is continuing to hold up the countryside, first to the north and then to the south of Ispahan. The Governor-General's Bakhtiari sowars have been reinforced by thirty gendarmes with a small gun.

The representative of the German Legation, having failed to get the Russian consul to treat with him concerning the affair of the "Russian" ryots at Kumisheh and the "German" ryots at Pudeh, returned to Tehran, whence he left for the war.

Local affairs at Ispahan are becoming complicated owing to the determination of the Russian consul to get rid of the Governor-General. The manager of the Russian Bank has collected some 300 armed men in the Zil-es-Sultan's Ispahan residence, but with what object is not apparent. It has, however, caused considerable excitement in the town. The Governor-General has lately been making arrangements to reduce the price of grain, which if carried out would considerably reduce the Zil-es-Sultan's profits; the Russians pointed out that the Governor-General means to take grain from the Zil-es-Sultan's stores by force. Governor-General says there is absolutely no foundation for this report.

Sultanabad.

Mr. Gale, British subject, resigned on the outbreak of war the position which he held of German vice-consul.

Hamadan.

An evening entertainment took place on the 20th July at the gendarmerie in honour of the Shah's coronation. Twenty-five prisoners, mostly brigands, took advantage of the reduction of guards to escape. Some have been recaptured and executed.

Yezd.

The Governor, Moazed-es-Sultan, has been suddenly recalled to Tehran. He will be replaced by Sardar Zafar Bakhtiari.

Caravans are passing freely, and the province seems quiet. The coronation celebrations passed off quietly at Yezd; elections for the Medjliss have been suspended, owing to dispute between Democrats and Moderates, each party accusing the other of bribery and corruption.

Shiraz.

A force of gendarmerie under Colonel Uggla and Captain Killander left Shiraz on the 1st August to establish posts, and to take over the north road as far as Abadeh.

Seistan.

Shaukat-ul-Mulk has sent a pacific reply to the Baluchi chiefs, saying that he will treat with them on his arrival in Seistan, and promising to deal with them gently if they make restitution to a reasonable extent of loot taken from Kainat. He will probably invite them to visit Seistan.

One of the chiefs in question is, however, rumoured to be constructing "sangars" at Taftab Kuh, which seems incompatible with his desire to make peace.

A Democrat has been elected as Medjliss member for Birjand; the Governor's nominee has been elected in Seistan. This latter result is a surprising and satisfactory demonstration of the influence already acquired by Shaukat-ul-Mulk.

The new Russian vice-consul reached Birjand on the 26th July; his arrival was followed by some friction with the local officials with regard to first calls.

Kerman.

The result of the recent Medjliss election at Bam was unfortunate. The successful candidate, Nazim-ut-Tujjar, received the entire support of the common people, but was strenuously opposed by the Bam khans, who challenged the validity of his election on accusations of corrupt practices. Nazim and a friend, Nusrat-ul-Mulk, thereupon collected a bodyguard of ruffians and terrorised the town and district. Acting on instructions from Tehran, the Governor-General of Kerman ordered Nazim's arrest, whereupon the latter took bast at the I.E.T.D. office at Bam, with an enormous crowd of townspeople. Fighting occurred between the Bakhtiaris and the bastis with some bloodshed.

The Governor-General thereupon commanded his men to cease the attack, and not to attempt to rush the office until he himself, accompanied by His Majesty's consul, arrived at Bam. These two officials proceeded to Bam, where they found everything quiet, though Nazim and some 400 bastis were still in the telegraph office.

On the 15th August the office was cleared by the Bakhtiari and gendarmes. Nazim escaped, but, being subsequently captured, was brought to Kerman. The question of his execution is being discussed. He caused much trouble in former years in the province, and is wholly responsible for this new trouble and for the agitations which have been proceeding against financial measures. Both he and the people of Bam deserve a severe lesson, as their conduct on the present occasion was in no way justified.

His Majesty's consul returned to Kerman on the 21st August with the Governor-General.

The new election is proceeding quietly at Bam. A Swedish officer with 110 gendarmes left Kerman about the middle of August to establish a station at Baft, thus opening a direct road from Kerman to Bunder Abbas, reducing the length of the journey by half.

All carpet weaving has stopped at Kerman and districts owing to the suspension of payments (due to the war) by European carpet agents. Hundreds of people are out of work.

Kermanshah.

Three notorious ruffians escaped from prison in the palace on the 1st August, shooting two soldiers. It is generally believed that the Governor-General connived at their escape. They took bast in His Majesty's consulate grounds, but His Majesty's Legation issued instructions that the Governor should be requested to remove them by force.

The Governor-General Farman Farma left Kermanshah on the 5th August, and Sardar Mutazid, who had been acting as Governor-General for some time previously, definitely assumed the reins of office.

Farman Farma had been extremely obstructive before leaving, and had rendered Sardar Mutazid's position very difficult, even *en route* for Tehran he continued his intrigues.

Sardar Mutazid assured His Majesty's consul that as soon as Farman Farma left he would do everything in his power to keep the trade route open. The Sardar proposed to employ the Sinjabis to preserve order on the road; he would put them in charge of the whole road from the frontier to Kermanshah, and let them arrange themselves with the Kalhurs and Kerindis for the safety of sections of the road.

Peace has been made between the two Kalhur chiefs. Sardar Akram and the Sinjabi chiefs have left for home. Though the roads are reported safe for the moment, camels are again being subjected to heavy blackmail under the name of "pasturage dues," and the Turkish military preparations have entirely stopped trade between Khanikin and Bagdad.

From Khanikin it is reported that the Turks are preaching a holy war against Russia, threatening to attack Persia if she does not join them.

The Turks are mobilising in Mesopotamia, and have expelled Persian post and telegraph agents from Khanikin, where they are preparing provisions for six regiments.

On the 18th August some Persian Cossacks arrived at Kermanshah from Hamadan, and on the 20th August the Russian colonel, Uchakof, with more Cossacks.

As regards the elections, the four elected deputies—all of whom are Democrats—have received their credentials now that Farman Farma has left office. The official signatures were not affixed to the credentials until a crowd went to the houses of the ulemas to insist on this being done. Thanks to the Farman Farma's opposition, all the Democrat candidates were elected by enormous majorities.

Bushire.

The Dashtistan revenue collecting expedition returned to Bushire towards the end of June. It is said they collected 16,000 tomans out of 27,000 tomans due. Many of the men deserted on the return journey, and it is believed that the collection made did not cover the expenses of the expedition.

Mohammerah.

Sheikh Ghazban of the Beni Lam has now made submission to the Sheikh of Mohammerah, and it is thought the trouble is over.

Ahwaz.

The Kuhgilu country is reported quiet.

[55922] No. 173.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 234. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tehran, September* 2, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith two very interesting despatches which I have received from Captain A. T. Wilson, Acting British Commissioner on the Turco-Persian Frontier Commission, describing the state of affairs prevailing in the districts of Urmia and Soujboulak.

A perusal of these documents will show the skilful manner in which the peaceful Russian occupation under arms of the rich Persian province of Azerbaijan is being carried out by Russian consular officers, despite the repeated assurances of the Russian Government that they have no desire or intention to annex any part of Persian territory. The same methods are being employed in a greater or lesser degree throughout the entire Russian zone.

The war has caused a temporary check to the colonisation of the Turcoman country between Asterabad and Gumbat-i-Kabus, to which reference has been made in previous despatches. All the Russian immigrants who had been installed as agricultural colonists on lands that did not belong to those who sold them have been withdrawn, and have rejoined the colours.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 173.

Captain Wilson to Sir W. Townley.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Camp Mawana, August* 15, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to submit for your information the following observations upon the state of affairs at present existing in the Urmia district so far as it has come under my notice:—

Political matters affecting Azerbaijan are altogether beyond my competence, but in view of the exceptional facilities that I have enjoyed for studying certain aspects of the situation on the spot, and for ascertaining the views of the Russian officers in

regard thereto, and as some time has elapsed since the district reported on has been visited by a British official, I trust that the following remarks may receive indulgent consideration :—

Distribution of Russian Troops.

2. Previous to the outbreak of war in Europe the following was the distribution of troops covered by this report :—

At Urmia.—Two infantry battalions 5th Caucasian Tirailleurs (each consisting of four companies nominally of 250 men each, one squadron Cossacks (Gorski Mazdoksky Regiment), for light field guns, and details.

At Mawana (15 *miles west of Urmia*).—Fifty men 5th Caucasian Tirailleurs.

At Hakki (20 *miles north-west of Urmia*).—50 men 5th Caucasian Tirailleurs.

At Ushnu (40 *miles south-south-west of Urmia*).—150 men 5th Caucasian Tirailleurs.

The Cossack squadron has since left for Erivan, and I understand that the detachment at Ushnu will shortly be replaced by Persian Cossacks under a Russian officer. It is rumoured that troops will before long be stationed in the Solduz district, south of the lake.

There is a general consensus of opinion amongst missionaries and others that the behaviour of these troops has been good; there is no indication that their presence is resented by the local population; on the contrary, everything that I have seen and heard indicates that their presence is welcomed by all the Christian villagers and the townspeople, who together form the greater part of the population, and by a majority of the Mohammedan villagers, on account of the security which they have imposed on the district, by force when necessary.

Had they not taken active steps to restore and maintain order, I have no doubt that their presence would be as much resented now as it was when they first arrived, but, as it is, they have made themselves indispensable, and their withdrawal would in the eyes of all but the lawless Kurdish tribesmen on the frontier be regarded as a calamity, and as the abandonment by Russia to pillage and robbery of many thousands of her co-religionists, to whom (as will be shown below) the fullest measure of official protection has been extended since 1911. The mere rumour that such a step was contemplated, on the outbreak of war in Europe, caused the greatest depression amongst Christian villagers, and a corresponding elation amongst the Kurds.

Everything, however, goes to show that the possibility of the withdrawal of Russian troops, at all events from Urmia, is officially considered a very remote one.

Substantial brick barracks for a regiment on the outskirts of Urmia are nearing completion; they are being built by a Russian subject on land purchased by him for the purpose, and partly at his own expense, the Russian Government paying a proportionate rent. Part of the cost appears, however, to have been subscribed for by local Persians, at the suggestion of M. Vedensky, the Russian vice-consul at Urmia, who appears personally responsible for most of the various measures that have been taken locally to consolidate the position of Russia.

It should be noted that the regiments selected for service in Persia are drawn entirely from the Caucasus, and some of the men of these regiments, who speak the Turkish dialect of Azerbaijan freely, are Mohammedans; they are on much the same plane of civilisation as the local population, with whom they fraternised freely, and I understand that they have even gone so far as to enlist a few drummers locally.

Russian Ecclesiastical Policy.

3. The Orthodox Church must be reckoned second in importance only to the Russian army in creating solid bonds of interest between Russia and the people of Urmia.

Half-a-dozen Russian priests of the Orthodox Church, with several Syrian colleagues, are stationed at Urmia with a Russian bishop, a man of some education and great energy, at their head; they exert considerable influence and occupy a prominent place at all official public Russian ceremonies.

It was the bishop who, amidst a crowd of complacent Persians, laid and consecrated the foundation stone of the Russian school, built by public subscriptions, derived largely from rich Mohammedans and others, and when, on the 6th August, a general parade of Russian troops and Persian Cossacks (Mohammedans) was held in the main street of

Urmia to pray for the success of the armies of Russia and her allies, the whole Russian body ecclesiastic, in full canonicals, with acolytes, &c., celebrated Mass in the street, in the presence of a large crowd of Persians; the local Governor, and a leading Seyyid, occupied a place of honour, and showed no embarrassment when they were, at the conclusion of the ceremony, sprinkled with Holy Water.

4. Thanks to the substantial temporal advantages which membership of the Russian Church confers on proselytes (all such becoming at once entitled to Russian protection) the efforts of the bishop in this direction have met with great success, and the greater part of the local Nestorian Church has adopted orthodoxy, at all events in name. The baptism of converted Moslems is performed publicly, a proceeding unique, I believe, in Persia or Turkey.

5. I am informed, moreover, that the bishop and his assistants are endeavouring, doubtless at the suggestion of high authority, to extend their missionary endeavours to a section—already pro-Russian—of the Syrian Church in Turkey; a meeting between Mar Shimm, the Syrian Patriarch and the Russian Bishop of Urmia, was recently arranged and was frustrated only by the summary arrest of the former by the Turks, and his deportation to Van.

Russian Commercial Interests.

6. Since Russian troops first arrived, in 1911, Russian trade with Urmia has greatly increased. Numerous well-built shops and extensive warehouses, built and owned by Russian subjects, have sprung up in the town. Russian telegraphists, installed in the Russian consulates at Khoi and Urmia, monopolise the single wire of the Persian Telegraph Administration, to the practical exclusion of the regular Persian telegraphists, and facilitate communication in the Russian and Armenian languages with Julfa and Tabriz. The general security which the continued presence of Russian troops has engendered, has encouraged Persian merchants to follow their example, and on every side solid brick buildings are being erected, and the streets, under the auspices of the ubiquitous M. Vedensky, widened and paved.

The presence of troops at Ushnu and Mawana is producing a similar effect, and a brisk trade has sprung up at these outlying towns, principally with Turkey, Russian exports through Urmia across the frontier having, I believe, greatly increased during the last twelve months.

Urmia, which is supplied to some extent direct from Julfa, is tending to replace Tabriz as a distributing centre for goods consumed in the Soujboulak district (including Solduz) and Turkey, and is, in any case, the centre of a district unsurpassed for fertility anywhere in Persia.

Local Administration.

7. (1.) *Municipal.*—A fairly efficient municipal administration is maintained; the streets are lighted and regularly cleaned, as also are the water courses; money for the purpose is raised by direct levies, and it is understood that a considerable proportion of the sum raised is embezzled, as elsewhere in Persia. It is even suggested, with what truth I do not know, that the Russian vice-consulate is financially interested in the municipal administration.

The Governor, Itimad-ed-Dowleh, is a mere puppet, well content to take his orders from his old friend the Russian vice-consul to whom he owes his present position. So long as he remains subservient, keeps order, and administers some sort of justice, M. Vedensky lets him make his pickings in the time-honoured way. It is important to note, however, that the latter, with a regiment at his back, has been able to make the exercise by the Itimad-ed-Dowleh of his rights of "mudakhil" dependent on the performance, even if perfunctory, by the latter of the primary duties of a Governor.

The Russian vice-consul enquires personally or by deputy into complaints made against the local Government, and, when necessary, tenders authoritative advice to the Governor, whose political complexion is sufficiently indicated by the fact that he informed me that the only Persians alive who could make good Prime Ministers were Seyyid-ed-Dowleh and Shuja-ed-Dowleh!

(2.) *Judicial.*—The "Court of Appeal" recently established here has, I understand, formed the subject of some discussion at Tehran. I attach, in case it has not already come to notice, a copy of the proclamation which announced its genesis. It is, of course, the product of the fertile brain of M. Vedensky, who, with a frankness born of enthusiasm rather than of effrontery, thus explained to me its origin.

On his arrival at Urmia from Tabriz, he said, he had found the administration of justice chaotic. There were half-a-dozen or more minor tribunals, religious or otherwise, to whom a plaintiff could have recourse, but none of these Courts could give a final decision, or enforce compliance with their orders. No tribunal existed to which appeals from outlying Courts, and from the religious tribunals in Urmia could be carried. On the other hand, owing to the great increase in the number of Russian subjects and protégés (the latter being accorded in judicial matters the same privileges as Russian subjects) the legal duties of the vice-consulate had greatly increased; indeed, few cases came before the Governor to which a Russian subject or protégé was not a party.

He had therefore arranged to sit with the Governor twice a week to hear such appeals, and was glad to be able to say that the system was working well. The people were well pleased with this expeditious, simple, and inexpensive tribunal, and (as I can quite well believe) considered his presence thereon as essential to the administration of justice. He added, in reply to a question from me, that in the unlikely event of a case coming before the Court involving a foreign subject other than a Russian, he would gladly stand aside. He assured me that a similar Court had been in existence for some time at Tabriz.

I gather from local enquiry that the presence of the Russian vice-consul is in no way resented locally, and is even "appreciated" by the few people who know the existence of the Court.

Collection of Taxes by Russian Consular Authorities.

8. Your Excellency is no doubt in full possession of all the facts relating to this branch of what my Russian colleague on this commission is pleased to call "our new financial and economic policy of penetration in Azerbaijan." The following facts may, however, be of some local interest:—

M. Vedensky told me that there were about 2,000 families of *bonâ fide* Russian subjects (exclusive of the families of Russian soldiers) resident in his district, a statement which I am unable entirely to believe; 500 would be nearer the mark.

When asked, however, how many families claimed to be Russian protégés, he replied that it would be easier to say how many did not claim this honour.

9. Of the nine districts included within the governorship of Urmia,* two-thirds of Ushnu, he said, comes under Russian protection, being the property of the Zarza Kurds, who, like their chiefs Sulaiman Khan, Mansur-ul-Mamalik, Rashid Beg, &c., were Russian protégés. (I saw a good deal of Mansur-ul-Mamalik, however, when I was at Ushnu, and doubt if he realises the honour that is thus being thrust on him and his people). Dasht-il-Bil is owned by a Russian subject. Margawar, Targawar, and Dasht are controlled by one man, who is a Russian protégé, with the result, the Russian vice-consul assured me, that the cultivators in these districts (who are mainly Christians) are also entitled to Russian protection.

In Baradust and Somai, he said, there were at present no Russian protégés. I have since ascertained that at all events as regards Baradust, this is not the case At Gangachin, the chief village of Baradust, a large Russian church was built last spring. The district of Enzel, and a part of Urmia, was, he said, almost entirely owned by a Russian protégé, Nasr-ed-Dowleh. Of the Urmia district itself, a considerable proportion was owned by Russian subjects or protégés.

10. In view of the foregoing, I found no difficulty in crediting M. Vedensky's assertion that he had more than enough to do collecting taxes from his subjects and protégés, but known facts give the lie to his protestations that he had no concern with the taxes of genuine Persian subjects. Part of the Russian vice-consulate at Urmia has been set apart as a revenue office, and three busy clerks, beseiged by a crowd of would-be taxpayers were proudly pointed out to me in support of the complaint of overwork referred to above.

On my mentioning to M. Vedensky that I had seen a proclamation at Ushnu requiring all taxpayers to remit Government dues through the Russian vice-consulate, he disclaimed any knowledge of it, and stated that the collection of taxes in Urmia was governed by the provisions of the proclamation of which I attach a translation, *i.e.*, was limited to Russian subjects and protégés.

11. It would be an impertinence on my part to offer any observations upon this thorny subject, but I may perhaps be permitted to remark that, from what I have seen, I

* Ushnu, Dasht-i-Bil, Margawar, Targawar, Dasht, Baradust, Somai, Enzel, Urmia.

should say that the attitude of Russian subjects and protégés to the Belgian Revenue Administration, should the latter resume its functions in Azerbaijan, is likely to be so hostile that unless the former has the whole-hearted support of Russian consular officers on the spot, it will be unable to effect much, and the adoption of such an attitude by people of the type and training of M. Vedensky at Urmia and Colonel Iyass at Sauj Bulaq is improbable.

The Russian School and Hospital at Urmia.

12. The claims of public security, religion, justice, and the collection of revenue having thus been satisfactorily provided for, the self-constituted guardians of the district have now set themselves to minister to the intellectual and bodily needs of the people.

During the spring subscriptions were invited from all leading personages towards the establishment of a secular school, under Russian management, where, amongst other things, the Russian language would be taught. The foundation stone, as I have already mentioned, was laid by the Russian bishop, after a religious ceremony.

I understand that considerable pressure was brought to bear upon potential subscribers, particularly Persian subjects, and with considerable success, no less than 15,000 tomans having been collected.

It is interesting in this connection to note that the head of the American mission at Urmia, the Rev. W. A. Shedd, told me that he was only deterred from teaching Russian instead of English in the large and well-managed schools which his organisation supports here by the difficulty of finding suitable teachers; should such be obtainable, he would not hesitate, in the interest of his pupils, to make Russian and not English the medium of instruction.

13. M. Vedensky hopes before long to establish a public Russian hospital and dispensary in the town, the present military hospital being of little use to the towns-people. The matter is under active consideration and the inevitable hat will soon be sent round, under the auspices of the Governor. Both these institutions are doubtless designed to counteract the influence of the American mission at Urmia, which has for many years maintained an excellent school and well-equipped hospital in the town.

Russian Policy on the Turco-Persian Frontier.

14. I asked M. Vedensky whether the Russian Government still adhered to their former policy of subsidising certain tribes on the frontier with a view to maintaining order. He replied in the negative, saying that the system had proved to be unsatisfactory, and that they now protected impartially all chiefs and all tribes, showing no favouritism whatever. Since the deportation to Tabriz in the spring of Sheikh Tahir, a firebrand whom they had at first assisted, but who later on proved treacherous to their interests, profound peace had reigned on the frontier, and so long as Russian troops remained at Urmia he had little doubt that this state of things would continue. It is to be regretted, however, that until recently the Russians have connived at the harbouring of their protégés of brigands from the Turkish side, who have taken refuge in Persia when hard pressed by the Turks.

I understand that the Russians are by no means unpopular with the tribes on the Turkish side of the frontier, who contrast their methods favourably with those of Ottoman troops, who do not, as a rule, pay for what they take.

15. The conclusions to which I have been led by the observations recorded above may be summarised as follows:—

Russian influences, at all events in the district under report, is the product of many factors, political, geographical, commercial, religious, linguistic, and others more difficult of analysis which are brought into play where a powerful State borders upon a weak and disorganised one. It is sedulously fostered by Russian agents, working with the approval of their Government, on a well-considered scheme, in the execution of which they have wide powers of initiative, and there is no longer any popular patriotic or fanatical opposition worth mentioning to its continued growth.

Neither in object or in methods has Russian policy in Azerbaijan anything in common (as has sometimes been suggested) with British policy in Southern Persia: were not our aims so totally dissimilar we could learn a good deal from the methods I have described above.

Lastly, though in no way competent to express an opinion on the subject, I venture

to hazard the view that any set-back to local Russian policy which we can encompass by diplomatic means is likely to be temporary and unsubstantial: even, for example, if the Russian vice-consul were to cease to sit in the Court of Appeal the influence he can bring to bear on his puppet the Governor would still enable him to affect its verdicts, and the withdrawal of troops, by whomsoever replaced, would inevitably be followed by pillage and murder on a sufficiently large scale to necessitate their early return.

I have, &c.

A. T. WILSON, *I.A.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 173.

Notice.

(Translation.)

IT was recently decided that a syndicate of merchants should build barracks and lease them, so as to provide accommodation for the troops of the Russian Government which were for a period quartered in the houses of the inhabitants of this town. Although the barracks are not yet ready it is possible that, when they have been completed and the troops, returning from their summer camp, have occupied them, the accommodation in the officers' quarters will be very limited; for this reason the latter are of necessity sending their wives and families back to Russia, to save the latter the hardships they would suffer in winter on account of insufficient accommodation.

Sundry known bad characters of rebellious tendencies, maliciously misconstructing this fact, have given out that the Russian troops are about to vacate Urmia.

It is hereby made known to the public that the despatch of the Russian military families to Russia is solely on account of want of accommodation, and with a view to saving the said families hardship in winter; and that, as regards the troops themselves, these, as heretofore, will remain in Urmia and will not quit it, and that any statements made [to the contrary] by malicious persons are baseless inventions.

ITIMAD-ED-DOWLEH.

10*th Ramazan*, 1332 (*August* 2, 1914).

Enclosure 3 in No. 173.

Notice.

(Translation.)

THE Imperial Russian consulate publishes with the greatest respect for the information of the public and of societes of both of Russian subjects and Persian subjects under Russian protection, and following telegram from the Russian Legation dated the 30th May, expressing the satisfaction of the Minister at the founding at Urmia of a Russian school named "Niklaiousky":—

"I am, indeed, pleased at the founding at Urmia of a Russian school, and request that you will express my heartfelt gratitude and sincerest thanks to those who have participated in the good and patriotic work."

KOROTZOVETZ.

Enclosure 4 in No. 173.

Notice.

(Translation.)

WHEREAS all the endeavours of the Governor are devoted to recognising and preserving the rights of the public, and in promoting general prosperity; and in treating impartially all sects whether Moslems, Nestorians, Christians or others;

And whereas, the Governor, owing to pressure of provincial work, has found it impossible to hear the suits of individuals, and has decreed that such be referred to Deputy Governors and to the Law Courts;

And whereas it is possible that certain litigants are of the opinion that adequate manners have not been taken for the preservation of their rights and for the administration of justice:

It is hereby made known to the public that all litigants who are of opinion that in the original hearing of their suits a failure of justice has occurred, have, according to the law, the right to appeal and to petition the Court of the Governor with a view to a rehearsing of their suits; and as there are foreign subjects in this town, the rehearsing of such suits and appeals will take place in the presence of the consul in order that the decisions arrived at may be final.

ITIMAD-ED-DOWLEH.

Enclosure 5 in No. 173.

Notice.

(Translation.)

IN pursuance of the orders of the administration of His Excellency the Farman Farma (Shuja-ed-Dowleh) and the wishes of the Russian consulate; and in accordance with the instructions of the officials of his honour the Governor of Urmia, it is hereby made known to all burghers and taxpayers that, hereafter, all taxpayers will transmit their taxes through the Governor of the Russian consulate for deposit in the Banque d'Escomptes; the taxes on slaughter animals, intestines and opium, which were administered by the local Government and will in future be administered by the municipality, should be paid in like manner.

All burghers who are desirous of being members of the municipality are requested to submit their names to the local Government. Those approved of by the inhabitants of the township will be elected members.

KAWAM-ES-SULTAN.

Ushnu, 17*th Sha'ban*, 1332 (*July* 10, 1914).

Enclosure 6 in No. 173.

Notice.

(Translation.)

THE following copy of instructions for the collection of revenue which has been received from the administration of his Excellency the Farman Farma is hereby published for the information of the people of Urmia:—

"To the Governors of the districts of Azerbaijan.

"It has come to my knowedge that revenue officials are in the habit of collecting taxes from individuals who are under the protection of the Russian Government and who should, acording to a notification received from the Imperial Russian consul-general, pay their taxes to Russian officials. You are, therefore, requested to instruct all revenue officers in your respective administrative areas not to collect taxes from the above-mentioned persons. In the event of their acting contrary to these orders they will be required to refund such amounts as they may have recovered, even though they should have paid them into the provincial Treasury.

SHUJA-ED-DOWLEH."

3*rd Ramazan*, 1148 (*July* 26, 1914).

On the authority of the above telegram it is binding on all persons who are under the protection of the Russian Government to pay all taxes to Russian officials through the Russian consulate. Should they have paid the said taxes to any one else they will, nevertheless, be called on to pay a second time.

ITIMAD-ED-DOWLEH.

Enclosure 7 in No. 173.

Captain Wilson to Sir W. Townley.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Camp Mawana, August* 16, 1914.

IN continuation of my despatch dated the 15th August, I have the honour to submit for your information a further report dealing with Russian policy in the Soujboulak district of Azerbaijan. I am indebted to Captain F. L. Dyer, 93rd Burrea

Infantry, Indian army (attached to this commission) for practically the whole of the material on which this report is based, he having twice visited Soujboulak (once in the absence there of the Russian vice-consul) at my request, to investigate and report upon the situation there. Captain Dyer is a competent observer with a good knowledge of Persian, and full reliance may be placed on the accuracy of the facts recorded by him.

Distribution of Russian Troops.

2. These first came to Soujboulak with the vice-consul in October 1912, and numbered at one time approximately 2,000. The force now stationed there consists of—

One company 5th Caucasian Tirailleurs.
One squadron of Cossacks (Gorski Mazdoksky regiment).
Two field guns (under orders for Urmia).
A consular guard of twenty Cossacks. A total of about 400 men.

The whole force is under the command of Colonel Mikoief, a Caucasian Prince.

The above force is somewhat inadequately housed in hired buildings in the town; quarters for officers are, however, being constructed by the private enterprise of Russian subjects. The behaviour of these troops has been good, but the attitude of the local population, which consists entirely of Mahommedan Kurds of the Mukri clan, contrasts strongly with that observed at Urmia, being one of sullen resentment, though the principal chiefs and notables, true to their national character, have almost without exception taken steps to ingratiate themselves with the Russian vice-consul.

The Russian Church in Soujboulak.

3. There are no Russian priests in Soujboulak, but one was sent last year from Urmia to Solduz, where there were about 100 families of Nestorians and fifty of Armenians and other Christians; the bulk of them—simple-minded yokels—yielded to the threats of the Russian priests that they would be sent to Siberia unless they joined his flock, and now vie with one another in Orthodoxy, hoping, as yet vainly, for Russian protection against their Kurdish masters. The Orthodox Church in Soujboulak numbers about fifty families. The district offers no opportunities for proselytism, the Christians now in the town being recent arrivals, who would probably leave the town were the troops to be withdrawn. The Russian vice-consul himself is a Lutheran, and has probably discouraged any attempt on the part of the Russian Orthodox Church to sow the good seed in his district.

Russian Commercial Interests.

4. There is no direct trade between Soujboulak and Russia; but Russian goods are extensively brought from Urmia and Tabriz; there is little or no trade with Kermanshah; the Russian Tajir-Bashi is a Persian merchant, now a Russian subject, who has for many years lived here and is the wealthiest man in the town.

Local Administration.

5.—(1.) *Municipal.*—Some sort of municipal administration has been created, and the streets are lighted and cleaned: the erection of new houses is proceeding apace, a sure sign of security and prosperity.

The hereditary Governor, Muhammad Husain Khan Sardar Mukri, succeeded his father four years ago: he is weak and syphilitic, in debt to a Russian subject in Tabriz to the tune of 150,000 tomans, and also, apparently, to the Russian Government or to the vice-consul personally. He is in a chronic state of bankruptcy, but will no doubt be allowed to retain his present position as a puppet of the vice-consul until he has been lent as much money as his properties would be worth at a forced sale.

The Russian vice-consul, Colonel Alexandar Iyass, a veteran intriguer whose anti-British attitude when at Birjand formed, I believe, the subject of diplomatic representations at one time, interests himself keenly in the local administration, and no important case is settled without his cognisance. The appointment to this distant vice-consulate of an officer of considerable experience and ability indicates that the Russian Government attach importance to his mission. He is far more able than his colleagues at Kermanshah, Bagdad, Basra, or Bushire.

There is reliable evidence, with the details of which I will not trouble your Excellency, and a widespread belief locally, that Colonel Iyass is in the habit of taking large bribes and presents, in particular from two rich Russian subjects, Haji Naghir Tajir-Bashi and one Satur Khan, an Armenian who arrived in Sauj Bulaq almost penniless two years ago and is now one of the richest men in the district. Both these men have apparently taken advantage of disputes as to the ownership of villages, consequent on the Turkish occupation of the district, leasing the disputed tracts from one of the claimants on very easy terms, purchasing the connivance of their vice-consul, and dispossessing more often not the rightful owner; claimants are often willing to execute a bogus lease, without consideration to these men, in the hope of strengthening their hold, with the assistance of the vice-consulate, on the disputed tract.

Collection of Taxes.

6. The revenue of Soujboulak district is 64,000 tomans a year out of which 29,400 tomans is said to be due from the district of Soujboulak itself;* Solduz pays no revenue, 450 mythical yeomanry being kept up in lieu. Sakiz and Baneh pay about 6,000 tomans each, and belong properly speaking to Kurdistan, having been placed under Azerbaijan as recently as December 1912, after the vacation of these districts by the Turks and subsequent to the arrival of the Russian vice-consul; they have only been actively administered by Soujboulak during the past four months. Russian subjects, who are stated to have leased about 150 villages in the district, pay their taxes into the vice-consulate, but with this exception taxes are remitted to the Persian Treasury at Tabriz; there appears to be no representative at Soujboulak of the Belgian financial administration. The owners of villages, and not the lessees, are responsible for paying the maliyat.

7. There is at present no Russian school or hospital in the district, nor is there any demand for them; the common people are exceedingly suspicious of all foreigners, who they imagine despite denials to be Russians; there is, however, no local opposition to the Lutheran Orient Mission, which has been established here for some years.

In the districts of Sardasht, Baneh, and Sakis, anti-Russian feeling is very marked, and was productive of some incidents during the summer, Russian survey parties (independent of the commission) who have been working over the first two districts having been the object of hostile demonstrations.

In the district of Lahijan the extent of Russian influence is somewhat obscure. The tribesmen are undoubtedly hostile, but some of their chiefs, swayed by motives of personal ambition, have been intriguing for the support of the Russian vice-consul to their candidature for the chiefship, and there is good reason to think that the present chief of the Mangur Bulbas, Baiz Pasha, who was the Turkish nominee, retained his position when they evacuated the district by means of a substantial bribe to the Russian vice-consul (five or ten mules and 1,000 tomans).

8. A comparison of the state of affairs recorded above with that set forth in my immediately preceding despatch, warrants, I venture to think, the following deductions:—

Russian influence in Soujboulak is of recent and artificial growth. The despatch of troops there was demanded neither by the state of the country nor by existing Russian interests, and their withdrawal would do no real harm to legitimate foreign interests. None of the strategical, geographical, political, economic, religious, or linguistic factors which tend to lend strength and permanence to the Russian position in Urmia exist in the case of Soujboulak. The Russian vice-consul is a political missionary engaged in collecting a flock, and the sphere of his corrupt but successful activities is likely to spread to Kurdistan, a province which is at present unique in Persia in being practically untouched by foreign influences of any sort. His position and influence, however, are mainly personal, and were he to be succeeded by an officer of ordinary talents, the influence of the vice-consulate would be considerably lessened.

If the general correctness of the foregoing distinction between the state of affairs in the Urmia and Soujboulak districts be admitted, the question arises whether it would not be possible, in the event of Russian action in Azerbaijan coming up for discussion, to recognise in some way her exceptional position in the districts north of latitude 37°, which would exclude the whole of the Soujboulak district except Solduz, which is closely related by language to the Ushnu district of which it was formerly

* Soujboulak (Bukan, Mahal, Diabekri, Mahal Faizullah Beg), Solduz, Sardasht, Lahijan, Sainkaleh, Sikiz, Baneh.

a part. Soujboulak might then be placed under Kurdistan, thus creating a buffer province out of the Kurdish-speaking tribes, who are, ethnologically and politically, a race wholly apart from the Turkish tribes of Azerbaijan; finally Great Britain and Russia might agree not to send consuls or otherwise interest themselves in the affairs of Kurdistan.

I make these suggestions in entire ignorance of what the views of His Majesty's Government on the subject may be and with the greatest diffidence, and trust that your Excellency will pardon me for the liberty I have taken in addressing you at such length on subjects which lie altogether beyond the sphere of my present duties.

I have, &c.

A. T. WILSON, *I.A.*

[55925] No. 174.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 237.)

Tehran, September 3, 1914.

Sir,

IN order to understand all the difficulties that beset the appointment of a Governor-General at Ispahan it is necessary to consider the special connection of the Bakhtiaris with that city; their family differences; the enmity prevailing between the Bakhtiaris and the family of the Zil-es-Sultan; and the predominant interests created for the Russians by the placing of the Zil's vast properties under the management of the head of the Ispahan branch of the Banque d'Escompte, or Russian Bank, as it is generally called.

The Bakhtiaris claim that Ispahan is of vital importance to them as a market for their produce; that without having control of the city through one of their own number, or through someone entirely devoted to their cause, they cannot maintain a proper control over the Bakhtiari road, or make sure that their large vested interests would be properly safeguarded. Such importance do the khans attach to the presence of a Bakhtiari Governor-General at Ispahan that, as soon as it was known that the Russians were seeking the downfall of Samsam-es-Sultaneh, they threatened to leave Tehran in a body, summon 5,000 Bakhtiari horsemen to assemble at Ispahan and hold the city against all comers. If the Belgians, they argued, could hold their country for so long against the German army, surely Bakhtiaris could hold Ispahan against any Russian force that might be sent against them. Of course there was much bombastic bluff in this threatening language which was fortunately confined to family councils at which Mr. Churchill was present, but it serves to show how much importance is attached to the presence of a Bakhtiari Governor-General, and, should they resort to extreme measures, a most uncomfortable situation might be created. I am fortunately on terms of close personal intimacy with the leading khans, and without alluding to the intemperate language used in Mr. Churchill's presence, it has been possible to make them understand that His Majesty's Government has their best interests closely at heart, but that any violent action on their part would be viewed with displeasure.

It has transpired in the course of recent conversations that the steady growth of Russian influence in Central Persia is beginning to make itself felt upon the Bakhtiaris. They have not hesitated to assert that it is impossible for them to feel sure of their ground so long as the Russian consul-general and bank manager are all supreme at Ispahan. They have expressed openly their opinion that, as long as Ispahan remains in the Russian zone, His Majesty's Government will be unable to give them such assistance as is necessary to induce the Russian Government to send instructions to their consular officers to refrain from meddling in the administration of the province, and to forbid the manager of the bank to usurp all the most essential administrative functions of the Governor-General. They have made it clear that, though they consider themselves bound by special ties of friendship and gratitude to His Majesty's Government, in the event of it being impossible to protect their interests, they will be constrained to follow the example of the Zil-es-Sultan and seek protection from those who can afford it them more effectually than we can.

The assurances given by the Russian Government concerning the Bakhtiaris are doubtless genuine, but I am convinced that the authorities at Petrograd have little or no knowledge of the doings of their local agents, both official and unofficial. The Russian consul-general has denied stoutly that any overtures had been made to Sardar-i-Jang through his local agent in Ispahan, but Captain Ranking would appear to have satisfied himself of the truth of the story he reported. The consul may well

know nothing about such proceedings, which are habitually conducted by some member of the swarm of official, semi-official, and unofficial myrmidons who are attached to Russian consulates in Persia and whose actions are easily disavowed. That Russian agents are eagerly on the lookout to detach Bakhtiaris from British allegiance there can be no doubt. M. Poklewsky made no concealment of the fact, though he perhaps placed too much confidence in the assurances of goodwill given him by some of the khans, such as Sardar Zafar, who came temporarily under his influence. As soon as it was seen that Morteza Quli Khan, the son of Samsam-es-Sultaneh, had incurred our displeasure, overtures were made to him by various Russian agents, but in such a manner that they could be easily denied if a question had been raised.

It has also transpired that the reason why the Bakhtiaris have not gone on with the proposal which originated with themselves to have British officers to instruct their men has been because they have felt that such a step would bind them completely to British interests. They feel that as long as Ispahan remains in the Russian zone they must leave a door open through which they can go over to the Russian side, if it should at any time suit their interests to do so. Certain members of the Ilkhani family, such as Sardar Assad, Samsam-es-Sultaneh, Sardar Bahadur, and probably his brother Amir-i-Jang, and Morteza Quli Khan would probably never do so, but Sadar Zafar, who on one occasion openly declared that he was Russia's nominee at Ispahan and all the members of the Haji Ilkhani family might well transfer their allegiance. The presence of British officers among the Bakhtiari would serve several useful purposes. They would create a strong defensive barrier in the mountainous district lying to the north of the oilbearing regions. They would serve to restrain the khans from even considering such dangerous measures as a resort to arms in defence of their interests. It may be hoped that they would succeed in transforming the wild freebooters into a disciplined body of men who would be of much greater use to the Persian Government in an emergency than can be the undisciplined tribesmen who are to-day more feared than the robber bands they may be called upon to suppress. Finally, they would bind the warlike tribe definitely to British interests, and so check the attempts of Russian agents to win it over to interests that cannot fail one day to come out in antagonism to those of Great Britain.

Although at moments it would appear as if all family quarrels among the Bakhtiaris had been patched up, the hostility between the Ilkhani family and the Haji Ilkhani family is deep rooted and ineradicable. The feud dates from the day when the Zil-es-Sultan sought with no small success to break the power of the tribe by setting the one family against the other. To achieve this end, he oppressed the richer and more important Ilkhani family and even went so far as to cause their leader, the father of Samsam-es-Sultaneh and Sardar Assad, to be murdered in 1882. The Zil meanwhile exalted the less important Haji Ilkhani family and raised them from comparative poverty to a certain measure of opulence. Whereas the members of the Haji Ilkhani strongly supported the Constitutional movement and were in no small measure responsible for the fall of Muhammad Ali Mirza, their cousins have always been suspected of reactionary leanings. They are also more favourably disposed towards the Zil's or Russian party in Ispahan.

The Ilkhani family has again become the more powerful in the Bakhtiari country, and though it would, I think, be unwise to support the one family against the other at the present moment, a day may well come when we shall find ourselves bound to support the branch of the tribe upon which most reliance can be placed, in order to safeguard our important interests that are seriously threatened by the steady growth of Russian influence in the southern centre. It may seem strange to have to harbour such suspicions at a moment when our two countries are making common cause in Europe, but one cannot shut one's eyes to to the fact that it is generally held in Persia that Russian interests are hostile to British. The actions of Russian consuls in opposing all who are supposed to be friendly to us is certainly not calculated to dispel this belief.

It is largely due to the machinations or intrigues of Akbar Mirza, Sarum-ed-Dowleh, the most able and active of the Zil's sons now in Persia, that there has been determined Russian opposition to Samsam-es-Sultaneh ever since the ex-Prime Minister took up the appointment of Governer-General at Ispahan. It is probable that this hotheaded old gentleman has been wanting in tact in his treatment of the Russian question, and he has doubtless repeatedly given himself over into the hands of his enemies by the use of intemperate language, but the fact cannot be denied that he was warned that he would meet with strong Russian opposition from the day that he should assume the reins of office. This, moreover, in spite of the fact that his

appointment was arranged in concert with the Russian Legation, and after the consent of Petrograd to his nomination had been given. It was early apparent that Samsam's was not a nature that could brook the state of semi-tutelage in which the Russian officials at Ispahan, perhaps even more the manager of the bank than the consul-general, seek to hold the Governor-General. There can be but little doubt that Samsam made many mistakes and occasionally allowed his tongue to run away with him in his outspoken expressions of dislike of the Russians and their ways, but the old chieftain has been highly tried and no concealment was made of the fact by Akbar Mirza and Von Kaver that no stone would be left unturned to get him out. Under such conditions it is easy to understand that the Cabinet of Petrograd has been persuaded that he has been consistently hostile to Russian interests. He has doubtless been so, if a genuine endeavour to recover some of the Governor-General's natural administrative attributes which had been filched from his more pliable predecessors by the manager of the Russian Bank, with the aid of the consulate-general, can be so classified. One can imagine what the situation must be when a bank manager can boast that he can put 1,000 armed men in the field, and when the Governor-General is forbidden, under the specious pretext that his men would illtreat the villagers, to send a representative to punish evil-doers into any village of which a Russian subject or protected person owns or administers an infinitesimal part. How is it possible under such conditions for a Persian official to arrest such a scourge to the postal service and commerce as has become Reza Khan Joozani? Akbar Mirza has himself said to me that it is not in their interests that this miscreant should be caught, which is at least equivalent to an avowal that he would be sure of a safe harbour in any village under Russian protection. When such a state of affairs prevails, it is not surprising that a Swedish officer at Ispahan should complain that M. von Kaver intrigues against the gendarmerie. The establishment of a strong and impartial road police could hardly be expected to meet with the approval of a bank manager who has arrogated to himself the position of Supreme Lord of Ispahan.

It is clear, however, that this haughty banker can be influenced by a word from Petrograd or the legation at Tehran, and that Russian consuls and other officials are not so independent as they have represented. In consequence of some hostile act that the Governor-General was said to be meditating, M. von Kaver recently openly summoned 300 armed retainers from the Zil's villages and lodged them in the Prince's residence at Ispahan. When it was agreed with the Russian Government that Samsam should be allowed to depart peacefully, without appearing to have been dismissed, it was arranged that his Excellency should be advised to adopt a more conciliatory attitude, and all outward show of opposition to him, of a nature to create a public disturbance, should be stopped. I learn that simultaneously with the receipt of my telegram advising Samsam to be more friendly, M. von Kaver has demobilised, doubtless upon the receipt of an order from a higher authority.

Sardar Bahadur is without doubt the most capable of the khans to succeed Samsam-es-Sultaneh. If the Russian Government consents to his appointment, it will be soon apparent from the attitude of the Zil's adherents and the Russian Bank whether or not it will be possible for him to succeed. He is an able young man, but only time can show whether or not he will be able to cope with an extremely delicate and difficult situation. Should Russian opposition prove insuperable, it will be probably best to try Sardar Mohtashem, now at Kerman where he is doing well, at Ispahan, but his name should not be put forward by us.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

[55926] No. 175.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 238.)

Sir, *Tehran, September* 3, 1914.

THE financial situation is at the present moment about as hopeless as it could well be. The Treasury is empty, and there seems but small chance of any money being available to meet current expenses. The revenues from the northern provinces have very appreciably diminished since the Russian consuls commenced to levy the taxes, none of the proceeds of which have as yet found their way into the coffers of the Government. There are clear evidences that in many places in Azerbaijan and

Asterabad the Persian taxpayers are ordered to pay their taxes into the Russian consulate. I have not been able to ascertain if the northern customs have already begun to fall off, but the southern customs show a marked reduction. There was a small deficit on the moneys required out of the southern customs to meet the services of the various loans and advances secured upon them in July and August, whilst, for the payments due on the 8th of the present month, only about 8,000 tomans out of the 67,000 tomans that should be paid in to cover the above services are available.

The Persian Government has considered the present moment a suitable one for accepting M. Mornard's resignation of the post of Treasurer-General, without previously advising or consulting the two legations, and without making any provision for a successor. I am informed privately that a decision of the Cabinet Council was taken to accept M. Mornard's resignation, and to appoint M. Heynssens, actually Director-General of Customs, to act in his place under the Minister of Finance. On the same occasion a decision was taken to appoint a commission to examine into the question of the arrears of "maliat" due to the Government from certain influential persons, whilst a commission was also appointed to study the question of drawing up a budget. There is no reason to suppose that either of these commissions will be more fertile than the numerous commissions previously appointed for similar purposes, but occasion will be given for twelve persons to draw additional salary, or to add to their incomes by such squeeze as may come their way. It will be noticed that the Cabinet has practically suspended the office of Treasurer-General by a stroke of the pen, and without consulting the two legations, by putting the Acting Treasurer-General under the immediate orders of the Minister of Finance, whilst an act of the last Medjliss, on the eve of the assembling of a new one, has been swept aside in the same summary manner.

I informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday that the moment appeared to me singularly ill-chosen to accept M. Mornard's resignation, when the Treasury is practically empty, and there would appear to be no immediate prospect of a successor agreeable to the two Governments being appointed. I called Ala-es-Sultaneh's attention to the fact that His Majesty's Government and the Imperial Bank of Persia are creditors of the Persian Government, and I pointed out that the southern customs receipts show a diminishing tendency, and that there would seem to be small chance of their sufficing to meet the service of the various loans and advances secured upon them, which matures on the 8th instant. My information, I said, was to the effect that only between 8,000 and 9,000 tomans had been encashed up to date, whereas 67,000 tomans will be required to meet the service. I asked his Highness, who was unable to make any reply, what steps, if any, Government proposed to take to make good a deficit which appeared inevitable. I added that I had some confidence in M. Mornard, who is well acquainted with all the intricacies of Persian finance, but that I had no knoweldge of M. Heynssens' capabilities to cope with a most difficult situation. I was aware, I continued, that M. Mornard had sent in his resignation and that he desired to be relieved of his duties, but it appeared to me that his resignation had been accepted in a somewhat curt and discourteous manner, whilst I could not conceal from him that I feared that my Government might resent the manner in which a successor, even though he might be a temporary one, had been appointed without any reference to me.

Ala-es-Sultaneh had no answer to make, except that he would convey my remonstrance to the Cabinet, and that M. Mornard had recently made himself objectionable by the dictatorial tone of certain communications he had addressed to the Government.

I was not aware, when calling on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, of the nature of the decision come to by the Cabinet respecting M. Mornard's resignation, the designation of his temporary successor with restricted powers, and the appointment of commissions. As the intention is clearly to place all the powers of the Treasurer-General in the hands of the Minister of Finance, a proceeding which does not inspire me with confidence that the financial engagements made with His Majesty's Government will be scrupulously observed, I have deemed it advisable to address a memorandum to the Persian Government, whilst awaiting your fuller instructions, setting forth my reasons why the mode of procedure adopted appears to me objectionable, I have the honour to enclose copy of this document as also of the decision of Ministers above sketched.

M. Mornard wishes to be relieved of his onerous duties and should, in my opinion, be allowed to go in due course. But it would appear to me undesirable that he should relinquish the post of Treasurer-General at the present moment, and the manner in

which his resignation has been accepted without reference to the two legations, and without proper precautions being taken to protect our interests, seems to me most unseemly and unsuitable.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 175.

Memorandum communicated to Ala-es-Sultaneh by Sir W. Townley.

WITH reference to the conversation which he had the honour to have with the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday, upon the subject of M. Mornard's resignation of his duties as Treasurer-General, and of the appointment of M. Heynssens to act as Treasurer-General until such time as a successor to M. Mornard be appointed, His Majesty's Minister has the honour to remind his Highness Ala-es-Sultaneh that he expressed the opinion that the moment was ill-chosen for changing the Treasurer-General when, in consequence of the war in Europe, it is impossible to foresee when a successor to M. Mornard can be secured. Sir W. Townley also called the serious attention of his Highness to the fact that the service of certain loans and advances made to the Persian Government by His Majesty's Government and the Imperial Bank of Persia, which are secured on the southern customs receipts, becomes due on the 8th instant, and that this service involves the payment by the Persian Government of the sum of 67,000 tomans, to meet which there is reason to believe that only some 8,000 or 9,000 tomans have been encashed to date. His Highness will not have forgotten that the revenues of the posts and telegraphs are also reserved as an additional guarantee for certain of these financial transactions, a fact that may necessitate the sequestration of a sum of about 4,000*l.* due to the Persian Government on account of international telegraphic traffic receipts. The views of His Majesty's Government have been sought on this point.

Since seeing his Highness yesterday, Sir W. Townley has learnt that the decision of the Council of Ministers appointing M. Heynssens to act temporarily as "gérant" of the Treasury-General places that official directly under the orders of the Minister of Finance, thus taking away from him powers conferred upon him, the Treasurer-General, by an act of the Medjliss, or suppressing in actual fact the office altogether.

The Council of Ministers are the best judges as to whether or not they have power to override a law of the Medjliss, but Sir W. Townley considers that it is his duty to represent to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that certain advances were made to the Persian Government by His Majesty's Government under the distinct understanding that the moneys would be handled by a European Treasurer-General, who would likewise hold himself responsible for the punctual payment of the interest due on these moneys, and for their eventual reimbursement. Under such circumstances Sir W. Townley cannot but fear that His Majesty's Government will learn with some resentment that the resignation of the Treasurer-General has been accepted without any reference to their representative at Tehran, and that a temporary successor has been appointed with such restricted powers that he can no longer be held responsible for the proper protection of their interests.

M. Heynssens is doubtless an official of marked capacity, but, by placing him, whilst in exercise of the functions of Treasurer-General, under the orders of the Minister of Finance, the Council of Ministers have themselves proclaimed that they have not complete confidence in his ability to conduct the delicate and onerous duties of the Treasurer-General.

Sir W. Townley would also beg to call the special attention of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Mint, where silver ingots are being minted daily. These ingots are the property of the Imperial Bank of Persia until handed to that institution in the shape of coin. It is most essential that special care should be taken in handing over the direction of the Mint to M. Heynssens to make sure that there has been no leakage to the detriment of the bank. It is usual, in order to provide against the possibility of such an occurrence, to fix a delay within which the outgoing official should hand over to his successor rather than, as has happened in the present case, to notify the appointment of the successor before announcing the resignation of the incumbent.

Sir W. Townley further begs to state that no notification at all of the change has been made to His Majesty's Legation.

Tehran, September 3, 1914.

Enclosure 2 in No. 175.

Decision of Council of Ministers, August 30, 1914.

ARTICLE 1er. La démission de M. Mornard de ses fonctions de Trésorier général est acceptée.

Art. 2. M. Heynssens est nommé gérant de la Trésorerie et sera sous les ordres du Ministre des Finances.

Art. 3. Une commission composée de cinq membres sera chargée du contrôle et de l'examen des comptes de la Trésorerie.

Art. 4. Une commission composée de cinq membres sera chargée d'établir le montant des arriérés et redevabilités des débiteurs envers le Gouvernement.

Art. 5. Une commission de sept membres sera chargée de l'élaboration et de l'examen du budget général de l'Empire.

Art. 6. Le Ministre des Finances est chargé de l'exécution des articles ci-dessus mentionnés.

[56146] No. 176.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 293.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, October* 5, 1914.

MY telegram No. 262 of 12th September: Dismissal of Shuja-ed-Dowleh.

Consul at Tabriz reports Shuja's departure, adding that he will probably reside at Yalta.

[56208] No. 177.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 294.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, October* 5, 1914.

MY telegram No. 292 of 2nd October: Persia and the war.

Following are essential points of note sent to Russian Minister by Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday announcing Persia's desire to declare her neutrality:—

"Now that war has unfortunately broken out between European Powers, my Government has decided to adopt policy of neutrality in order to avoid any incident that might lead to troubles on the frontier.

"It will be clear to your Excellency that in order that my Government may achieve this object it is legally necessary that Imperial Russian Government should, in view of good neighbourly relations existing between two countries, withdraw their troops from Persia, as has been repeatedly promised, and thus support views of my Government.

"I would beg to point out that Turkish Ambassador has distinctly informed me that, in the event of Persia declaring her neutrality, Ottoman Government will fully respect that neutrality."

Persia is of course seeking, perhaps not unnaturally, to take advantage of situation to obtain withdrawal of Russian troops. I have been earnestly requested to seek your good offices in this direction.

[56210] No. 178.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 485.)
(Telegraphic.) *Petrograd, October* 5, 1914.

YOUR telegram No. 780 of 22nd September.

Aide-mémoire received from Russian Government states that decrease in revenue from northern customs of Persia was largely due to disorganisation of Russian railway service, and this revenue will now probably show an increase.

Minister for Foreign Affairs agrees that any large advance to Persia in present

prices is out of the question, but Russian Government is ready to advance 300,000 tomans as soon as conditions laid down by Russian Bank have been accepted by Persian Government.

Russian Government have already directed that land tax collected by Russian consulates from Russian subjects be paid over to Persian Government after deducting cost of collection and of maintaining Cossack brigade in Azerbaijan. Russian Government have already consented to cessation of collection of this tax by consuls as soon as Persian Government agrees to lodgment from Russian sphere in Russian Bank. It would therefore be desirable that Imperial Bank of Persia renounce claim to part of these revenues being lodged with them, which is contrary to spirit of agreement of 1907. This would facilitate proposed Russian advance to Persia.

[55375] No. 179.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 246.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 5, 1914.*

YOUR telegram No. 292 of 2nd October.

While question is primarily one for Russia to decide, I cannot regard proposal with any favour.

Turkish assurance is scarcely sufficient to act on. Moreover, with two Persian forces already proved unsatisfactory, it appears an inopportune moment to embark on a third experiment.

In these circumstances I am not prepared to urge Imperial Bank to facilitate the matter.

I feel convinced that Russia has no hostile designs against Turkey in Asia unless the Porte begins hostilities, and you could not do better than counsel the Persian Government to adhere to their present attitude instead of giving any sign of a wish to enter upon a rash experiment, which might with some justice be regarded at Petrograd as inspired by a potential enemy.

(Repeated to Petrograd, No. 842.)

[56621] No. 180.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 490.)
(Telegraphic.) *Petrograd, October 6, 1914.*

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier incidents.

Your telegram No. 837 of 4th October.

Minister for Foreign Affairs told Mr. O'Beirne to-day that supposed Kurds who had raided Urmia region were in large part Turkish Askers. He said that he had no intention of allowing this incident to develop into an armed conflict with Turkey. At the same time he spoke again with great emphasis (see my telegram No. 447 of 2nd October) of "decomposition" of Persia and of uselessness of pretending any longer to regard her as a Sovereign Power.

[56622] No. 181.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 492.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Petrograd, October 6, 1914.*

NOTE received from Russian Government to-day states that they have heard that Imperial Bank of Persia intends to establish new branches in certain towns in Northern Persia, amongst others Sebzewar.

Russian Government represent that such a step would threaten interests of Russian bank, and would not be in accordance with spirit of 1907 Agreement. They hope, therefore, that His Majesty's Government will use their influence with British bank to induce it to renounce its intention.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 250.)

[57328] No. 182.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 252.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 7, 1914.*

YOUR telegram No. 281 of 24th September: Persian finance.

Have Persian Cabinet come to any decision about the islands?

His Majesty's Government are prepared to discuss the question at any time, and if financial needs are as imperative as has been depicted present moment would not be inopportune.

I would propose that His Majesty's Government should pay down a lump sum of 300,000*l.* to the Persian Government, and at the same time cancel Persia's indebtedness to Great Britain and India, which at present amounts to about 790,000*l.* By this means Persian Government would have released a sum of over 50,000*l.* per annum, at present earmarked for interest and amortisation of the debt, which, with the interest on the 300,000*l.*, represents a payment of over 70,000*l.* a year for the islands.

[57458] No. 183.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 296.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, October 8, 1914.*

I HAVE communicated contents of your telegram No. 246 of 5th October to the Persian Government. Both Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs have requested me to state that Persia's action was not due to any outside influence, and that Government merely sought to prevent, if possible, Azerbaijan from becoming the theatre of war between Russia and Turkey in order to save what they consider a sorely tried province from the horrors of devastation.

They profess to believe that friction likely to lead to hostilities, sooner or later, might have been avoided had Russia consented to withdraw her troops, but think war inevitable now that she has refused to do so, since repeated frontier incidents, which are of almost daily occurrence, must produce intolerable situation.

In spite of their disappointment, tone of the Ministers was more anti-Turkish than anti-Russian, but should war break out and hostilities be waged in Azerbaijan, Persian Government will probably be powerless to prevent Kurds, Shahsevans, and others, who have grudges against Russians, from carrying on guerrilla warfare. It is to be hoped that other parts of Persia would remain quiet, but there can be but small doubt that all Persia would dearly love to seize the opportunity to have a shot at the hated Russians.

(Repeated to Petrograd and Constantinople.)

[56208] No. 184.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 254.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October 8, 1914.*

YOUR telegram No. 294 of 5th October: Persia's neutrality.

When the Persian Government cannot keep order themselves, the communication of such a note as that addressed to the Russian Government can only add to their difficulties.

(Repeated to Petrograd, No. 851.)

[58308] No. 185.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 11.)

(No. 504.)
(Telegraphic.) *Petrograd, October 11, 1914.*

GOVERNOR-GENERAL of Ispahan.

Note received from Russian Government states that Samsam continues to display hostility to Russia and to spread rumours of imaginary Russian defeats in Europe.

Russian Government accordingly think his departure from Tehran should be encouraged, irrespective of protests of certain sections of the population, protests which are certainly inspired by him.

With regard to his successor, Imperial Government desire to draw attention of His Majesty's Government to arrangements existing among the Bakhtiari, by which members of the family of Haji Illhani and Illhani occupy post of Governor-General in Ispahan in turn. It would accordingly, in the opinion of the Russian Government, be preferable for Samsam to be succeeded by a member of another branch of this tribe, *e.g.*, Sardar Mohtashem, especially as Sardar Bahadur has always displayed hostile sentiments towards Russia.

[59077] No. 186.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 13.)

(No. 299.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, October 13, 1914.*

MR. NEW, of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, was appointed financial aide posts and telegraphs by Shuster in October 1911 for three years. After considerable hesitation Russian Government agreed to appointment.

Persian Government are anxious to renew New's contract two years with the title of Adviser to the Minister of Telegraphs. Russian Minister professes to see no objection, but his spoken views seldom correspond with those of Petrograd.

New had done good work, and put telegraph administration on a sound working footing, and he deserves to have his contract renewed. His presence in the Telegraph Department is of no assistance to us, as it serves rather to encourage Persian Government to construct line we might like to build than the reverse, but it would not be fair that he should suffer for having been loyal servant to his employers.

[59061] No. 187.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 13.)

(No. 300.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, October 13, 1914.*

MY telegram No. 276 of 22nd September.

Appointment of Ispahan Governor-General is again giving trouble. Samsam resigned, as agreed, on [?] October, but a popular demonstration is in full swing at Ispahan. Bazaars closed, sanctuaries, mosques, &c., to protest against his departure. Acting consul-general considers demonstration genuine. Russian Legation is by no means reconciled to Samsam, and is much incensed by his attitude on the occasion of the recent demise of the Russian consul-general, when he was only dragged to the official reception by Bristow, and refused to put on uniform as requested.

[59061] No. 188.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 257.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 15, 1914.*

YOUR telegram No. 300 of 13th October: Samsam.

I ceased to advocate Samsam's retention on learning that in your opinion he had better leave, and that he would go at a word from you. Moreover, I understand that, though Sardar Bahadur might be the better Khan to succeed, you thought that Sardar Mohtashem would be preferable, and that the Bakhtiaris were satisfied with the arrangements.

I must leave the settlement to you, but I think it essential that the Bakhtiari Khans should not be alienated.

(Repeated to Petrograd, No. 877.)

[59077] No. 189.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 875.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 15, 1914.*

MR. NEW'S contract with Persian Government.

Sir W. Townley's telegram No. 399 of 13th October.

You should inform Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and express hope that he will raise no objection to this extension of time of appointment, to which no exception was taken in 1911 (see Mr. O'Beirne's telegram No. 234 of 6th October of that year).

[60440] No. 190.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 302.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, October 16, 1914.*

MY telegram No. 301 of 14th October.

Consul at Tabriz telegraphs latest reports from Urmia state that tribesmen were driven off with heavy loss upon arrival of Russian reinforcements.

Tribesmen are said to have been assisted by Turkish Kurds of Sheikh Abdel Kader under his son Abdullah, and two dead bodies brought in had on Turkish uniforms.

Russian consul at Urmia has forwarded to Legation copies of proclamations signed by Abdel Kader's son, calling on tribesmen in his father's name and by order of Sultan to join with Indians, Afghans, Persians, and all other Mussulmans, without distinction of sect, who have risen in Holy War.

(Repeated to Constantinople and Petrograd.)

[60135] No. 191.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 303.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, October 16, 1914.*

SWEDISH gendarmerie.

Your telegram No. 254 of 14th October.

Gendarmerie has much deteriorated since Hjalmarson left. He is unpopular with his subordinate officers and has earned credit for having brought out inferiority of Moslem officer, but he had the force well under control and had the confidence of the Persian Government, who would do for him what they will not do for his temporary successor. If the force is to be maintained he had much better come at once. That he should not do so will be no financial saving for the Government, as he is drawing pay. No doubt his full salary until the conclusion of his contract will be claimed if he does not return.

The link on the southern trade route between Fars frontier and Kasalle territory is about to be made good, and in my opinion it would be a thousand pities if force were to be allowed to disappear. The Government are quite alive to the necessity of maintaining it, and will find money for it rather than for anything else. Despite many mistakes made, the force has made its influence seriously felt for good and has surmounted many serious obstacles.

It should be maintained unless we can supply something better to take its place, and I still think that British officers, even if available, would encounter almost insurmountable difficulties.

[60485] No. 192.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 17.)

(No. 304.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 17, 1914.*

SEISTAN–ROBAT telegraph extension.

Sixty-nine miles, or nearly two-thirds of the line, were completed to 14th October. To avoid possible delay I should be glad to be favoured with a reply to my telegram No. 256 of 9th September and as soon as may be convenient.

[60254] No. 193.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 261.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 18, 1914.

YOUR telegram No. 297 of 9th October: Persian finances.

If means are not found to meet deficiency, possibly amounting to 15,626*l.*, in service of Imperial Persian Loan, 1911, on 15th November next, and payment of coupon has to be passed, Persian Government's credit, already low, will be most seriously damaged, and position of His Majesty's Government will be gravely affected in Southern Persia. Moreover, passing of coupon would inevitably have damaging effect on influence and credit of Imperial Bank.

While as separate transaction to make good deficit would be open to objection, His Majesty's Government and Government of India might agree to it as part of scheme for purchasing the islands in the Gulf.

If Persian Government show disposition to bargain over offer in my telegram No. 252 of 5th October, the two Governments might agree to make themselves responsible for finding balance of November coupon, a sum which would be worth far more than its cash value to the Persian Government if it saved their credit. Additional argument lies in fact that disposal of islands in manner proposed should obviate any future difficulty in meeting coupons, since all prior charges on southern customs will be removed.

Time is of importance, and you should therefore press questions of islands and of necessity of meeting next coupon in above sense.

[61073] No. 194.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 19.)

(No. 242.)
Sir, *Tehran, September* 21, 1914.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 179 of the 13th ultimo, I have the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a letter which I addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 15th ultimo requesting the sanction of the Persian Government to the immediate construction on their behalf by the Indo-European Telegraph Department of a telegraph line connecting Seistan with Kuh-i-Malik-i-Siah at Robat.

Copy is also enclosed herewith in translation of his Highness's reply, dated the 8th instant, in which the Persian Government express their approval of the project as laid before them.

As I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 264 of the 14th instant, construction work on the line was commenced from Robat on the 14th September.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 194.

Sir W. Townley to Ala-es-Sultaneh.

Chère Altesse, *Téhéran, le* 15 *août*, 1914.

JE ne doute pas que vous soyez au courant des démarches qui ont été faites de temps à autre pour compléter la communication télégraphique entre Seïstan (Noussrétabad) et Kuhi-Maliki-Siyah, afin d'établir, non seulement une autre ligne de communication entre l'Europe et les Indes, mais aussi d'améliorer les communications entre Kerman et le midi de la Perse avec Meched et les provinces du nord-est.

Aujourd'hui qu'il y a la guerre en Europe et que tous les télégrammes entre la Russie et Londres doivent passer par la Perse, il est de la plus haute importance de faire construire une troisième ligne télégraphique entre Téhéran et les Indes. Déjà la voie de Kerman est gravement compromise à cause de la situation qui existe à Bam, et malheureusement on ne peut pas se cacher qu'il existe toujours un danger de voir les communications télégraphiques interrompues entre Ispahan et Bouchir.

Pour ces raisons, j'ai recours à votre bienveillance, et d'ordre de mon Gouvernement, pour prier votre Altesse de ne pas perdre un moment à donner les ordres nécessaires qui permettraient au directeur de l'Indo-European Telegraph Department

(Mr. King Wood) de procéder de suite à la construction d'une ligne télégraphique qui relierait Noussrétabad au système anglais de Robat, pour les frais du Gouvernement persan. On estime que les frais de construction ne s'élèveraient pas à plus de 60,000*l.* au maximum, et il y a tout lieu de croire que tous les matériaux nécessaires se trouvent à Robat.

Je prie votre Altesse instamment de ne pas perdre de temps à donner des ordres à qui de droit de se mettre d'accord avec Mr. King Wood, afin que cette œuvre d'une aussi grande utilité pour la Perse que pour nous soit achevée dans le plus bref délai possible.

Veuillez, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 2 in No. 194.

Note communicated to Sir W. Townley by Ala-es-Sultaneh.

(Translation.)
(After compliments.)

I HAVE the honour to inform you that as the extension of the telegraph line from Nasratabad to Kuh-i-Malik-i-Siah to link up the Seistan system with the Central Persian will be productive of great benefit to this country, the Persian Government has had the project under consideration for a long time.

Now that the Indo-European Telegraph Department has intimated its readiness, as stated by your Excellency both verbally and in writing, to construct the line in question on account of Government and afterwards recover cost of same from Government, the Persian Government, in view of the urgency of the scheme, approve of it in principle, *i.e.*, that the Indo-European Telegraph authorities should start construction of the line in question which is to go from Nasratabad to Ormek, and from that place to Kuh-i-Malik-i-Siah; and in order that when the Central Persian line is interrupted, Indian messages may pass over this wire (the Meshed-Seistan line), it is agreed that the same line may be continued on to Robat on the poles of the Central Persian line.

I beg to draw your Excellency's attention to the fact that the conditions and terms of the project, as discussed verbally between the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs with your Excellency and the Director of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, will shortly be settled and embodied in a convention signed by the Persian Government and your Excellency.

It is obvious that the line will not be open or messages accepted before the signature and ratification of the definitive convention.

I avail, &c.
MOHAMMAD ALI, ALA-ES-SULTANEH.

Tehran, September 8, 1914

[61078] No. 195.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 19.)

(No. 247.)
Sir, *Tehran, September* 24, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the usual summary of events in Persia since the 1st instant.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 195.

Summary of Events in Persia for September 1 *to* 24.

Tehran.

Treasurer-General.—M. Mornard having repeatedly tendered his resignation of the post of Treasurer-General, it was accepted by the Persian Government on the 1st September, and M. Heynssens was appointed Acting Treasurer-General. The

financial embarrassments of the Persian Government have become so acute, owing to the falling off of the customs receipts and other causes, that a deadlock is apprehended.

Diplomatic Changes.—Mr. J. Caldwell, the newly appointed United States Minister, arrived at Tehran on the 17th instant. Mr. Russell, the former American Minister, is still in the country on tour, and apparently ignorant of the arrival of his successor.

Provincial Governors.—Farman Farma has arrived from Kermanshah, and is endeavouring to re-establish his former good relations with the British Legation.

The Prime Minister, in consultation with His Majesty's Minister, is contemplating the transfer of Sardar Mohtashem from Kerman to Ispahan, and the appointment of Sardar Zafar to Kerman. No decision has yet been taken regarding Kermanshah and Yezd. The Bakhtiaris are hoping to get both appointments.

G. P. CHURCHILL,
Oriental Secretary.

Tabriz.

The question of Shuja-ed-Dowleh's dismissal appears to have been arranged. He has left Tabriz for an adjoining village, and Sardar Reshid assumed office as Acting Governor-General on the 11th September.

Mr. Hubbard of the Turco-Persian frontier Delimitation Commission was severely wounded by Kurds on the 31st August while out shooting. He has been sent to London by easy stages.

The Delimitation Commission has experienced some difficulty of late, as the Turkish commissioner refused to continue work, as, under the protocol, surrender to Persia would have been entailed of some nineteen villages in the Kotur district, the male inhabitants of which are away with the colours under the Turkish mobilisation order. The Turkish Government have instructed their commissioner to resume work.

Considerable uneasiness has prevailed in the Urmia district on account of the withdrawal of Russian troops from that place to Khoi; the Christian population fears excesses by the Kurds; the situation is now easier, and the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs states that the infantry regiment recalled from Urmia is to be replaced by Cossacks.

The German consul at Tabriz has been warned by the Russians to withdraw to Tehran with his colony and Austrian subjects, as their lives were in danger on account of temper of population at Tabriz on receipt of news of German ferocities in Europe. After some hesitation the German consul is now said to have been ordered by his legation to proceed to Tehran with all German and Austrian subjects when practicable.

Resht.

The acting Russian consul has issued written instructions to his subjects that they must pay taxes on lands owned or leased by them to the Russian consulate.

There has been a constant coming and going of Russian troops.

There are said to be at Ardebil 300 Cossacks, 600 infantry, and 250 artillerymen, and at Astara 150 Cossacks. The number of guns at Ardebil is unknown as yet. At Enzeli there are 125 "Black Sea" Cossacks, and 150 at Lesht.

The number of Russian troops at present at Kazvin is estimated to be between 400 and 500.

The Russian agent (a Persian) at Barferush is reported to have been murdered on the 9th September, whereupon there was considerable commotion in the town.

Meshed.

The troubles at Daragez have settled themselves after a fashion. Mirza Masud Khan has been killed by a young relative and servant; another servant killed Masud's father, and a brother of Masud killed Abdul Hamid Khan. The Governor-General has appointed a cousin of Masud to be Governor of Daragez.

The 1st Semirechia Cossacks are, after all, not to be moved from Meshed.

The Afghan boundary pillar Commission was well received by the Russians at Kara Tepe, but a difference of opinion arose as to the scope of the duties of the joint commission. The Russians wish to erect new pillars where the distance between the

old pillars is so great as to leave the exact position of the boundary line uncertain, but the Afghans maintain that their orders restrict them to the repair and restoration of old pillars.

Work hung fire for some time, but is now proceeding quietly, the commandants of the frontier posts being on cordial terms.

The Russian commissioners objected at the start to the numerical superiority of the Afghan escort and forty Afghan sowars were sent back to Herat.

Ispahan.

Friction between the Russian faction and the Governor-General has subsided again, and the Russian bank manager has disbanded the armed men whom he brought to the Zil-es-Sultan's residence. The brigand, Reza Khan Joozani, is on the warpath again, and has looted a large caravan on the Lynch road, at the Gav peeseh pass. Goods, chiefly belonging to Zieglers of the value of about 4,000*l.* were carried off, also twenty-seven mules.

The Swedish officer in charge of the gendarmerie at Ispahan has left for the pass to see if he can arrange for a post of gendarmes there. He is doing his best to arrange guards for the roads in the district, but is greatly hampered by lack of money.

The Russian consul-general has opened a special department at his consulate for the collection of taxes.

A serious robbery occurred recently on the Yezd road two stages out of Ispahan, the victim being a native of Burma holding a British passport. His loss amounts to 1,400*l.*

Intrigues have been on foot between the Russian consulate-general and Naib Hussein of Kashan with a view to the latter's properties being placed under Russian "protection."

Yezd.

Caravans are passing freely.

Shiraz.

Districts round Shiraz were much disturbed during the week ending the 12th September.

A small tax is to be levied from all vehicles and animals crossing a certain important bridge on the main Ispahan road 25 miles from Shiraz which is in a ruinous condition. It will probably fall during the winter's rains unless repaired, thereby severing all direct communication with the north. His Majesty's Legation have approved the tax provided that its levy ceases as soon as sufficient money to meet repairs to the bridge has been collected.

Sistan.

The negotiations towards a settlement of our claims against Hashmat-el-Mulk are progressing slowly.

Construction work on the telegraph line connecting Sistan with Kuhi Maliki Siah at Robat was started from Robat on the 14th September.

Kerman.

The Governor-General has abandoned his proposed disciplinary tour in Sirjan and Afshar, as he does not wish to be absent from Sistan while the re-shuffling of the various Governor-Generalships among the Bakhtiari khans is in progress.

Kermanshah.

The Farman Farma has returned to Tehran, but his supporters in Kermanshah still continue their intrigues on his behalf.

The Director of Finance is in great difficulties for funds. The new Governor has reduced expenditure very considerably, but even the reduced budget cannot be met. Road guards openly say they will start brigandage unless they are paid.

The Bagdad road is at present safe, thanks to an arrangement made between the

new Governor and local chiefs, but it is feared that the volume of trade to be carried will now hardly repay all the trouble taken.

The Governor has no money to pay his troops, who have therefore proceeded to their homes. It is to be hoped that the tribes will remain quiet.

Bushire.

A rumour has reached both the Government of India and His Majesty's Resident at Bushire that a mission consisting of two Germans and three Turkish officials left Bagdad soon after the war began for Kabul viâ Tehran with a letter for the Amir from the German Emperor. Nothing is known in Tehran of the supposed mission, and no credence is placed in its real existence.

Mohammerah.

A European in the employ of the Oil Company was attacked and robbed at Cheshma-Abdulla in Kheran territory on the 10th September by Arabs. Representations have been made to the Sheikh of Mohammerah, who is making efforts to track the offenders.

Ahwaz.

Construction of the Arabistan telegraph line is to be resumed in October from Ahwaz, first to Mohammerah and then to Dizful.

[61541] No. 196.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 20.)

(No. 305.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, October 20, 1914.*

YOUR telegram No. 257 of 15th October: Governor of Ispahan.

Bakhtiari khans are quite satisfied with arrangements made. Mohtashem goes to Ispahan, Zaffer to Kerman, and Samsam's son to Yezd, whilst it is possible that Amir-i-Fakham may be sent to Kermanshah.

Quiet has been restored at Ispahan. Acting consul-general defends Samsam's action, and says that he was not responsible for demonstration and behaved correctly, after consultation with Russian representative, on occasion of Russian consul-general's death.

(Repeated to Petrograd.)

[61537] No. 197.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(No. 686.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October 20, 1914.*

YOUR telegram No. 742 of 10th September.

Persian Government state that Turkish commissioner on Frontier Commission has been recalled to Constantinople at once. They point out great undesirability of of signing report of only part of frontier, and urge his retention to complete delimitation with his colleagues.

If you and your Russian colleague think it desirable at this juncture you will doubtless press Porte to instruct Turkish commissioner accordingly. If necessary demarcation must proceed without Ottoman commissioner.

(Repeated to Petrograd, No. 892, and Tehran, No. 262.)

[61941] No. 198.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 21.)

(No. 1018.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 21, 1914.*

TURCO-PERSIAN Frontier Commission.

I and my Russian colleague have already pressed Grand Vizier to retain Turkish Commissioner, which he has promised to do.

(Sent to Tehran, and substance telegraphed to Wilson.)

[62346] No. 199.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 308.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, October 22, 1914.*

MY telegram No. 303 of 16th October.

Position of gendarmerie becoming most serious, about 20,000*l.* are owing to them. Large reductions are being made, and men are being disbanded on all sides. Swedish officers are naturally reluctant to remain whilst force under their command visibly deteriorates owing to want of funds. The men are in rags, and it is piteous to compare their appearance to-day with the good show they made six months ago. The Swedes complain, and with reason, that there is apparently always money for local forces that exist on paper only, but none for gendarmerie. I have made strong representations on this head in cases of Kerman and Fars, but I have not so far succeeded in persuading the Government of their folly in paying for perfectly useless forces.

At Kerman, where Governor has his own force, there is no need for a local army, which as a matter of fact is non-existing, though regularly paid for.

At Shiraz there is more force in argument that Governor-General's prestige requires a force outside the gendarmerie and that we have recognised this. To this I answered that we granted value of a disciplined force under a European officer, but not of the existing rabble. I have threatened to devote what remains of the 50,000*l.* advanced to pay gendarmerie debts to British firms unless means are found to provide money for gendarmerie.

Another serious feature is the early departure of senior Swedish officers, who have finished their contract. Two are leaving Shiraz, and a very young and inexperienced officer will be left in charge unless a senior officer can be sent from Sweden.

It is most unfortunate that situation should appear so hopeless when a detachment has just been established at Ispahan. Safety of road to Bushire has thereby been greatly increased, and a combined attack to put an end to Naib Hussein, the scourge of Kashan, is in course of preparation.

The Swedes themselves think that presence of General Hjalmarson might save the situation.

[63289] No. 200.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 312.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, October 26, 1914.*

SIR G. BUCHANAN'S telegram No. 492 of 6th October.

Imperial Bank of Persia has already established branch at Sabzewar. This action appears to be quite in accordance with the Anglo-Russian Convention which expressly confirms all rights held by two contracting parties before its signature.

[63613] No. 201.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 555.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Petrograd, October 26, 1914.*

YOUR telegram No. 875 of 15th October: Mr. New's appointment in Persia.

Russian Government agree.

[62346] No. 202.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 265.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October 27, 1914.*

YOUR telegram No. 308 of 22nd October.

The situation you describe is exceedingly unsatisfactory, showing complete absence of any financial control.

His Majesty's Government are therefore not prepared to make to the Persian Government any financial advance either for general purposes or even for gendarmerie, except the offer made in my telegram No. 252 of 7th October, in connection with the islands, to which I await a reply.

I am informing Swedish Government that we should welcome General Hjalmarson's return.

You are authorised to inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of the above, and add that I approve your proposal to devote remainder of the 50,000*l.* to British claims connected with the gendarmerie.

[62290] No. 203.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 266. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 27, 1914.

PERSIAN Government have proposed to renew Strick's oxide contract, and have asked for advance of 30,000*l.*

I am informing the firm that His Majesty's Government are in treaty with Persian Government regarding islands.

[64330] No. 204.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 313. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, October* 28, 1914.

YOUR telegram No. 266 of 27th October.

I much regret that in confusion of move to town I forgot to report that Minister of Finance had offered to renew Strick's contract. When agent informed me I replied that I could not without instructions, and I also let him know confidentially outlines of our negotiations respecting the purchase of islands. Those negotiations are no longer secret, since I broached the question officially with Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[63289] No. 205.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 935.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October* 29, 1914.

YOUR telegram No. 492 of 6th October.

In order to meet wishes of Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Imperial Bank of Persia have agreed not for the present to proceed further with their undoubted right to establish a branch at Sabsewar.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 269.)

[65201] No. 206.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 30.)

(No. 314.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Tehran, October* 30, 1914.

MY telegram No. 159 of 2nd June, 1914: Attack on Consul Smart.

Following from Shiraz:—

"Ali Muhammad Kamariji, chief culprit in attack on Smart, has been killed in local fight near Kazerun. This is fortunate occurrence, which, however, reflects no credit on Persian Government or its agents, as quarrel in question was due to high-handed procedure of Muhammad Ali Khan Kashkuli. Major Lundberg has left Kazerun with small force of gendarmes to restore order."

[65345] No. 207.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 315.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, October* 30, 1914.

YOUR telegram No. 265 of 27th October: Swedish gendarmerie.

After conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs on Wednesday I requested to see Ain-ed-Dowleh and the President of the Council together yesterday. We had conversation of over two hours, at which Minister of Finance was present. I represented that, unless money was at once forthcoming and reliable assurances given for the future regular payment of gendarmerie, Swedish officers had decided at once to present their resignations. I made a communication in the sense of your above-mentioned telegram, and pointed out that, instead of answering my memorandum embodying the proposals of His Majesty's Government for the purchase of certain islands in Persian Gulf, Minister for Foreign Affairs had addressed me officially, asking that all payments on southern customs should be suspended for one year and a joint advance of 3,000,000 tomans (about 500,000*l.*) should be made to Persia by Great Britain and Russia. A pious hope that things may mend is the only security offered for the future repayment of advance and for resumption of payments due from the southern customs.

I said that I refused to submit such a proposal unless I received some satisfactory assurance that sale of islands would be carried through. President of the Council put in a sentimental pleading on the grounds that Great Britain has always helped Persia, who has nobody but her to rely on. I refused to listen to such arguments.

President of Council then said that question of sale of the islands could not be treated until the Medjliss assembled in a few days, and after much discussion agreed that he would to-morrow lay the question before the Cabinet and let me know if the Ministers would undertake to press its conclusion upon the Medjliss as soon as it meets. I answered that until I received his reply I would not submit quite unacceptable request for a further advance to your consideration.

Representative of the Swedes called on me this morning.

On my telling him that I saw no prospect of money being forthcoming, he said that he and his comrades would send in their resignations, and that orders would be issued for the withdrawal of the men on the roads to their centres in order that their arms may be collected.

[65745] No. 208.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 316.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, October* 31, 1914.

MY telegram No. 308 of 22nd October.

Mere announcement that the gendarmes are about to withdraw from the roads has created the utmost concern in commercial circles, and where they have been removed from the duties connected with financial administration complete stagnation of business has resulted. If proof were needed of good work that has been done, it has been supplied by the consternation that is general on its being realised that the Swedes are in earnest.

Situation might be still saved if Russian Government would consent to pay over to Persian Government taxes collected by Russian consuls. I understand that in Ispahan alone some 80,000 tomans has been collected. If I press my Russian colleague he will merely reply that he has no influence at Petrograd.

(Repeated to Petrograd.)

[65746] No. 209.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 317. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, October* 31, 1914.

MY Russian colleague told me yesterday that his Government has decided that present Persian Government is useless, and that it must be replaced by Cabinet under

Saad-ed-Dowleh or Vossuk-ed-Dowleh. He said that communication in this sense has been made to you, and that idea emanates from M. Klem. This may be so, but Russian Ministry has from the day it took office threatened openly the life of the present Cabinet. He has told me that he thinks corrupt Ministers better than those who do nothing. He has also not scrupled to state to a member of this legation that manager of Russian Bank read him a list of bribes paid to Vossuk-ed-Dowleh. Under such circumstances it is easy to understand why Russians prefer to do business with corrupt Ministers.

Present Cabinet has done little to win our sympathies, but situation in which they found themselves was an impossible one, and I much hope that I shall not be instructed to co-operate in their downfall.

(Repeated to Petrograd.)

[65345]

No. 210.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 270.)
(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, October 31, 1914.

YOUR telegram No. 315 of 30th October: Gendarmerie.

From your telegram No. 303 of 16th October I understood that Swedish General's return to Tehran was desirable, and I supported it to Swedish Government.

It now appears that the rest of the Swedes may resign forthwith, whereby General's return will be rendered useless.

I presume officers will not actually leave before General goes back to Persia, if he decides to do so.

(Repeated to Petrograd, No. 955.)

[66239]

No. 211.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 1.)

(No. 318.)
(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, November 1, 1914.

YOUR telegram No. 270 of 31st October: Gendarmerie.

Swedes are in constant touch with general, who presumably will not come out if they go home. They have agreed to wait till Tuesday before taking final decision. Prime Minister has promised that some money will be found by then, but there can be no certainty about the situation unless regular payment can be guaranteed. Some four or five Swedes are, in any case, ready to remain and endeavour to carry on gendarmerie. Senior officers at four or five centres would be better than nothing and might suffice to keep force together on reduced scale.

I quite understand that His Majesty's Government have decided to advance no more money for gendarmerie unless the Persians agree to sale of islands, but I should be glad to know whether you attach importance to Swedes remaining.

If they choose to go, and war breaks out between the allies and Turkey, there will be no reliable force left to control possible hostilities of popular section in favour of Turkey and we may find ourselves in unpleasant situation.

(Repeated to Petrograd.)

[65815]

No. 212.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 958.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 1, 1914.

TURKEY has now shown herself incorrigible and impossible, and deserves and should receive no consideration.

We believe a large section of Mussulman opinion will hold the view that Turkey has brought her own misfortunes on herself.

But you should earnestly impress upon Minister for Foreign Affairs that the inevitable war with Turkey may be a strain upon Mohammedan opinion in India and Egypt. It is therefore essential that Russian Government should do all in their power to ease that strain and help us to conciliate Mussulman opinion by being most for-

bearing and friendly to Persia and avoiding all harshness there. Now that breach with Turkey is complete and we give up all plea for consideration as far as Turkey is concerned, Minister for Foreign Affairs should realise the necessity of impressing upon all Russian policy and personnel in Persia that a conciliatory and friendly attitude there is essential. There may be no limits to the embarrassment and weakening of our hands that may be caused unless the war with Turkey is set off by a benevolent attitude in Persia.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 272.)

[66036]

No. 213.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 271.)
(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, November 1, 1914.

RUSSIAN Government are seriously disturbed regarding presence of Salar-ed-Dowleh on Turco-Persian frontier, which, even if not instigated by Turks, is certainly direct encouragement to them and a menace to order in Persia.

M. Sazonof proposes that two legations should warn Prince that two Governments disclaim all responsibility for future consequences, including possibly his execution.

His Excellency thinks Persian Government should be urged to take all possible steps against him, using either Cossack brigade or gendarmerie, and suggests that money might be found by advance by both banks. He further thinks Farman Farma should be reappointed to Kermanshah and supplied with means and force for above purposes; also that Shah should be urged to summon to his aid Vossuk-ed-Dowleh or Saad-ed-Dowleh.

I should prefer selection of Ain-ed-Dowleh as stronger adviser; but he would certainly be unacceptable to Russian Government without one of the above-mentioned ex-Ministers. Perhaps a compromise could be arranged.

Please telegraph your views, and repeat above, with your reply, to Petrograd.

[66094]

No. 214.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 256.)
Sir,

Tehran, October 10, 1914.

AS the allusion made in Sir G. Buchanan's telegram No. 448 of the 24th ultimo, about an arrangement under which 50 per cent. of the maliat of Resht and Tabriz was to be paid into the Imperial Bank, conveyed nothing to me, I called upon my Russian colleague, and asked him if he could tell me what arrangement under consideration M. Sazonof had referred to. M. Korostovetz replied that the Acting Treasurer-General had put forward a scheme under which the Banque d'Escompte would advance the Persian Government 1,000,000 tomans upon the security of the northern revenues. Out of this money the loan of 100,000*l.* (roughly speaking, at the present rate of exchange, 650,000 tomans), made to the Persian Government by the Imperial Bank in March 1913, would be repaid, and the remainder of the money would be available for current expenses. The Persian Government had declared their unwillingness to allocate all the northern revenues as a security for the loan, and had proposed that 50 per cent. only of the land tax of certain districts, including Resht and Tabriz, should be paid through the Banque d'Escompte, the Government reserving the right to pay the remainder into any other banking institution it chose. No special bank was named, but M. Korostovetz jumped to the conclusion that the Imperial Bank was intended, and reported in that sense to Petrograd.

I expressed my regret that I had been kept in the dark about the negotiations on foot because I saw no objection at all to the Government making such an arrangement with the Banque d'Escompte. The agreement made with the Imperial Bank had been for one year only, and would have expired last March had the Treasurer-General been in a position to refund the loan made. The Imperial Bank could claim no monopoly of these financial transactions, though I contended that the Persian Government had a perfect right to make such arrangements with it if it was convenient to do so, just as they could with the Banque d'Escompte. What I held was that each institution should be treated equally, and that it could not be argued that the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 had overriden the Bank's Charter of 1888. M. Korostovetz said that he had

not intentionally concealed the matter from me, and that he had told the Persian authorities to discuss it with me.

We then talked the whole matter over, and I said that it seemed to me, as I had often said previously, that it was in the interest of all parties to arrive at a *modus vivendi*. I agreed that it was but natural that the Russian Government should wish that the Russian Bank should be in a position to do Government business in those places where Russian interests were predominant. That this had been recognised when the 1913 agreement with the Imperial Bank was concluded was apparent from the fact that the revenues of the province of Azerbaijan were expressly excluded from the arrangement. I suggested that the requirements of all parties might be satisfied if it was agreed that a portion of the maliat of such places as Kermanshah, Hamadan, Sultanabad, Ispahan, and Yezd, where British interests are important, was paid into the Imperial Bank. It would be a distinct violation of the old-established charter of that institution were its business with the Government to be confined solely to the much less prosperous neutral and British zones.

The manager of the Imperial Bank much resents any restriction of the bank's sphere of action, and technically his contention is absolutely just. At the same time it does seem very desirable that some arrangement should be reached that would satisfy Russian pretensions. There is small doubt that the arbitrary seizure of the taxes due from Russians and Russian-protected persons by the Russian consuls was primarily due to jealousy of the fact that, under the 1913 arrangement, the northern revenues, with the exception of those of Azerbaijan, were hypothecated to the Imperial Bank. M. Korostovetz assured me that the collection of these revenues would be handed back to the Persian officials as soon as this question was settled, and that all that would be insisted upon would be that the consuls would be advised of the exact amount of tax claimed from each Russian landowner, protected persons being excluded. It must also be borne in mind that the Persian financial authorities are at liberty to make what loan they can on the security of the northern revenues when once the Imperial Bank's loan has been paid off.

In a subsequent conversation with the Chef de Cabinet of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, I learned that the Government does not propose to conclude the proposed arrangement with the Banque d'Escompte, for the present at all events, and that the Prime Minister is much averse to the conclusion of any agreement which would underline the demarcation of the zones of influence. It is for this reason that he proposed that only 50 per cent. of the revenues should be hypothecated to the Banque d'Escompte, reserving to the Government the right to do business on the security of the remaining half with whomsoever they liked.

M. Sazonof's endeavour to restrict the sphere of action of the Imperial Bank, and to argue that the establishment of fresh branches in the Russian zone is contrary to the spirit of the 1907 Convention, is unreasonable. It should be remembered that the peculiar and illegal practice of the Russian Bank, under which, in distinct violation of the letter of its concession, it has taken possession of large tracts of country on mortgage, has caused a large portion of Northern Persia to pass under the sole control of Russian consuls. These officers and the officers of the Russian Bank are not very particular as to the legal rights of people to whom money is advanced on the security of lands that do not belong in many cases to the borrower. M. Sazonof has denied that the Russian Government had the intention of extending protection to that arch-brigand, Naib Hussein of Kashan, but it can easily be established beyond contradiction that the bank manager at Ispahan, with the assistance of the consul-general, had practically concluded a short time ago an arrangement with the outlaw under which all the properties he has stolen would have been taken under the management of the bank. Consuls and bank managers have found by experience that a *fait accompli* usually receives the official sanction of Petrograd in the long run.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

[66390] No. 215.

Note communicated by Count Benckendorff, November 2, 1914.

M. SAZONOF télégraphie en date du 31 octobre, 1914 :

"Bien qu'il n'y ait pas eu encore entre la Russie et la Turquie de déclaration d'état de guerre, l'attaque de la flotte turque sur nos côtes a ouvert les hostilités.

"Il est possible que, pour considérations purement militaires et pour protéger l'Azerbeïdjan et nos frontières du Caucase contre toute agression turque, nous nous voyons obligés de renforcer nos troupes sur territoire persan. Le Gouvernement persan, le cas échéant, ne devrait en éprouver aucune inquiétude et maintenir sa neutralité en tous repos. Le Gouvernement Impérial confirme l'absence complète d'aucune sorte de projet agressif contre la Perse et l'intégrité de son territoire. Le Ministre de Russie à Téhéran a été chargé de porter ce qui précède à la connaissance du Gouvernement persan."

Ambassade Impériale de Russie, Londres,
le 2 novembre, 1914.

[66657] No. 216.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 3.)

(No. 630.)
Sir,

Constantinople, October 7, 1914.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 557 of 13th August, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the British Commissioner on the Turco-Persian Frontier Commission, reporting the delimitation of that frontier between Kouhi Kocé and Berdi Aboul Fath.

I have, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

Enclosure in No. 216.

Mr. Wratislaw to Sir L. Mallet.

(No. 43.)
Sir,

Camp at Kaniresch, July 12, 1914.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 42 of the 19th ultimo, I have the honour to report that the frontier has now been delimited as far as Berdi Aboul Fath, about latitude 36° 10′.

As laid down in the protocol, the frontier from Kouhi Kocé Rescha, where my last report left it, follows a well-defined watershed as far as the Khilé-resch River, the only difficulty occurring over the village of Tchamperaw, the fate of which was to be decided by the Commission "sur la base du principe accepté du *statu quo*." We found that this village paid taxes to neither the Turks nor the Persians, and, in fact, had for very many years enjoyed a position of practical independence, a fact which the inhabitants not unnaturally regarded with considerable complacency. Dervish Pasha, however, when defining the frontier which existed in 1848, declared explicitly that the line passed between the villages of Siahguvez (Turkish) and Tchamperaw, which clearly indicated that, on the *status quo* principle, Tchamperaw was Persian, and, after the inevitable reference to arbitration, my Russian colleague and I so decided. There was some difficulty in tracing the dividing-line between the lands of the villages of Tchamperaw and Siahguvez, and, of course, the geographical frontier was marred by its having to leave the watershed and cross a valley; but after Tchamperaw all was again plain sailing, when the frontier ascended Mount Sourkev and then followed the medium *filum aquæ*, first of the Khilé-resch River and then of the lesser Zab up to latitude 36°. Beneath Tepe Salos, where the frontier quits the Zab, some little trouble arose over the interpretation of the protocol phrase, "l'extrémité sud de Tépé Salos," and over the presence of two villages, claimed to be Turkish, to the east of where the protocol, read in conjunction with the large identic map, appeared to intend the frontier to run. The difficulty was finally settled by the parties agreeing that these two villages should be left on the Persian side, the Persian commissioner engaging, for his part, that Schenié, a village to the south of Vazneh, whose fate the Commission is left to decide, should be awarded to Turkey.

The progress of the Commission has lately become lamentably slow. Owing to the defective character of the mountain tracks over which we now have to travel long marches are an impossibility, and the speed of the caravan has fallen to 2 miles per hour. At the same time much valuable time is unnecessarily wasted in exaggerated periods of repose, which the amount of work done in between hardly justifies.

The weather is at times very hot, the temperature occasionally reaching well over 100 degrees in the tents, in spite of the altitude (3,000 to 6,000 feet above sea level) at which the camp is pitched.

I have, &c.
A. C. WRATISLAW.

[66658]

No. 217.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 3.)

(No. 631.)

Sir,

Constantinople, October 7, 1914.

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the British commissioner on the Turco-Persian Frontier Commission, transmitting copies of the *procès-verbaux* of meetings of the Commission Nos. 52 to 58.

I have, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

Enclosure 1 in No. 217.

Mr. Wratislaw to Sir L. Mallet.

(No. 44.)

Sir,

Camp at Kaniresch, July 13, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Excellency herewith copies of the *procès-verbaux* of meetings of this Commission Nos. 52 to 58, at which the frontier line was settled as far as the Lesser Zab.

I have, &c.
A. C. WRATISLAW.

Enclosure 2 in No. 217.

Procès-verbal of Fifty-second Meeting of Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

SÉANCE tenue à Piran, le 15 juin, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire persan.

Étaient présents tous les commissaires.

Le procès-verbal de la séance précédente a été lu et approuvé.

Une sous-commission a été chargée de l'érection d'une borne sur le pic d'Avroman au-dessus de Kani-Sef.

La Commission s'est ensuite rendue sur les lieux afin de déterminer la ligne exacte que la frontière doit suivre entre ladite borne et le partage des eaux entre Tcham Berzé et Tchenaran.

Après quelque discussion, MM. les commissaires se sont accordés pour faire descendre la frontière en ligne droite de la borne ci-dessus mentionnée à la jonction d'un ravin à environ 1 mille et demi en aval de Piran avec le Tcham Berzé, où une borne a été érigée. De ce point la ligne frontière remonte ledit ravin et atteint le partage des eaux. Une sous-commission fut constituée pour l'érection d'une borne sur le partage des eaux à l'endroit où la frontière y aboutit.

La Commission s'est rendue le lendemain, 16 juin, à la jonction du Tcheneran et du Lev et y a fait ériger une borne. Ensuite MM. les commissaires, ayant remonté le Lev jusqu'au point d'où un canal dérive du côté droit, ont reconnu comme borne frontière une ancienne borne située à 17 mètres en amont dudit point et que recouvre une quantité de charbon de bois. Cette borne servira à marquer l'endroit où la ligne frontière quitte le Lev. La prochaine séance a été fixée pour le 17 courant à Bnava-Souta.

Fait à Piran, le 15 juin, 1914.

ETELA-OL-MULK.
A. C. WRATISLAW.
V. MINORSKY.
AZ. SAMIH.

Enclosure 3 in No. 217.

Procès-verbal of Fifty-third Meeting of Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

SÉANCE tenue à Bayéva, le 18 juin, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire russe.

Étaient présents tous les commissaires.

Les procès-verbaux des séances 50 et 51 ont été signés, et celui de la dernière séance lu et approuvé. Les rapports des deux sous-commissions nommées à la dernière séance ont été lus ; ils sont annexés au présent procès-verbal.

Une discussion s'étant engagée sur la ligne que la frontière doit suivre entre Sékouh, limite de la partie déjà délimitée, et Kélé-Navé-Sar, point établi par le Protocole de Constantinople, M. le commissaire ottoman demande qu'elle soit tracée de manière à laisser à la Turquie le village d'Asinawa.

M. le commissaire persan n'accepte pas cette proposition, et MM. les commissaires médiateurs recommandent fortement et d'un commun accord que la frontière suive la ligne des crêtes qui unit Sékouh à Kélé-Navé-Sar; les droits privés des habitants d'Asinawa étant, toutefois, sauvegardés comme par le passé. M. le commissaire russe fait observer, à ce propos, que la localité en question n'est point un village proprement dit, mais un groupe de huttes habitées en été seulement par les gens de Chehrizor. M. le commissaire britannique, d'autre part, signale les grands inconvénients, au point de vue géographique, qui résulteraient de l'adoption du tracé proposé par son collègue ottoman.

En conséquence, la ligne des crêtes a été acceptée.

Une nouvelle dissidence s'est manifestée au sujet de la frontière entre Kélé-Navé-Sar et le ruisseau de Bnava-Souta.

M. le commissaire ottoman fait savoir que les habitants du village de Bnava-Souta possèdent des terrains de cultivation situés en amont du village sur la rive droite du ruisseau et arrosés par ses canaux, et il réclame que ces terrains soient laissés en territoire ottoman. Il ajoute que seule la partie du ruisseau qui est en aval du confluent de ses deux tributaires est connue par le nom de Bnava-Souta.

M. le commissaire persan trouve que cette proposition porte atteinte au protocole et dit qu'il tient aux dispositions de ce dernier.

M. le commissaire britannique est d'avis que la possession par la Turquie des terrains en question comporteraient un grand bénéfice pour les habitants de Bnava-Souta sans imposer une perte sensible à la Perse.

Une ligne a été ensuite tracée sur la carte de façon à comprendre ces terrains en Turquie.

Le ked-khuda du village voisin de Bayéva, interrogé par la Commission, déclare que ses villageois ne possèdent rien dans les limites des terrains susmentionnés. Là-dessus la Commission a accepté la ligne proposée, qui est la suivante :

A partir de Kélé-Navé-Sar, la frontière suit toujours le même partage des eaux vers l'est pour une distance d'environ 1 mille jusqu'à un endroit où un ravin descend le versant septentrional ; elle s'engage dans ce ravin et le suit jusqu'à son confluent avec le ruisseau de Bnava-Souta, qui se trouve à environ 600 mètres en aval du village du même nom.

De là, la frontière descend le Bnava-Souta jusqu'à sa jonction avec le Kyzyldja, qu'elle suit en aval jusqu'au confluent du ruisseau de Khalil-Abad et s'engage dans ce dernier ruisseau en suivant toujours le *medium filum aquæ*.

Une sous-commission a été envoyée pour ériger des bornes aux confluents du Kyzyldja avec les ruisseaux de Bnava-Souta et de Khalil-Abad respectivement, et une autre sous-commission a été nommée pour l'érection de deux bornes : une sur le col de Kélé-Navé-Sar et l'autre à la jonction du ravin plus haut mentionné avec le ruisseau de Bnava-Souta.

Fait à Bayéva, le 18 juin, 1914.

V. MINORSKY.
A. C. WRATISLAW.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
AZ. SAMIH.

Rapport.

Conformément aux instructions ci-annexées, nous, soussignés, nous sommes rendus près le col de Tchaghan et avons fait ériger une borne sur le sommet le plus septentrional du mont Sourène (au-dessus de Kani-Sef) environ à une distance de 1 mille au nord-est du susdit col.

Cette borne consiste en un amas de pierres ayant 2 mètres de hauteur et 2 mètres de diamètre à la base. Vu l'impossibilité de transport, les pierres n'ont pas été cimentées.

MANSOUR-ES-SULTANEH.
A. T. W.
M. NAMI.

Piran, le 21 *juin*, 1914.

Instructions.

La Commission a chargé la sous-commission, composée de MM. le Capitaine Wilson, Mehmed Effendi, Mansour-es-Sultaneh, de faire ériger une borne sur le pic de la chaîne d'Avroman, qui s'élève au-dessus de Kani-Sef, à environ 1 mille au nord-est de Mélé-Tchakan.

E. M.
A. S.
A. C. W.
V. M.

Piran, le 15 *juin*, 1914.

Rapport.

Conformément aux instructions ci-annexées, nous, soussignés, nous sommes rendus au lieu et avons fait ériger une borne sur le partage des eaux de Gogasur et Tcheneran à la tête du ravin indiqué, à une distance de 40 mètres à l'ouest du sommet.

Hauteur et largeur à la base, 1½ mètre; en pierre liée avec du ciment.

A une distance de 3 mètres de la borne nous avons érigé deux petites bornes, hauteur ½ mètre, pour marquer la direction de la frontière.

C. H. D. RYDER, *Lieutenant-Colonel, R.E.*
ABDARRAZAGH.

Piran, le 15 *juin*, 1914.

Instructions.

Une sous-commission, composée de MM. le Colonel Ryder, Abdarrazagh Khan, Kadri Effendi, est nommée pour ériger une borne à la tête d'un ravin indiqué sur la carte entre Toutman et Piran.

E. M.
A. C. W.
V. M.
AZ. S.

Piran, le 15 *juin*, 1914.

Enclosure 4 in No. 217.

Procès-verbal of Fifty-fourth Meeting of Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

SÉANCE tenue près de Massoud (Masod), le 19 juin, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire ottoman.

Étaient présents tous les commissaires.

Le procès-verbal de la dernière séance a été lu et approuvé, ainsi que les rapports des deux sous-commissions nommées à ladite séance.

La Commission s'est occupée de la délimitation de la frontière à partir du

confluent du ruisseau de Khalil-Abad avec le Kyzyldja jusqu'à Kouhi-Kocé-Rescha.

On a constaté que trois branches s'unissent pour former le ruisseau de Khalil-Abad, et la question s'est posée laquelle de ces trois branches correspond le mieux aux termes du protocole.

M. le commissaire ottoman demande qu'on prenne comme frontière la branche la plus à l'est, puisque Khanoum-Abad doit être considéré, il déclare, comme village turc.

M. le commissaire persan, par contre, réclame la branche la plus à l'ouest, laquelle, dit-il, est indiquée comme frontière par les renseignements puisés au rapport de Dervich Pacha.

M. le commissaire britannique propose qu'on fasse un compromis en traçant la frontière par la branche du milieu, c'est-à-dire la première vallée à l'est de Massoud.

M. le commissaire russe suggère une modification du tracé proposé consistant à faire passer la frontière par le contrefort qui enferme la vallée en question de son côté oriental.

Cette proposition est acceptée par M. le commissaire ottoman à condition qu'on maintienne les droits de propriété privée d'un sujet ottoman nommé Cheikh Omar, à Khanoum-Abad. MM. les commissaires médiateurs répondent que le principe du maintien des droits privés est toujours sous-entendu, mais que la Commission n'est pas en état d'examiner les titres des particuliers.

M. le commissaire persan ayant, lui aussi, accepté la ligne suggérée, on s'accorde que la frontière soit tracée de la manière suivante :

Après avoir remonté le ruisseau de Khalil-Abad jusqu'au confluent de la branche qui descend de la première vallée à l'est de Massoud, la frontière remonte ladite branche jusqu'au point où le chemin qui mène de Pendjevine à Khalouzé la traverse. De là, elle suit ce chemin vers le nord-est jusqu'au pied du contrefort qui forme le côté oriental de la susdite vallée. Elle remonte ce contrefort et gagne la crête de Kouhi-Kocé-Rescha, qu'elle suit vers le nord-est.

La Commission a fait ériger une borne à l'endroit où la frontière quitte la branche du ruisseau, et une seconde borne au pied du contrefort au point où la frontière laisse le chemin pour remonter le contrefort.

Une sous-commission a été envoyée, en même temps, à l'endroit où le chemin de Khalouzé à Kani-Serd traverse le partage des eaux (col de Kélé-Melaik) pour y faire construire une borne.

En conséquence, on a arrêté pendant cette séance la frontière à partir de la jonction de la rivière de Kyzyldja avec le ruisseau de Khalil-Abad jusqu'à la crête de Kouhi-Kocé-Reschan.

Fait à Khalouzé, le 19juin, 1914.

AZ. SAMIH.
A. C. WRATISLAW.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
V. MINORSKY.

Rapport.

Conformément aux instructions ci-annexées, les soussignés ont fait construire les bornes suivantes :

1. Sur le col de Kélé-Navé-Sar, à 30 mètres à l'ouest de la route entre Piran et Bnava-Souta. Borne No. 89. En pierres liées avec du ciment :

Diamètre : 1½ mètre.
Hauteur : 2 mètres.

2. Sur le bord d'un ravin à 30 mètres de la jonction de celui-ci avec le ruisseau de Bnava-Souta, sur sa rive droite. Borne No. 90. Azimut, près de la borne No. 89, 2 degrés. En pierres liées avec du ciment :

Diamètre : 1½ mètre.
Hauteur : 2 mètres.

C. H. D. RYDER.
MANSOUR-ES-SULTANEH.
H. BASRY.

Instructions.

La Commission a chargé une sous-commission, composée de MM. le Colonel Ryder, Mansour-es-Sultaneh et Basry Bey, pour ériger :

1. Une borne sur le col de Navé-Sar.
2. Une borne à l'endroit indiqué sur la carte sur la rive droite de la rivière de Bnava-Souta, à environ un demi-mille en aval du village de ce nom.

A. C. WRATISLAW.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
V. MINORKY.
AZ. SAMIH.

Rapport.

Conformément aux instructions ci-annexées, les soussignés ont fait construire les bornes suivantes :

1. Sur la rive droite du ruisseau de Bnava-Souta à la jonction de celui-ci avec la rivière Kyzyldja.

Dimensions :

Diamètre : $2\frac{1}{2}$ mètres.
Hauteur : $1\frac{3}{4}$ mètre.

Construction en pierres liées avec du ciment.

2. Sur la rive droite du ruisseau de Khalil-Abad (Carte identique) à la jonction de celui-ci avec la rivière Kyzyldja, à environ 1 mille en aval de la borne précédente.

Dimensions :

Diamètre : 3 mètres.
Hauteur : 2 mètres.

Construction en pierres liées avec du ciment, sur une monticule de terre du centre duquel s'élèvent des rochers de marbre blanc. La borne est construite sur deux de ces rochers. D'après le témoignage des habitants du pays, lesdits rochers ont toujours été considérés comme marquant la frontière.

Ces deux bornes portent les numéros 91 et 92 respectivement.

SALAR MOZAFFER.
A. T. WILSON.

Bnava-Souta, le 18 *juin*, 1914.

Instructions.

La Commission a chargé une sous-commission, composée de MM. le Capitaine Wilson et Salar Mozaffer, d'ériger :

1. Une borne sur la rive droite du ruisseau de Bnava-Souta à la jonction de celui-ci avec la rivière Kyzyldja ; et
2. Une borne sur la rive gauche du ruisseau de Khalil-Abad (Carte identique) à la jonction de celui-ci avec la rivière Kyzyldja.

A. C. WRATISLAW.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
V. MINORSKY.
AZ. SAMIH.

Bnava-Souta, le 18 *juin*, 1914.

Enclosure 5 in No. 217.

Procès-verbal of Fifty-fifth Meeting of Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

SÉANCE tenue à Lareder, le 20 juin, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire britannique.

Étaient présents tous les commissaires.

Les procès-verbaux des séances Nos. 52 et 53 ont été signés, et celui de la dernière séance lu et approuvé.

M. le président donne ensuite lecture du passage suivant du protocole concernant la description de la partie de la frontière située entre Kélé-Mélaïk et Galasch :

" La ligne monte ensuite sur la chaîne des montagnes qui forment la frontière entre le district persan de Bané et le district turc Kyzyldja, Galasch, Berdi-Ketchel, Poucht-Hangajal, Dou-bera, Parajal et Spi-Kani, après quoi elle atteint le col de Now-Khouvan. De là, en suivant toujours le partage des eaux, la frontière tourne vers le sud et puis à l'ouest, passant par les sommets de Voul-Gouza, Pouchti-Schehidan, Hazar-Mal, Bali-Keder, Kélé-Mélaïk et Kouhi-Kocé-Rescha, séparant le district turc de Teretoul du district persan de Merivan."

MM. les commissaires examinent la Carte identique et suivent sur celle-ci la description précitée.

M. le commissaire persan fait observer que le mont Voul-Gouza se trouvant marqué sur la limite de la zone contenue dans la carte, il serait très utile d'attendre la nouvelle carte du district que le corps technique est sur le point d'achever.

La ligne frontière déterminée par le protocole ne déviant nulle part du partage des eaux, MM. les commissaires décident de l'appliquer en faisant ériger des bornes sur les cols traversés par :

1. La route qui passe par Now-Khouvan.
2. La route qui suit Déré-i-Kouterech.
3. La route qui va de Vuna à Nanor.
4. La route qui va de Pendjevine à Bané.

On constitue une sous-commission pour l'érection de bornes aux endroits où les routes susdites traversent le partage des eaux.

M. le commissaire persan fait remarquer qu'à Kalé-Hav, qui est resté en territoire persan, il y a un détachement de troupes ottomanes, et il prie son collègue ottoman de prendre des mesures pour amener l'évacuation. M. le commissaire ottoman déclare qu'il a déjà fait les démarches nécessaires et que l'ordre d'évacuer ne tardera pas à parvenir.

M. le commissaire russe relève que, dans la suite, des cas pareils de nature à retarder la marche des travaux de la Commission pouvant se présenter, il serait très utile que MM. les commissaires médiateurs s'adressent à leur Gouvernements respectifs pour les engager à faire des démarches auprès du Gouvernement ottoman, afin de l'amener à munir son représentant au sein de la Commission des pouvoirs nécessaires pour qu'il puisse donner des ordres directs pour l'évacuation dans des circonstances analogues.

M. le commissaire britannique accueille la proposition de son collègue russe et se déclare disposé à envoyer, conjointement avec lui, un télégramme identique dans le sens voulu.

En conséquence, on a arrêté pendant cette séance la frontière à partir de Kélé-Mélaïk jusqu'à Galasch.

Fait à Lareder, le 20 juin, 1914.

A. C. WRATISLAW.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
V. MINORSKY.
AZ. SAMIH.

Enclosure 6 in No. 217.

Procès-verbal of Fifty-sixth Meeting of Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

SÉANCE tenue près de Tchamperaw, le 26 juin, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire persan.

Étaient présents tous les commissaires.

Le procès-verbal de la cinquante-quatrième séance a été signé, et celui de la dernière séance lu et approuvé.

Une discussion s'est engagée sur la question de l'appartenance de Tchamperaw, dont le sort doit être statué par la Commission selon les stipulations du protocole.

M. le commissaire persan prétend que les déclarations de Dervich Pacha prouvent incontestablement la possession persane de ce village à l'époque de la première

commission. Dervich Pacha écrit que le village a été donné à Djaffar Bey, sujet persan, et qu'il dépendait de Souleïmanieh. Or, par le Traité d'Erzeroum, le Gouvernement persan a cédé ses droits sur Souleïmanieh ; par conséquent, Tchamperaw a fait partie, avant le traité, du territoire persan.

M. le commissaire russe relève que le Gouvernement persan n'a fait que s'engager à ne pas s'ingérer dans les affaires de Souleïmanieh.

M. le commissaire ottoman cite le livre de Khourchid Effendi, qui explique dans quelles circonstances le village a été donné comme propriété privée et pour quelles raisons il a été exempte du payement des impôts.

Une référence au livre de Khourchid Effendi laisse voir que le village de Tchamperaw s'y trouve inséré dans la liste des villages dépendant de Kyzyldja et en même temps parmi ceux dépendant de Bané.

M. le commissaire ottoman fait ressortir les inconvénients, au point de vue géographique, qui seraient comportés par l'inclusion du village en territoire persan.

Les deux parties intéressées se trouvant dans l'impossibilité de se mettre d'accord sur la frontière, la question fut référée à l'arbitrage des commissaires britannique et russe. Il est convenu que les exposés seront présentés sans délai et la prochaine séance est fixée pour le lendemain à 10 heures du matin.

Fait le 26 juin, 1914.

ETELA-OL-MULK.
A. C. WRATISLAW.
V. MINORSKY.
AZ. SAMIH.

Enclosure 7 in No. 217.

Procès-verbal of Fifty-seventh Meeting of Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

SÉANCE tenue près de Tchamperaw, le 27 juin, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire russe.

Étaient présents tous les commissaires.

Le procès-verbal de la cinquante-cinquième séance a été signé et celui de la dernière séance lu et approuvé, ainsi que les rapports des deux sous-commissions nommées aux séances 54 et 55 respectivement.

Lecture a été donnée ensuite de la décision arbitrale concernant le sort du village de Tchamperaw, en vertu de laquelle ledit village fait partie du territoire persan. Cette décision ainsi que les exposés des deux parties intéressées se trouvent annexés au présent procès-verbal.

L'après-midi du même jour la Commission, constituée de M. le commissaire britannique et des commissaires-adjoints des trois autres Puissances, s'est rendue sur les lieux afin de fixer, à la suite d'une enquête locale, la ligne frontière entre les villages de Tchamperaw et de Siah Guveza.

On a interrogé le Cheikh de Siah Guveza et le propriétaire de Tchamperaw. Celui-ci désigne la limite entre les terrains des deux villages et ses dépositions se voient confirmées de tous points par le Cheikh de Siah Guveza.

MM. les officiers techniques, invités à trouver une ligne frontière géographique répondant autant que possible à la limite entre les terrains des deux villages, proposent la ligne suivante, qui est acceptée par la Commission :

A partir du mont Galasch, la frontière continue le long du partage des eaux jusqu'à un col qui se trouve à un demi-mille environ au delà d'une grande falaise connue sous le nom de Berdé-Sour. Un ravin qui descend du col au ruisseau de Tchamperaw forme ensuite la frontière. Arrivée audit ruisseau, la frontière le descend pour une distance de 50 mètres, se transfère ensuite au chemin qui longe la rive droite et le suit dans la direction de Tchamperaw pour une distance de 200 mètres.

Elle monte en ligne droite à un point milieu entre les deux sources portant en commun le nom de Tchiftekan, et de là se porte en ligne directe à la crête du mont Sourkew.

La Commission a procédé ensuite à l'érection de deux bornes : l'une pour marquer l'endroit où la frontière quitte le ruisseau de Tchamperaw, l'autre l'endroit où elle quitte le chemin pour monter vers les sources.

La prochaine séance a été fixée à Moussek.

En conséquence, on a arrêté pendant cette séance la frontière entre les monts Galasch et Sourkew et le sort du village de Tchamperaw.

Fait le 27 juin, 1914.

V. MINORSKY.
A. C. WRATISLAW
ETELA-OL-MULK.
AZ. SAMIH.

Exposé communiqué par M. le Commissaire persan aux Commissaires des Puissances médiatrices, le 25 juin, 1914.

Les droits du Gouvernement persan sur la localité de Tchamperaw sont tellement claires que je crois inutile de m'étendre trop sur cette question. Je me contenterai seulement de citer les arguments suivants qui, j'en suis sûr, feront prévaloir leur autorité au premier examen qu'on en fera :

1. A la finale du chapitre 41 de son rapport où Dervich Pacha fait la description de la ligne frontière des deux États, il est formellement écrit que la frontière passe entre les villages de Siah-Guevz et de Tchamperaw. En voici, d'ailleurs, la traduction :

"La ligne frontière passe par . . . . . le col de Now-Khouvan . . . . . le mont Berdé-Ketchel et, séparant Tchamperaw—village qui jusqu'à ces derniers temps faisait partie de Kyzyldja et qui aujourd'hui est en possession d'Ahmed Bey, originaire de Bané—du village de Siah-Guevz, atteint le mont de Sourkew. . . . . ."

2. Dans le chapitre 42, où Dervich Pacha donne la liste des villages qui dans ces parages sont entre les mains de la Perse, il est fait mention de Tchamperaw aussi bien que de Piran, Bayawi, Khanoumi et autres qui, tous, sont réstes à la Perse.

3. Dans le chapitre 43, Dervich Pacha, désireux d'affaiblir la puissance des aveux qu'il a faits dans les deux chapitres précités relativement à l'appartenance de Tchamperaw à la Perse, il dit que ce village a été donné par Suleïman Pacha à Djafar Bey, son domestique, originaire du Bané.

Or, en examinant bien l'ensemble des preuves que Dervich Pacha a citées pour prouver la dominance ottomane sur telle ou telle autre partie de la frontière, on s'aperçoit clairement que la base la plus solide des droits de l'État est fondée sur la propriété privée des sujets de cet État. En d'autres termes, c'est de la propriété privée des nationaux que découlaient à cette époque les droits du Gouvernement (voir, par exemple, commencement chapitre 43 relatif à Benovi-Souté). Et il n'y a aucun doute pour Dervich Pacha lui-même qu'en 1848 Tchamperaw appartenait à Ahmed Bey, sujet persan.

Enfin, aujourd'hui même tous les habitants de cette région, les sujets ottomans de Siah-Gouvz également, avouent que Tchamperaw a toujours été en territoire persan, et personne ne s'y souvient de la domination ottomane.

En présence de ces arguments, surtout ceux tirés des chapitres 41 et 42 du livre de Dervich Pacha, on ne peut douter un instant de l'appartenance à la Perse de Tchamperaw lors de la conclusion du Traité d'Erzeroum et, par conséquent, de ce fait qu'il restera toujours en territoire persan, étant donné que le Protocole de Constantinople se réfère au sujet de cette question au *statu quo* de 1848.

ETELA-OL-MULK.

Le 26 juin, 1914.

Exposé communiqué par M. le Commissaire ottoman aux Commissaires des Puissances médiatrices, le 25 juin, 1914.

A l'article 1er du Protocole de Constantinople, il est dit que la frontière passe dans la direction de Tchamperaw. S'agissant de direction, les discussions à ce propos doivent être réservées à ce village seul.

Des informations puisées des villageois de Syah-Keuz, il ressort que les champs de Tchamperaw cessent, du côté ouest, trop près du village. Les autres endroits appartenant à Syah-Keuz, il me paraît nécessaire de restreindre l'étude à la limite du croquis annexé à cet exposé.

Le village de Tchamperaw, comme il est écrit au chapitre 43 du livre de Dervich Pacha, faisait partie des territoires de l'Empire ottoman. A cette époque il n'y avait pas d'habitant et ce n'était qu'un pâturage. Mehmed Pacha, Gouverneur de Souleïmanieh, l'a destiné à un de ses anciens serviteurs, Djafer Bey. Cet acte du Vali prouve, il est vrai, un droit de propriété à Djafar Bey, mais il ne donne jamais lieu à la possession de cet endroit par la Perse. Le droit de possession d'un État ne peut dépendre de la sujetion de son propriétaire.

Plus tard, sur ces terrains, un village fut construit et durant tout le temps que les Pachas de Baban ont gouverné Souleïmanieh rien ne fut demandé de ses habitants. A ce moment, le Gouvernement ottoman percevait des redevances fiscales par l'entremise des chefs de localité sans s'adresser aux particuliers. Il s'ensuit que les Gouverneurs de Souleïmanieh payaient aussi les impôts de Tchamperaw. Le fait que Djafer Bey et son fils, déclarant Tchamperaw dépendre de Souleïmanieh, n'ont rien payé aux autorités persanes prouve que le Gouvernement persan n'a aucun droit sur ce village.

D'autre part, il est rapporté dans le journal de voyage de Hourchid Effendi (p. 243) que, jusqu'en 1267 de l'Hégire, le sandjak de Souleïmanieh était octroyé à un descendant des Babans, avec le titre de pacha, après quoi ceux-ci chargaient un des leurs à en percevoir les impôts. Ces gens disposaient ainsi de ces villages et autres, comme des propriétés privées. Le village en question était dans le même cas. L'année 1267 correspond à peu près à l'année 1848, c'est-à-dire au moment de la conclusion du Traité d'Erzeroum, Tchamperaw était en possession ottomane.

Aux pp. 258 et 259 du même journal, Hourchid Effendi mentionne Tchamperaw parmi les villages dépendant du caza de Kyzyldja. Ces villages étaient au nombre de cinquante, dont sept en ruine et quarante-trois florissants. A la p. 243 du même livre, il est dit également qu'après la destitution du dernier Pacha de Baban, Abdullah Pacha, le général du corps d'armée de Bagdad, Namik Pacha, vint à Souleïmanieh. Il confisqua les immeubles de certaines personnes et les attacha aux biens de l'État, pour d'autres il les fit enregistrer et les dîmes seules revenaient aux propriétaires (Hourchid Effendi, p. 245). Les premiers on les appela villages de l'État et les seconds villages dont les dîmes font exception à la loi.

Ainsi les quarante-trois villages de Kyzyldja étaient dans le second cas, c'est-à-dire que leurs dîmes étaient laissées aux propriétaires.

Or, il ressort de tout ce qui précède que Tchamperaw se trouvait parmi ces quarante-trois villages et le Gouvernement ottoman avait laissé la perception des dîmes aux fils de Djafer Bey.

Ceci n'implique nullement le désintéressement du Gouvernement ottoman de Tchamperaw, car le plus grand nombre des quarante-trois villages qui étaient dans le même état se trouvent actuellement en territoire ottoman.

Ressoul Bey, Caïmacan de Chevekel, a perçu des impôts du village en question et à la mort de celui-ci, il y a vingt ans, il n'y eut plus de caïmacan à Chevekel et on n'a pas perçu d'impôts depuis.

Le droit de possession du Gouvernement ottoman de Tchamperaw se trouve pleinement établi, tandis que le Gouvernement persan n'a jamais exercé aucune autorité à cet endroit.

La situation géographique même de ce village démontre qu'il fait partie des villages de Kyzyldja, et non de la Perse, de laquelle il est séparé par une chaîne magistrale.

En 1297, Moutemedus-Saltaneh et en 1305 Fettah, Khan de Bané, se sont présentés à Tchamperaw pour demander de l'argent; mais les villageois leur déclarant dépendre de la Turquie et ne payant rien, leur village fut saccage et incendié.

Exposant ci-haut mes considérations à propos de Tchamperaw, je me rapporte à l'appréciation impartiale et éclaircie de MM. les commissaires médiateurs pour statuer sur le sort de ce village.

Le Commissaire Impérial ottoman,
AZ. SAMIH.

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1. Mahmoud Hassan ..	Syah-Keuz.
2. Feredj ..	..
3. Hama Kerim	..
4. Kale mal..	Tchamperaw.
5. Rahman ..	Siah-Keuz, domicilié à Tchamperaw.
6. Rahman ..	
7. Sali Hama tchavouch	Tchamperaw.
8. Ahmed Ismail	"
9. Kerim Fata	"
10. Aziz ..	Syah-Keuz.
11. Hama Kerim	"
12. Nasroullah	"
13. Feredj ..	"
14. Salih Moustapha ..	"
15. Feredj ..	Tchamperaw.
16. Aziz ..	Syah-Keuz.
17. Mahmoud	"
18. Rechid Keuhé	"
19. Keuhé ..	"
20. Sidki Hadji	"
21. Mahmoud Slah	"
22. Feredj ..	Tchamperaw.
23. Keuhé ..	Syah-Keuz.

Ayant examiné les exposés ottoman et persan concernant la question du village de Tchamperaw en date d'aujourd'hui, et prenant en considération :

1. Qu'en vertu du protocole final, "le sort [de Tchamperaw] sera statué par la Commission de Délimitation sur la base du principe accepté de *statu quo*";

2. Que Dervich Pacha, parlant du *statu quo* de la frontière des deux États en 1848 (paragraphe 41), explicitement affirme que la frontière passe entre les villages de Siah-Guvèze et Tchamperaw;

3. Que nos observations personnelles ne nous donnent pas lieu à croire que le *statu quo* ait changé depuis 1848;

nous décidons que le village de Tchamperaw restera à la Perse et que la frontière descendra du Galache et montera sur le Sour-kew en passant entre les villages Siah-Guvèze et de Tchamperaw en suivant la frontière actuellement reconnue entre leurs champs, en tant que les considérations géographiques le permettent. Il est évident que la frontière ne préjugera pas l'appartenance des champs d'un parti ou de l'autre qui pourraient se trouver situés de l'autre côté de la frontière.

Fait à Tchamperaw, le 14 (27) juin, 1914.

A. C. WRATISLAW.
V. MINORSKY.

Rapport.

Conformément aux ordres de la Commission ci-annexés, les soussignés ont érigé une borne sur le partage des eaux à l'endroit où le chemin conduisant de Khalouzat à Kani Serd traverse le partage des eaux entre la rivière Kyzyldja et de Chirwan.

Ce col est connu, paraît-il, sous le nom de Kal-i-Meilak.

Dimensions :

Hauteur, 2¼ mètres.
Diamètre, 3 mètres.

Construction en pierres peintes en rouge.

A. T. W.
D. A.
O. KADRI.
SALAR MOZAFFER.

Instructions.

La Commission a chargé une sous-commission, composée de MM. le Colone Andriewsky, le Capitaine Wilson, Kadri Effendi, Salar Mozaffer, d'ériger une borne à l'endroit où le chemin conduisant de Khalouzat à Kani Serd traverse le partage des eaux.

AZ. SAMIH.
V. MINORSKY.
A. C. WRATISLAW.
ETELA-OL-MULK.

Massoud, le 19 *juin*, 1914.

Rapport.

Conformément à l'ordre de la Commission ci-annexé, les soussignés ont érigé les bornes suivantes :

1. Sur le col de Now Khovan, sur un petit monticule entre les deux routes qui traversent ce col : un entassement de pierres de 1½ mètre de hauteur et 1 mètre de diamètre.
2. Sur le col de Doubéré au nord de Darou Khan : un entassement de pierres de 2 mètres de hauteur et 3 mètres de base.
3. Sur le col entre Vénah et Nanour : un entassement de pierres 1½ mètre de hauteur et 1½ mètre de diamètre.
4. Sur le col entre les villages d'Ahmedabad et Serambend (Serunben) sur la grande route entre Pendjevine et Bané passant par Mirava, à l'ouest de la route : un entassement de pierres 1½ mètres de hauteur, 1½ mètre de diamètre.

Ce col est connu, à ce qu'il paraît, sous le nom de Milleh Yovalan, et la montagne par laquelle elle passe du nom de Berde Diwan.

V. MINORSKY.
A. HAMID.
A. T. W.
D. B.
D. ANDRIEWSKY.
S. M.

La Commission a chargé une sous-commission, composée de Hamid Bey, Mehmet Effendi (Turquie), Salar Muzaffer, Mohsin Khan (Perse), le Colonel Andriewsky (Russie), le Capitaine Wilson (Angleterre), de mettre une borne à chacune des localités suivantes :

1. Sur la route qui passe par le col de Nou-Kouvan ;
2. Sur la route qui suit Déré-Kouterech ;
3. Sur la route qui va de Véna à Nanor ;
4. Sur la route qui va de Pendjevine à Bané ;

Aux endroits où ces routes traversent le partage des eaux que suit la frontière.

A. C. WRATISLAW.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
V. MINORSKY
AZ. SAMIH.

Le 20 *juin*, 1914.

Enclosure 8 in No. 217.

Procès-verbal of Fifty-eighth Meeting of Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

SÉANCE tenue près de Kandol, le 6 juillet, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire ottoman.

Étaient présents tous les commissaires.

Le procès-verbal de la dernière séance a été lu et approuvé et celui de l'avant-dernière séance signé.

MM. les commissaires ont également signé les originaux des Cartes supplémentaires Nos. 10 et 11.

MM. les commissaires ottoman et persan ont communiqué ensuite l'accord intervenu entre eux à propos de la partie de la frontière s'étendant de Sourkew à la rivière de Kialou (le Petit Zab). Cet accord a été ainsi défini : La frontière suit les crêtes de Sourkew jusqu'à l'endroit où la route Dounès–Moussek traverse la ligne des crêtes. Un tas de pierres constaté à cet endroit a été reconnue comme une borne. De là, la frontière continue à suivre les crêtes et, arrivée à celle située à un quart de mille environ au nord-ouest de l'endroit susdit, et où une autre borne a été érigée, elle tombe dans un ravin et le suit jusqu'à sa jonction avec la rivière de Bané (Khilé-Resch, d'après le Protocole de Constantinople).

Elle descend cette rivière et arrive au Kialou (le Petit Zab).

M. le commissaire persan relève que deux questions sont restées sans solution : l'une, le droit de pâturage des Sindjabis, et, l'autre, l'évacuation de Kalé-Hav. Il demande à son collègue ottoman s'il a reçu des instructions à ce sujet. M. le Commissaire ottoman répond qu'il s'est référé à propos de la question des Sindjabis à Constantinople, mais qu'il n'a pas reçu de réponse. Quant à l'évacuation des localités revenant à la Perse et qui seraient occupées par la Turquie, il déclare qu'il a reçu l'autorisation d'en ordonner l'évacuation. Il promet, d'ailleurs, de télégraphier aussitôt l'ordre d'évacuer Kalé-Hav.

MM. les commissaires ont ensuite considéré l'application du passage du protocole relatif à la partie de la frontière s'étendant du Kialou vers le nord. Le terme "extrémité sud de Tépé Salos" a été différemment interprété par MM. les commissaires des parties intéressées.

M. le commissaire ottoman soutient que la frontière doit descendre de Tépé Salos vers le sud de manière à laisser en territoire ottoman Gaké et Horzéné, deux villages qui ont de tout temps appartenu au Gouvernement ottoman.

M. le commissaire persan est d'avis que l'extrémité sud veut dire la partie sud-ouest de la colline, c'est-à-dire celle qui est la plus rapprochée du Kialou et que la frontière doit descendre directement à cette rivière. M. le commissaire fait observer, en outre, que la frontière ne peut pas dévier de la description du protocole jusqu'à aller contourner le village de Gaké. Quant à Herzéné, tout en convenant que ce village est actuellement en possession ottomane, il propose par esprit de conciliation la combinaison suivant afin de trouver une ligne géographique et naturelle :

La frontière descendra de l'extrémité sud de Tépé Salos directement à la rivière, de manière à laisser Herzéné du côté persan. Par contre, arrivée devant le village de Chenié, elle laissera celui-ci du côté ottoman.

M. le commissaire ottoman déclare ne pouvoir accepter cette proposition, étant donné, dit-il, que tous les deux villages sont et ont été en possession ottomane.

La discussion de cette question est remise à la prochaine séance.

Fait le 6 juillet, 1914.

AZ. SAMIH.
A. C. WRATISLAW.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
V. MINORSKY.

[66330] No. 218.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 3.)

(No. 591.)
(Telegraphic.) *Petrograd, November* 2, 1914.

RUSSIAN policy in Persia.

I read Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning your telegram No. 958 of 1st November and impressed on him the necessity of his adoption of a conciliatory and friendly attitude towards Persia. His Excellency said that I might assure you that he would do all he could to meet your wishes, more especially as it was to Russia's interest to keep on friendly terms with Persia on account of supplies which she can draw from that country. Turkey, he said, would almost certainly attack Russia on the flank through Azerbaijan, and in protecting herself on that side Russia would also be protecting Persia against Turkish aggression. I expressed the hope that Russia would make it quite clear that any military measures

which she might be forced to take on Persian territory had for their object the maintenance of the integrity of Persia, and not its dismemberment.

I have promised to give his Excellency to-morrow a memorandum embodying your above-mentioned telegram, and will ask him to give me a written reply.

[66812] No. 219.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 3.)

(No. 320.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, November 3, 1914.*

YOUR telegram No. 271 of 1st November.

I have discussed situation with my Russian colleague, who concurs with me in all particulars.

He does not consider Cossack brigade could now undertake expedition against Salar, as many Russian officers have been recalled. It would also appear to be a risky proceeding to send Russian officers at head of Persian expedition into a part of country in which hostilities may take place between Russian and Turkish troops. If an expedition is sent he thinks it should be formed of gendarmes. If Salar is really back in Persia he will probably either join Turks or endeavour to lead an expedition against Tehran. My information does not point to his having serious following. There is so much uncertainty about the future if hostilities occur between Russia and Turkey that I am of opinion that it would be better if all forces upon which some reliance can be placed remained at Tehran or on the road between Hamadan and Tehran, so as to control any possible popular movement that may occur here, and also to repel any attack made by Salar. Such a joint communication to Salar as M. Sazonof proposes could only have salutary effect, as it would serve to convince Salar that he can expect no sympathy from either Government.

Now that all trade with Bagdad has ceased, Farman Farma can do us no harm. but previous experience has shown that he is most unlikely to effect Salar's capture, Since his departure the Kermanshah district has been much quieter.

Concerning change of Cabinet, Russian Minister authorises me to say that each of the three statesmen mentioned would be the same to him.

He thinks Saad would make unacceptable conditions if he took office. We are both of opinion that, under the conditions prevailing to-day, it would be better to maintain present Prime Minister and, if possible, get him to substitute [group undecypherable] -er man for Ala-es-Sultaneh and to change Minister of Finance.

If Saad or Vossuk were forced upon the Shah and if war with Turkey breaks out, we shall be obliged to consider the advisibility of not irritating the Persians. Moreover, the Medjliss will probably meet in a week or two, and it will then be no easy task to force change of Cabinet. I have also reason to know that the Shah would much resent such an attempt.

(Repeated to Petrograd.)

[65745] No. 220.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 966.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 3, 1914.*

SIR W. TOWNLEY'S telegram No. 316 of 31st October: Gendarmerie in Persia.

You should speak to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding last paragraph of this telegram in connection with my telegram No. 958 of 1st November.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 273.)

[66239] No. 221.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 274.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 4, 1914.*

YOUR telegram No. 318 of 1st November: Gendarmerie.

Penultimate paragraph.

I do attach importance to Swedes' presence.

[67242] No. 222.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 602.)
(Telegraphic.) *Petrograd, November 4, 1914.*

YOUR telegram No. 966 of 3rd November: Collection of taxes by Russian consuls in Persia.

I spoke to Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning as instructed.

His Excellency said that question was rather complicated one and that he could not give me an answer straight off. I reminded him that when I first made representations to him on the subject I had been informed that the only object which the intervention of consuls had in view was to facilitate collection of revenues, but that none of revenue thus collected ever found its way into the Persian Treasury. I trusted that, in view of what you had said in your telegram No. 958 of 1st November, that he would take this opportunity of giving Persia proof of his good-will by instructing the consuls to hand over proceeds of the taxes which they had collected to the Persian Treasury.

His Excellency referred once more to the necessity of providing for repayment of advances made by Russian Bank to certain Persian subjects, while I contended that bank had no right to recover its bad debts at expense of Persian Government.

Minister for Foreign Affairs promised to go into the question and to let me have an answer shortly.

[68499] No. 223.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 327.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, November 7, 1914.*

MY telegram No. 320 of 3rd November.

I understand that Russian Legation has demanded reappointment of Farman Farma as Governor-General of Kermanshah.

I have been informed by Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs that Government does not intend to accede to Russian request. I told my Russian colleague yesterday that mere rumour that Farman Farma was to be reappointed had provoked strong protest from local manager of Imperial Bank of Persia and other British interests.

Russian Minister replied that he saw no reason why the present arrangement, which appeared to be working well, should be altered, and added that he personally had no desire to see the Prince return to Kermanshah.

(Repeated to Petrograd.)

[68669] No. 224.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 8.)

(No. 328.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, November 8, 1914.*

PERSIAN Government has summoned and separately warned the clergy, press, and independent notables that no action in favour of one belligerent more than another must be taken. We shall all the same have to guard against multiple endeavours to inflame public opinion against Russians and us incidentally. Already two false stories have made no small impression—one that Russian troops at Kazvin were marching on Tehran, the other that Russian Cossack officer had endeavoured to take familiarities with Persian woman in the bazaars.

Although the two Governments have decided not to assist Persia financially any more, I think excellent impression would be made, and a good work done, if some money were found for the police and the gendarmerie, as it appears to me really important that Imperial Government should have these forces to depend on at least as long as the war lasts. Important though their maintenance is in the south, it is even more important here.

(Repeated to Petrograd.)

[68499] No. 225.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 1000.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November* 10, 1914.

SIR W. TOWNLEY'S telegram No. 327 of 7th November.

It is to be hoped, in view of opinion of Russian Minister at Tehran, that no change will be made at Kermanshah. You should mention this when opportunity offers.

[70844] No. 226.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 637.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Petrograd, November* 13, 1914.

YOUR telegram No. 966 of 3rd November.

Russian Government have sent the necessary instructions to the Russian consuls to pay into Persian Treasury at the end of each month taxes collected by them from Russian subjects and protected persons.

(Repeated to Tehran.)

[71821] No. 227.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 336.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, November* 16, 1914.

FOLLOWING received from Tabriz, 14th November:—

"Shuja-ed-Dowleh is expected here in a few days. His return, however, I am informed by my Russian colleague, is in a private capacity only, and he will reside at Maraga, and not at Tabriz."

Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed certain anxiety about this the other day. I assured him that there was no cause for alarm. As far as I am aware, Shuja left Persia of his own accord.

(Repeated to Petrograd.)

[72650] No. 228.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 339. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, November* 18, 1914.

MY telegram No. 287 of 1st October.

I have ascertained from secret source that American Minister here has been instructed to bring to the notice of the Persian Government action taken by Russia towards Germans in Azerbaijan. Consul at Tabriz has also been instructed to give asylum to German consul and his wife if their lives are in immediate danger. They have been at United States consulate for some time, and their lives were and are in no danger. Mr Bryan states that he is taking action at instigation of German Ambassador.

Previous to receipt of this information I had advised my Russian colleague to let German consul come here, as he cannot do much harm and it would help Russian Government. He has telegraphed to Petrograd in this sense.

Meanwhile situation at Tabriz has changed, and there is a chance of the boot being on the other foot, as Russian consul-general has sent his archives away and talks of leaving himself.

Situation will form subject of another telegram, but does not seem to me to justify feeling of panic which appears to prevail at Tabriz.

(Repeated to Petrograd.)

[72670] No. 229.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 343.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, November* 18, 1914.

MY telegram No. 274 of 19th September: Persia.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has addressed a second identic note to Russian Minister and myself asking that service of loans and advances secured on customs revenues may be postponed for one year, and that advance of 3,000,000 tomans (about 500,000*l.*) may be made to Persia by the two countries. It is argued that war is largely to blame for Persia's present pressing difficulties, since customs revenues have fallen off about 50,000*l.* during first six months of the current Persian year.

(Repeated to Petrograd.)

[73465] No. 230.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 346.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, November* 20, 1914.

YOUR telegram No. 296 of 18th November.

I much regret that I have come to the conclusion that present Cabinet lacks the courage to carry through such an important business as the sale of islands. Since my telegram No. 315 of 30th October, I have received thoroughly unsatisfactory note from Foreign Minister, evading question directly, but making it evident that nothing can be done until Medjliss meets.

Minister has at the same time told me that we shall have our wish in time, but that we must be patient. I do not attach much importance to his assurance. It would not appear to me sufficient to justify our holding up Strick's negotiation.

[73486] No. 231.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 347. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, November* 20, 1914.

MY telegram No. 341 of 19th November: Persia.

I am informed that Prime Minister has stated openly that the Medjliss will be opened on 15th Moharrem, which begins to-morrow.

I understand that Moderates, who form majority, and the Democrats, who form powerful minority, are combining to put forward New Cabinet that will have their confidence whilst containing elements in it of a sufficiently Russophil nature to satisfy Russian Legation. No one can, however, be found to support such men as Saad-ed-Dowleh or Vossuk-ed-Dowleh.

(Sent to Petrograd.)

[73019] No. 232.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 302.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November* 21, 1914.

YOUR despatch No. 227 of 3rd August: South Persia.

While general situation is certainly obscure, and little can be done apparently to make progress in Persia, I should be glad to receive your views regarding the possibility of bringing influence to bear in Luristan, as mentioned in paragraph 6 of above-mentioned despatch, with a view to facilitate the Khoremabad Railway project.

You should also submit any suggestions for reconciling interests of Sheikh of

Mohammerah with those of Bakhtiari khans, and, with reference to your despatch No. 224 of 3rd August, any suggestions for attaching the Bakhtiari to British interests, and for countering Russian methods in Ispahan, on the hypothesis that no general arrangement with Russia regarding spheres, or other large questions, is possible in the near future.

[73486] No. 233.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 1078.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November* 22, 1914.

SIR W. TOWNLEY's telegram No. 347 of 20th November: Persian Cabinet.

In view of apparent intention of Persian Government to show accommodating spirit, it is very desirable, especially after activity of Mesopotamian Mujteheddin to arouse Persians against the allies, to be conciliatory.

Your Excellency might unofficially express to Minister for Foreign Affairs strong hope that the names of the two ex-Ministers will not be pressed.

(Repeated to Tehran No. 304.)

[74563] No. 234.

Captain Wilson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 25.)
Sir, *Camp Bazirgah, October* 8, 1914.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 21, dated the 26th August, I have the honour to enclose herewith, for your information, copy of a despatch which I have addressed to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, describing the proceedings of this Commission from the 27th August to date.

I have, &c.
A. T. WILSON, *Captain, I.A.*

Enclosure in No. 234.

Captain Wilson to Sir L. Mallet.

(No. 54.)
Sir, *Camp Bazirgah, October* 8, 1914.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 50, dated the 26th August, I have the honour to submit, for your Excellency's information, the following report upon the proceedings of this Commission subsequent to that date.

2. From the 27th August to the 3rd September we were engaged on erecting the necessary pillars between Kotoul Dagh and Pir Omar Dagh, the southern limit of the Kotoul district; the country was difficult; on the Persian side it was barren, whilst on the Turkish side supplies were almost unobtainable, everything having been commandeered by the troops. For this reason I asked Colonel Ryder to rejoin me at Khaniga, near Pir Omar Dagh, with the main British Commission, I myself with four men and a few mules accompanying my colleagues, who also restricted the size of their caravans, along the frontier.

It was whilst the party were on their way to Khaniga that Mr. Hubbard was severely wounded, under the circumstances detailed in the enclosure to my despatch No. 52 dated the 6th September.

3. The news only reached me on the 3rd September, at Khaniga, where we were holding a *séance* to discuss our further movements. I had, as usual, been urging my colleagues to continue the work without intermission, and M. Minorsky, as usual, had represented himself in urgent need of a rest, and had just secured the postponement of the next *séance* till the 7th, my Persian and Turkish colleagues being ready as usual to agree to whatever course involved the least personal exertion to themselves.

4. Had we continued to demarcate without intermission we might have completed the Kotour frontier before the orders of the Turkish Government were received, and

only the evacuation of the five villages by the Turks would have been in issue; as it is, the frontier in this region has not been demarcated, though excellent detailed maps have been prepared by the Indian surveyors, the sketches submitted to the Commission by the Russian survey party being found to be quite unreliable.

5. I at once returned to Ashnok to rejoin main British Commission, which left under Colonel Ryder for Kotour on the following day, Captain Pierpoint, Indian Medical Service, and myself remaining with Mr. Hubbard in order to transport him, when his condition permitted, to Khoi *en route* to Julfa and Batoum.

Nothing was decided at the first *séance* held in the Kotour district under the presidency of Colonel Ryder, the supplementary maps (to prepare which Russian surveyors had been sent on ten days ahead) being found quite untrustworthy, and it was decided to send Indian surveyors to map the ground afresh.

6. On the following day the Turkish commissioner handed to his colleagues a laconic note, saying: "J'ai reçu ordre de mon Gouvernement de cesser la délimitation."

This communication came as a surprise to all, none of us having any idea as to the reason which had caused the Turkish Government to issue such orders, though the Turkish secretary informed us privately that the inhabitants of the six villages destined to be transferred to Persia,* alarmed at the prospect of being handed over to the tender mercies of the local Persian chiefs (who are brigands of the worst kind, with a bad reputation for cruelty and oppression), had been protesting by telegram to Van and Constantinople.

7. Colonel Ryder and M. Minorsky sent an identic telegram† to Constantinople the same day, and in the meanwhile Colonel Ryder, as doyen of the corps technique and as Acting British Secretary, urged upon all concerned the expediency of completing the maps, and of accepting without delay the provisional description of the frontier, which, thanks to him and to Mr. Hubbard, had been prepared some time back, and the greater part of which was only waiting for M. Minorsky's tardy approval.

8. On the 10th September a further identic telegram‡ was sent asking for information as to the cause of the stoppage of work by the Porte.

9. No reply to these telegrams was received from your Excellency, but on the 13th September intimation was received from the Turkish commissioner that the Grand Vizier had promised to issue orders for the demarcation to continue. At a further meeting on the 14th, however, Aziz Bey, being absent with a convenient sore throat, and his substitute feigning ignorance of any orders to continue, a third telegram was sent,§ M. Minorsky simultaneously suggesting to his embassy, in cypher, with Colonel Ryder's concurrence, a solution of the *impasse* on the following lines:—

"Grand Vizier to instruct the Turkish commissioner to continue work, giving at the same time to the embassies a written declaration stating that it was necessary temporarily to retain Turkish troops in the villages in question; the Turkish commissioner, subsequent to the demarcation, to make a similar declaration to his colleagues; in case of absolute necessity Kotour could be omitted altogether."

10. On the 17th September the Turkish commissioner announced that he had received orders to continue the demarcation provided that Kotour was left alone. The same evening the Russian commissioner received a telegram *en clair* from his Minister saying that the Grand Vizier had agreed that the work of demarcation should continue provided that the evacuation of the disputed villages was postponed until after demobilisation. This was agreed to, and on the 18th idem the whole Commission left for Sarai.

The question of Kotour is one which concerns Russia rather than ourselves, and Colonel Ryder therefore associated himself with M. Minorsky, as I should have done had I been present, in accepting this solution, in view of M. Minorsky's anxiety to continue demarcation.

But we both consider that, had further representations been made, it is probable

* Biledjik, Razi, Gharatil, Djellik (2), Panamerik.

† "Venons recevoir lettre officielle notre collègue ottoman, qui nous fait part réception ordres de son Gouvernement de cesser la délimitation. Le commissaire ottoman se dit prêt terminer travaux secrétariat et avoir séance pour signature des cartes. Impossibilité terminer le peu de travail qui reste jusque Ararat serait regrettable. Attendons instructions vos Excellences."—Kotour, September 8.

‡ "Prochaine séance, le 14 septembre. Ignorant cause cessation travaux. Sollicitons vos Excellences nous éclairer là-dessus. Prions vouloir bien accélérer instructions. Permission communiquer en chiffres pas encore obtenue.—Kotour, September 10.

§ Commissaire ottoman nous fait savoir qu'il n'a pas encore reçu instructions reprendre travail. Retard réponse ottomane va créer grandes difficultés point vue climat.—Kotour, September 14.

that demarcation could have been carried out on the conditions which it appears the Grand Vizier originally put forward.

At a meeting held on the 20th at Sarai the frontier was settled in principle up to Kyzyl Ziaret, West of Maku, and by the 27th the Commission had finished demarcation up to Egri Tchai.

11. In the meanwhile, I had reached Khoi with Mr. Hubbard on the 12th, his condition making it extremely difficult to move him more than 10 miles a day owing to the pain that any movement gave him. On the 20th he left for Julfa by Russian motor ambulance, *en route* for Batoum, accompanied by Captain Pierpoint, I.M.S. and Captain F. L. Dyer, I.A. The journey was painful in the extreme to him, owing to the nature of the conveyance and the condition of the road, but after three days rest at Julfa he was able to leave by train for Batoum, special arrangements being made to facilitate his journey to the Russian authorities, who have been most helpful throughout.

12. On the 26th August I had suggested to Government that the bulk of the British officers with this Commission could be spared for military duty, to which they were anxious to revert. This telegram was apparently deliberately mutilated *en route*, and owing to the inevitable delays consequent on my distance from the nearest telegraph station, it was not until the 9th September that I was able to repeat it. On the 19th September I received instructions from the Government of India to send back Major Cowie, R.E., and Captain Brooke to India without delay. These orders were at once communicated to them on the frontier, and on the 24th September they left for Port Saïd for Batoum. They brought in with them, at my request, practically the whole staff of the British Commission, including all the escort and the bulk of the survey party (two surveyors remaining with Colonel Ryder). On the 25th I despatched twenty-three mules, with surplus tents and stores, for Tabriz. On the 26th I despatched a caravan to Mohammerah viâ Ispahan with all our spare gear, for shipment to India and elsewhere; and on the 27th I despatched the escort, survey party, and Indian servants to Kermanshah, *en route* for India viâ Bagdad, leaving at Khoi with myself only the head clerk and two servants.

The escort, &c., should reach Bagdad before the cold weather begins in earnest and its departure has greatly diminished the monthly cost of the British Commission, all Persian servants and four mules out of five having been dismissed.

After devoting two days at Khoi to the preparation of my accounts, I left on the 30th September for Maku, arriving on the 3rd October. I here learned that the Commission was expected at Bazirgah on the 6th October, on which date I left Maku to rejoin Colonel Ryder there.

In spite of a snowstorm, which should have warned them of the danger of delay, and with Ararat in sight, and war in these regions apparently imminent, Colonel Ryder found his colleagues (including M. Minorsky) no more inclined than usual to exert themselves to bring the work to a speedy conclusion.

The local Turkish authorities have lately been obstructive, preventing our surveyors from working, the Persians impotent, or conspicuous by their absence, whilst the good intentions of the Russian consular authorities are hampered by the presence in the neighbourhood of large bodies of Russian troops, whose presence they wish to conceal from the Turish Commission as far as possible. Apart from this, the Turkish commissioner has for some time shown a lack of energy in prosecuting the work of demarcation amounting to obstruction, and on the 6th October, after arranging for a meeting of a sub-commission on the frontier at 10 A.M., he failed to put in an appearance but proceeded to Bayazid, feigning sickness, and taking with him all the officers of the Turkish Commission who could have replaced him on the sub-commission. The deputy Turkish commissioner who has spent the past six weeks at Van has, it is stated, been summoned to replace him.

Of the Persian Commission only Itila-ul-Mulk remains, all the other members, except the surveyors, having left to-day for Tehran.

13. I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Foreign Office.

I have, &c.

A. T. WILSON, *Captain, I.A.*

[74124]

No. 235.

Captain Wilson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 32.)
(Extract.)

Camp near Maku, October 26, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith copies of the proceedings of sittings Nos. 1–43 of the Turco-Persian Frontier Commission, with corrections and with certain other documents which it is desired to have printed, together with the *procès-verbaux* for convenience of reference.

I have, &c.

A. T. WILSON, *Captain, I.A.,*
British Commissioner,
Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

Enclosure 1 in No. 235.

LISTE du Personnel de la Commission mixte pour la Délimitation de la Frontière turco-persane.

Commission britannique.

Commissaire	M. A. C. Wratislaw, C.B., C.M.G.	Jusqu'au 15 juillet.
Commissaire-Adjoint ...	Le Capitaine A. T. Wilson, C.M.G.	Commissaire depuis le 16 juillet.
Secrétaire	Mr. G. E. Hubbard.	
Sous-Secrétaire	Abdul Alim Khan.	
Corps technique	Le Lieutenant-Colonel C. H. D. Ryder, D.S.O., R.E.	Commissaire-Adjoint depuis le 16 juillet.
	Le Major H. M. Cowie, R.E.	
	Haji Abdul Rahim Khan, Khan Bahadur	Jusqu'au 1er mai. Service topographique des Indes.
	Sher Jang, Khan Bahadur ...	
	Hamid Gul	
	Sujawal Khan	
Médecin	Le Capitaine H. W. Pierpoint, I.M.S.	
Commandant de l'Escorte...	Le Capitaine A. H. Brooke, 18th K.G.O. Lancers.	

Commission russe.

Commissaire	M. V. Minorsky.	
Commissaire-Adjoint ...	M. D. Belayew.	
Chef du Personnel militaire	Le Colonel de l'État-Major D. Andriewsky	Depuis juin jusqu'à septembre.
Corps technique	Le Capitaine S. Tskhakaya.	
	Le Capitaine M. Alieff	Jusqu'à août.
	Le Capitaine A. Jordanoff ...	Depuis juillet.
	Le Capitaine A. Tchernoff ...	" "
	Le Capitaine A. Emelianoff ...	" août.
Médecin	Le Docteur A. Volansky.	
Commandant de l'Escorte...	Yessaoul I. Bortnikow, Poltavsky Cossacks Regiment	Depuis juin jusqu'à septembre.

Commission persane.

Commissaire	Etéla-ol-Mulk.
Commissaire-Adjoint ...	Mansour-os-Saltaneh.
Secrétaire	Djalil-ul-Mulk.
Conseiller militaire ...	Salar Muzaffar.
Corps technique	Mirza Abdur Razak Khan, Sartip.
	Mohsen Khan.
	Mirza Ali Asghar Khan.
Médecin	Le Docteur Saïd-ol-Melk Hosain Khan.

Commission ottomane.

Commissaire	Le Major d'État-Major Aziz Samih Bey.
Commissaire-Adjoint ...	Le Capitaine d'État-Major Abdul Hamid Bey.
Secrétaire	Basri Bey.
Corps technique	Le Capitaine Mehmed Effendi.
	Le Capitaine Salih Effendi.
	Le Lieutenant Kadri Effendi.
Médecin	Le Docteur Djevdet Effendi.
Commandant de l'Escorte...	Le Capitaine Saïd Effendi.

Enclosure 2 in No. 235.

Protocole relatif à la Délimitation turco-persane, signé à Constantinople le 4 (17) Novembre, 1913.

LES soussignés, son Excellence Sir Louis Mallet, Ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté britannique auprès de Sa Majesté le Sultan, son Excellence Mirza Mahmoud Khan Kadjar Ehtéchamos-Saltaneh, Ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté le Schah de Perse auprès de Sa Majesté le Sultan, son Excellence M. Michel de Giers, Ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie auprès de Sa Majesté le Sultan, son Altesse le Prince Saïd Halim Pacha, Grand Vézir et Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de l'Empire ottoman, se sont réunis dans le but de consigner au présent protocole l'arrangement au sujet de la frontière turco-persane intervenu entre leurs Gouvernements respectifs.

Ils ont commencé par récapituler la marche que les récentes négociations engagées entre eux ont suivie jusqu'à ce jour.

La Commission mixte prévue par l'article 1er du protocole signé à Téhéran entre l'Ambassade Impériale ottomane et le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Perse en vue d'arrêter les bases des pourparlers relatifs à la délimitation de la frontière turco-persane, a tenu dix-huit séances, dont la première a eu lieu le 12 (25) mars et la dernière le 9 (22) août, 1912.

Le 9 (22) août, 1912, l'Ambassade Impériale de Russie à Constantinople a adressé à la Sublime Porte, *sub* No. 264, une note déclarant que "le Gouvernement Impérial estime qu'on ne saurait revenir assez sur la nécessité de la mise à l'exécution sans délai des stipulations explicites du Traité d'Erzeroum qui se ramènent au rétablissement du *statu quo* de 1848."

L'Ambassade Impériale a fait parvenir en même temps au Gouvernement Impérial ottoman un mémorandum exposant en détail le tracé de la frontière, conforme aux stipulations des traités en vigueur.

Le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman a répondu à cette communication par une note en date du 18 (31) mars, 1913, *sub* No. 30469/47. Il a déclaré que "la Sublime Porte, désireuse de satisfaire au désir exprimé par le Gouvernement Impérial de Russie en écartant toute cause de divergence dans ses rapports cordiaux avec lui, et voulant, d'autre part, témoigner au Gouvernement persan son entière bonne foi dans la contestation existant à ce sujet entre les deux pays, a décidé d'accorder son adhésion au tracé mentionné dans la note et le mémorandum précités de l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie pour la délimitation de la partie septentrionale de la frontière turco-persane depuis Serdar Boulak jusqu'à Bané, c'est-à-dire jusqu'à la hauteur du 36e parallèle de latitude."

Toutefois, le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman a suggéré quelques modifications à la ligne proposée dans le mémorandum annexé à la note de l'Ambassade Impériale de Russie en date du 9 (22) août, 1912, *sub* No. 264.

Le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman a en outre annexé à sa note "une notice explicative de la situation des limites du Zohab et de l'arrangement qu'elle pourrait accepter pour arriver à une entente définitive et équitable avec le Gouvernement persan dans cette partie de la frontière."

L'Ambassade Impériale de Russie a répondu par une note en date du 28 mars (10 avril), 1913, *sub* No. 78. Elle a pris acte de la déclaration "par laquelle le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman reconnaît pour principe de la délimitation du tronçon Ararat-Bané le sens précis de l'article 3 du Traité de 1848 dit d'Erzeroum, tel qu'il se trouve exposé dans la note du 9 (22) août, 1912, *sub* No. 264." Quant aux modifications proposées par la Sublime Porte, l'Ambassade Impériale a déclaré, tout en faisant une réserve sur la question d'Egri-tchaï, qu'elle ne saurait assez insister sur la nécessité de n'apporter aucune modification à la ligne établie dans sa note du 9 (22) août, 1912."

Pour la question du Zohab, l'Ambassade Impériale de Russie, tout en se réservant de présenter ses observations détaillées sur cette frontière, a émis "son opinion sur l'ensemble du projet ottoman qui ne lui semble pas garantir suffisamment pour l'avenir le maintien de l'ordre et de la paix sur les frontières."

Le 20 avril (3 mai), 1913, les Ambassades de Russie et de Grande-Bretagne ont adressé une note identique à son Altesse le Prince Saïd Halim Pacha, accompagnée d'un mémorandum résumant le point de vue sur la délimitation du Zohab et des régions situées au sud de ce district.

Cet échange de notes a été suivi par des pourparlers entre leurs Excellences M. de Giers et Sir Gerard Lowther, d'une part, et feu son Altesse Mahmoud Chefket Pacha, de l'autre. Le résultat de ces pourparlers a été relaté dans un aide-mémoire présenté par son Excellence l'Ambassadeur de Russie à son Altesse le Grand Vézir le 6 juin, 1913, et dans la note de la Sublime Porte adressée le 26 juin (9 juillet), 1913, *sub* No. 34553/95, à l'Ambassade de Russie, et le 12 juillet, 1913, à l'Ambassade de la Grande-Bretagne.

Le 29 juillet, 1913, une "déclaration" a été signée à Londres par Sir Edward Grey et son Altesse Ibrahim Hakky Pacha concernant le tracé de la ligne frontière méridionale entre la Perse et la Turquie.

L'Ambassade Impériale de Russie a ensuite tenu à récapituler les principes de délimitation établis dans la correspondance au sujet de la frontière turco-persane. Elle a adressé à cet effet à la Sublime Porte une note en date du 5 (18) août, 1913, *sub* No. 166. Une note identique a été adressée à la Sublime Porte par l'Ambassade de la Grande-Bretagne à la même date.

La Sublime Porte a répondu à ces communications par des notes identiques datées du 23 septembre, 1913, *sub* No. 37063/113.

A la suite des négociations subséquentes, les quatre plénipotentiaires de la Grande-Bretagne, de la Perse, de la Russie et de la Turquie sont tombés d'accord sur les dispositions suivantes :

I.

Il est convenu que la frontière entre la Perse et la Turquie sera tracée comme suit :

La frontière au nord partira du bornage No. XXXVII de la frontière turco-russe, se trouvant près de Serdar Boulak sur la crête entre le Grand et le Petit Ararat. Elle descendra ensuite vers le sud par les crêtes, laissant du côté persan la vallée de Dambat, la localité de Sarnytch et le système des eaux de Yarym-Kaya qui prend sa source au sud de la montagne d'Ayoubeg. La frontière laisse ensuite à la Perse la localité de Boulak-bachi et suit toujours la plus haute crête dont l'extrémité sud se trouve à peu près à 44° 22′ longitude et 39° 28′ latitude. Puis, contournant du côté ouest le marais qui s'étend à l'ouest de Yarym-Kaya, la frontière traverse le courant de Sary-Sou, passe entre les villages Guirdé-baran (turc) et Bazyrgan (persan) et montant sur la crête à l'ouest de Bazyrgan, suit le partage des eaux marqué par les crêtes de Saranli, Zendouli, Guir-Kélime, Kanly-baba, Guédouki-Khaziné et Dévédji.

Après Dévédji la ligne traversera la vallée d'Egri-tchaï à l'endroit qui sera désigné par la Commission de Délimitation en conformité du *statu quo* en laissant à la Perse les villages de Nado et Nifto.

L'appartenance du village de Kyzyl-Kaya (Bellasor) sera établie après examen de la situation géographique dudit village, le versant ouest du partage des eaux de cette région devant appartenir à la Turquie et le versant est à la Perse.

Dans le cas où le tracé définitif de la frontière laisserait en dehors du territoire ottoman une section de la route qui passe près de Kyzyl-kaya et qui relie le district de Bayazid à la province de Van, il est entendu que le Gouvernement persan accordera libre passage par cette section de la route à la Poste Impériale ottomane, aux voyageurs et aux marchandises, exception faite des troupes et des convois militaires.

La frontière remontera ensuite que les crêtes du partage des eaux: Kyzyl-Ziaret, Sarytchimène, Doumanlu, Kara-bourga, colline entre les bassins d'Ayry-tchaï (persan) et de Djelli-göl (turc), Avdal-daschi, Reschkan, colline entre Akhourek et Tavra Bevra-begzadan, Gevri-Mahine, Khydyr-baba, Avristan.

Pour le Kotour le protocole du 15 (28) juillet, 1880, dit de Sary-Kamiche, sera appliqué de la sorte que le village de Kevlik restera à la Turquie et les villages de Bilédjik, Razi, Gharatil (Haratil), les deux Djellik et Panamérik resteront à la Perse. La frontière suivant les crêtes de Mir-Omar montera sur la montagne de Sourava et, laissant Khanyga du côté turc, passera par le partage des eaux formé par le col de Borouch-Khouran, la montagne de Haravil, Béléko, Schinétal, Sardoul, Goulambi, Kepper, Bergabend, Peri-Khan, Iskender, Avène et Kotoul. La vallée de Bajirga reste à la Turquie, les villages de Sartyk et Séro à la Perse, et la frontière passe de l'extrémité méridionale de Kotour sur la crête s'élevant à l'ouest du village persan de Béhik et suivant les sommets de Séri-Baydost rejoint la crête du mont Zont.

A partir du mont Zont la frontière suit tout le temps le partage des eaux entre les districts persans de Tergever, Decht et Mergever et le sandjak turc de Hakkiari, notamment, les crêtes de Schivé-Schischali, Tchil-Tchovri, Tchel-Berdir, Kouna-Koter, Kazi-beg, Avoukh, Mai-Hélané, les montagnes à l'ouest de Binar et Delamper; puis laissant du côté persan le bassin des eaux se déversant par Ouchnou au lac d'Ourouméié y compris les sources de la rivière de Gadyr dites Abi-séri-gadyr (dont la vallée est située au sud de Delamper et à l'est du mont Guirdé), elle aboutit au col de Kélé-Chine.

Au sud de Kélé-Chine la frontière laisse du côté persan le bassin de Lavène, y compris la vallée de Tchoumi-Guéli (située à l'est de Zerdé-guel et au sud-ouest de Spi-rez) et du côté turc les eaux de Révnadouz, et passe par les sommets et les cols suivants: Siah-Kuh, Zerdé-Guel, Bez, Barzine, Sei-schiva, Kevi-Khodja-Ibrahim. De là, la frontière continue à suivre vers le sud la chaîne magistrale de Kandil, laissant du côté persan les bassins des affluents de Kialou du côté droit: les ruisseaux de Pourdanan, Khydvrava et Talkhatan.

Il est entendu que les tribus turques qui ont l'habitude de passer l'été dans lesdites vallées aux sources de Gadyr et de Lavène resteront en jouissance de leurs pâturages aux mêmes conditions que par le passé.

Étant arrivée au sommet de Séri-Kélé-Kéline, la ligne passe sur Zinvi-Djasousan et le col de Bamine, et traverse la rivière de Vezné près du pont de Pourde-Berdan. La Commission de Délimitation aura à se prononcer sur le sort du village de Schénié, sur la base du principe général de *statu quo*.

Après Pourde-Berdan la frontière monte sur les chaînes de Foka-baba-kyr, Berde-spian, Berde-Aboul-Fath, le col de Kani-resch. Elle suite ensuite le partage des eaux formé par Lagav-Ghird, Douléri, le col de Khan-Ahmed et l'extrémité sud de Tépé-Salos. Ainsi, la frontière passe entre les villages de Kandol (turc) et Kesch-keschiva et Mazynava (persan) et atteint le courant de la rivière de Kialou (le Petit Zab).

Ayant rejoint le courant de Kialou, la frontière le suit en amont, laissant du côté persan la rive droite (l'Alani-adjem) et du côté turc la rive gauche de cette rivière. Arrivée à l'embouchure de la rivière de Khilé-resch (affluent de Kialou du côté gauche), la frontière remonte en amont le courant de cette eau, laissant du côté persan les villages d'Alot, Kivero, &c., et du côté turc le district d'Alani-Mavout. A l'extrémité sud-ouest du mont Balou la frontière quitte le courant de Khilé-resch, et montant sur l'extrémité nord-ouest de la chaîne de Sourkew, s'étendant au sud de la rivière de Khilé-resch, passe par les crêtes de Sourkew, laissant du côté turc les districts de Siwel et de Schivé-Kel.

Arrivée au point astronomique de Sourkew presque à la hauteur de 35° 49′ latitude, la frontière passe dans la direction du village Tchampar-aw, dont le sort sera statué par la Commission de Délimitation sur la base du principe accepté de *statu quo*. La ligne monte ensuite sur la chaîne des montagnes qui forment la frontière entre le district persan de Bané et le district turc Kyzyldja; Galasch, Berdi-Ketchel, Poucht-Hangajal, Dou-béra, Parajal et Spi-Kana, après quoi elle atteint le col de Now-Khouvan. De là, en suivant toujours le partage des eaux, la frontière tourne vers le sud et puis à l'ouest, passant par les sommets de Voul-Gouza, Pouchti-Schehidan, Hazar-Mal, Bali-

Keder, Kélé-Melaïk et Kouhi-Kocé-rescha, séparant le district turc de Térétoul du district persan de Mérivan.

De là, la frontière suit en aval le courant du ruisseau de Khalil-Abad jusqu'à sa confluence avec Tchami-Kyzyldja, puis suit en amont cette dernière rivière jusqu'à l'embouchure de son affluent gauche coulant du village de Bnava-Souta, remonte ce ruisseau de Bnava-Souta et par les cols de Kéli-Navé-Sar et Kéli-Piran atteint le col de Sourène, connu à ce qu'il paraît sous le nom de Tchigan (ou Tchakan).

La grande chaîne d'Avroman s'étendant dans la direction nord-ouest-sud-est forme ensuite la frontière entre la Perse et le district ottoman Schehrisor. Arrivée au pic de Kémadjar (sud-est de Kala-Selm et nord-ouest de Schéri-Avroman), la frontière continue à suivre la crête magistrale jusqu'à sa ramification du côté ouest, s'élevant au nord de la vallée de Déré-Vouli laissant du côté persan le village de Khan-Guermela et de Nowsoud. Pour le reste de la frontière jusqu'au de Sirvan la Commission—à titre exceptionnel—délimitera le terrain en prenant en considération les changements qui ont pu s'y produire à partir de l'année 1848 jusqu'à l'année 1905.

Au sud de Sirvan la frontière commence près de l'embouchure du Tchami-Zimkan, passe par la montagne de Beyzel (Bezel) et descend au cours d'eau de Tchémi-Zérischk. Ensuite, en suivant la ligne du partage des eaux entre ce dernier cours d'eau et la rivière qui, prenant sa source dans le Bend-Bémo, porte d'après la Carte identique le nom de Pouchti-Ghérav (Arkhevendou) monte au sommet de Bend-Bémo.

Après avoir suivi la crête de Bamou (Bémo), la frontière, arrivée au défilé de Derbendi-Déhoul (Derbendi-Hour), suit le cours de la rivière de Zenguéné (Abbasan) jusqu'au point le plus rapproché du sommet de Chevaldir (point astronomique) et situé en aval du village de Mamychan. Elle montera sur ce sommet et passera ensuite par les crêtes des collines partageant les eaux des plaines de Tilékou et de Serkalé, puis par les chaînes de Khouli-Baghan, de Djebel-Ali-Beg, de Bender-Tchok-Tchermik, de Sengler et d'Asenguéran jusqu'au point dans le défilé de Tengui-Hammam situé vis-à-vis de l'extrémité nord des montagnes de Karawiz.

De là, la frontière suivra le cours de la rivière de Kourétou jusqu'au village de ce nom. Le sort du village de Kourétou sera décidé par la Commission de Délimitation sur la base de la nationalité de ses habitants. De là, la frontière passe par le chemin entre les villages de Kourétou et de Kouch-Kourrek, ensuite le long des crêtes des monts Kischka et Ak-Dag, puis laissant Kala-Sebzi à la Perse, elle se dirige vers le sud jusqu'au poste ottoman de Kanibez. De là, elle suit le cours de la rivière d'Elvend en amont jusqu'au point distant d'un quart d'heure en aval de son confluent avec le cours d'eau de Guilan; à partir de ce point elle va rejoindre le Naft-Sou en contournant l'Ab-Bakhchan suivant le tracé convenu avec feu Mahmoud Chefket Pacha et indiqué sommairement sur la carte annexée à la note de l'Ambassade Impériale de Russie en date du 5 (18) août, 1913, et en laissant à la Turquie le Naft-Mukataasy. De là, la ligne frontière suivant le Naft-Deressi, arrivée au point où la route de Kassri-Chirine coupe ce cours d'eau et se prolonge ensuite le long des monts Varboulend, Konérigh-Keleschouvan et Djébel-Guérébi (la prolongation de la chaîne de Djébéli-Hamrine).

La Commission de Délimitation élaborera un arrangement spécial pour la répartition des eaux de Guenguir (Soumar) entre les parties intéressées.

La partie de la frontière entre Mendeli et le point septentrional du tracé indiqué dans la déclaration faite à Londres le 29 juillet (Schouaïb), entre Hakky Pacha et Sir E. Grey n'ayant pas encore fait l'objet d'une délibération détaillée, les soussignés laissent l'établissement de ladite partie de la frontière à la Commission de Délimitation.

En ce qui concerne la délimitation depuis la région de Haouizé jusqu'à la mer, la ligne frontière part de l'endroit nommé Oumm-Chir, où le Khor-el-Douvel se sépare de Khor-el-Azem. Oumm-Chir est situé à l'est de la jonction du Khor-el-Muhaisin avec le Khor-el-Azem à 9 milles au nord-ouest de Bisaitin, endroit qui se trouve à la latitude 31° 43′ 29″. A partir d'Oumm-Chir, la ligne se dirige vers le sud-ouest et atteint la longitude *45° à l'extrémité méridionale d'un petit lac, connu aussi par le nom d'Azem et situé dans le Khor-el-Azem à quelque distance au nord-ouest de Chouaïb. De ce point la ligne continue vers le sud le long du marécage jusqu'à la latitude 31°, qu'elle suit directement vers l'est jusqu'à un point au nord-est de Kouchk-i-Basra, de façon à laisser cette localité en territoire ottoman. De ce point la ligne va au sud jusqu'au canal de Khaïyin à un point qui se trouve entre le Nahr-Diaidji et de Nahr-Abou'l-Arabid; elle suit le *medium filum aquæ* du canal Khaïyin jusqu'au point où celui-ci rejoint le Chatt-el-Arab, à l'embouchure du Nahr-Nazaïlé. De ce point la frontière suit le cours du Chatt-el-Arab jusqu'à la mer, en laissant sous la souveraineté

* NOTE.—This should read 47° 45′ (see map).

ottomane le fleuve et toutes les îles qui s'y trouvent aux conditions et avec les exceptions suivantes :

(*a.*) Appartiennent à la Perse : (1) l'île de Mouhalla et les deux îles qui se trouvent entre celle-ci et la rive gauche du Chatt-el-Arab (rive persane d'Abadan) ; (2) les quatre îles entre Chetaït et Maaouiyé et les deux îles devant Mankouhi qui sont toutes des dépendances de l'île d'Abadan ; (3) tout îlot actuellement existant ou n'existant qui pourrait se former et qui serait relié par les eaux basses à l'île d'Abadan ou à la terre ferme persane en aval du Nahr-Nazaïlé.

(*b.*) Le port moderne et l'ancrage de Mouhammera, en amont et en aval de la jonction du fleuve Karoun avec le Chatt-el-Arab, continueront à se trouver sous la juridiction persane en conformité du Traité d'Erzeroum, sans que cela puisse infirmer le droit d'usage ottoman de cette partie du fleuve, et sans que la juridiction persane puisse s'étendre aux parties du fleuve restant en dehors de l'ancrage.

(*c.*) Aucune atteinte ne sera portée aux droits, us et coutumes existants en ce qui concerne la pêche sur le rivage persan du Chatt-el-Arab, le mot "rivage" comprenant aussi les terres réunies à la côte par les eaux basses.

(*d.*) La juridiction ottomane ne pourra pas s'étendre sur les parties de la côte persan qui pourront être temporairement couvertes d'eau par la marée ou par d'autres causes accidentelles. La juridiction persan de son côté ne pourra pas s'exercer sur des terres qui seront temporairement ou accidentellement découvertes en excédant le niveau normal des eaux basses.

(*e.*) Le Cheikh de Mouhammera continuera à jouer en conformité des lois ottomanes de ses droits de propriété existant en territoire ottoman.

La ligne frontière établie dans cette déclaration est indiquée en rouge sur la carte ci-annexée.

Les parties de la frontière non détaillées dans le tracé susmentionné seront établies sur la base du principe du *statu quo*, conformément aux stipulations de l'article 3 du Traité d'Erzeroum.

II.

La ligne de la frontière sera tracée sur les lieux par une Commission de Délimitation composé des commissaires des quatre Gouvernements.

Chaque Gouvernement sera représenté dans cette Commission par un commissaire et un commissaire-adjoint. Ce dernier remplacera le commissaire, en cas de besoin, au sein de la Commission.

III.

La Commission de Délimitation devra se conformer dans l'accomplissement de la tâche qui lui a été dévolue :

1. Aux dispositions du présent protocole ;
2. Au Règlement intérieur de la Commission de Délimitation en annexe (A) au présent protocole.

IV.

Dans le cas de divergence d'opinion dans la Commission sur le tracé de telle ou autre partie de la frontière les commissaires ottoman et persan présenteront dans les quarante-huit heures un exposé par écrit de leurs points de vue respectifs aux commissaires russe et britannique, lesquels, réunis en séance privé, statueront sur les questions en litige et communiqueront leur décision à leurs collègues ottoman et persan. Cette décision sera insérée dans le procès-verbal de la séance plénière et sera reconnue comme obligatoire pour tous les quatre Gouvernements.

V.

Dès qu'une partie de la frontière aura été délimitée, cette partie sera considérée comme fixée définitivement et ne sera susceptible ni d'examen ultérieur ni de revision.

VI.

A mesure de l'avancement des travaux de délimitation, les Gouvernements ottoman et persan auront le droit d'établir des postes sur la frontière.

VII.

Il est entendu que la concession octroyée par la convention du 28 mai, 1901 (9 séfer, 1319, de l'hégire), par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale le Schah de Perse à William Knox D'Arcy et actuellement exploitée, en conformité des dispositions de l'article 9 de ladite convention, par l' "Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited)," ayant son siège principal à Winchester House, Londres (convention ci-après désignée "la convention" dans l'annexe (B) du présent protocole), reste en pleine force et vigueur dans toute l'étendue des territoires transférés par la Perse à la Turquie en vertu des dispositions du présent protocole et de son annexe (B.)

VIII.

Les Gouvernements ottoman et persan distribueront parmi les fonctionnaires sur la frontière un nombre suffisant de copies de la carte de délimitation élaborée par la Commission, ainsi que de traductions de la déclaration prévue dans l'article 15 du Règlement intérieur de la Commission. Il est cependant entendu que seul le texte français fera foi.

LOUIS MALLET.
EHTÉCHAMOS-SALTANEH MAHMOUD.
MICHEL DE GIERS.
SAÏD HALIM.

Annexe (A).

Règlement intérieur de la Commission de Délimitation de la Frontière turco-persane.

I.

Les quatre commissaires jouiront exactement des mêmes droits et des mêmes prérogatives, quel que soit leur rang personnel.

Les commissaires présideront à tour de rôle les séances de la Commission.

Le même principe de parfaite égalité sera appliqué tant aux rapports entre eux des commissaires-adjoints que des autres membres des Commissions remplissant des fonctions similaires.

II.

La Carte identique originale communiquée en 1869–70 aux Gouvernments ottoman et persan servira de base topographique pour la délimitation.

III.

En cas de maladie ou pour toute autre raison, chaque commissaire pourra se faire représenter au sein de la Commission par son adjoint. Dans ce cas l'adjoint jouira de tous les droits appartenant au commissaire qu'il représente.

IV.

La langue officielle de la Commission sera la langue française.

V.

La Commission se réunira une fois par semaine, ou plus souvent en cas de nécessité, pour constater les résultats des travaux de délimitation exécutés sur les lieux.

Il sera tenu un procès-verbal de chaque séance. Ce procès-verbal sera lu au début de la séance suivante et après avoir été dûment approuvé par les commissaires sera signé par eux. Ces procès-verbaux contiendront la description détaillée de chaque borne ainsi que de la frontière.

La ligne frontière, au fur et à mesure qu'elle sera définitivement arrêtée, sera tracée sur la Carte identique, qui sera parafée par chacun des commissaires.

VI.

La Commission fera les arrangements nécessaires pour les travaux du secrétariat qui sera chargé de la rédaction des procès-verbaux et de tout autre travail que la Commission trouvera utile de lui confier. Les membres du secrétariat assisteront aux réunions de la Commission

VII.

Copies des procès-verbaux seront transmises en temps utile par les commissaires à leurs Gouvernements respectifs.

VIII.

Le caractère des bornes à ériger sera arrêté par la Commission; les frais de leur érection seront à la charge des Gouvernements ottoman et persan par moitiés. Les frais de construction seront approximativement fixés pour chaque étape par la Commission; la somme désignée sera ensuite versée par moitiés par les commissaires ottoman et persan et sera dépensée sous le contrôle des Sous-Commissions prévues dans l'article 9. La Commission tiendra une comptabilité en vue de la répartition finale des frais entre les deux Gouvernements.

IX.

Au fur et à mesure de la fixation définitive de la position des bornes, la Commission nommera une Sous-Commission pour en surveiller l'érection. Cette Sous-Commission sera composée de deux membres au moins, pris soit parmi les commissaires soit parmi les membres du personnel. La Sous-Commission soumettra à la Commission un compte rendu détaillé de son travail aussitôt que faire se pourra.

Ce rapport sera inséré aux procès-verbaux de la Commission.

La Sous-Commission pourra être nommée à titre permanent.

X.

En cas de besoin, d'autres Sous-Commissions spéciales pourront être formées par la Commission dans les conditions susmentionnées et sous la réserve de l'approbation de leur travail par les quatre commissaires en séance plénière.

XI.

Dans les cas où les commissaires jugeront utile de renforcer leurs escortes personnelles, le commissaire ottoman ou persan, selon le cas, se chargera de faire les démarches nécessaires auprès de l'autorité locale.

Chaque commissaire, avec son escorte personnelle, aura libre passage de la frontière.

XII.

La Commission réglera ses déplacements d'un commun accord. Chaque commissaire pourra cependant choisir l'emplacement de son propre camp, à condition toutefois de se conformer autant que possible aux mouvements de la Commission.

XIII.

La Commission aura le droit d'ajourner temporairement la délimitation d'une partie de la frontière pour des raisons de climat ou autres. La décision à cet effet sera prise à la majorité des voix.

XIV.

Aussitôt que possible après l'achèvement final des travaux de la Commission des copies de la carte mentionnée dans l'article 2, signées par tous les commissaires, seront préparées et distribuées comme suit: à chacun des Gouvernements représentés à la Commission, une copie; à l'Ambassade de Turquie et aux Ministres de Russie et d'Angleterre à Téhéran, une copie à chacun; aux Ambassadeurs de la Grande-Bretagne, de Perse et de Russie à Constantinople, une copie à chacun.

XV.

En fournissant aux quatre Puissances la carte de la frontière susmentionnée, les commissaires soumettront en même temps une déclaration donnant une description détaillée de la frontière; cette description suivra textuellement celle des procès-verbaux de la Commission et portera les signatures des quatre commissaires.

LOUIS MALLET.
EHTÉCHAMOS-SALTANEH MAHMOUD.
MICHEL DE GIERS.
SAÏD HALIM.

Annexe (B).

Le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale le Schah de Perse, désireux de pourvoir au maintien et à l'exécution intégrale dans les territoires transférés par la Perse à la Turquie des divers droits et obligations créés par la concession octroyée à l'"Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited)" par le Gouvernement Impérial persan en vertu de la convention du 28 mai, 1901 (9 séfer, 1319, de l'hégire), sont convenus de ce qui suit:

(*a.*) La Sublime Porte déclare reconnaître la concession comme maintenue en pleine force et validité dans les territoires transférés et que la concession, accordée par l'article 1er de la convention, constitue un monopole absolu et exclusif dans la limite des droits acquis par la concession dans toute l'étendue des territoires transférés; aucune concession de même nature propre à léser ou porter préjudice aux droits et privilèges de l'"Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited)" ne sera octroyée à quelque individu, société ou association que ce soit.

(*b.*) Tous les droits, privilèges, franchises et autres avantages accordés à l'"Anglo-Persan Oil Company (Limited)" par le Gouvernement Impérial persan en vertu de la convention ou dont celle-ci jouit actuellement lui seront respectés et maintenus par la Sublime Porte dans les territoires transférés en stricte conformité des dispositions de la convention.

(*c.*) Sauf les cas prévus aux alinéas (*d*) et (*e*) du présent article, le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman jouira dans les territoires transférés en stricte conformité des dispositions de la convention de tous les droits, privilèges et avantages réservés ou acquis au Gouvernemement Impérial persan en vertu de la convention.

(*d.*) L'"Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited),"ayant versé au Gouvernement Impérial persan conformément à l'article 10 de la convention des deux sommes y mentionnées, à savoir 20,000*l.* en espèces et 20,000*l.* en actions entièrement libérées, la Sublime Porte ne pourra rien réclamer à l'"Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited)" de ce chef.

(*e.*) Le Gouvernement Impérial persan n'aura droit à aucun versement de l'"Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited),"en vertu de la dernière phrase de l'article 10 de la convention, du chef des bénéfices résultant de l'exploitation de la concession dans les territoires transférés. La redevance à payer en vertu de cette phrase du chef de cette exploitation sera versée par la compagnie au Gouvernement Impérial ottoman, et le Gouvernement Impérial persan n'aura rien à réclamer à la compagnie ou à la Turquie du chef de ces bénéfices.

(*f.*) Afin d'assurer l'exécution effective des articles de la convention relatifs à l'installation des "pipe-lines," la Sublime Porte reconnaît que ces articles assurent à l'"Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited)" le droit d'exécuter cette installation dans les territoires de la Turquie de façon à relier des gisements pétrolifères dans les territoires transférés avec un point proprement situé pour faciliter l'exportation par le Golfe Persique des produits de la compagnie. Ce point sera déterminé par un accord à intervenir entre le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman et l'"Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited)" aussitôt que possible après la signature du présent traité.

(*g.*) La Sublime Porte reconnaît que les dispositions de l'article 9 de la convention comportent la formation facultative, en conformité des stipulations de cet article, d'une nouvelle société, pour l'exploitation de la concession dans les territoires transférés et que dans le cas de la création eventuelle de pareille société celle-ci sera chargée de toutes les obligations et jouira de tous les droits et privilèges de l'"Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited),"à laquelle elle se trouvera ainsi pleinement et entièrement substituée.

(*h.*) Tout différend ou question, de quelque nature que ce soit, qui pourrait surgir entre le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman et l'"Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited)" sera soumis à deux arbitres à Constantinople, dont l'un sera nommé par chacune des parties, et à un tiers arbitre qui sera désigné par les arbitres avant de procéder à l'arbitrage. La décision des arbitres ou, dans le cas où ces derniers ne tomberaient pas d'accord, celle du tiers arbitre, sera concluante.

(*i.*) Le Gouvernement Impérial persan se charge d'obtenir l'adhésion de l'"Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited)" aux dispositions de cet article. Le moyen de signifier cette adhésion à la Sublime Porte sera arrêté ultérieurement de commun accord.

LOUIS MALLET.
EHTÉCHAMOS-SALTANEH MAHMOUD.
MICHEL DE GIERS.
SAÏD HALIM.

Le 4 (17) *novembre*, 1913.

Enclosure 3 in No. 235.

Première Séance.

EN exécution de l'article 2 du protocole de délimitation de la frontière turco-persane signé à Constantinople le 4 (17) novembre, 1913, par son Altesse le Prince Saïd Halim Pacha, Grand Vizir et Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de l'Empire ottoman, et leurs Excellences MM. les Ambassadeurs de la Grande-Bretagne, de Perse et de Russie, les commissaires et commissaires-adjoints, spécialement délégués par les quatre Gouvernements susdits, se sont réunis le 8 (21) janvier, 1914, à Mohammerah, à 10 heures du matin, pour procéder à l'application des clauses dudit protocole.

Étaient présents :

En qualité de commissaire :

Pour la Grande-Bretagne, Mr. Wratislaw.
Pour la Perse, Etela-ol-Mulk.
Pour la Russie, M. Minorsky.
Pour la Turquie, le Major d'État-Major Aziz Samih Bey.

En qualité de commissaire-adjoint :

Pour la Grande-Bretagne, le Capitaine Wilson.
Pour la Perse, Mansour-os-Saltanah.
Pour la Russie, M. Belayew.
Pour la Turquie, le Capitaine d'État-Major Abdul-Hamid Bey.

M. le commissaire britannique, alléguant qu'il est d'usage de donner la présidence au représentant du Gouvernement sur le territoire duquel la commission débute ses travaux, propose de donner la présidence à M. le commissaire persan. Ceci a été accepté.

M. le président déclare la séance ouverte et prononce une courte allocution, souhaitant que les travaux se poursuivent rapidement et aboutissent le plus tôt.

M. le commissaire britannique lui répond dans les mêmes termes. Il ajoute qu'il faudrait commencer par organiser le secrétariat.

M. le président parle des sous-commissions prévues.

M. le commissaire russe dit que pour la partie de la frontière de Fao jusqu'à Dâédji il n'y a pas lieu de constituer des sous-commissions. Seulement on pourrait parcourir cette partie et ériger des bornes là où la frontière change de direction.

MM. les commissaires persan et turc mettent à la disposition de la commission leurs bateaux pour transporter les commissaires sur les lieux.

M. le commissaire russe propose d'effectuer le voyage de Mohammerah à Fao à bord du bateau turc et de Mohammerah à Dâédji à bord du bateau persan.

Ceci a été adopté et on a décidé de partir dimanche, 25 courant, à 7 heures du matin.

On tiendra une séance à bord même pour fixer ce qu'il y a aura à faire pour la partie de la frontière de Mohammerah à Dâédji.

M. le commissaire britannique dit qu'il tient à la disposition de MM. les commissaires des copies en nombre suffisant de la carte identique.

Il est décidé que les officiers techniques marqueront sur cette carte les quelques îles et îlots qui, n'ayant probablement pas existé à l'époque où elle a été dressée, n'y paraissent pas.

Sur la proposition de M. le commissaire britannique, on décide qu'aux séances la présidence soit confiée à chacun de MM. les commissaires par ordre alphabétique des pays qu'ils représentent.

M. le commissaire turc demande à quelle échelle seront dressées les cartes.

M. le commissaire russe propose de dresser les cartes sur la même échelle que celle de la carte identique.

Il ajoute que dans le cas où les cartes ou croquis seraient destinés à servir d'illustration on pourrait changer l'échelle selon le besoin.

L'eau potable faisant défaut dans la partie de la frontière entre Dâédji et Kouchk-i-Basri, une discussion s'engagea pour trouver le moyen le plus pratique d'ériger des bornes dans cette partie de la frontière. M. le commissaire turc propose de fixer la position de Kouchk-i-Basri, et de descendre vers Dâédji autant qu'on le pourra et placer là une borne.

Il a ajouté qu'on pourra agir de même du côté de Dâédji, et on marquera ainsi la ligne, qui est d'ailleurs directe entre ces deux points.

M. le président demande à consulter son ingénieur pour prendre son avis.

La proposition fut émise ensuite qu'on pourrait porter la triangulation tout le long du fleuve Karoun, pour déterminer la position exacte de Kouchk-i-Basri.

M. le commissaire russe propose de combiner ces deux propositions : c'est-à-dire (1) de déterminer la position de Kouchk-i-Basri par une triangulation en zigzag passant par Mohammerah–Saba'a, et (2) de construire des bornes dans le désert sur la ligne droite entre Kouchk-i-Basri et Dâédji, commençant les travaux simultanément de ces deux points et seulement jusqu'à une distance que pourrait parcourir chacune des sous-commissions pendant une journée.

En conséquence, la commission a fixé au dimanche, 25 janvier, 1914, son départ pour Fao.

M. le président déclare que la séance est levée.

Fait à Mohammerah, le 21 janvier, 1914.

ETELA-OL-MULK.
A. C. WRATISLAW.
V. MINORSKY.
AZ. SAMIH.

Enclosure 4 in No. 235.

Deuxième Séance.

LA deuxième séance a eu lieu dimanche, 12 (25) janvier, 1914, à bord de la canonnière ottomane "Marmaris," sous la présidence de M. le commissaire britannique.

Étaient présents : MM. les commissaires et commissaires-adjoints au complet et le corps technique.

M. le président donne lecture du procès-verbal de la séance précédente, qui fut approuvé.

Il propose ensuite que le corps technique trace la ligne frontière qui leur sera indiquée par MM. les commissaires sur la carte identique, en y apportant les modifications rendues nécessaires par ce travail.

M. le commissaire ottoman relève que parmi les îles marquées sur la carte identique il y en a qui n'existent pas actuellement. Il demande que la Commission prenne acte de cette déclaration. En conséquence, on en prend acte.

Pendant le trajet MM. les commissaires ont constaté la position des îles revenant à la Perse conformément au protocole.

Arrivés à Fao, MM. les commissaires et le corps technique se rendent à terre pour déterminer le point où la ligne frontière venant du large touche la rive persane.

De retour à bord, la Commission reprend la séance. On procède à décrire la frontière de la manière suivante :

La ligne frontière vient du large pour toucher la rive gauche du Chatt-el-Arab à un point situé à une distance de 2 milles en aval du fort appartenant actuellement au Cheikh Khazaal. La position de ce fort a été observée de la terrasse du bureau télégraphique Impérial ottoman de Fao, où son azimut avec le nord fut constaté être de 87 degrés. A partir de ce point elle suit le niveau des eaux basses de la rive gauche (rive d'Abbadan) jusqu'aux deux îles situées devant Manyouhi (Mankouhi), qu'elle contourne de façon à les laisser à la Perse. Elle vient immédiatement rejoindre la ligne du niveau qu'elle suit jusqu'aux quatre îles situées entre Mouaouie (Maouiye) et Choutait (Chetait). Ayant contourné ces îles de manière à les laisser en territoire persan, elle se confond de nouveau avec la ligne du niveau des eaux basses et la suit jusqu'à l'île de Mahalla (Mouhalla), qui fait partie du territoire persan avec les deux îles situées entre celle-ci et la rive persane. Après avoir contourné Mahalla en suivant toujours le même niveau, elle vient au point où commence le port et ancrage de Mohammerah. Ce point, actuellement connu sous le nom de Touweidjat, est situé à une distance de 4,650 pieds anglais du point le plus avancé de la rive gauche du Karoun près de sa jonction avec le Chatt-el-Arab.

M. le commissaire ottoman dit que les îles appartenant à la Perse d'après le protocole de Constantinople furent énumérées une à une dans la description, tandis que

celles qui reviennent à la Turquie d'après le même protocole n'y sont pas mentionnées. Il déclare que la description est incomplète, et demande y faire insérer la phrase suivante du protocole : " De ce point la frontière suit le cours du Chatt-el-Arab jusqu'à la mer en laissant sous la souveraineté ottomane le fleuve et toutes les îles qui s'y trouvent . . . ."

La demande de M. le commissaire ottoman souleva une discussion. M. le commissaire russe dit qu'il n'est pas nécessaire de donner plus de détails, puisque la frontière suit la rive persane du Chatt-el-Arab. M. le commissaire persane trouve inutile l'addition de la phrase. M. le président déclare que la possession ottomane du Chatt et des autres îles est reconnue ; elle est une chose établie dans le protocole : la Commission n'est chargée que de marquer la frontière. M. le commissaire ottoman persiste dans sa manière de voir, qu'il dit être des plus logiques. Il dit qu'il pourrait se contenter de l'insertion de la phrase " les autres îles appartiennent à la Turquie."

Enfin, sur la proposition de M. le commissaire russe, la Commission décide de prendre acte dans ce procès-verbal de la déclaration turque.

Ensuite on a discuté le programme des travaux de la Commission pour la semaine prochaine, et MM. les commissaires se sont mis d'accord pour se rendre à Dâédji (Diaiji) jeudi, 18 (29) janvier, à bord du bateau persan. Il fut également décidé qu'une commission composée d'un nombre restreint des délégués de chaque commission partira pour Kouchk-i-Basri dimanche, le 19 janvier (1er février). M. le commissaire britannique se déclare prêt à se charger de toute l'organisation pour le voyage, qui nécessite de considérables préparatifs, vu la nature du désert qu'on va traverser. La Commission a accepté cette offre avec remerciements.

En conséquence, il a été arrêté durant cette séance :

1. La description de la ligne frontière depuis la mer jusqu'à Touweidjat ;
2. Le départ jeudi pour Dâédji ; et
3. Le départ pour Kouchk-i-Basri d'une commission pour déterminer ce point et y planter les bornes nécessaires.

Fait à Mohammerah, le 12 (25) janvier, 1914.

A. C. WRATISLAW.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
V. MINORSKY.
AZ. SAMIH.

Enclosure 5 in No. 235.

Troisième Séance.

MM. LES commissaires des quatre Puissances, s'étant embarqués sur le vaisseau persan " Karoun," jeudi, le 16 (29) janvier, à 8 heures du matin, pour le voyage à Dâédji, se sont réunis en séance plénière sous la présidence de M. le commissaire persan.

Le procès-verbal de la première séance a été signé par les quatre commissaires et celui de la deuxième séance lu et apprové.

Arrivés à l'endroit de la jonction du Nahr-el-Khayin avec le Chatt-el-Arab, les membres de la Commission se sont transportés dans de petites embarcations afin de pouvoir suivre le cours du canal. MM. les commissaires sont descendus à terre pour indiquer au moyen de deux poteaux érigés aux extrémités des rives du Nahr l'emplacement du bornage (No. 1), qui sera à construire pour marquer l'entrée du canal. MM. les commissaires ottoman et persan se sont chargés de faire élever ledit bornage, chacun sur le territoire de son Gouvernement.

Ayant suivi le Nahr-el-Khayin jusqu'au point déterminé où la ligne frontière le quitte pour se diriger vers Kouchk-i-Basri, MM. les commissaires ont fait eriger la borne No. 2.

M. le président a saisi cette occasion pour adresser à ses collègues quelques paroles éloquentes, où il faisait sentir sa satisfaction de pouvoir s'unir à eux dans une tâche dont l'achèvement, si longtemps différé, était enfin rendu imminent, grâce à l'esprit de conciliation et de concorde manifesté par les deux Gouvernements intéressés et aux bons offices des deux Gouvernements médiateurs. M. le commissaire ottoman a répondu dans les même termes.

L'emplacement des bornes Nos. 3 et 4, au nord de la borne No. 2, a été ensuite fixé, la distance entre les bornes Nos. 2 et 3 étant de 846 pieds (260 mètres), et celle entre les bornes Nos. 3 et 4 de 1,365 pieds (420 mètres).

La séance ayant été reprise à bord du " Karoun " pendant le retour à Mohammerah, il a été décidé :

1. Que les commissaires partiront le 19 janvier (1er février) pour Kouchk-i-Basri afin de délimiter la frontière et ériger des bornes au sud et à l'ouest de cet endroit, c'est-à-dire dans la direction de Dâédji et des marécages de Hor-el-Azem ; et
2. Qu'une sous-commission, composée du Capitaine Aliew, le Lieutenant Mehmed Effendi et Mohsen Khan, partira le même jour de Dâédji pour tracer la frontière au nord de ce point dans la direction de Kouchk i-Basri, ainsi que pour déterminer la position de la borne No. 2 par rapport au Nahr-Abou'l-Arabid.

Le tracé de la frontière depuis Touweidjat jusqu'à Dâédji a été défini de la manière suivante :

A partir de Touweidjat la ligne-frontière se transfère au *medium filum aquæ* du Chatt, qu'elle suit en passant entre la rive persane et l'île qui porte le nom d'Oumm-er-Rassas dans sa partie orientale et d'Oumm-el-Khassasif dans sa partie occidentale. Arrivée devant l'entrée orientale du Nahr-el-Khayin, qui se distingue par moyen de deux bornes en briques (portant en commun le No. 1) érigées aux extrémités de ses deux rives, la ligne frontière entre dans le canal et en suit le *medium filum aquæ* jusqu'à un point situé à une distance de 400 pieds (122 mètres), approximativement, à l'ouest de la jonction du Nahr-Abou'l-Arabid avec le Nahr-el-Khayin.

La borne No. 2 a été placée à ce point. Partant de là, la ligne-frontière suit la crête d'un ancien amoncellement de terre sur lequel ont été érigées les bornes Nos. 3 et 4, à 846 pieds (260 mètres) et à 1,365 pieds (420 mètres) de distance des bornes Nos. 2 et 3 respectivement. La direction de cette ligne est de 23 degrés d'azimuth à l'est du nord.

Fait à Mohammerah, le 16 (29) janvier, 1914.

ETELA-OL-MULK.
A. C. WRATISLAW.
V. MINORSKY.
AZ. SAMIH.

Enclosure 6 in No. 235.

Quatrième Séance.

LA quatrième séance de la Commission a été tenue à Kouchki-Basri le 21 janvier (3 février), 1913, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire russe.

Étaient présents :

Pour la Russie : M. Minorsky.
Pour la Grande-Bretagne : Mr. Wratislaw.
Pour la Perse : Mansour-os-Saltaneh.
Pour la Turquie : le Major Aziz Samih Bey.

La Commission a d'abord récapitulé les événements des trois derniers jours comme suit :

La Commission quitta Mohammerah le 19 janvier (1er février) et se trouva à Saba'a la nuit du même jour. Partant de Saba'a de bonne heure le lendemain, elle arriva l'après-midi à un petit lac d'eau fraîche, seul dépôt d'eau dans le district, situé à une distance d'à peu près 5 milles à l'est de la ruine de Kouchk-i-Basri ; ici le campement fut etabli.

Le même jour la Commission se rendit à Kouchk-i-Basri. A une distance de 300 mètres à l'est du centre de la façade du nord de cette ruine on a fixé le point par lequel doit passer la ligne de frontière allant du canal de Khayin au 31e parallèle de latitude. Le lendemain, 3 février, la Commission s'est rendue de nouveau à Kouchk-i-Basri et du point ci-dessus mentionné elle a mesuré dans la direction du vrai nord une ligne de 9,900 pieds (3,019 mètres), distance entre Kouchk-i-Basri et le 31e parallèle d'après la Carte indentique.

A l'extrémité de cette ligne elle a fait placer une borne sous forme d'un amoncellement de terre ayant un diamètre à sa base de 17 pieds sur un hauteur de

6 pieds à peu près pour marquer le point où la ligne-frontière partant du Canal de Khayin vient aboutir au 31ᵉ parallèle.

Quatre autres bornes, consistant de terre et de dimensions inférieures à celle de la première, ont été érigées sur la ligne-frontière du côté du sud pour indiquer sa direction, c'est-à-dire : (1) une borne à une distance de 4,620 pieds (1,409 mètres) ; (2) une à 9,900 pieds (3,019 mètres)—le point à 300 mètres à l'est de la ruine, dont il a déjà été fait mention ; (3) une à 13,182 pieds (4,021 mètres) ; et (4) une à 20,460 pieds (6,240 mètres). Les distances sont en chaque cas approximatives et sont calculées à partir de la borne principale, située sur le 31ᵉ parallèle.

En outre, la Commission, pour fixer la direction de la ligne là où elle suit le 31ᵉ parallèle vers le marais dit Hor-el-Azem, a fait ériger deux autres bornes à l'ouest de la borne principale, c'est-à-dire une à une distance approximative de cette dernière de 10,560 pieds (3,221 mètres), et l'autre à une distance de 19,008 pieds (5,797 mètres).

L'impossibilité de s'éloigner de sa provision d'eau a empêché la Commission de s'avancer plus en avant vers le sud et vers l'ouest des points indiqués.

Dans la même séance il fut décidé qu'à la prochaine séance, qui sera tenue à Mohammerah à 11 heures du matin du dimanche, 8 février, on fixera la date du rendez-vous à Oumm-Tchir (Oumm-Chir).

Il fut encore décidé qu'à la prochaine séance MM. les officiers techniques soumettront à la Commission, sur une copie photographique de la Carte identique, un tracé de la frontière déjà délimitée, et que la Commission prendra aussi connaissance du rapport de la sous-commission.

M. le président a proposé à la Commission d'exprimer leurs remerciements à la délégation britannique en général, et au Capitaine Wilson en particulier, pour l'organisation excellente qui seule a permis l'exécution de cette excursion. La proposition fut acceptée à l'unanimité.

Fait à Kouchk-i-Basri, le 21 janvier (3 février), 1914.

V. MINORSKY.
A. C. WRATISLAW.
MANSOUR-OS-SALTANEH.
AZ. SAMIH.

Enclosure 7 in No. 235.

Cinquième Séance.

SÉANCE tenue à Mohammerah, le 8 février, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire ottoman.

M. le président déclare la séance ouverte et donne lecture du procès-verbal de la dernière séance, qui fut approuvé.

La Commission ayant terminé ses travaux de délimitation de Fao à Kouchk-i-Basri, on a discuté la date du déplacement rendu nécessaire, et on a décidé de partir pour Oumm-Chir, où il a été convenu de tenir séance le 25 février.

Il a été décidé de munir dorénavant les sous-commissions d'instructions précises réglant leurs travaux. On a ensuite parlé du caractère des bornes érigées dans le désert, et on a décidé qu'elles pourront être faites de terre.

M. le président relève qu'il lui a été rapporté que quelques centaines de mètres de terrain, appartenant à Dâédji, sont restés du côté persan lors de la délimitation. Il demande à son collègue persan de faire donner les ordres nécessaires à qui de droit pour que les cultivateurs de Dâédji puissent en toute liberté disposer de ces terrains. M. le commissaire persan déclare qu'il se charge de faire le nécessaire.

M. le président propose d'examiner la Carte identique, sur laquelle le corps technique a tracé la ligne-frontière.

M. le commissaire britannique déclare qu'il a reçu de son Gouvernement la réponse qu'on pourra marquer la ligne-frontière sur les copies photographiques.

MM. les commissaires examinent ladite carte. M. le président relève qu'on devrait noter que les quatre îles situées entre Chétait et Mounouïé s'étant trop rapprochées les unes des autres, la Commission a trouvé inutile de marquer la frontière de façon qu'elle quitte deux îles pour gagner la rive et qu'elle reparte ensuite pour contourner les deux îles précédentes. La Commission a approuvé cette remarque.

On a approuvé également le tracé de la frontière de Fao à Kouchk-i-Basri (jusqu'à la borne No. 14) et on a paraphé les deux feuilles de la Carte identique contenant cette section de la ligne-frontière.

M. le commissaire britannique dit que pour l'érection des bornes au Poucht-i-Kouh il faut penser aux matériaux et aux maçons. On a décidé de faire transporter du ciment et de prendre des maçons. M. le commissaire-adjoint britannique veut bien se charger de cet arrangement. La Commission accepte cette offre avec remerciements.

Pour les dépenses, on tiendra un compte selon le protocole.

M. le commissaire russe dit qu'en cas de son absence à Oumm-Tchir (Oumm-Chir), ce sera son adjoint qui le remplacera.

M. le président lève la séance.

En conséquence, il a été décidé durant cette séance du 8 février :

1. D'envoyer à Dâédji une sous-commission pour constater et définir les bornes ;
2. De parapher la Carte identique ; et
3. De tenir séance à Oumm-Chir le 25 février.

Fait à Mohammerah, le 8 février, 1914.

AZ. SAMIH.
A. C. WRATISLAW.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
V. MINORSKY.

Enclosure 8 in No. 235.

Sixième Séance.

LA Commission s'est réunie à Oumm-Tchir (Oumm-Chir), le 26 février, à 2 heures de l'après-midi, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire britannique.

Etaient présents :

Pour la Grande-Bretagne	Mr. Wratislaw.
Pour la Perse	Etela-ol-Mulk.
Pour la Russie	M. Belayew.
Pour la Turquie	Le Major Aziz Samih Bey.

Le procès-verbal de la dernière séance a été lu et approuvé et ceux de la troisième et de la quatrième séances signés.

Après lecture du rapport de la Sous-Commission [No. 1] envoyée à Dâédji, on a décidé, sur la proposition de M. le président, de l'incorporer dans le procès-verbal de la séance. Ce rapport est conçu ainsi que suit :

"De la borne No. 4, en direction directe vers Kouchk-i-Basri, on a érigé trois bornes dont la base a un diamètre de 3 mètres et dont la hauteur est de 2 mètres. Au-dessous de ces bornes il a été posé du charbon et à leur centre des poteaux en bois. Ces bornes consistent en des amoncellements de terre. Leur distance mesurée par le kipregel est de 2,178 mètres entre les bornes Nos. 4 et 5, de 2,150 mètres entre les bornes Nos. 5 et 6 et de 2,214 mètres entre les bornes Nos. 6 et 7.

"Le Capitaine ALIEW.
"MOHSEN."

Ensuite la Commission s'est occupée de la ligne de frontière entre la ligne de latitude 31° et Oumm-Chir.

M. le président rappelle à ses collègues qu'il avait été convenu d'attendre jusqu'à l'arrivée à Oumm-Chir avant de prendre une décision au sujet de cette ligne pour cause des difficultés connues qui empêchent l'entrée dans le Hor-el-Azem par son côté sud. Après avoir traversé le marais entre Bisaïtin et Oumm-Chir, il s'était formé l'avis que l'œuvre de faire la démarcation du Hor-el-Azem serait infaisable. Tous les efforts faits pour trouver le canal marqué sur la carte annexée au protocole de Constantinople étaient, d'ailleurs, restés infructueux. Par conséquent, M. le président prie ses collègues qu'on émette des propositions afin de résoudre la difficulté qui s'est présentée.

M. le commissaire persan proposa là-dessus qu'on adopte comme frontière une

ligne de longitude. Les lignes de longitude marquées sur la carte annexée au protocole n'étant pas garanties exactes, on s'est rapporté à la Carte identique. Les commissaires ayant décidé en unanimité que la frontière doit remonter la ligne de longitude 47° 40′ du point de son intersection par la ligne de latitude 31° et ensuite quitter cette ligne de longitude à un point donné pour se porter en ligne droite à Oumm-Chir, il s'agissait uniquement de s'accorder sur la position dudit point. Le point de l'intersection de la ligne de latitude 31° 25′ avec la ligne de longitude 47° 40′ fut d'abord avancé comme donnant une solution convenable par l'inclusion en territoire ottoman du petit lac mentionné dans le protocole. M. le commissaire ottoman, trouvant cette solution trop peu favorable pour la Turquie, voulait que le point soit fixé à l'intersection de la ligne de latitude 31° 23′ avec la ligne de longitude 47° 40′.

M. le commissaire persan, après consultation avec ses officiers techniques, s'est déclaré prêt à accepter cette proposition.

MM. les officiers techniques ont ensuite présenté aux commissaires un mémorandum traitant des corrections qu'il y a eu lieu de porter à la Carte identique pour mieux faciliter l'œuvre d'y tracer la ligne frontière. Ce mémorandum a été adopté par la Commission. Le texte en est comme suit :

" Afin d'obtenir une base pour les travaux topographiques, le Colonel Ryder et le Major Cowie ont entrepris des observations à Fao et à Bouchire à l'aide du fil télégraphique et sont ainsi parvenus à constater le différend existant entre les longitudes de ces deux endroits. On peut accepter comme entièrement exacte la position de Bouchire—endroit qui a servi de station intermédiaire lors de la vérification de la longitude de Madras par communication télégraphique avec Greenwich.

" La longitude de Fao a pu être déterminée ainsi avec assez d'exactitude. Elle est de 48° 28′ 55″ Greenwich. Comparé avec la dernière valeur navale (observations effectuées par les soins de la marine anglaise) du même endroit, c'est-à-dire 48° 29′ 25″, ce résultat ne présente qu'un petit différend de 30″. La longitude de Fao sur la Carte identique, où celui-ci ne figure pas, serait de 48° 35′ 39″ si on calcule la position de cet endroit en constatant le point où sa ligne de latitude coupe la rive droite du Chatt-el-Arab. Ainsi il est à noter que la position sur la Carte identique qu'aurait occupé Fao serait écartée de sa vraie position de 6′ 44″ est. Il est probable qu'à l'époque de la première Commission aucune triangulation ni aucune autre méthode précise ne fût mise en exécution en aval de Mohammerah.

" La latitude de Mohammerah a été prouvée par des observations astronomiques être exacte ; sa longitude est de 2′ 13″ à l'est de la vraie position. La vraie position de Mohammerah a été obtenue en soustrayant de la valeur navale le différend entre la vraie longitude et la longitude navale de Fao. Une triangulation exacte fut exécutée entre ces deux endroits par les autorités navales.

" Il conviendrait d'enregistrer ces différends de longitude de telle façon que MM. les commissaires pourront trouver la plus utile.

" Les corrections (tracées en jaune) portées à la Carte identique ont été faites selon la carte préparée il y a deux ans sous la direction du Capitaine Wilson.

" Lors de leur visite à Fao les officiers techniques se sont rendus compte de la justesse de ces corrections. Comme les iles et l'embouchure du Chatt-el-Arab ne cessent pas de changer de forme, on n'a pas censé nécessaire de faire un nouveau levé.

" Vu les modifications qui se sont produites dans les canaux d'irrigation près du canal de Khayin, il serait utile de joindre aux actes de la Commission la petite carte qui a été préparée par les soins du Colonel Ryder, afin de rendre plus précis le point où la ligne frontière se dégage du canal de Khayin.

" En ce qui concerne le tronçon de la frontière entre ce point et Kouchk-i-Basri, on a trouvé opportun, en prenant en considération (1) les difficultés que le manque d'eau apporte à l'exécution d'une triangulation à travers le désert, et (2) que la Carte identique a été basée sur une traverse menée entre Kouchk-i-Basri et Mohammerah par voie de Bassora, d'agréer la position relative des deux points susmentionnés telle qu'elle se trouve donnée sur la Carte identique. La position même de Kouchk-i-Basri est marquée sur la Carte identique. Pour fixer celle du point de départ de la ligne frontière du canal de Khayin, on a calculé la distance entre ce point et le Nahr Dâédji (le plus voisin des points communs aux deux cartes) en se servant de la carte préparée par les soins du Colonel Ryder.

" D'après mesurage fait sur la Carte identique, la ligne de frontière vers Kouchk-i-Basri suit la direction approximative du nord.

" Les officiers techniques se sont bornés à faire les corrections là où le tracé de la frontière les rend nécessaires, et ne se sont pas occupés à corriger la Carte identique hors de cette région."

On a aussi décidé que la carte de la région du canal de Khayin dont le mémorandum fait mention sera annexée à la description de la frontière près de Daédji.

La Commission s'est ensuite rendue à l'endroit nommé Oumm-Chir, où elle a fait planter un poteau pour marquer l'emplacement de la borne No. 15 et l'érection d'une borne en terre a été commencée sur le lieu.

La prochaine séance a été fixée pour le lendemain, 27 février, à 9 heures du soir.

En conséquence, il a été arrêté dans cette séance (1) l'adoption du rapport de la Sous-Commission de Daédji, (2) la ligne de frontière depuis la ligne de latitude 31° jusqu'à Oumm-Chir et (3) l'adoption du mémorandum des officiers techniques au sujet des corrections portées à la Carte identique.

Fait à Oumm-Chir, le 26 février, 1914.

A. C. WRATISLAW.
ETELA-OL-MULK.]
D. BELAYEW.
AZ. SAMIH.

[J'ai compris qu'il s'agissait de la longitude 47° 40′.]

Enclosure 9 in No. 235.

Septième Séance.

SÉANCE tenue à Oumm-Chir le 27 février, 1914, sous la] présidence de M. le commissaire persan.

M. le président déclare la séance ouverte et donne lecture du procès-verbal de la dernière séance.

M. le commissaire ottoman relève que durant la séance précédente il avait compris la ligne de longitude être de 47° 45′, tandis qu'il voit qu'on a passé dans le procès-verbal la ligne de 47° 40′. Il déclare ne pouvoir accepter cette ligne.

On prend en considération la remarque de M. le commissaire ottoman et décide de charger MM. les ingénieurs de chercher telle ligne de longitude qui donnerait une frontière équitable.

Il est entendu que le procès-verbal de la sixième séance sera signé tel quel, mais M. le commissaire ottoman y apposera sa signature sous réserve à cause de la malentendu survenu. Les procès-verbaux des deux séances seront signés simultanément. La proposition fut ensuite émise de discuter et puis marquer la frontière sur une copie réduite de la Carte identique et de l'appliquer ensuite sur le terrain. On a pensé que cela sera le meilleur procédé pour une solution prompte et rapide.

M. le président prie M. le commissaire ottoman de définir la ligne qu'il proposera pour le tronçon d'Oumm-Chir à la rivière Tyb. M. le commissaire ottoman déclare que, d'après les renseignements authentiques puisés des registres gouvernementaux, la ligne frontière doit être la suivante :

La frontière suit les pentes occidentales de la chaîne de Tel Kudje Ahmed et coupe la rivière Mime de façon à laisser en territoire ottoman Cheker Ab et en territoire persan Tinque. Elle passe à l'est de Decht Koum, Decht Akbar et Decht Abbas, qui constituent les pâturages des Beni Lam ottomans, et laisse à la Turquie ces localités. Là elle traverse le cours d'eau du Douvéridj et atteint le fleuve Kerha à un endroit situé à une heure de distance de Kanatir. Elle suit le cours du Kerha et arrive au Hor-el-Azem.

M. le commissaire britannique fait observer que la ligne définie est hors de la Carte identique. M. le commissaire ottoman déclare que le principe de faire passer la frontière des endroits qui sont marqués sur ladite carte ayant été établi et accepté, la ligne définitive doit s'approcher autant que possible de la ligne plus haut définie, qu'il considère être la ligne du *statu quo*. La meilleure frontière entre deux pays, ajoute-il, ne pouvant être que celle qui est géographique, il propose la ligne suivante :

D'Oumm-Chir la frontière suit la Nahr-el-Amma jusqu'à son affluent oriental, qui se dirige vers Djébel-i-Ramla-Melaïb. Elle suit cet affluent et, contournant Djébel-i-Recheïda, arrive à la rivière de Douvéridj à un point Dj. marqué sur la Carte identique.

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De là elle suit le cours de la rivière de Douvéridj et se dirige vers le nord-ouest. Arrivée à l'est de Djébel-i-Oumm-el-Goumbar, elle quitte le cours du Douvéridj et atteint les chaînes de Djébel-i-Oumm-el-Goumbar, de Djébel-i-Amjine, de Djébel-i-Cherganie, dont elle suit les crêtes et atteint la rivière Tyb.

M. le président dit que, d'après le Traité d'Erzeroum, article 3, toutes les prétentions territoriales sont abandonnées. Seulement les terrains qui étaient en la possession de l'une ou l'autre des parties lors de la conclusion dudit traité doivent rester en sa possession. Il demande à son collègue ottoman de prouver que les terrains qu'il a nommé etaient en possession ottomane hors de la conclusion dudit traité, et se déclare être à même de démontrer sur la foi de documents authentiques que ces mêmes terrains étaient, au contraire, en possession de la Perse. M. le commissaire ottoman déclare que ces terrains appartiennent directement à l'État et sont, pour ainsi dire, donnés à loyer aux Beni Lam, dont le Cheikh vient à Amara les prendre en affermage pour un certain temps. Il y a des contrats d'affermage et les registres gouvernementaux sont là pour le prouver.

M. le président relève que ces contrats étant des actes unilatéraux ne peuvent être des documents d'appui et ajoute que les Beni Lam se divisent en deux branches : l'une est persane et l'autre ottomane. Il dit, en outre, que les Beni Lam de Djébel-i-Recheïda paient leur tribut eu Cheikh de Mohammerah.

M. le président demande qu'on consulte les Arabes des deux côtés—des Beni Lam et des Beni Turuf. Il ajoute que les Beni Lam habitent le pays jusqu'au Douvéridj où commence le Poucht-i-Kouh. M. le commissaire ottoman répond que les Beni Turuf habitent Bisaïtin et viennent pas au nord du côté de Djébel-i-Recheïda, tandis que ces endroits sont les pâturages des seïds de Halfayé et d'Oumm-Chir.

On trace en rouge sur une copie de la Carte identique réduite le tracé indiqué par M. le commissaire ottoman. M. le président donne lecture de la proposition persane suivante :

"A partir d'Oumm-Chir la frontière suit le cours du Chatt-el-Amma, qu'elle suit jusqu'à sa jonction avec le Nahr Douvéridj. Arrivée à ce point, elle coupe transversalement ledit Nahr de manière à le quitter à l'endroit où le Khyr Efnan vient le joindre. Ensuite elle suit le cours du Khyr Efnan et du Khyr Kentiz, passe près des ruines de Tchehariz pour atteindre les monts de Bend Bazerguian, qu'elle suit jusqu'à ce qu'elle atteigne la rive gauche du Tyb en face de la pente sud-ouest du mont Tel Bouab-el-Gavir."

M. le président fait lire ensuite le chapitre 15 du rapport de Dervich Pacha pour prouver la justesse de son point de vue, après quoi la Commission a interrogé les Cheikhs de Bisaïtin.

M. le commissaire britannique demande à son collègue persan s'il est intransigeant pour la ligne au delà du Douvéridj.

M. le président dit que, d'après les rapports de Dervich Pacha, il aurait pu demander une frontière passant à l'ouest et en dehors de la zone comprise dans la Carte identique.

M. le commissaire russe dit qu'il vaut mieux examiner la carte et trouver une frontière géographique qui est la meilleure. Il fait remarquer qu'une ligne contournant Djébel-i-Recheïda ne donnerait pas une frontière naturelle, tandis qu'au nord de cette partie, au contraire, la proposition ottomane paraît donner une frontière géographique.

Les deux parties n'ayant pas pu se mettre d'accord, il a été décidé, sur la proposition de M. le président, de recourir à l'arbitrage de MM. les commissaires britannique et russe. Sur les instances de ces messieurs, les commissaires ottoman et persan ont promis de remettre leurs réclamations dans les vingt-quatre heures.

Conformément à la décision prise au commencement de la séance, le corps technique a tracé un projet de ligne frontière de la latitude 31° jusqu'à Oumm-Chir. Cette ligne suit la longitude 47° 42′ depuis la latitude 31° jusqu'à la latitude 31° 24′ ; de là elle va directement à Oumm-Chir.

On décide d'envoyer sur les lieux une commission chargée de déterminer la jonction des deux branches du Chatt-el-Amma près de son embouchure au Hor. Cette commission est également chargée d'ériger une borne à la jonction de ces deux branches. Elle est composée du Capitaine Tsakaya, Abdurrazak Khan et Kadri Bey. Ils donneront la description de cette borne.

En conséquence, il a été décidé durant cette séance (1) la ligne frontière depuis la ligne de latitude 31° jusqu'à Oumm-Chir, (2) la soumission à l'arbitrage de MM. les commissaires britannique et russe de la frontière entre Oumm-Chir et le Tyb et (3) l'érection d'une borne à Oumm-Chir.

Fait à Oumm-Chir, le 27 février, 1914.

ETELA-OL-MULK.
A. C. WRATISLAW.
D. BELAYEW.
AZ. SAMIH.

Enclosure 10 in No. 235.

Huitième Séance.

LA huitième séance a été tenue à Oumm-Chir, le 28 février, 1914, à 9 heures du soir, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire-adjoint russe, remplaçant son commissaire.

Les commissaires des trois autres Puissances étaient présents.

Le procès-verbal de la cinquième séance a été signé. Cela de la septième séance a été lu et approuvé après la modification de plusieurs phrases.

Les officiers techniques ayant préalablement continué le tracé de la frontière sur la Carte identique jusqu'au point marqué par la borne No. 16, MM. les commissaires ont approuvé ledit tracé et ont apposé leurs signatures à la carte à l'endroit où la ligne de frontière coupe le marge de la feuille No. 2 et encore à l'endroit où se trouve marquée la borne No. 16 sur la feuille No. 3.

Le meilleur moyen de décrire la frontière et les bornes a fait l'objet d'une discussion. La décision a été prise que les officiers techniques devront à l'avenir fournir une description détaillée de la frontière ainsi que de chacune de ses bornes, en donnant leur position astronomique. Ces descriptions, dûment approuvées par les commissaires en pleine séance, seront incluses dans les protocoles des séances au fur et à mesure qu'on aura fait la démarcation. Des instructions à ce propos ont été données aussitôt au corps technique.

Alors M. le commissaire britannique, parlant au nom de son collègue russe et de lui-même, a fait savoir que les commissaires ottoman et persan ayant remis les exposés de leurs points de vue respectifs concernant la frontière entre Oumm-Chir et la rivière Tyb dans les mains des commissaires russe et britannique, ces derniers avaient conféré et statué sur la question en litige. Il communique ensuite le texte de leur décision, qui est comme suit :

"Les soussignés, ayant examiné les rapports de MM. les commissaires ottoman et persan, en date du 28 février, 1914, concernant la ligne frontière entre Oumm-Chir et la rivière Tyb, et s'étant réunis en séance particulière pour arrêter leur décision arbitrale, déclarent que la frontière part de la borne No. 15 et va en ligne droite jusqu'à la borne No. 16. De là elle suit le canal du Chatt-el-Amma jusqu'à la rivière Douvéridj. Ayant traversé ladite rivière, elle suit la crête la plus élevée du Djébel-i-Fohka jusqu'à la jonction de celle-ci avec la chaîne qui la relie à la chaîne du Djébel-i-Hamrine. Elle suit la crête de cette chaîne jusqu'à sa jonction avec le Djébel-i-Hamrine, et ensuite elle tourne vers le nord-ouest en suivant la crête du Djébel-i-Hamrine jusqu'à ce qu'elle arrive à la rivière Tyb.

"Fait à Oumm-Chir, le 15 (28) février, 1914.

"A. C. WRATISLAW.
"D. BELAYEW."

Les exposés des deux parties ont été confiés aux archives de la Commission et des copies ont été annexées au présent procès-verbal sur la requête de M. le commissaire persan.

Enfin, il a été convenu que les commissaires, accompagnés de quelques membres du corps technique, partiraient le lendemain pour parcourir la frontière vers le Douvéridj.

En conséquence, il a été décidé durant cette séance (1) d'approuver le tracé de la frontière jusqu'à la borne No. 16, (2) de remettre au corps technique la tâche de rédiger les descriptions de la frontière et des bornes et (3) de partir pour le Douvérid

En outre, la décision des commissaires des Puissances médiatrices au sujet de la frontière entre Oumm-Chir et la rivière Tyb a été communiquée à la Commission.

Fait à Oumm-Chir, le 28 février, 1914.

A. C. WRATISLAW.
D. BELAYEW.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
AZ. SAMIH.

Exposé communiqué par M. le Commissaire persan à MM. les Commissaires britannique et russe.

Comme j'ai eu l'honneur d'exposer à la séance d'hier soir, à partir d'Oumm-Chir la frontière suit le cours du Chatt-el-Amma jusqu'à sa jonction avec le Nahr Douvéridj. Arrivée à ce point, elle coupe transversalement ledit Nahr de manière à le quitter à l'endroit où le Khyr Efnan vient le joindre. Ensuite elle suit le cours du Khyr Efnan et du Khyr Kehriz (Tchehariz), passe près des ruines de Tchehariz pour atteindre les monts de Bend Bazerguian, qu'elle suit jusqu'à ce qu'elle atteigne la rive gauche du Tyb, en face de la pente sud-ouest des monts Tel Bouab-el-Gavi.

Pour faire ressortir l'exactitude de ce tracé, je crois utile de le partager en deux parties : l'une d'Oumm-Chir à Douvéridj et l'autre de Douvéridj à Tyb.

En ce qui concerne la première partie, je ne crois pas être dans la nécessité de m'appuyer sur d'autres preuves et documents ou sur des renseignements pris sur les lieux mêmes et je pourrai me contenter de recourir au rapport officiel de Dervich Pacha, c'est-à-dire à un document authentique du Gouvernement ottoman en tant qu'il prouve les réclamations du mien.

En effet, le chapitre 15 de ce rapport porte formellement que "la frontière actuellement en vigueur entre les deux Gouvernements est . . . . la branche du Douvéridj qui vient se jeter à Nahr Souveïb . . . ."

Or, ce passage donne au Gouvernement persan le droit de revendiquer à juste titre la région située entre la rive occidentale du Chatt-el-Amma et la branche du Douvéridj qui se jette à Nahr Souveïb.

Cependant, le respect au principe adopté et d'après lequel les prétentions des parties en cause ne doivent pas dépasser la zone indiquée par la Carte identique, d'une part, et l'esprit de conciliation dont mon Gouvernement s'est toujours inspiré au sujet des questions relatives à la frontière turco-persane, d'autre part, l'ont porté à renoncer à ses prétentions, réduire ses droits et à ne réclamer que les régions dont il était possesseur au moment de la conclusion du dernier Traité d'Erzeroum.

Ceci étant, et vu le passage précité du rapport de Dervich Pacha, je ne puis douter un instant d'une sentence favorable à la cause persane et de l'adoption de la ligne frontière telle qu'elle est précitée.

Quant à la partie de la frontière entre le Douvéridj et le Tyb, je crois encore nécessaire de recourir avant tout au rapport de Dervich Pacha et ne citer les autres preuves qu'après avoir attiré l'attention de mes honorables collègues sur certains passages de ce rapport.

Au chapitre 15 de son rapport, Dervich Pacha dit que la ligne de frontière ". . . . en suivant le cours du Douvéridj arrive aux pentes des montagnes" ; et plus bas il ajoute que "Les terrains plats situés au sud et au sud-ouest de cette ligne sont en possession des Beni Lam et dépendent de Bagdad et les terrains montagneux du nord et de nord-est sont en possession de Filis et dépendent du Gouvernement persan."

Je dois donc relever de ce passage que :

1. Les premières montagnes que le Nahr Douvéridj rencontre dans son cours et des pentes desquelles il passe, ce sont les monts El Fokki. Or, Dervich Pacha n'a certainement pas voulu parler, comme semble prétendre mon collègue ottoman, des monts Oumm-el-Gumbar, car, s'il en était ainsi, il ne manquerait pas de le faire ressortir, étant donné qu'en suivant soit sur la carte, soit sur le terrain même la description de Dervich Pacha on serait obligé de faire quitter à la ligne frontière le Nahr Douvéridj aussitôt arrivé aux pentes des montagnes, et ce seront celles des monts El Fokki. Et comme la ligne de frontière, du dire même de Dervich Pacha, doit suivre les pentes des montagnes, il est donc tout à fait naturel de le faire suivre par le lit de Khyr Efnan, seule frontière géographique possible aux pentes de Djébel-el-Fokki.

2. En parlant de Beni Lam qui sont en possession de terrains plats situés au sud et au sud-ouest de la ligne ci-haut indiquée (voir chapitre 15 du rapport), Dervich Pacha entend certainement parler de Beni Lam ottomans et non de Beni Lam persans, dont une partie considérable habite la province de Poucht-i-Kouh et autres localités de la Perse (voir chapitre 17).

Ceci étant, il résulte des passages précités du rapport de Dervich Pasha que seuls les terrains plats situés au sud et au sud-ouest des monts El Fokki et des monts Oumm-Ghyrri-Ga font partie du territoire, ce qui laisserait à la Perse même la région située entre la rive occidentale de Khyr Efnan et les monts Gafavy et qu'elle abandonnerait en obéissant à ses sentiments de conciliation et de concorde.

Mon collègue ottoman ne serait donc point dans ses droits en venant prétendre que les régions situées entre le Khyr Efnan et le Djébel-i-Oumm-el-Gumbar sont de terrains plats et doivent de ce chef revenir à la Turquie. Et, d'ailleurs, en qualifiant même de collines et montagnes de terrains plats, le Gouvernement ottoman n'en deviendrait guère propriétaire. Car, comme vous le savez bien, mes chers collègues, le principe de terrains plats et de terrains montagneux était admis pour le Zohab et non pour le Poucht i-Kouh. Ici mon Gouvernement ne fait que profiter des documents de la partie adverse pour l'exclure des parties montagneuses sans lui reconnaître un droit quelconque sur les terrains plats de Poucht-i-Kouh.

Un raisonnement analogue prouvera également que les monts de Bend Bazerguian doit servir de frontière jusqu'au Tyb et que le Gouvernement ottoman, de l'aveu même de Dervich Pacha, n'a droit à aucune partie montagneuse de ces régions.

Il est vrai que la région située entre les monts Bend Bazerguian, d'un côté, et le Djébel Efnan et le Djébel-i-Hamrine, de l'autre côté, semble être, d'après mon collègue ottoman, de terrains plats devant revenir à la Turquie, mais c'est plutôt une vallée très étroite par où passe le Khyr Kehriz.

D'ailleurs, la ligne de frontière que je viens de décrire est celle qui a été suivie par les représentants des quatre Gouvernements après la conclusion du dernier Traité d'Erzeroum. Ces régions ont été trouvées par eux en la possession du Gouvernement persan ; ils y ont été reçus par le représentant du Vali de Poucht-i-Kouh, y ont été toujours accompagnés des gardes désignés par ledit Vali et approvisionnés, enfin, par ses soins. Mes collègues doivent, d'ailleurs, être au courant de ces faits, étant donné que le représentant de leur Gouvernement respectif a dû donner à cette époque des rapports détaillés à son Gouvernement.

Je suis absolument certain qu'au moment de leur arrivée dans ces régions mes honorables collègues trouveront mes réclamations confirmées par des enquêtes locales qu'ils pourront faire. Ils constateront que ces régions font partie de la province de Poucht-i-Kouh et sont administrées par le Vali de cette province.

Avant de terminer cet exposé, permettez-moi d'ajouter que, confiant à votre esprit de justice et d'équité, je suis sûr et certain que votre sentence n'enlèvera à la Perse aucune parcelle de territoire occupée par elle au moment de la conclusion du dernier Traité d'Erzeroum.

ETELA-OL-MULK.

Oumm-Chir, le 27 février, 1914.

Exposé communiqué par M. le Commissaire ottoman à MM. les Commissaires britannique et russe.

Il résulte des études faites dans les registres gouvernementaux de Bagdad et d'Amara que, pendant tout le temps que la rivière de Douvéridj a suit son ancien cours, la localité de Douvéridj était le chef-lieu (caza) de l'arrondissement de même nom relié à Amara. Les limites de cet arrondissement comprenaient le Djébel-i-Recheïda, de Goubour-ul-Abdal, les cultivations de Gneïmieh et d'autres pâturages et plaines situés des deux côtés de cet ancien cours. L'ensemble de ces cultivations était mis aux enchères par le Gouvernement d'Amara et donné au plus offrant en affermage pour quelques années.

Plus tard, la rivière de Douvéridj ayant changé son cours, les cultivations et pâturages sont restés sans eaux et n'ont pas suffi à nourir toute la population, et dans très peu de temps presque la totalité des cultivateurs se sont vus obligés d'émigrer. Le Gouvernement Impérial s'est vu obligé, à son tour, de changer en commune (nahié) l'arrondissement de Douvéridj, qu'il dut suivre les émigrants et transporter le chef de Gouvernement à Halfaya jusqu'à ce qu'il y ait eu le temps de faire drainer l'ancien cours, tout en gardant son nom, la commune de Douvéridj.

Actuellement, bien que manquant d'eau, les terrains de Douvéridj sont affermés chaque année à quelques centaines de livres aux tribus de Beni Lam. Les troupeaux

qui viennent de Bisaïtin et des alentours paître dans ces terrains paient la taxe réglementaire de mouton (aghnam) au Cheikh qui les prend en affermage. Ceci est une réalité connue des Arabes de ces endroits.

D'autre part, ces terrains de Douvéridj, avec d'autres terrains analogues et qui ont tous des nom spéciaux, appartiennent directement à l'Etat ottoman.

Se basant sur ces considérations, la frontière essentielle devrait suivre les chaînes de Decht-i-Abbas, Decht-i-Seïd-Ekbar, Decht-i-Koum-Tinsavy. Mais le Gouvernement ottoman, pour faciliter un accord à ce sujet et montrer son entière bonne volonté et son esprit de conciliation, s'est borné, avec des pertes sensibles, à réclamer comme frontière définitive, la ligne ci-dessous définie :

D'Oumm-Chir, la frontière suit le cours du Chatt-el-Amma jusqu'à son affluent oriental, qui se dirige vers Djébel-i-Ramla-Melaïb. Elle suit cet affluent et, contournant Djébel-i-Recheïda, arrive à la rivière de Douvéridj à un point Dj. marqué sur la Carte identique. De là, elle suit le cours de la rivière de Douvéridj et se dirige vers le nord-ouest. Arrivée à l'ouest de Djébel-i-Oum-el-Gumbar, elle quitte le cours du Douvéridj et atteint les chaînes de Djébel-i-Cherganie, qu'elle suit des crêtes et atteint la rivière Tyb.

Les revenus des terrains situés au nord et au sud de cette ligne sont perçus de tout temps par le Grand Cheikh des Beni Lam et remis au Gouvernement d'Amara. Ceux des terrains situés près de Djébel-i-Cherganie sont perçus par les Cheikhs des Beni Lam et remis au Gouvernement d'Ali-ul-Gharbi.

Dans ces deux parties de la frontière il n'y a pas eu une trace du Gouvernement persan ni de tribus persanes.

D'autre part, la frontière entre les Gouvernements ottoman et persan, pour cette partie, est marquée sur toutes les cartes sérieuses et notamment sur celle de la Société Royale de Géographie de Londres de façon à suivre la ligne réclamée.

Le soussigné, confiant en l'impartialité de MM. les commissaires des deux Hauts Gouvernements médiateurs, s'en remet à eux et ne doute pas qu'ils approuveront la logique des réclamations ci-haut mentionnées et qui sont uniquement basées sur l'idée de trouver une frontière géographique qui ne puisse changer avec le temps et donner lieu plus tard à des malentendus.

Le Commissaire ottoman,
AZ. SAMIH.

Oumm-Chir, le 28 février, 1914.

Enclosure 11 in No. 235.

Neuvième Séance.

LA neuvième séance a été tenue le 1er mars, 1914, sur les rives du Chatt-el-Amma, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire ottoman.

Étaient présents :

Pour la Grande-Bretagne	Mr. Wratislaw.
Pour la Russie	M. Belayew.
Pour la Perse	Etela-ol-Mulk.
Pour la Turquie	Le Major Aziz Samih Bey.

De la borne No. 16, la Commission suivit le canal du Chatt-el-Amma jusqu'à un point où celui-ci se perd momentanément. Ici on a fait poser la borne No. 17. Ensuite la Commission se rendit au point où le canal reparaît et ici la borne No. 18 fut érigée. La frontière passe en ligne droite entre ces deux bornes. La Commission suivit de nouveau le Chatt-el-Amma dans la direction du Douvéridj jusqu'à l'endroit dit Kabr-i-Sabar, où MM. les commissaires ont campé.

En conséquence, on a démarqué ce jour du 1er mars la frontière depuis Oumm Chir jusqu'à Kabr-i-Sabar.

Fait sur les rives du Chatt-el-Amma, le 1er mars, 1914.

AZ. SAMIH.
A. C. WRATISLAW.
D. BELAYEW.
ETELA-OL-MULK.

Enclosure 12 in No. 235.

Dixième Séance.

LA séance No. 10 a été tenue le 2 mars, 1914, sur les rives du Chatt-el-Amma, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire britannique.

Depuis le campement près de Kabri-Sabar la Commission a suivi le cours du Chatt-el-Amma jusqu'à un point où celui-ci se perd. Là on a posé la borne No. 19. A un point distant de dix minutes de marche de cette dernière le canal devient de nouveau apparent et ici on a fait construire la borne No. 20. La frontière passe en ligne directe entre ces deux bornes. A partir de la borne No. 20, la Commission a continué à suivre le Chatt-el-Amma jusqu'au point où le canal se bifurque. Ici la borne No. 21 a été érigée. De là la frontière suit la branche ouest jusqu'au point où les deux branches se réunissent de nouveau.

En conséquence, on a démarqué ce jour du 2 mars la frontière depuis Kabr-i-Sabar dans la direction du Douvéridj.

Fait sur les rives du Chatt-el-Amma le 2 mars, 1914.

A. C. WRATISLAW.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
D. BELAYEW.
AZ. SAMIH.

Rapport identique des Commissaires russe et britannique concernant la Décision qu'ils ont émise au sujet de la Frontière turco-persane d'Oumm-Chir jusqu'à la rivière Tyb.

Les frontières réclamées par les commissaires ottoman et persan n'ont coïncidé que pour une courte distance à partir d'Oumm-Chir, c'est-à-dire jusqu'au point où un vieux ravin, ou, comme le dit le commissaire ottoman, un affluent du Chatt-el-Amma (marqué en rouge sur la Carte identique réduite) quitte le canal y marqué "Ghor eddowil." De ce point la frontière, selon les vues turques, se tourne vers le nord-nord-est en suivant ce ravin même et plus tard sa bifurcation occidentale, traverse le Djebel Rescheyda et arrive à la rivière Douvarij. Elle suit la rivière en amont jusqu'à ce qu'elle arrive au Djebel Hamrine, et ensuite suit cette dernière chaîne jusqu'à la rivière Tyb.

Le commissaire persan réclama le Chatt-el-Amma comme frontière jusqu'au Douvarij ; ensuite le Kyr Etnan, et puis une ligne passant par le mont Bendi Bazarguian jusqu'au Tyb. A l'appui de cette demande, il cita des passages du livre de Dervich Pacha donnant comme frontière entre les deux Empires dans cette région le Douvarij et les montagnes.

A la séance de la Commission dans laquelle la question de cette frontière fut discutée, les deux parties ont parlé d'autres preuves documentaires qu'elles étaient prêtes à fournir, mais dans le fait aucunes ne nous furent présentées.

Il ne nous a pas été difficile à décider que le Chatt-el-Amma devait être la frontière entre Oumm-Chir et le Douvarij. C'est la frontière qui paraît être reconnue localement, autant qu'une frontière quelconque l'est dans ces régions dépourvues de population stable, et les quelques bergers qui ont été rencontrés du côté persan déclaraient tous que leurs troupeaux appartenaient à des seyids de Bisaïtin, district incontestablement persan.

Au delà du Douvarij nous n'avions presque rien pour nous guider, mais, même en acceptant la théorie que les montagnes forment la frontière, il serait difficile d'admettre qu'une chaîne de collines insignifiantes telle que Bendi Bazyrguian puisse être considérée comme des montagnes et servir de frontière. Le Djebel Hamrine nous a paru offrir une frontière convenable en vue surtout de ce que dit le Capitaine Lorimer dans un rapport sur le Pucht-i-Kuh, c'est-à-dire que les seuls individus qui fréquentent jamais le district, même au delà du Djebel Hamrine, sont des bergers de la tribu turque des Beni Lam.

Le commissaire britannique aurait préféré comme frontière le Douvarij jusqu'à la chaîne du Djebel Hamrine, et puis le Djebel Hamrine jusqu'au Tyb ; mais le commissaire russe, tout en reconnaissant cette ligne comme étant plus simple du point de vue purement géographique, considérait qu'il était inadmissible d'enlever ainsi aux habitants du Pucht-i-Kuh leur ligne de communication la plus facile avec le nord de l'Arabistan ; et nous sommes tombés finalement d'accord sur la ligne de frontière

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suivante à l'ouest du Douvarij, c'est-à-dire le Djebel Fokki jusqu'à la chaîne transversale qui la relie au Djebel Hamrine, puis cette chaîne transversale elle-même, et ensuite le Djebel Hamrine jusqu'au Tyb.

Il est à remarquer que la ligne frontière ainsi adoptée offre un compromis par lequel chaque partie perd ou gagne la moitié de ce qu'elle a demandé.

D. BELAYEW.
A. C. WRATISLAW.

Enclosure 13 in No. 235.

Onzième Séance.

SEANCE tenue près du Douvéridj le 3 mars, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire persan.

Etaient présents :

Pour la Grande-Bretagne : Mr. Wratislaw.
Pour la Russie : M. Belayew.
Pour la Perse : Etela-ol-Mulk.
Pour la Turquie : Le Major Aziz Samih Bey.

M. le président donne lecture des Procès-verbaux Nos. 8, 9 et 10, qui sont approuvés.

On a décidé ensuite d'achever la démarcation de la frontière jusqu'au Douvéridj aussitôt que le temps permettrait d'y travailler.

Il a été résolu qu'il serait annexé à la description la frontière une carte supplémentaire du Chatt-el-Amma.

MM. les commissaires se sont accordés pour faire une excursion du côté du Djébel-i-Hamrine à la première occasion.

Fait le 3 mars, 1914.

ETELA-OL-MULK.
A. C. WRATISLAW.
D. BELAYEW.
AZ. SAMIH.

Enclosure 14 in No. 235.

Douzième Séance.

LA séance s'est tenue sous la présidence de M. Belayew, commissaire-adjoint, faisant fonction du premier commissaire russe.

Étaient présents :

M. le premier commissaire persan et son adjoint ; et
M. le commissaire ottoman.

M. le premier commissaire britannique, ayant traversé le Douvéridj et se trouvant dans l'impossibilité de le retraverser à cause de grandes crues, s'est excusé par lettre, se déclarant prêt à accepter tout ce que décideraient ses trois autres collègues unanimement.

Après un échange d'idées, la Commission a jugé inutile, étant déjà en possession d'une carte détaillée dressée par les topographes, de suivre de nouveau le Chatt-el-Amma à partir de son embouchure jusqu'à l'endroit où les travaux de la délimitation ont été arrêtés, et elle a décidé qu'à partir de ce point la frontière suivra le cours du même Chatt jusqu'à sa jonction avec le Douvéridj.

Dans les endroits où le Chatt-el-Amma se trouve divisé en plusieurs branches, la ligne de frontière suivra la branche principale conformément à la carte ci-annexée.

La Commission s'est ensuite rendue sur les lieux et ayant constaté que l'embouchure essentielle du Chatt-el-Amma a été détruite par les crues du Douvéridj, elle a décidé

qu'arrivée au dernier point où le Chatt se divise en deux branches avant de rejoindre le Douvéridj, la ligne de frontière suivra la branche orientale (qui, pour le moment, est la seule par laquelle le Chatt puisse s'alimenter des eaux de Douvéridj) pour aboutir à un ancien lit d'une branche du Douvéridj. Et c'est là que, vu les écroulements constants des rives du Douvéridj, à cause de crues immenses dont la Commission a été témoin, celle-ci a décidé d'ériger la borne No. 22 pour marquer la jonction du Chatt-el-Amma avec le Doujvéridj.

Fait à Douvéridj, le 6 mars, 1914.

D. BELAYEW.
A. C. WRATISLAW.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
AZ. SAMIH.

Enclosure 15 in No. 235.

Treizième Séance.

SÉANCE tenue près du Douvéridj le 8 mars, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire ottoman.

Étaient présents :

Pour la Grande-Bretagne : Mr. Wratislaw.
Pour la Russie : M. Belayew.
Pour la Perse : Etela-ol-Mulk.
Pour la Turquie : Le Major Aziz Samih Bey.

La ligne-frontière à partir de la borne No. 22 a été définie comme suit : Elle tombe perpendiculairement sur la rivière Douvéridj, et la remonte en suivant le *medium filum aquæ* jusqu'au point où la crête du Djébel-i-Fokki la plus au nord descend à pic à la rivière. A cet endroit elle quitte la rivière et gagne la crête susdite.

M. le président a dit ensuite que le corps technique britannique avait bien voulu exécuter la majeure partie du travail topographique jusqu'à présent, et qu'il voulait prier son collègue britannique de faire donner au corps technique ottoman les points de triangulation, afin que celui-ci pût prêter son concours aux travaux. M. le commissaire britannique a répondu qu'il aura plaisir à se conformer à la demande de son collègue.

On s'est décidé de partir pour le Tyb le 9 du mois, et de parcourir cette partie de la frontière en trois étapes.

MM. les commissaires se sont rendus ensuite sur le Djébel-i-Fokki et ont suivi la ligne du partage des eaux.

A la reprise de la séance, à 9 heures du soir, on a signé les procès-verbaux Nos. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 et 12 et les trois premières feuilles des copies de la Carte identique appartenant aux commissaires persan, russe et ottoman, ainsi que l'original de la Carte supplémentaire No. 1, avec deux copies appartenant aux commissaires russe et ottoman.

En conséquence, on a fait pendant cette séance :

1. La définition de la ligne-frontière jusqu'au Djébel-i-Fokki ;
2. La décision de partir pour le Tyb le 9 courant ; et
3. La signature de procès-verbaux et des cartes.

Fait le 8 mars, 1914.

AZ. SAMIH.
A. C. WRATISLAW.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
D. BELAYEW.

Enclosure 16 in No. 235.

Quatorzième Séance.

SÉANCE tenue près du Tyb le 14 mars, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire britannique.

Étaient présents :

Tous les commissaires et commissaires-adjoints.

Les procès-verbaux Nos. 11 et 13 ont été lus et approuvés.

M. le commissaire britannique ayant relevé que le numérotage adopté jusqu'à présent dans les procès-verbaux en parlant des feuilles de la Carte identique a suivi l'ordre inverse par rapport aux numéros imprimés sur les feuilles mêmes (lesquels commencent par le nord), il est décidé de marquer en rouge sur lesdites feuiles une série de numéros commençant par le sud.

Une discussion a été ensuite entamée sur les travaux entre le Tyb et la région de Baksaï (Baksayé).

M. le commissaire persan est de l'opinion que le meilleur moyen de procéder sera de parcourir la distance d'abord et ensuite de délibérer la ligne de la frontière. Cet avis est partagé par M. le commisssaire ottoman.

MM. les commissaires russe et britannique objectent en disant que, sans accord préalable sur la ligne approximative, on ne saurait choisir la route à suivre. Il serait donc à désirer que les commissaires persan et ottoman se mettent d'accord des maintenant sur la frontière jusqu'à un certain point.

M le commissaire persan prie ses collègues russe et britannique d'émettre quelque proposition, mais ceux-ci répliquent qu'il n'est pas à eux de proposer une ligne sauf dans les cas où les parties intéressées ne peuvent pas tomber d'accord.

M. le commissaire russe appuie sur la nécessité de se baser sur des principes établis en discutant la ligne de la frontière, et cite le dernier paragraphe de l'article 1er du Protocole du Constantinople concernant le *statu quo*, qu'il dit s'appliquer en cas actuel.

M. le commissaire britannique soutient que l'article en question n'est applicable qu'aux parties de la frontière pour lesquelles un tracé a été établi dans le protocole. Tout en admettant que le principe du *statu quo* doit régir tous les travaux de la Commission autant que possible, il croit que dans les régions de Poucht-i-Kouh les commissaires ont plus de liberté qu'ailleurs, en vertu de la déclaration suivante du protocole, article 1er :

"La partie de la frontière entre Mendeli et le point septentrional du tracé indiqué dans la déclaration faite à Londres le 29 juillet (Schouaïb), entre Hakky Pacha et Sir E. Grey n'ayant pas encore fait l'objet d'une délibération détaillée, les soussignés laissent l'établissement de ladite partie de la frontière à la Commission de Délimitation."

M. le commissaire russe dit que l'application du principe du *statu quo* aussi à Poucht-i-Kouh étant pleinement établi dans la correspondance préalable, il ne croit pas possible d'admettre des exceptions pour cette région.

MM. les commissaires persan et ottoman ont tracé ensuite sur une copie de la Carte identique réduite les frontières réclamées par l'un et l'autre depuis le Tyb jusqu'à un point à peu près 10 milles au deçà de Baksaï. Le tracé ottoman suit les crêtes des montagnes Bend-i Zouméyli et Bend-i-Huvéyze ; le tracé persan descend le Tyb jusqu'au delà de Kut-el-Gamich et ensuite coupe à travers les plaines au sud des montagnes.

M. le président fait l'observation que les deux tracés ne présentent pas une différence très marquée ; il espère donc que les deux parties pourront trouver un moyen de reconcilier leurs points de vue respectifs.

M. le commissaire ottoman se déclare prêt à conférer avec son collègue persan.

M. le commissaire russe conseille fortement de chercher un compromis. D'accord avec son collègue britannique, il regarde comme la ligne la plus convenable celle qui longe de pied des montagnes.

M. le commissaire persan insiste sur la nécessité de comprendre en territoire persan la ruine du fortin de Kut-el-Gamich (Kout-el-Gomysch) appartenant au Vali de Poucht-i-Kouh, et connu sous le nom de Kaleh Husseinie. A cette exception, il serait prêt à accepter le compromis.

Les trois autres commissaires trouvent qu'il serait inadmissible de faire courber la ligne-frontière de façon à contourner cet endroit, qui est situé dans la plaine éloigné des montagnes.

Enfin, sur les instances urgentes des commissaires russe et britannique, et étant entendu que la décision actuelle sera sans préjudice de toute question ultérieure, M. le commissaire persan donne son assentiment à la proposition précitée. M. le commissaire ottoman ayant fait de même, la Commission décide comme suit :

"La ligne passant par le pied des montagnes est acceptée en principe comme ligne-frontière depuis le Tyb jusqu'au ravin situé à 10 milles environ à l'est de Baksaï. Aucun préjudice n'est porté par cette décision au règlement de la frontière au delà de ce point."

Après une discussion sur l'approvisionnement et le bornage, il est convenu, sur la proposition de M. le commissaire ottoman, que le corps technique se divise en deux parties, dont la première, composée de deux officiers topographes russes et d'un officier ottoman, se rendra sans délai à Baksaï pour commencer le levé de ses alentours, tandis que les autres officiers s'occuperont de dresser une carte du pays entre le Tyb et Baksaï. Toutes les deux cartes seront faites sur la même échelle que la Carte identique.

Les cartes suivantes ont été signées par MM. les commissaires :

Carte identique, feuilles Nos. 1, 2 et 3—copie britannique.
Carte supplémentaire, No. 1—copie britannique.

La prochaine séance de la Commission a été fixée pour le lendemain à 10 heures du matin.

En conséquence, il a été décidé pendant cette séance :

1. Le numérotage des feuilles de la Carte identique ;
2. La délimitation de la frontière depuis le Tyb jusqu'à près de Baksaï ; et,
3. La répartition des travaux topographiques dans cette section de la frontière ainsi qu'à Baksaï.

Fait le 14 mars, 1914.

A. C. WRATISLAW.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
V. MINORSKY.
AZ. SAMIH.

Enclosure 17 in No. 235.

Quinzième Séance.

SÉANCE tenue près de la rivière Tyb, le 15 mars, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire persan.

Étaient présents tous les commissaires et commissaires-adjoints.

M. le président déclare la séance ouverte et donne lecture du procès-verbal de la dernière séance, qui fut approuvé.

Le corps technique fait observer que la Carte identique lui paraissant suffisamment exacte, il trouve superflu de lever une nouvelle fois le plan de la partie entre le Tyb et Baksaï sur la même échelle.

Il a été décidé de laisser le corps technique libre de juger de la nécessité de lever un nouveau plan.

On a décidé de se rendre sur les lieux pour constater la ligne frontière venant du Djebel Hamrine vers le Tyb et pour faire planter les bornes nécessaires.

Les commissaires ont fait ériger une borne à l'extrémité occidentale de la chaîne du Djebel Hamrine où celle-ci descend à pic vers la rive gauche du Tyb, et une seconde borne sur la rive droite, au pied des montagnes. La ligne-frontière partant de la première de ces deux bornes (No. 23) atteint le Tyb en ligne droite et en suit le *medium filum aquæ* jusqu'en face de la borne No. 24.

La prochaine séance a été fixée pour le 16 mars.

En conséquence, on a arrêté pendant cette séance la ligne de frontière entre les bornes Nos. 23 et 24.

Fait le 15 mars, 1914.

ETELA-OL-MULK.
A. C. WRATISLAW.
V. MINORSKY.
AZ. SAMIH.

Enclosure 18 in No. 235.

Seizième Séance.

SÉANCE tenue près de la rivière Tyb, le 16 mars, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire russe.

Etaient présents tous les commissaires.

MM. les commissaires ont apposé leurs signatures aux procès-verbaux Nos. 11, 13, et 14, à la copie persane de la Carte supplémentaire No. 1 et à l'original, ainsi qu'aux quatre copies, de la Carte supplémentaire No. 2.

Le corps technique a ensuite présenté aux commissaires la description écrite de la frontière et des bornes à partir de la borne No. 1 jusqu'à la rivière Douvarij. MM. les commissaires, ayant approuvé la description, ordonnent qu'elle soit annexée au présent procès-verbal.*

Une discussion a eu lieu à propos de la meilleure façon d'indiquer sur les cartes le tronçon de la ligne frontière comprise dans la Carte supplémentaire No. 2. Les parallèles de longitude et de latitude tels qu'ils se trouvent marqués sur cette carte et sur la Carte identique offrent une différence très sensible, ce qui empêchent de tracer la ligne avec exactitude sur la Carte identique. M. le commissaire russe propose de tracer la frontière sur la Carte supplémentaire et de laisser la partie de la Carte identique en question sans tracé, en y ajoutant une note portant que la Carte supplémentaire est substituée à la Carte identique pour ce qui concerne ladite section. M. le commissaire russe pense qu'il serait bon de compléter parfois la description de la frontière en indiquant la distance entre certains de ses points et des points saillants des environs.

Le programme des travaux pour le lendemain a été discuté.

Fait le 16 mars, 1914.

V. MINORSKY.
A. C. WRATISLAW.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
AZ. SAMIH.

Enclosure 19 in No. 235.

Dix-septième Séance.

LA Commission a parcouru la frontière du Tyb au ravin de Zafarani (limite de la partie délimitée) en deux étapes, et une réunion a eu lieu à Baksaï le 20 mars, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire ottoman.

Etaient présents tous les commissaires.

On a décidé d'ériger une borne au ravin de Zafarani, mais on a cru qu'il serait préférable de connaître au préalable le tracé de la frontière après cet endroit et d'examiner la carte de Baksaï que le corps technique était en train de dresser.

Il a été jugé opportun de fournir à MM. les officiers topographes certaines données approximatives pour qu'ils puissent déterminer l'étendue de leurs plans. On a prié alors MM. les commissaires ottoman et persan de formuler les lignes générales de leurs points de vue.

M. le commissaire ottoman déclare qu'il vaudrait mieux résoudre la question de Baksaï simultanément avec celle de Seïd Hassan. M. le commissaire persan indique

* NOTA.—Voir les procès-verbaux des séances Nos. 39 et 63 et l'annexe au procès-verbal de la séance No. 63.

le Ziarat de Seïd Mohammad comme l'extrême limite méridionale du plan que les topographes doivent lever de Baksaï.

Il a été ensuite convenu d'envoyer immédiatement à Kala Seïd Hassan une partie du corps technique composée d'officiers britanniques, persans et ottomans avec mission de lever le plan des alentours de cette localité.

Finalement, on a décidé de tenir séance le lendemain, 21 mars. MM. les commissaires persan et ottoman ont promis de présenter en lignes générales pendant cette séance leurs points de vue respectifs relativement à la partie de la frontière entre le ravin de Zafarani et la ligne de latitude 33° 10′.

Fait à Baksaï, le 20 mars, 1914.

AZ. SAMIH.
A. C. WRATISLAW.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
V. MINORSKY.

Enclosure 20 in No. 235.

Dix-huitième Séance.

SÉANCE tenue à Baksaï, le 21 mars, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire britannique.

Etaient présents tous les commissaires.

On a signé le procès-verbal de la seizième séance et paraphé la description de la frontière y annexée. Le procès-verbal de la dernière séance a été lu et approuvé.

Conformément à la résolution prise à la dernière séance, MM. les commissaires persan et ottoman ont énoncé en lignes générales leurs vues au sujet de la ligne que la frontière devrait suivre entre le ravin de Zafarani et le parallèle de latitude 33° 10′. Les lignes ainsi indiquées ont été portées sur une copie réduite de la carte identique.

La ligne persane se trouvant être tracée de telle façon qu'elle dépassait la zone de la Carte identique, a été modifiée afin d'entrer dans les limites prescrites.

Le texte de l'exposé persan est comme suit :

"Du point où la ligne-frontière arrive au lit de Zafaranieh, elle suit le pied des montagnes jusqu'à une distance de 9 milles de la tour de Kaka Ali. Arrivée là, ladite tour étant considérée comme centre, elle forme un demi-cercle, englobant Imamzade Seyed Mohammed et autres dépendances de Baghi Chahi.

"Arrivée sur la ligne qui sert de diamètre audit demi-cercle, elle passe par la crête des monts Kaleuyzan (Kalaouzynan) et Kélé Chir (Kéléschire) et va atteindre la rivière de Guendjan-Tchem à un point situé à 3 milles de distance à l'ouest du confluent de cette rivière et du Gavi.

"De ce point elle se dirige vers l'est en remontant le cours de Guendjan-Tchem jusqu'au confluent ci-dessus mentionné."

Le texte de l'exposé ottoman est comme suit :

"A partir du point où la ligne des pentes des montagnes vient couper le ravin de Zagferanieh, la frontière remonte en amont ce ravin et atteint les crêtes de la chaîne (sans nom dans la Carte identique) la plus rapprochée de la route qui vient du sud de Rekalum à la rivière Tchengoulé et les suit jusqu'à cette route.

"Arrivée là, la frontière se confond avec la route susdite et, après avoir traversé Tchengoulé, va à Si-Hila. A quelque distance de cet endroit, elle continue à suivre la branche occidentale de la même route et arrive à la jonction des deux branches de cette route. Là la frontière se dirige en ligne droite à un point de Teng-i-Goundjiun-Tchem marqué sur la Carte identique du mot 'défilé.'"

MM. les commissaires ont discuté ensuite la question des travaux topographiques enterpris aux environs de Baksaï et de Seïd Hassan. En vue de restreindre la région dont le levé sera nécessaire à faire, M. le commissaire russe trouve avantageux de procéder aussi vite que possible à l'étude de la question de la frontière.

On décide aussi de se réunir le 23 courant à 10 heures du matin (le 22 étant le jour de la fête persane du Nouvel An). Durant cette séance MM. les commissaires

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persan et ottoman présenteront leurs exposés définitifs et détaillés pour la partie de la frontière entre Zafarani et la latitude 33° 10′.

Fait à Baksaï, le 21 mars, 1914.

A. C. WRATISLAW.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
V. MINORSKY.
AZ. SAMIH.

Enclosure 21 in No. 235.

Dix-neuvième Séance.

SÉANCE tenue à Baksaï, le 23 mars, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire persan.

Le procès-verbal de la dix-septième séance a été signé et celui de la dernière séance lu et approuvé.

Conformément à ce qui a été convenu à la séance précédente, MM. les commissaires persan et ottoman ont développé leurs points de vue au sujet des terrains de Baksaï et de Seïd Hassan.

M. le commissaire persan fait son exposé le premier. Il dit qu'à la conférence d'Erzeroum le commissaire ottoman dans sa réclamation n'a fait aucune mention de Baksaï. Il en déduit la conclusion que la possession desdits terrains n'était pas contestée à cette époque, et cite le livre de Dervich Pacha (chapitre XX), pour prouver que les terrains de Baksaï et de Seïfi et Malhatavi (Seïd Hassan) étaient occupés alors par des tribus persans.

M. le commissaire ottoman présente ensuite son exposé. Il lit quelques passages du livre de Dervich Pacha (chapitre XX) concernant la frontière et les tribus habitant les districts de Baksaï et de Seïd Hassan. Les Feïlis, qui ensemble avec les Beni Lam habitaient la région comprise entre les rivières de Goundjiun-Tchem et Gavi, se considéraient sujets ottomans, ce qui est prouvé par le fait qu'ils ont immigré plus tard avec les Beni Lam en territoire turc. Les vrais propriétaires des terrains étaient les Beni Lam, les autres n'étant que des cultivateurs au service des Beni Lam.

Une discussion a résulté sur la nationalité des diverses tribus.

M. le commissaire persan dit qu'il réclame seulement ce que Dervich Pacha lui-même a dit appartenir à la Perse à l'époque de la conclusion du Traité d'Erzeroum.

M. le commissaire ottoman n'admet pas que Dervich Pacha ait attribué Baksaï à la Perse.

M. le commissaire russe fait la récapitulation des questions qui ont été soulevées. La question à débattre est de savoir si les terrains de Baksaï et de Malhatavi étaient en possession persane ou ottomane à l'époque du Traité d'Erzeroum. Il trouve que les preuves avancées des deux côtés n'appuyent que partiellement les réclamations faites. Les parties intéressées devraient réciproquement prendre en considération au moins une partie des preuves adverses. M. le commissaire persan a répliqué que jusqu'à présent le commissaire ottoman n'avait pas présenté de preuves, étant donné que le livre de Dervich Pacha ne peut pas être considéré comme une preuve à l'appui des réclamations turques.

M. le commissaire ottoman relève qu'il a présenté à la Commission les registres gouvernementaux de Bedraï dans lesquels il est marqué que les terrains de Baksaï et de Seïd Hassan ont été donnés en affermage depuis une époque datant de quarante-trois ans. Il avait dit qu'il avait des témoins très sérieux, anciens propriétaires de Baksaï pour prouver la possession de Baksaï par le Gouvernement ottoman.

M. le commissaire persan répond que si la Commission accepte de pareilles preuves, il est prêt à présenter les registres gouvernementaux et un grand nombre de témoins. M. le commissaire britannique engage ses collègues persan et ottoman à chercher un moyen terme pour parvenir à se rapprocher.

M. le commissaire ottoman déclare qu'il lui est impossible de restreindre ses réclamations relatives à Baksaï et à Seïd Hassan, où son pays a des intérêts vitaux. M. le commissaire persan dit également qu'il tient aux territoires réclamés.

Les limites de Baksaï font ensuite l'objet d'une discussion. M. le commissaire ottomane a présenté une carte de la région sur laquelle les limites sont marquées.

M. le commissaire russe propose que les deux parties fassent un exposé écrit de leurs preuves pour plus de clarté. MM. les commissaires persan et ottoman trouvent

ceci inutile, et on décide de lever la séance pour se réunir de nouveau le lendemain à 10 heures du matin.

En conséquence, la Commission s'est occupée pendant cette séance de l'exposé et de l'examen des preuves avancées par MM. les commissaires persan et ottoman.

Fait à Baksaï, le 23 mars, 1914.

ETELA-OL-MULK.
A. C. WRATISLAW.
V. MINORSKY.
AZ. SAMIH.

Enclosure 22 in No. 235.

Vingtième Séance.

SÉANCE tenue à Baksaï le 24 mars, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire russe.

Étaient présents tous les commissaires.

Le procès-verbal de la dernière séance a été lu et approuvé et celui de l'avant-dernière séance signé.

M. le commissaire russe prie ses collègues ottoman et persan de préciser leurs réclamations et les preuves qu'ils auront à faire valoir. Il s'agit, dit-il, de désigner, de la part de la Turquie, la limite nord, et, de la part de la Perse, la limite sud de Baksaï.

M. le commissaire ottoman déclare que la possession d'un endroit ne peut être prouvé que par des actes et registres officiels et par des témoins impartiaux. Les registres gouvernementaux, ajoute-il, sont prêts ainsi que les témoins—fils des Cheikhs de Baksaï. Ce sont des témoins dont l'autorité ne peut être contestée par personne.

M. le commissaire persan répond que, quant aux registres cadastraux et aux cartes topographiques, on ne les a pas acceptées comme preuves pendant les négociations de Constantinople. Il pourrait, de son côté, présenter des registres et des témoins. Si la Commission décide l'audition des témoins, le Vali de Poucht-i-Kouh et le caïmakan de Bedraï devraient assister à l'interrogatoire.

M. le commissaire russe est de l'avis que le témoignage des habitants de la région ne peut pas être tout à fait impartial, et que ces témoins ne sauraient parler avec beaucoup de certitude du *statu quo* de 1848. Les déclarations des deux parties, dit-il, manquent un peu de précision. Il prie donc ses collègues persan et ottoman encore une fois de donner les limites de Baksaï.

M. le commissaire ottoman déploie de nouveau la carte sur laquelle sont marquées les limites de Baksaï et qu'il dit avoir été faite il y a environ trente ans.

M. le commissaire persan déclare que, d'après lui, Bagh Chahi comprend tous les terrains irrigués par les canaux qui dérivent du Tchengoulé, et, d'après Dervich Pacha, la limite est à l'endroit où le Tchengoulé prend le nom d' "El Wadi," endroit que Dervich Pacha place à une demi-heure de distance en bas de Bagh Chahi. Il laisse la désignation précise de cet endroit à l'appréciation de ses collègues.

M. le commissaire britannique fait observer que la phrase citée n'est pas de Dervich Pacha lui-même : elle se trouve dans un rapport fait par les Cheikhs de Bedraï et inséré par Dervich Pacha dans son livre.

Une discussion suit au sujet de l'admissibilité du témoignage des témoins locaux. M. le commissaire britannique rappelle que la Commission avait écouté des témoins à Oumm-Chir, et il ne voit pas qu'on puisse refuser d'en écouter à Baksaï. En cas de rigueur, on pourrait, peut-être, restreindre le nombre des témoins présentés par chaque partie.

M. le commissaire russe trouve qu'il devient de plus en plus claire que la possession des terrains contestés dans leur ensemble a toujours été incertaine. Le Général Tchirikof, seul témoin neutre, appuie cette opinion : "Le village [c'est-à-dire Baksaï] avait autrefois plus de 500 maisons, les autres disent même 1,000 ou 2,000, avec de riches jardins de palmiers et d'orangers ; mais Kelb Ali Khan, pendant les hostilités contre Hassan Khan, détruit le village et abattit 11,000 palmiers. L'endroit où nous étions descendus s'appelle Bagh-i-Schah. Quelques trois dizaines de familles arabes et de Lours cultivent les terres et payent un cinquième de leur récolte comme impôt, qui se partage entre Ali Khan et le Cheikh des Beni Lam, Maskout." (Page 390 du journal

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du Général Tchirikof.) Considérant les preuves citées par les deux parties insuffisantes pour la totalité des réclamations qu'on désire baser là-dessus, il croit très désirable que MM. les commissaires ottoman et persan veuillent indiquer de certains compromis pour concorder leurs points de vue quant à la délimitation près de Baksaï.

M. le commissaire ottoman réplique qu'il a déjà modifié sa réclamation en se dispensant des montagnes, et qu'il lui est impossible de faire davantage.

M. le commissaire persan, se référant aux paroles de son collègue russe, affirme que la chose incertaine n'est pas la possession des terres, mais la nationalité des tribus qui y habitaient.

MM. les commissaires russe et britannique ayant exprimé le désir d'étudier la situation, on a décidé de lever la séance et de se réunir le lendemain, 25 mars.

En conséquence, dans cette séance on a poursuivi la discussion concernant les terrains de Baksaï et de Seïd Hassan.

Fait à Baksaï, le 24 mars, 1914.

V. MINORSKY.
A. C. WRATISLAW.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
AZ. SAMIH.

Enclosure 23 in No. 235.

Vingt et unième Séance.

SEANCE tenue à Baksaï, le 26 mars, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire ottoman.

Etaient présents tous les commissaires.

Le procès-verbal de la dernière séance a été lu et approuvé et celui de l'avant-dernière séance signé.

Une divergence s'est manifestée dans les interprétations données à certains paragraphes du 20e chapitre du livre de Dervich Pacha, et la signification exacte a provoqué une discussion.

M. le commissaire britannique dit qu'il partage l'opinion exprimée par son collègue russe concernant l'insuffisance des arguments avancés de part et d'autre pour prouver une possession exclusive des terres de Baksaï proprement dit. La déclaration du Général Tchirikof le persuade au contraire que c'était, lors de la visite du général, une possession en commun.

Une note sur les travaux topographiques depuis Nasiri jusqu'au Douvarij, présentée par le corps technique, a été lue et adoptée. Le texte est comme suit :

"Note sur les travaux topographiques présentée par les officiers techniques et faisant suite à la note comprise dans le procès-verbal de la sixième séance.

"Afin de fournir une base pour les travaux d'Oumm-Chir vers le nord-ouest, le Major Cowie s'est rendu à Nasiri (près d'Ahwaz), où il a fixé la position exacte du consulat de la Grande-Bretagne. Sa latitude, constatée par des observations astronomiques, est de 31° 19′ 21″, sa longitude, constatée par correspondance télégraphique avec le Colonel Ryder à Mohammerah, est de 48° 40′ 43″ est Greenwich. Prenant ces chiffres comme base, le Major Cowie a poursuivi le travail de triangulation jusqu'à la localité connue sous le nom d'Oumm-Chir, avant l'arrivée de la Commission à cet endroit. La latitude et la longitude, selon la Carte identique de l'endroit où le lit desséché du Chatt-el-Amma atteint le marécage près d'Oumm-Chir, ont correspondu avec assez de précision avec les résultats donnés par les travaux de triangulation. Ainsi on a trouvé possible de marquer sur la Carte identique la position des bornes Nos. 15 et 16 avec assez d'exactitude.

"Un topographe a été envoyé près de Schoueïb pour lever le plan des limites du marais, et du résultat de son travail il a été constaté que celles-ci sont marquées avec plus d'exactitude sur la carte annexée au Protocole de Constantinople que sur la Carte identique, c'est-à-dire que le marécage s'approche davantage de Kouchk-i-Basri qu'il n'est marqué sur la Carte identique.

"D'Oumm-Chir on a porté la triangulation jusqu'au Douvarij dont la latitude d'après la Carte identique s'étant montrée inférieure de 4 minutes à la vraie latitude, on a jugé indispensable de dresser une nouvelle carte (Carte supplémentaire No. 2), pour indiquer la ligne-frontière et la position des bornes entre Oumm-Chir et le Douvarij et d'écrire sur la Carte identique les mots 'Pour le tracé précis de la section de la frontière indiquée par la ligne coupée, voir la Carte supplémentaire No. 2.'"

On discute enfin le programme des travaux de la Commission. MM. les commissaires ayant jugé utile d'étudier la question des terrains de Seïd Hassan conjointement avec la question de Baksaï, ils se décident à partir demain pour Seïd Hassan.

Fait à Baksaï, le 26 mars, 1914.

AZ. SAMIH.
A. C. WRATISLAW.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
V. MINORSKY.

Enclosure 24 in No. 235.

Vingt-deuxième Séance.

SÉANCE tenue à Seïd Hassan, le 28 mars, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire britannique.

Etaient présents tous les commissaires.

Le procès-verbal de la dernière séance a été lu et approuvé.

On a signé les exemplaires britannique, ottoman et celui des archives de la Commission de la troisième feuille de la Carte identique.

M. le président a demandé à MM. les commissaires persan et ottoman s'ils avaient trouvé un arrangement à propos des terrains de Baksaï et de Seïd Hassan. MM. les commissaires persan et ottoman déclarent qu'une entente directe leur paraît impossible à ce sujet. On a décidé, par conséquent, de recourir à l'arbitrage de MM. les commissaires britannique et russe.

Les deux parties intéressées ont promis de présenter leurs exposés dans les quarante-huit heures.

Fait à Seïd Hassan, le 28 mars, 1914.

A. C. WRATISLAW.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
V. MINORSKY.
AZ. SAMIH.

Enclosure 25 in No. 235.

Vingt-troisième Séance.

SÉANCE tenue à Seïd Hassan, le 3 avril, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire persan.

Étaient présents tous les commissaires.

Les procès-verbaux de la vingtième et de la vingt et unième séances ont été signés, et celui de la dernière séance a été lu et approuvé.

Ensuite M. le commissaire russe a donné lecture, au nom des commissaires des deux Puissances médiatrices, de la décision arbitrale rendue par eux concernant la frontière entre Zaférani et la rivière Goundjiun-Tchem. MM. les commissaires décident que ladite décision ainsi que les exposés écrits des deux parties soient annexés au present protocole.

M. le commissaire ottoman prie ses collègues russe et britannique d'expliquer plus exactement le sens de la décision arbitrale en ce qui concerne les droits de propriété du Vali de Poucht-i-Kouh sur certains terrains à Baksaï. Il déclare ne rien savoir d'une telle propriété. Si on reconnaît, dit-il, les droits de propriété à Baksaï au Vali de Poucht-i-Kouh, il faudrait reconnaître en revanche le droit de propriété des sujets ottomans à Seïd Hassan.

M. le commissaire britannique répond qu'il est de la connaissance de tous que le

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Vali est propriétaire des terrains en question à Baksaï, tandis qu'il n'a pas été prouvé qu'il y ait des propriétaires ottomans à Seïd Hassan. La visée des arbitres a été de sauvegarder au Vali ses droits comme simple particulier. En ce qui concerne lesdits terrains, sa situation envers le Gouvernement ottoman sera celle d'un propriétaire privé. M. le commissaire russe ajoute qu'en fait d'impôts sur la propriété, &c., le Vali serait naturellement sur un pied d'égalité avec les sujets ottomans.

MM. les commissaires ont alors déterminé l'emplacement des bornes à ériger sur la partie de la frontière qui venait d'être délimitée, et ont décidé d'en faire construire aux points ci-après énumérés: borne No. 25, au ravin de Zaférani; No. 26, sur la rive du Tchengoulé à sa sortie des montagnes; No. 27, au ravin de Sarkher; No. 28 et No. 29, aux deux extrémités du ravin de Palk; No. 30, au point du Hamrine d'où la ligne frontière se dirige vers la rivière de Bedraï. Une sous-commission, composée de MM. le Capitaine Wilson, Salar Muzaffar, Belaief et le Capitaine Abdul Hamid, a été constituée pour appliquer sur les lieux le tracé de la frontière arrêté entre Zaférani et le ravin de Palk. Des instructions écrites leur ont été données. Cette sous-commission partira demain matin. MM. les commissaires se rendront demain, de leur côté, à l'extrémité nord du ravin de Palk pour y faire ériger la borne.

En conséquence, il a été arrêté au cours de cette séance: (1) Le tracé de la frontière de Zaférani jusqu'au ravin de Palk; (2) L'emplacement des bornes Nos. 25 à 30; et (3) L'envoi à Baksaï d'une sous-commission chargée de l'érection des bornes.

Fait à Seïd Hassan, le 3 avril, 1914.

ETELA-OL-MULK.
A. C. WRATISLAW.
V. MINORSKY.
AZ. SAMIH.

Exposé communiqué par M. le Commissaire persan à MM. les Commissaires britannique et russe.

Pour bien mettre en relief la concordance du tracé que j'ai eu l'honneur de présenter à la dix-huitième séance de notre Commission avec les droits incontestables du Gouvernement persan, je dois, avant tout, remarquer que conformément au principe du *statu quo*, posé par le dernier traité d'Erzeroum, le tronçon de frontière dont le sort définitive est soumis à l'arbitrage doit revenir à celui des deux États intéressés qui en avait la possession à l'époque de la conclusion dudit traité.

Or, il est nettement établi dans le procès-verbal de la onzième séance tenue à Erzeroum que cette partie de la frontière, c'est-à-dire Bagh Chahi, Seifi A. Melkhetavi ou Seïd Hassan, se trouvait en la possession exclusive de l'une seule des deux parties. En effet, le délégué ottoman, invité à préciser les réclamations de son Gouvernement, n'a fait, à cette époque, aucune mention de ces territoires et l'on doit en conclure qu'il les considérait non pas litigieux, mais faisant partie exclusive du territoire persan ou de l'Empire ottoman.

Il me suffit donc de rechercher la situation de ces régions à l'époque de la conclusion du traité de 1848 et d'établir qu'elles se trouvaient en la possession exclusive du Gouvernement persan.

Pour cela je crois absolument nécessaire d'attirer l'attention de mes honorables collègues sur certains passages contenus dans le rapport de Dervich Pacha: passages dont l'interprétation a déjà donne lieu à de longues discussion et que je me suis efforcé de traduire aussi fidèlement que possible. Cette nécessité se fait d'autant plus sentir qu'abstraction faite des preuves tirées soit de l'histoire, soit des documents officiels du Gouvernement persan, c'est de ce rapport—document qui provient d'un fonctionnaire officiel ottoman, spécialement chargé de trouver des arguments pour pouvoir appuyer les prétention de son Gouvernement—que seront tirées les preuves les plus éclatantes des droits de la Perse.

Ces passages sont:

1. Le mazbata de Bedra cité au chapitre 20 du rapport de Dervich Pacha;
2. La seconde moitié du chapitre 15 dudit rapport.

Le mazbata est ainsi conçu:

"La frontière de la localité nommée Bedra est la rivière de Guendjian-Tchem, rivière située au nord de Bedra et venant des montagnes connues sous le nom de Molebazan. Du commencement de Guendjian-Tchem, c'est-à-dire

de l'endroit où cette rivière sort des montagnes jusqu'à l'endroit nomme Makhlat (confluent) la rive droite fait partie de Bedra et la rive gauche appartient aux tribus de Feïlis, dépendant de la Perse. Également le Gavi, rivière qui sort des montagnes Varvad, situé à l'est de Bedra, et qui se jette à Guendjian-Tchem au susdit point nommé Makhlat. A partir du point où cette rivière sort des montagnes jusqu'à Makhlat les deux rives appartiennent aux Feïlis, et de Makhlat plus bas elles dépendent, toutes deux, de Bedra. Les terrains situés entre les deux rivières sont habités par les Al-Toans et Al-Khomeyss de Beni Lams et par les Seïfis, Melkhetavis et Khanomis de Feïlis. Les tribus des deux parties y cultivent la terre et le cinquième de récolte revenant à l'État est partagé par leurs cheikhs respectifs. Quant à la cultivation faite par les Cheikhs de Beni Lams par voie de corvée ('imedji'), ils en recueillent la récolte sans intervention des autres. Bagsaye et ses champs de culture, arrosés par Tchengouleh, qui prend sa source dans les monts Keder ou de Kouh Kebir, sont, de la façon susmentionnée, en la possession des tribus de Beni Lams et des Feïlis. Du point situé à une distance de une demi-heure plus bas que Bagsaye jusqu'au Tigre, la rivière de Tchengouleh prend le nom d'El Vadi. De ce point distant d'une demi-heure plus bas que Bagsaye jusqu'au Tigre la rive droite de El Vadi jusqu'à Bedra et sa rive gauche jusqu'au Tyb, rivière qui coule près de l'endroit nommé Bayat, sont en possession de Beni Lams et appartiennent au Gouvernement ottoman et le côté de Bagsaye, adjacent aux montagnes appartiennent aux Feïlis. Et bien que . . . ."

La seconde moitié du chapitre XVI est en ces termes:

" . . . . Outre que les tribus de Feïlis ont, depuis quelque temps, étendu leur main d'oppression sur les deux localités susmentionnées (Bayat et Dehloran) et qu'ils ont mises en ruines, ils interviennent également depuis quelques années dans Peksaye ou Bagsaye, endroit situé à une distance de trois à cinq heures des terrains montagneux et reste jusqu'aux récentes époques sous l'administration des Beni Lams et en dehors des interventions et empiétements des Feïlis lesquels prennent aujourd'hui la moitié du cinquième de récolte revenant aux tribus de Beni Lams."

Ces textes cités, étudions séparément, pour plus de précision, la question de Bagh Chagi d'une part, et celle de Seïfi, Melkhetavi ou de Seïd Hassan d'autre part, et commençons, pour suivre le même ordre que Dervich Pacha, par le nord.

(*a.*) Seïfi, Melkhetavi, Seïd Hassan.

En examinant la première partie de mazbata, cité plus haut, on s'aperçoit clairement que les points suivants y sont formellement établis:

1. Qu'à partir de l'endroit où le Gavi sort des montagnes jusqu'à Makhlat les deux rives de cette rivière appartiennent aux Feïlis, à l'exclusion des Beni Lams sur la rive gauche.

Or, la partie adverse peut-elle, après un aveu tellement formel, venir prétendre que ces territoires ont appartenu ou appartiennent aujourd'hui au Gouvernement ottoman par la simple considération que dans ce mazbata, précisément pour diminuer la valeur de l'aveu y contenu, on attribue, à quelques familles de Beni Lams, une part de bénéfice dans le produit des récoltes faites dans les terrains situées entre le Gavi et le Guendjian-Tchem seulement?

Cette considération, qui trouve peut-être un peu de crédit relativement à Bagsaï à cause de la concordance du contenu du mazbata avec le récit du Général Tchirikof, doit n'être d'aucune valeur en ce qui concerne les terres de Seïfi, Melkhetavi ou de Seïd, Hassan. Car un simple coup d'œil jeté sur ce mazbata fait clairement ressortir que si l'on y fait mention de Beni Lams par rapport à ces territoires c'est précisément pour pouvoir trouver un prétexte aux prétentions ottomanes. N'y est-il pas, en effet, déclaré formellement que d'une part la rive gauche du Guendjian-Tchem et que d'autre part la rive droite de Gavi, c'est-à-dire tous les terrains situés entre ces deux rivières, appartiennent aux Feïlis? Où peut-on donc placer les Beni Lams qui aurait cultivé les terrains d'entre Gavi et Guendjian-Tchem?

Le Général Tchirikof écrit également que cette région est habitée par des Laurs habillés à l'arabe et que les terres de Seïd Hassan appartiennent à Hayder Khan (fils de Hassan Khan, Vali de Poucht-i-Kouh).

Encore une fois la rive gauche de Guendjian-Tchem et la rive droite de Gavi, toutes deux jusqu'à Makhlat, appartenant à la Perse, quelle portion de territoire pourra

bien appartenir au Gouvernement ottoman sans être complètement englobée dans le territoire persan?

Les terres de Seïfis et de Melkhetavi (du nom des tribus Laurs qui y habitent) ou les terres de Seïd Hassan ont donc toujours appartenu et appartiennent encore au Gouvernement persan et doivent rester définitivement sous sa souveraineté.

(*b.*) Bagh Chahi.

En analysant, ne fût-ce que sommairement, la dernière moitié du mazbata et la seconde moitié du chapitre XVI du rapport du Dervich Pacha on constate clairement:

1. Que du point distant d'une demi-heure de Bagh Chahi jusqu'au Tigre la rive droite d'El Vadi jusqu'à Bedra et sa rive gauche jusqu'au Tyb sont en possession de Beni Lams, et le côté de Bagsaye adjacent aux montagnes appartient aux Feïlis.

2. Que Bagh Chahi est un endroit situé à une distance de trois à cinq heures des montagnes.

Or, quelle que soit l'interprétation donnée au texte turc du rapport par mon collègue ottoman, et quelles que soient les restrictions qu'il veuille y apporter, on doit cependant reconnaître que le mazbata en question—document établi pour servir de preuves aux prétentions ottomanes—attribue à la Perse le côté de Bagh Chahi adjacent aux montagnes, et aux Beni, la partie allant vers le Tigre du point où Tchengoulé prend le nom d'El Vadi.

La possession de Bagh Chahi par la Perse avant le Traité d'Erzeroum et à l'époque de sa conclusion ressort non seulement des écrits de Dervich Pacha, mais elle est encore reconnue par Kourchid Pacha où il dit qu'à la mort de Hassan Khan, Vali de Poucht-i-Kouh, l'administration des tribus de Feïlis a été confiée aux trois enfants de ce Vali et que ces derniers, devenus rivaux, ont mis en ruines Bagh Chahi, Bayat et autres localités alors florissantes. C'est d'ailleurs ce qui est à peu près rapporté par le Général Tchirikof, où il écrit qu'à Bagh Chahi 11,000 palmiers ont été abattus à cause de querelles intestines des Feïlis (Kah Ali Khan et Hassan Khan).

Enfin il me reste encore à dissiper les confusions qui ont été produites dans nos séances relativement à l'intervention que les Beni Lams auraient eue dans les terres de Bagh Chahi et à applanir la difficulté relative à l'étendue de ce territoire.

L'entreprise de cette tâche est d'autant plus nécessaire qu'en présence de preuves tellement probantes en faveur des droits de la Perse, et en l'absence de tout argument valable pouvant appuyer les prétentions de la Turquie (absence d'arguments reconnue en séance même par M. le commissaire ottoman en déclarant que les seules prevues de son Gouvernement consistaient aux registres gouvernementaux et au témoignage des arabes) mon collègue ottoman tâche de mettre à profit ces confusions afin de pouvoir créer de doute sur les droits incontestables de mon Gouvernement.

Aussi je dois remarquer:

(*a.*) Qu'en admettant même qu'il y ait eu des cultivateurs Beni Lams sur les terres de Bagh Chahi, c'étaient des Beni Lams persans, et non des Beni Lams ottomans. (Je crois que l'existence de Beni Lams persans ne fait de doute pour personne.)

(*b.*) Que dans le cas même où ce seraient des Beni Lams ottomans qui auraient eu une part dans la récolte de Bagh Chahi, c'étaient des cultivateurs établis en qualité d'ouvriers et non en qualité de propriétaires ayant des Feïlis pour ouvriers, comme semble le prétendre mon collègue ottoman. En effet, en adoptant même l'opinion de Dervich Pacha, d'après laquelle les Feïlis ont étendu leur main d'oppression et se sont fait attribuer la moitié de la part revenant aux Beni Lams, il serait absolument illogique de venir prétendre que les opprimés étaient des maîtres et les oppresseurs des ouvriers à leur service.

(*c.*) Qu'enfin dans le cas même où l'on écarterait tout argument en faveur de la thèse persane pour ne se tenir, au sujet de Beni Lams, aux prétensions ottomanes, c'est-à-dire dans le cas où, malgré l'absence de toute preuve, on reconnaîtrait la sujétion ottomane aux Beni Lams qui auraient eu autrefois des intérêts agricoles sur les rives du Tchengouleh et que l'on donnerait, contrairement à toute logique, la qualité de maîtres aux Beni Lams opprimés, on serait conduit à reconnaître à ces Beni Lams un droit sur le produit de récolte dans le partie seulement de Bagh Chahi que le document turc leur assigne, c'est-à-dire à partir du point où le Tchengouleh prend le nom d'El Vadi et dont j'ai laissé la détermination exacte à l'esprit de justice et d'équité de mes honorables collègues.

Je crois, cependant, nécessaire de préciser quelques points relatifs à ce sujet; ce sera d'ailleurs applanir la difficulté concernant l'étendue de Bagh Chahi mentionnée plus haut.

Dervich Pacha place l'endroit où le Tchengouleh prend le nom d'El Vadi à une demi-heure plus bas que Bagh Chahi. Où se trouve donc Bagh Chahi et quelles en sont les limites?

Si la Commission n'avait pas écarté dès le commencement les preuves émanant de l'une seule des parties et citées comme arguments aux réclamations de la partie même dont elle émanent, je répondrais à cette question en exhibant les registres financiers de la province de Poucht-i-Kouh et d'où il résulte que Bagh Chahi est un district de Poucht-i-Kouh, situé au sud-ouest des dernières collines de la chaîne de Hamrine et dont les limites s'étendent au nord-ouest jusqu'à Bedra, au sud-est jusqu'à Zafaranieh et au sud-ouest jusqu'au près du Tigre; mais on ne m'appuyant que sur les documents de la partie adverse—les plus probantes preuves que l'on puisse avoir dans un litige—je dirai que Dervich Pacha lui-même entend par Bagh Chahi un endroit se trouvant à une distance de trois à cinq heures des montagnes (voir fin du chapitre XVI du rapport de Dervich Pacha.)

Or, si l'on écarte toujours les calculs les plus favorables à la cause persane, c'est-à-dire si l'on prend quatre heures de distance au lieu de cinq, et si l'on compte $3\frac{1}{2}$ milles par heure au lieu de 4 milles, la limite sud-ouest de la partie de Bagh Chahi que Dervich Pacha assigne aux Feïlis, sera, à partir des pieds des montagnes, à une distance de 14 milles plus la demi-heure, soit $1\frac{3}{4}$ milles, ce qui fait en tout près de 16 milles—juste la limite occidentale marqué sur la Carte identique.

Ainsi la possession exclusive de l'une des deux parties étant établie par le procès-verbal de la onzième séance du congrès d'Erzeroum, la possession seule du Gouvernement persan, soit avant, soit à l'époque du traité de 1848, étant prouvée par les preuves mêmes tirées des documents de la partie adverse, et enfin la valeur des soi-disant droits de Beni Lams (s'il y avait des droits) étant ainsi annulée, je ne doute pas un instant de ce que les droits de mon Gouvernement soient hautement reconnus, et toutes ces régions restent, comme par le passé, sous sa propriété définitive.

ETELA-OL-MULK.

Le 31 mars, 1914.

Exposé communiqué par M. le Commissaire ottoman à MM. les Commissaires britannique et russe.

Seïd Hassan, le 1er avril, 1914.

La frontière essentielle entre l'Empire ottoman et le Gouvernement persan suit la chaîne magistrale de Kebir-Kouh, en laissant ainsi le Poucht-i-Kouh du côté ottoman.

Au chapitre XVI du livre de Dervich Pacha il est dit qu'en l'an de l'Hégire 1254 le Major Rawlinson, consul britannique à Bagdad, dans son article paru dans la revue de la Société de Géographie de Londres, déclare que le Kalé de Seymer est situé sur la frontière turco-persane. Il y est rapporté le témoignage de Selim Khan comme quoi le Poucht-i-Kouh se trouve en territoire ottoman.

La différence entre les années 1254 et 1264 n'étant pas trop grande, on peut en déduire que le Kebir-Kouh constitue toujours le *statu quo* 1264.

Les chefs des tribus Filis, habitant les environs de Khorremabad, ont été de tout temps en continuels conflits avec le Gouvernement persan, qui dut employer contre eux la force armée, à la suite de laquelle ils se retirèrent aux environs de Poucht-i-Kouh et vinrent s'installer à la partie montagneuse de ce contrée. A cette époque même cette partie de Poucht-i-Kouh appartenait au Gouvernement ottoman, et était habitée par des Beni Lam ottomans.

Il ressort de ce qui précède que cette contrée n'a jamais appartenu aux tribus Filis, mais que ceux-ci, poussés par les armées persanes, vinrent s'y réfugier en usurpant des droits déjà acquis.

La ligne du *statu quo* en l'an 1848 (1264 de l'Hégire), dans la partie de la frontière entre Zafaranieh et Goundjiun-Tchem, est telle qu'il est rapporté ci-dessus de la correspondance de Dervich Pacha. D'autre part il y est fait mention des dépositions des habitants. Ainsi, il ressort de ces dépositions que les territoires de Dehloran et de Bayat appartenaient aux Beni Lam. Ce n'est qu'après la mort de Hassan Khan que ses fils les ont attaqués, et les ont poussés à quitter lesdits endroits. Il ne resta dès lors aux Beni Lam que Baksaï seulement, et même de cela ils furent contraints par force à partager avec le Khan un cinquième des revenus.

Le territoire situé entre les rivières Ghovi et Goundjiun-Tchem appartenait aux Beni Lam. Pour prévenir une attaque pareille à celle de Baksaï, ils payèrent au khan une certaine somme.

Dans tous les deux cas n'était nullement sous forme d'impôt que les Beni Lam ont payé au khan.

Il apport des dépositions de 1264 et de celles des cheikhs que Poucht-i-Kouh, et particulièrement les territoires de Baksaï et de Seïd Hassan, n'ont jamais appartenu au Gouvernement persan. Les Khans Filis ne sont venus en ces contrées qu'en usurpateurs et de vive force.

A cette époque, le Gouvernement Impérial donnait en affermage, en un seul lot tout le territoire situé de Bedré aux environs de Douveridj au Grand Cheikh des Beni Lam et celui-ci en cédait la jouissance par petits lots à des cheikhs inférieurs; il recevait d'eux la redevance fiscale et la remettait au Gouvernement. Les Beni Lam se trouvaient alors compact et cette union seule rendait impossible une attaque de la part des Filis. Au contraire, leurs cheikhs percevaient, pour le compte toujours du Gouvernement, le droit de pâture des troupeaux appartenant aux Filis.

Ce mode de donner en affermage des terrains en un si grand lot paraissant préjudiciable au fisc, le Gouvernement Impérial jugea plus tard utile de le partager en plusieurs plus petits. Ceci eut l'effet néfaste de diviser les Beni Lam, amoindrit leur force et rendit possible une incursion des Filis. En effet, ceux-ci ne tardèrent pas à profiter de cette faiblesse et pour prendre leur revanche ils ont attaqué un à un chaque petite tribu des Beni Lam et essayèrent de les forcer à leur payer cette taxe de pâture, voulant ainsi se faire restituer les taxes que les Beni Lam avaient jusque-là prélevées.

Ce partage date de l'année 1270, époque à laquelle Rechid Pacha était Gouverneur général de Bagdad, et l'affermage par petits lots a été donné aux requérants par l'arrondissement de Bedré. Les contrats d'affermage ont été, selon un rapport officiel du vilayet de Bagdad, envoyé en 1300 au Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, qui en fit la demande.

Les Filis ont détruit Bayat et Dehloran, jusque-là fertile et prospère. Au temps de Ferdjullah, descendant de Ressen, Kelb Ali Khan a attaqué Baksaï et détruisit les habitations et coupa les dattiers. Il s'est retiré plus tard après avoir fait de Baksaï une ruine. Les cultivateurs Beni Lam sont alors revenus labourer leurs champs; mais avant vingt-cinq ans, ils subirent une nouvelle attaque, à la suite de laquelle ils allèrent à Grieybeh et à d'autres endroits.

Actuellement, le chef de tribu est Ressen-bin-Rahme. Ses sept aïeux ont cultivé Baksaï et étaient des sujets ottomans. Celui qui a embelli le plus Bakasï, celui qui y a planté la vigne ("bagh") est Abduch-Chah, aïeul de Ressen. C'est par déférences à ses services qu'on a nommé le village Baghi-Chahi.

Il est établi par le témoignage du Général Tchirikof que la tribu d'Abduch-Chakh se trouvait aux environs du Tigre et était de sujetion ottomane.

Toutes les maisons, tous les canaux, moulins et autres ont été, sans exception aucune, établis et construits par des Beni Lam Les cheikhs d'aujourd'hui, descendants directs des cheikhs de Baksaï, sont là pour désigner les propriétaires des ruines qu'on voit actuellement et pour prouver par qui elles ont été construites.

Dans la partie de Baksaï située près des montagnes, il existe les ruines d'une caserne et des dépôts construits par le Gouvernement Impérial.

Ce sont les cheikhs qui ont fondé le village, ont cultivé ses champs par des Filis, qu'ils ont fait travailler comme de simples ouvriers.

Le Cheikh d'El Humeiss est un des propriétaires de Baksaï. Il avait son terrain du côté Djerea.

Tous les deux fourniront tous les détails qu'on aurait désirés.

Il est également dit dans l'ouvrage du Général Tchirikof que Cheikh Mascout des Beni Lam dépendait du Gouvernement Impérial, c'est-à-dire il était sujet ottoman.

Dervich Pacha aussi dit dans les chapitres XVI et XX de son livre que Baksaï appartient au Gouvernement ottoman.

Dans le même livre, la déclaration si impartiale des habitants de Bedré montre que Baksaï était habité par des tribus Beni Lam et Filis. Mais il est établi par le témoignage des cheikhs que ces derniers étaient de simples ouvriers au service des Lam.

Au chapitre XX du même livre, il se trouve défini que la partie montagneuse de cet endroit appartient aux Filis et que la frontière passe de manière à laisser les montagnes aux Filis.

Les cheikhs Beni Lam déclarent dans leur mazbata que Baksaï leur appartient.

Il est enregistré dans les registres de prélèvement des impôts de Bedré que le Moukataa de Baksaï a été régulièrement donné en affermage depuis 1287. Avant cette date, Bedré n'était qu'un nahié (village); les registres se trouvent à Bagdad. En cas de nécessité, on les fera apporter.

Outre Baksaï, la ligne frontière tracée par MM. les délégués persans, comprend aussi en partie les Moukataa de Griebbeh, de Hori-Djessan, et de Muzeibleh. Or, jusqu'à ce jour aucune réclamation n'a été soulevée pour ces terrains.

Les khans ont attaqué de la même manière le territoire situé entre Ghovi et Goundjiun-Tchem. En 1300 les habitants de ce endroit, pour se soustraire à la violence de ces khans, durent émigrer.

Au chapitre XX de son livre, Dervich Pacha définit les limites de l'endroit dit Bedré, c'est-à-dire du Moukataa de Bedré; il parle également de Seïd Hassan dans une nouvelle phrase. Ceci montre que la frontière ne s'arrête pas aux limites du Moukataa de Bedré, mais elle comprend également les terrains situés entre Ghovi et Goundjiun-Tchem.

Au même chapitre, dans la déposition des Beni Lam, il est écrit que les Filis n'avaient aucun rapport avec les terrains de Seïd Hassan. Dans ces terrains habitaient les tribus El Humeiss et Et Taane des Beni Lam et ceux de Malhatavi, Sayfi et Hanimi des Filis. C'est après qu'ils ont été attaqués que les tribus Et Taane des d'El Humeiss ont émigré ensemble à Muzeïble et à Zorbatié. La grande partie des Sayfi ont suivi les El Humeiss et se trouvent actuellement au Moukataa de Muzeïble. Leur cheikh commun est Jassine. Il est resté cinq maisons à Seïd Hassan.

De même la majeure partie des Malhatavis est émigrée à Abbara et font partie de la tribu Et Taane. Leur cheikh est Noussaïff. Les Hanimi, en tout cinq maisons, se trouvent à Muzeible.

Or, les tribus Beni Lam et Filis, mentionnées dans le livre de Dervich Pacha comme étant les habitants des susdits contrées, ont tous émigré à Bedré. Leur émigration avec les Beni Lam, leur attachement aux cheikhs Lam, sont des preuves suffisantes pour montrer la parfaite harmonie entre les propriétaires et les ouvriers. Le fait même qu'ils ont suivi les Beni Lam prouvent qu'ils étaient les ouvriers ayant besoin de leur maître.

Par analogie, il ressort que les Filis de Baksaï ont été, eux aussi des cultivateurs au service des Beni Lam.

Avant et pendant la conclusion du Traité d'Erzeroum, les tribus Et Taana et El Humeiss ont été les propriétaires des terrains de Seïd Hassan. Actuellement le cheikh des Taana est Noussaïff-bin-Chati.

Noussaïff affirme que trente ans auparavant ils durent tous quitter leurs terrains à la suite de l'attaque du père du khan actuel.

Cheikh Noussaïff montrera l'emplacement et les fondations du fortin construit par Taano, fondateur de la tribu. Kalei-Sayfi est la ruine du dépôt que le Gouvernement Impérial avait fait construire dans le temps pour y emmagasiner le cinquième de la récolte revenant au Fisc. Ceci est connu par toutes les tribus.

Il existe également dans les registres fiscaux des inscriptions prouvant que les terrains de Seïd Hassan ont été donnés en affermage à la date de 1287.

Tous les arguments du Gouvernement persan pour les terrains de Baksaï et de Seïd Hassan se résument à ceci: les khans de Poucht-i-Kouh ont contraint par force les quelques cultivateurs et pâtres de ces endroits, à payer une certaine somme. On veut déduire de ça un droit de possession légale. Leurs preuves se consacrent aux mazbata contenus dans le livre de Dervich Pacha.

Or, comme il est dit plus haut, un examen attentif et impartial de l'ouvrage prouve tout le contraire. Ainsi, il y est ouvertement dit que la frontière passe des montagnes. Si, même on supposait que ces arguments et preuves étaient vrais et logiques, il est évident que l'usurpation et le vandalisme n'impliquent jamais la possession.

Il ressort de tout ce qui précède que les terrains de Baksaï et de Seïd Hassan ont de tout temps appartenu au Gouvernement Impérial, et par des considérations stratégiques, de sécurité et d'intérêts locaux il ne peut s'en désister.

Le Tchengouleh, qui traverse les terrains de Baksaï, arrose également le Moukataa de Griebeh. Dans le cas où Baksaï est attribué au Gouvernement persan, toutes les eaux du Tchengouleh seront distribuées à ces terrains et Griebeh et toute la contrée s'étendant jusqu'au Tigre manqueront totalement d'eau, surtout pendant l'été.

Il en résultera que ces endroits plus ou moins florissants aujourd'hui, deviendront des déserts et par là les habitants se verront obligés d'acheter l'eau du khan et deviendront ainsi ses tributaires.

Également pour les terrains de Seïd Hassan : Dans le cas où les eaux de Ghovi et Goundjiun-Tchem seront distribuées aux terrains situés entre les deux rivières, Zorbatié, Bedré, Muzeibleh, Djessan, Hor Djessan et toute la contrée s'étendant jusqu'à Kutul-Amara resteront sans eaux, deviendront un immense désert et les habitants seront obligés d'émigrer.

L'installation aux terrains de Bedré, de Griebeh et aux plaines s'étendant du Tybe au Tchengouleh, d'une tribu qui, par ses attaques continuelles, a ruiné Dehloran, Bayat et Baksaï, amènera un état d'insécurité dans la région située entre le Tigre d'une part, et le Djebel-i-Hamrine jusqu'à Bedré d'autre part tel qu'aucune tribu ne pourra y faire des cultivations.

J'ai appris de l'investigation que j'ai faite parmi les habitants de la contrée qui s'étend de Kara Tépé au ravin de Zagteranieh que le khan actuel les forcent à payer un certain droit de pâturage.

Ceci prouve que dans le cas où la frontière viendrait descendre dans la plaine, le même système d'invasion continuera sur une plus grande échelle.

D'autre part, l'approche démesuré d'un Gouvernement voisin au Tigre, à cette très importante route fluviale qui relie Bagdad à Bassora, ne manquera pas d'inquiéter sérieusement le Gouvernement Impérial.

Je suis persuadé que toutes ces considérations politiques et économiques amèneront MM. les commissaires des deux hautes Cours médiatrices à trouver une solution telle que les droits du Gouvernement Impérial seront tout à fait sauvegardés.

Confiant en leur esprit d'impartialité, je me remets à eux pour une solution équitable du différend.

Le Commissaire Impérial ottoman,
AZ. SAMIH.

Décision des Commissaires des Puissances médiatrices concernant la Frontière depuis le Ravin de Zaaferani jusqu'à la Rivière de Goundjiun-Tchem.

L'application de l'article 4 du Protocole final étant devenue nécessaire à la suite de la décision prise dans la séance de la Commission en date du 28 mars (Seifi-Malkhatavi), nous nous sommes réunis en séance privée pour étudier les exposés de nos collègues ottoman et persan, datés respectivement le 1er avril et le 31 mars, et pour statuer sur le sort des localités susmentionnées.

Nous avons attentivement examiné les preuves citées dans lesdits exposés, sans toutefois acquérir la certitude de leur suffisance pour prouver les droits exclusifs d'une partie ou de l'autre sur l'ensemble des territoires de Baksaï et de Seïd Hassan.

L'étude des données du livre du Général Tchirikof, du rapport de Dervich Pacha et d'autres matériaux accessibles nous permet de dire que le *statu quo* de 1848 était fort incertain à cause de la présence simultanée des tribus de Beni Lam et de Feïli, ainsi à Baksaï qu'à Seïd Hassan. On trouvait des tribus Beni Lam (Et Taan, El Khoumeis) au milieu de la presqu'île formée par les courants de Koundjiun-Tchem et de Gavi ; d'autre part, les impôts (le "khoms") de Baksaï se partagaient entre Ali-Khan Feïli et le Cheikh Beni Lam. Or, dans le cas d'attribution de ces deux localités à une seule partie une injustice serait faite à l'autre.

Il est donc évident que les indications que nous possédons concernant le *statu quo* ne sont pas à même d'écarter des difficultés de la délimitation.

Les considérations géographiques, par contre, militent en faveur de l'appartenance à la Turquie : de Baksaï, situé dans la plaine en dehors de la ligne de frontière acceptée jusqu'ici ailleurs au Poucht-i-Kouh, et à la Perse : de la vallée de Seïd Hassan, limitée au sud par la rangée de collines, formant une bonne frontière.

Comme, toutefois, il est indubitable que la délimitation ne doit pas porter atteint aux droits de propriété privée et que la présence des laboureurs feïlis à Baksaï et l'appartenance au Vali de Poucht-i-Kouh de certains terrains arrosés de la rivière de Tchengouleh sont des faits avérés, nous croyons nécessaire de les prendre également en sérieuse considération.

Vu ce qui précède, nous décidons :

"Que la frontière étant arrivée au ravin de Zaaferani passera de son côté droit (nord), et suivant le pied de la montagne traversera le Tchengouleh à sa sortie dans la plaine. Puis reprenant de nouveau la ligne du pied des montagnes la frontière contournera le pied des collines s'étendant au sud du Hamrine (Carte indentique : Khourmale-Djebel-

Bendjiki, Kalaouzynan, Keleschire) jusqu'au ravin dit Palk (ou Park) ; ensuite, suivant ce ravin en amont, passera sur la crête du Hamrine, qu'elle suivra vers l'ouest jusqu'au petit pic distant à peu près de 5 milles au sud-ouest du confluent du Koundjian-Tchem avec le Gavi. De là, la frontière descendra en ligne directe jusqu'à la rivière de Bedré. Passant par son *medium filum aquæ* la frontière ira en amont jusqu'à l'embouchure de la rivière de Koundjian-Tchem, qu'elle suivra de la même façon jusqu'à un point devant être ultérieurement fixé par la Commission.

"Ainsi la localité de Baksaï restera du côté turc et le district de Seïd Hassan (Seifi-Malhatavi) du côté persan. Nous croyons devoir ajouter que, dans notre opinion, ces terrains jusqu'ici contestés ne deviennent la propriété respective des deux États qu'en vertu de la présente décision arbitrale.

"La répartition définitive des droits souverains des deux États sur les terrains de Baksaï et de Seïd Hassan ne touchera aucunement aux droits des privés y existant. Il est expressément entendu que les tribus feïlis (Chouhan, &c.) resteront en jouissance de leurs droits à Baksaï et que le Vali de Poucht-i-Kouh gardera la possession et les emoluments provenant des terres arrosées par les canaux de Dirmali, Baksaï et Garre-Ghouhan (Kendelan), qui lui appartiennent. Une ligne droite joignant le Tchiga Naderi à la colline Kandelan et sa prolongation forment les limites sud des terres appartenant au Vali.

"Il est entendu que l'interprétation de cette décision en ce qui concerne son application sur les lieux appartiendra à nous ou à nos remplaçants."

Fait à Seïd Hassan, le 21 mars (3 avril), 1914.

Le Commissaire de la Grande-Bretagne,
A. C. WRATISLAW.

Le Commissaire de la Russie,
V. MINORSKY.

Enclosure 26 in No. 235.

Vingt-quatrième Séance.

SÉANCE tenue à Seïd Hassan, le 4 avril, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire russe.

Étaient présents :

Pour la Grande-Bretagne : Mr. Wratislaw.
Pour la Perse : Mansour-os-Soltaneh.
Pour la Russie : M. Minorsky.
Pour la Turquie : la Major Aziz Samih Bey.

Le procès-verbal de la dernière séance a été lu et approuvé et celui de l'avant-dernière séance signé.

M. le président dit qu'il faut déterminer le point où la frontière quittera le Goundjiun-Tchem et la direction qu'elle prendra ensuite pour aller vers Mendeli.

M. le commissaire ottoman déclare que la frontière devra suivre le Goundjiun-Tchem jusqu'au défilé situé entre les montagnes Kapari et Koulak-Bouzurg ; de là elle montera sur les crêtes de cette dernière montagne et de Koulik-Koutchouk ; ensuite elle coupera en ligne directe les deux petits cours d'eau et atteindra le sommet de Tépé Kalalan pour se joindre à la ligne venant de Djebel-i-Guerebi.

M. le commissaire persan propose le tracé suivant : arrivée sur le Goundjiun-Tchem, la ligne frontière en suit le *medium filum aquæ* jusqu'à un point situé à 2 milles à l'est du Makhlat (confluent du Gavi et du Goundjiun-Tchem) ; de là elle se dirige vers le nord et atteint le pied de Guynjevez. Ensuite elle suit le pied des montagnes jusqu'à ce qu'elle atteigne la rivière de Ab-i-Talkh, et remonte le cours de cette rivière jusqu'à son intersection avec la route allant vers Mendeli.

A partir de ce point elle suit la chaîne de Hamrine, passe la rivière de Kani Chakh de gauche à droite et se prolonge le long des monts Guerebi et Kelh Chouan.

Sur la prière de M. le président d'exposer les raisons pour lesquelles il désigne la ligne ci-dessus énoncée, M. le commissaire ottoman relève que Vermézia (Vermd Ziadi) et Teliman sont les pâturages des habitants de Zorbathia. Son Gouvernement, dit-il,

avait communiqué aux deux Gouvernements médiateurs le même projet pour cette partie de la frontière, et ceux-ci avaient fait des réserves quant à son acceptation pure et simple, alléguant que les données précises faisaient défaut, c'est-à-dire que la proposition n'avait pas été rejetée.

M. le commissaire persan dit que Vermézia et les terrains situés des deux côtés de Zaliab sont habités part des Feïlis et que la saline de Tchechmé Nomak est exploitée par eux et appartient au Vali de Poucht-i-Kouh.

M. le commissaire ottoman affirme que ces salines sont administrées par la Dette publique ottomane.

M. le commissaire russe observe qu'on est en présence de deux principes géographiques. Le tronçon de la frontière aboutissant à Guerebi du côté nord et constituent une "chose jugée" suit évidemment les crêtes des montagnes, tandis que la partie de Poucht-i-Kouh après la rivière Tyb a été délimitée suivant le principe du pied des montagnes. Il est évident qu'un passage d'un système à l'autre devra s'effectuer précisément sur le tronçon entre Seïd Hassan et Guerebi, et il serait juste que MM. les commissaires persan et ottoman élaborent un compromis.

Par conséquent, M. le commissaire persan propose la ligne suivante : Après le mont Guynjevez la frontière pourrait passer par le contrefort à la crête principale de Bendi-Koulik-Bouzurg, mais à la condition que les salines restent du côté persan.

M. le commissaire russe fait la proposition suivante de la part de son collègue britannique et de la sienne :

Les deux parties paraissent être d'accord pour prendre comme frontière la crête des Bendi-Kouliks. Il reste à considérer le point de départ de la frontière sur la rivière Goundjiun-Tchem. La ligne indiquée par M. le commissaire ottoman, et qui serait une frontière naturelle, part du défilé. Par contre, M. le commissaire persan réclame les salines. Mais la ligne qu'il propose couperait à travers les canaux qui fournissent les eaux à Zorbathia. Ceci comporterait un grand préjudice aux habitants de cette localité. On pourrait peut-être trancher la difficulté en cherchont une ligne moyenne, qui laisserait une partie du territoire réclamé à la Perse, tout en assurant aux habitants de Zorbathia leur approvisionnement d'eaux. La ligne suivante remplit les conditions voulues. Quittant le Goundjiun-Tchem près du ravin de Zaliab, elle remonte ce ravin en contournant les côtés sud et ouest du petit massif de montagnes qui se trouve à cet endroit et monte au sommet de Koulik-Bouzurg. A partir de là, elle suit la ligne des crêtes des montagnes jusqu'à Guerebi.

M. le commissaire persan demande un court délai pour considérer la question.

MM. les commissaires décident de faire construire demain la borne No. 29.

En conséquence, on a étudié pendant cette séance la question de la frontière depuis le Goundjiun-Tchem jusqu'à Guerebi.

Fait à Seïd Hassan, le 4 avril, 1914.

V. MINORSKY.
A. C. WRATISLAW.
MANSOUR-OS-SALTANEH.
AZ. SAMIH.

Enclosure 27 in No. 235.

Vingt-cinquième Séance.

MM. LES COMMISSAIRES ont fait ériger pendant la journée du 5 avril les bornes Nos. 25 à 30 aux endroits déterminés à la séance précédente. En outre, ils ont placé une borne (No. 31) au point où la frontière gagne la rive gauche de la rivière de Bedraï pour en suivre le *medium filum aquæ*.

Le lendemain, 6 avril, la vingt-cinquième séance a été tenue à Seïd Hassan, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire ottoman.

Etaient présents tous les commissaires.

Le procès-verbal de la dernière séance a été signé.

MM. les commissaires persan et ottoman déclarent accepter la proposition faite à la dernière séance par MM. les commissaires britannique et russe à propos de la ligne de frontière entre le Goundjiun-Tchem et la chaîne de Guérébi.

Après avoir examiné en détail la ligne indiquée, MM. les commissaires tombent d'accord sur le tracé suivant :

La frontière quitte le Goundjiun-Tchem au point de sa jonction avec le Zaliab (d'après la Carte identique). Elle suit ce ravin et atteint la crête de Bendi-Koulik-Bouzurg. Ensuite elle passe par Bendi-Koulik-Koutchouk, en suivant toujours la crête, jusqu'à Kouh-i-Guetchan. La ligne coupe alors la rivière de Toursak au défilé de Mar Aguetiar, remonte la crête méridionale du mont Meymyk et contourne du côté sud le Déré-i-Gourre-Geg. Puis elle se dirige sur le confluent du Déré-i-Gourre-Geg et du Ab-i-Tâlkh, remonte cette dernière jusqu'à l'intersection de cette rivière avec les routes (marquées sur la Carte identique) et, passant par le Tépé Kalalan, atteint la chaîne de Guérébi.

Un rendez-vous a été fixé pour le lendemain à la jonction du Zaliab avec le Goundjiun-Tchem, où il a été décidé de faire ériger le borne No. 32.

En conséquence, il a été arrêté pendant cette séance la ligne-frontière entre la rivière de Goundjiun-Tchem et la chaîne de Guérébi.

Fait à Seïd Hassan le 6 avril, 1914.

AZ. SAMIH.
A. C. WRATISLAW.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
V. MINORSKY.

Enclosure 28 in No. 235.

Vingt-sixième Séance.

EN exécution de la décision prise à la dernière séance, la Commission (composée de MM. le Capitaine Wilson, Etela-ol-Mulk, Belaief et le Major Aziz Samih Bey) s'est rendue, le 7 avril, 1914, à l'endroit où la frontière quitte la rivière Goundjiun-Tchem, pour surveiller l'erection des bornes.

MM. les commissaires, ayant constaté que le ravin de Zaliab ne s'unit pas au Goundjiun-Tchem, ont décidé d'ériger la borne No. 32 sur la rive droite d'un ravin qui conflue avec le Goundjiun-Tchem (rive droite) à une distance d'à peu près un quart de mille du point où, d'après la Carte identique, le Zaliab rejoindrait cette rivière.

Ainsi la ligne frontière, qui, à partir de la borne No. 31, se confond avec le *medium filium aquæ* du Goundjiun-Tchem, quitte ladite rivière à l'endroit où le ravin ci-haut mentionné la rejoint ; elle suit ce ravin sur une distance d'à peu près un quart de mille jusqu'aux pieds des premières collines, se prolonge ensuite en suivant ces pieds de collines jusqu'à la borne No. 33 (placée sur la rive gauche d'un ravin situé à $1\frac{3}{4}$ milles de distance de la borne No. 32), et remonte ce dernier ravin. Après avoir atteint la crête de Bendi-Koulik-Bouzurg, elle la suit vers le nord.

Retournée au camp, la Commission s'est réunie de nouveau à 8 heures du soir, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire britannique.

Etaient présents tous les commissaires.

La Commission ayant achevé ses travaux aux environs de Zorbathia, M. le président invite ses collègues à arrêter les déplacements de la Commission dans la direction de Mendeli. On décide de partir le lendemain pour Mendeli pour étudier la situation de cet endroit, laissant à la même sous-commission, qui s'était rendue à Baksaï, l'érection des bornes sur la partie de la frontière entre le Goundjiun-Tchem et la chaîne de Guérébi. Le soin de trouver une ligne naturelle qui relie la crête de Koulik-Koutchouk à Meymyk est laissé à la sous-commission.

Le rapport de la sous-commission de Baksaï [No. 2] a été ensuite présenté à la Commission, qui a ordonné qu'il soit inséré dans le présent procès-verbal. Il est ainsi conçu :

"Conformément aux instructions ci-annexées données par les commissaires en date du 3 avril, 1914, les commissaires-adjoints britannique, russe, et ottoman sont partis du camp près du Ziaret Seïd Hassan à 7 heures du matin du 4 avril et se sont réunis à 4 heures de l'après-midi avec M. Salar Muzaffar, représentant M. le commissaire persan, et le Capitaine Alief, à l'endroit où la rivière Tchengouleh sort des montagnes. Ayant placé sur la rive gauche la borne No. 26 (voir description des bornes et de la frontière), on s'est rendu à Baksaï, où on a passé la nuit.

"Le lendemain la sous-commission s'est rendu au ravin de Zaaferanié On a érigé sur la rive droite la borne No. 25. Le Capitaine Alief a déterminé la position de ce point par rapport aux points fixés de Baksaï. Ensuite on est revenu au ravin de Sarkher, constatant en route que la borne No. 24 a été bien construite.

"La situation de la borne à placer sur le Sarkher a été choisie sur la rive droite. On a passé la nuit sur le Sarkher.

"Le matin du 6 avril on a commencé par compléter la borne No. 27 ; ensuite la sous-commission est partie pour le ravin de Palk (connu aussi à cet endroit par les arabes sous le nom de Khashaim Rattan). Après avoir construit sur la rive gauche la borne No. 28, on est retourné, en suivant le ravin susdit, au campement près du Ziaret de Seïd Hassan.

"Fait à Zorbathia, le 9 avril, 1914.

"A. T. WILSON.
"SALAR MUZAFFAR.
"D. BELAIEF.
"ABDUL HAMID."

[No. 2.]

Instructions remises à la Sous-Commission pour leurs Travaux à Baksaï et dans les Environs, et annexées à son Rapport du 9 avril.

MM. le Capitaine Wilson, Salar Muzaffar, Belaief et le Capitaine Abdul Hamid Bey sont chargés par la Commission d'appliquer sur les lieux la décision prise par rapport au tronçon de la frontière entre Zaaferani et Palk, c'est-à-dire de choisir l'emplacement de bornes et de les faire ériger à Zaaferani, Tchengouleh, Serkhyr, et Pulk.

MM. le Capitaine Wilson et Belaief remplaceront respectivement les commissaires britannique et russe pour ce qui concerne l'interprétation de la décision arbitrale du 21 mars (3 avril), 1914.

Seïd Hassan, le 3 avril, 1914.

ETELA-OL-MULK.
A. C. WRATISLAW.
V. MINORSKY.
A. SAMIH.

En conséquence, au cours de cette séance, MM. les commissaires ont : (1) déterminé le point où la ligne-frontière quittera la rivière Goundijiun-Tchem ; (2) approuvé le rapport de la sous-commission de Baksaï ; et (3) arrêté le déplacement de la Commission vers Mendeli et désigné une sous-commission pour l'érection des bornes entre le Goundjiun-Tchem et la chaîne de Guérébi.

Fait à Zorbathia, le 7 avril, 1914.

(Pour Mr. Wratislaw),
A. T. WILSON, *Captain.*
ETELA-OL-MULK
V. MINORSKY.
AZ. SAMIH.

Enclosure 29 in No. 235.

Vingt-septième Séance.

SÉANCE tenue à Mendeli, le 11 avril, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire persan.

Étaient présents tous les commissaires.

Les procès-verbaux des séances 24 et 25 ont été signés, et celui de la 26e séance a été lu et approuvé.

M. le président engage ses collègues à la discussion d'un projet pour l'accomplissement des travaux au nord de Mendeli.

M. le commissaire russe se dit en faveur d'un système de travail qui permet aux commissaires de parcourir le terrain à délimiter et d'y déterminer la ligne de la frontière et l'emplacement approximatif des bornes, le soin de l'érection même des bornes étant réservé à une sous-commission. Il faudrait que des officiers du corps technique devancent les commissaires pour préparer des levés à leur usage. Pour cette besogne Kanibiz serait un bon centre.

Il est décidé à cet effet que MM. Alief, Tskhakaya et Kadri Bey ainsi que deux topographes indiens du corps britannique se rendront à l'endroit où la route de Khanikin coupe le Naft-Deressi et, partant de là dans la direction du nord, travailleront le long de la ligne de frontière projetée, à faire le levé de cette ligne et des régions voisines.

M. le commissaire britannique appuie sur la nécessité de déterminer dans le moindre délai possible la position exacte de Naft Mukataasi, vu les stipulations spéciales du protocole de Constantinople s'y rapportant.

On a traité ensuite de la répartition des eaux du Guenguir, qui fait de même l'objet d'une disposition spéciale du protocole.

M. le commissaire ottoman demande que la Commission entende parler à ce sujet des individus parmi les notables de Mendeli.

M. le commissaire persan veut également qu'on entende des habitants de Soumar.

M. le commissaire britannique trouve qu'il serait plus avantageux si ces personnes pouvaient rendre leurs déclarations par écrit à la Commission.

M. le commissaire russe prie son collègue ottoman de vouloir bien faire montrer à Commission des cartes de la région, s'il en existe, afin d'éclaircir la question des eaux.

La prochaine séance est fixée pour demain, le 12 avril, à 10 heures du matin.

Fait à Mendeli, le 11 avril, 1914.

ETELA-OL-MULK.
A. C. WRATISLAW.
V. MINORSKY.
AZ. SAMIH.

Enclosure 30 in No. 235.

Vingt-huitième Séance.

SÉANCE tenue à Mendéli le 12 avril, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire russe.

Étaient présents tous les commissaires.

Le procès-verbal de la dernière séance a été lu et approuvé.

Les feuilles Nos. 2 et 3 de la Carte identique (copie russe) ont été signés par MM. les commissaires.

Une longue discussion a eu lieu à propos de la répartition des eaux du Guenguir.

M. le commissaire ottoman fait savoir que les eaux du Guenguir ne pouvant souffir aux besoins de Mendéli, la répartition constituera un état insoutenable de haine entre les habitants de Mendéli et les gens qui viendront cultiver Soumar. Pour prévenir des rixes sanglantes inévitables entre les habitants des deux parties il est d'une nécessité absolue que les deux Gouvernements de trouver un terrain d'entente qui établira un état normal sur cette partie de la frontière. Trois solutions, ajoute-t-il, peuvent être envisagées pour cette entente : (1) l'achat par le Gouvernement ottoman ou la municipalité de Mendéli de la vallée de Soumar, tout en la laissant au delà de la frontière ; (2) l'achat de la partie de l'eau du Guenguir revenant à la Perse ; et (3) un échange de territoires ayant pour but de laisser du côté ottoman la vallée de Soumar.

M. le commissaire persan déclare que, d'après le Protocole de Constantinople, la Commission est obligée de solutionner la question de la répartition de l'eau de Guenguir. Cette répartition une fois arrêtée, il se dit prêt à communiquer les propositions de son collègue ottoman à son Gouvernement.

M. le commissaire russe pense que cette répartition nécessite une série d'études précises et scientifiques, faute de quoi il serait impossible à la Commission de pouvoir trouver une solution en rapport avec les besoins des deux côtés.

On a discuté ensuite une solution pécuniaire, mais sans arriver à un résultat.

Les deux parties n'ayant pu se mettre d'accord sur la somme à payer par les habitants de Mendéli aux gens de Soumar et les données exactes pour fournir de base à une répartition proportionnelle faisant défaut, M. le commissaire russe, conjointement avec son collègue britannique, propose de partager les eaux à moitié entre les deux parties intéressées.

Il a été alors convenu que l'eau sera partagée en deux moitiés: l'une appartiendra à Mendéli, l'autre aux gens de Soumar. Pour la moitié qui leur est reconnue les habitants de Mendéli ne paieront rien aux gens de Soumar. Le kehriz (canal souterrain) construit par les habitants de Mendéli sera fermé. Il sera considéré en principe comme propriété des habitants de Mendéli, et si les gens de Soumar désirent en faire usage ils devront se mettre d'accord avec les habitants de Mendéli.

La prochaine séance a été fixée pour le lendemain à 10 heures du matin.

Fait à Mendéli, le 12 avril, 1914.

V. MINORSKY.
A. T. WILSON, *Captain.*
ETELA-OL-MULK.
A. SAMIH.

Enclosure 31 in No. 235.

Vingt-neuvième Séance.

SÉANCE tenue à Mendéli, le 13 avril, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire ottoman.

Étaient présents tous les commissaires.

Le procès-verbal de la dernière séance a été lu et approuvé et celui de l'avant-dernière séance signé.

M. le commissaire russe annonce que le programme des travaux topographiques, tel qu'il fut arrêté à la vingt-septième séance, a été modifié en ce qui concerne les officiers russes. Les Capitaines Alief et Takhakaya suivront le cours de la rivière Guenguir pour faire une étude plus détaillée de sa vallée. Ceci servirait éventuellement de base au partage des eaux dans le cas où des difficultés surgiraient à ce propos.

Les topographes britanniques poursuivront les travaux vers le nord.

On décide de se rendre ce soir sur les lieux pour déterminer l'emplacement de la borne No. 41, à l'endroit où la frontière traverse la rivière de Guenguir.

La mise à exécution de la décision prise par la Commission relative au partage des eaux du Guenguir a été ensuite discutée. M. le commissaire russe fait remarquer que les stipulations du Protocole de Constantinople chargent la Commission seulement d'élaborer un arrangement pour la répartition des eaux. La mise à exécution de cet arrangement n'entre donc pas dans les attributions des commissaires.

M. le commissaire britannique trouve également que l'exécution de la décision devrait être laissée à des experts locaux, qui, ayant des connaissances spéciales, seraient mieux en état de l'accomplir.

M. le commissaire russe demande si toutefois le point où le partage des eaux s'effectuera pourrait être fixé par la Commission.

MM. les commissaires ottoman et persan sont cependant de l'opinion que les parties directement intéressées seraient plus à même de choisir l'endroit.

La discussion ayant tourné sur la position de Naft Mukatassi, M. le commissaire ottoman fait savoir que les informations qu'il avait reçues lui donnent à croire que cet endroit se trouve à l'ouest de la ligne de frontière établie dans le protocole.

M. le commissaire britannique dit que le levé que les topographes britanniques sont en train de préparer sera prêt, sauf imprévus, le soir du 18 courant, et que les topographes attendront la Commission à Naft Deressi; par conséquent, il propose que la Commission parte de Mendéli le 16.

MM. les commissaires déclarent prêts à partir à cette date.

Fait à Mendéli, le 13 avril, 1914.

A. SAMIH.
A. T. WILSON, *Captain.*
V. MINORSKY.
ETELA-OL-MULK.

Enclosure 32 in No. 235.

Trentième Séance.

SÉANCE tenue près de Guenguir, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire-adjoint britannique.

La direction que la ligne-frontière devrait prendre pour passer de la crête de Kelle-Chouvan à celle de Kohnerig a fait l'objet d'une discussion.

M. le commissaire ottoman a déclaré que la ligne-frontière doit passer directement de la crête de Kelle-Chouvan à celle de Kohnerig, en suivant une ligne qui descendrait dans la vallée.

M. le commissaire persan a soutenu que cette ligne serait contraire au protocole, étant donné qu'elle doit partout suivre les chaînes de Kelle-Chouvan et de Kohnerig, et que le passage d'une crête à l'autre doit se faire en suivant les deux montagnes.

M. le commissaire russe fait remarquer que le tracé proposé par M. le commissaire ottoman priverait le Gouvernement persan du pouvoir de construire des postes frontières sur des points dominants la vallée de Soumar, et que, par contre, le tracé persan priverait le Gouvernement ottoman du même pouvoir par rapport à Mendéli. Il pense qu'il serait mieux de faire passer la frontière en suivant un ravin qui descend du mont Kohnerig à l'entrée de la vallée de Soumar.

MM. les commissaires ottoman et persan n'ayant pu se mettre d'accord, il a été décidé de recourir à l'arbitrage de MM. les commissaires de deux Gouvernements médiateurs.

En conséquence, MM. les commissaires ottoman et persan ont promis de remettre leurs exposés dans la matinée du 16 avril, 1914.

Fait près de Guenguir, le 15 avril, 1914.

A. T. WILSON, *Captain.*
ETELA-OL-MULK.
V. MINORSKY.
A. SAMIH.

Enclosure 33 in No. 235.

Trente et unième Séance.

SEANCE tenue à Mendéli, le 16 avril, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire adjoint britannique.

M. le commissaire britannique a dû partir pour Bagdad à cause d'une indisposition après avoir donné pleins pouvoirs à son adjoint, qui le remplacera conformément au protocole.

On a commencé par signer les exemplaires ottoman, persan et des archives de la feuille No. 4 de la Carte identique; les exemplaires britannique, ottoman et des archives de la feuille No. 5, l'original de la carte-annexe No. 3; les exemplaires britannique, ottoman et l'original de celle No. 4.

Le rapport de la sous-commission chargée d'appliquer sur les lieux le tronçon de la ligne-frontière arrêté par la Commission et situé entre la borne No. 33 et le défilé de Kani-Scheikh près de Mendéli a été lu et approuvé. Il se trouve annexé au présent procès-verbal.

Ensuite M. le commissaire russe a donné lecture au nom des commissaires des deux Gouvernements médiateurs de la décision arbitrale rendue par eux concernant le passage de la frontière de Koéhnerig à Kelle-Chouvan (texte ci-annexé).

On a changé alors la sous-commission composée de délégués de chaque commission de ses rendre immédiatement sur les lieux de d'appliquer la décision arbitrale avec les instructions nécessaires. Le procès-verbal de l'avant-dernière séance a été lu.

Les commissaires britannique et russe ont émis l'opinion que le principe de la répartition de l'eau de Guenguir ayant été établi par la Commission, il serait préférable que tous les différents surgissant au cours de l'application de ladite décision soient réglés entre les deux Gouvernements intéressés par voie diplomatique. Ils pensent que le règlement de ses différents par les autorités locales ne pourrait mener à bonne fin et ils croient très désirable que leur tâche médiatrice au sein de la Commission de Délimitation fût prolongée par le concours que les consuls-généraux des deux Puissances à Bagdad

pourraient prêter dans le cas de divergence d'opinions quant à l'application du règlement élaboré par la Commission pour les eaux de Guenguir.

MM. les Commissaires se sont tous rangés tous à cet avis. Après quoi le procès-verbal a été approuvé.

La Commission ayant terminé ses travaux du côté de Mendéli, on décide de partir demain pour Abi-Neft.

Fait à Mendéli, le 16 avril, 1914.

A. T. WILSON, *Captain.*
ETELA-OL-MULK.
V. MINORSKY.
A. SAMIH.

Exposé communiqué par M. le Commissaire ottoman à MM. les Commissaires britannique et russe.

Les attributions de la Commission se trouvant déterminées dans le Protocole de Constantinople et la partie de la frontière près de Mendéli s'y étant établie, il n'est pas nécessaire de citer des preuves et documents pour prouver le passage de la frontière près du défilé de Kume-Senk.

A l'article 1er du protocole il est dit que ". . . . . la frontière se prolonge ensuite le long des monts Varbuland, Kohnerig, Kelle-Chouvan et Djébeli-Guérébi, prolongation du Djébeli-Hamrine."

Or, aucune précision ne se trouve énoncée comme quoi le défilé de Kume-Senk ou la vallée de Soumbar appartiendront à la Turquie ou à la Perse. Il est dit seulement que la frontière suit les chaînes de Kohnerig et de Kelle-Chouvan.

Il est d'autre part un principe admis depuis Bayazid que la frontière suit les crêtes des montagnes.

Comme en se rendra compte de l'examen de la carte annexée au présent exposé, la ligne des crêtes de Kohnerig s'arrête à l'endroit marqué par la lettre (A) et celle de Kelle-Chouvan par (B). Entre ces deux points la frontière passera ou en ligne droite, ou en suivant la ligne descendant des crêtes vers la rivière et marquée sur la carte par (C) et (D). La meilleure frontière naturelle est marquée sur la même carte par une ligne rouge.

La frontière proposée par M. le commissaire persan est contraire au principe de la ligne des crêtes et à celui de la configuration du terrain. Car la ligne dite des crêtes suit le versant de la chaîne et les pentes formant les deux rives de la rivière Guenguir. Faire suivre à la ligne des crêtes les deux côtés de la rivière et la descendre jusqu'à la plaine n'est basé sur aucune règle ni principe.

La coupe longitudinale des deux rives de la rivière est également marquée sur la carte.

Par suite de l'érosion, la rive droite n'a pu se maintenir en état perpendiculaire par rapport à la rivière et un petit ravin s'est formé. Ce ravin n'a nullement dévié la ligne des crêtes et n'a pas modifié les versants. La rivière a rongé les rives et a formé une bande étroite de terre. La formation de cette bande ne peut constituer une raison logique pour la faire attribuer à la Perse.

Comme il sera établi par l'examen de la carte annexée et de la configuration du terrain, la frontière suit très naturellement la ligne marquée. Cette ligne est la prolongation de celle venant des crêtes de Hamrine, comme il est dit dans le protocole.

Le fait que la ligne des crêtes domine la vallée de Soumar ne peut constituer un argument pour son attribution à la Perse. Car dans une grande partie de la frontière non seulement les crêtes, mais toutes les montagnes et avec celles-là tous les points dominants sont restés du côté persan et nos plaines se trouvent sous la menace de ces points.

Il est donc une nécessité topographique de faire suivre à la frontière la ligne des crêtes marquée en rouge sur la carte.

Je suis certain que MM. les commissaires médiateurs dans leurs appréciations éclairées et impartiales conviendront que la ligne-frontière ne peut suivre que celle établi dans cet exposé.

Le Commissaire Impérial ottoman,
AZIZ SAMIH.

Mendéli, le 15 avril, 1914.

Exposé communiqué par M le Commissaire persan à MM. les Commissaires britannique et russe.

L'acceptation du tracé que le commissaire ottoman réclame et d'après lequel la ligne-frontière arrivée au sommet des monts Kelle-Chouvan devrait passer directement sur la crête de Gebel Kohnerig en coupant ainsi l'entrée de la vallée de Soumar est contraire à l'esprit et à la lettre du Protocole final de Constantinople ainsi que des correspondances échangées entre les ambassades des deux Puissances médiatrices et la Sublime Porte.

En effet, d'une part le Protocole de Constantinople porte formellement que la ligne frontière "se prolonge le long des monts Varbulend, Kohnerig, Kelle-Chouvan et Gebel-Guérébi." D'autre part, la notice annexée à la lettre que l'Ambassade Impériale de Russie a adressée à la Sublime Porte en date du 20 avril (3 mai), 1913, contient les passages suivants : (*a*) "la délimitation dans les régions situées entre la rivière d'Elvend et Mendéli devant se faire sur la base du *statu quo* (article 3 du traité de 1848) on longera . . . . . " (*b*) "la frontière suivra par les crêtes des chaînes de Varbulend, Kohnerig, Kelle-Chouvan," etc., qui sont les prolongations de Djebeli-Hamrine laissant ainsi à l'ouest les plaines du Mésopotamie et à l'est les pâturages montagneux de la tribu persane et Chiite de Kelhours qui habite toute cette localité entre Abi-Neft, la vallée parcourue par la rivière de Guenguir. Enfin, dans la note adressée par la Sublime Porte à l'Ambassade Impériale de Russie en date du 9 juillet, 1913, il est dit que le *statu quo* actuel doit être pris pour base de délimitation à partir d'Elvend jusqu'à Mendéli.

En examinant les passages ci-haut cités de différents documents on relève :

1. Que la ligne-frontière doit partout suivre le long des monts Kohnerig et Kelle-Chouvan, et non pas, comme le prétend mon collègue ottoman, sauter de la crête de celui-ci au sommet de celui-là en laissant ainsi du côté ottoman une partie de la vallée de Soumar et par conséquent les deux versants des monts qui doivent servir de frontière.

Je conviens que la ligne frontière doit passer par les deux crêtes, mais le passage de l'une à l'autre doit se faire selon les documents précités en suivant le long des deux montagnes, et non pas en coupant la vallée de Soumar.

2. Que la ligne-frontière doit suivre le long des monts Kohnerig et Kelle-Chouvan de manière à laisser à l'ouest les plaines de Mésopotamie et à l'est la vallée parcourue par la rivière de Guenguir.

Or, l'adoption du tracé proposé par le commissaire ottoman va directement à l'encontre de ce principe posé et accepté par les documents diplomatiques, car elle laisse à l'ouest non seulement les plaines de Mésopotamie mais encore une partie de la vallée parcourue par le Guenguir.

3. Que dans cette partie de la frontière la délimitation doit se faire sur la base du *statu quo* de 1848 selon l'Ambassade Impériale de Russie à Constantinople, et du *statu quo* actuel selon la Sublime Porte.

Or, d'après le *statu quo* de 1848 et de celui d'aujourd'hui, la frontière entre Mendéli et Soumar passe par le Koume-Senk. Je laisse la précision de ce point aux soins de mes honorables collègues, qui pourront entendre les notables des deux parties après leur avoir fait prêter serment.

Outre que toutes ces raisons de principe tirées de différents documents diplomatiques militent en faveur de mon tracé, la configuration naturelle et géographique des lieux dictent également son adoption, étant donné qu'il serait vraiment inadmissible de s'ecarter, ne fût-ce que dans un trajet de quelques kilomètres de la ligne-frontière naturelle conforme au principe devant servir de base à la délimitation pour prendre une ligne qui est en même temps contraire et à la configuration naturelle des lieux et auxdits principes.

Les considérations d'ordre stratégique en faveur de la Turquie et l'esprit de concession si aimablement suggéré par mes honorables collègues aux parties intéressées ne pourront guère me conduire à renoncer aux droits incontestables de mon Gouvernement—droits que reconnaîtra également l'esprit de justice et d'équité de MM. les commissaires arbitres.

ETELA-OL-MULK.

Mendéli, le 15 avril, 1914.

Décision des Commissaires des Puissances médiatrices concernant le passage de la Ligne-Frontière de la Crête de Kohnerig à celle de Kelle-Chouvan.

La question du passage de la ligne-frontière de la crête de Kohnerig à celle de Kelle-Chouvan ayant été soumise à notre arbitrage par nos collègues de Perse et de Turquie, qui nous ont présenté leurs exposés datés Mendéli le 15 avril, nous avons attentivement étudié les arguments des deux parties et nous sommes tombés d'accord sur ce qui suit :

1. Le protocole final ne contient pas d'indications détaillées au sujet de la question précitée.

2. Des preuves authentiques et suffisantes sur le *statu quo* de 1848 ne nous ont pas été présentées dans les exposés.

3. Au point de vue géographique, on constate sur la rive droite de Guenguir la présence des deux prolongations de Kohnerig, l'une plus au nord (ligne A B du croquis annexé), et l'autre plus au sud, aboutissant à un petit amas de pierres dit Koume-seng (ligne G F du croquis). Ces lignes sont respectivement combinées avec les lignes C D et D E des prolongations de Kelle-Chouvan sur la rive gauche du Guenguir.

La ligne A, B, C, D que réclame le commissaire ottoman est plus courte que celle des prolongations méridionales des deux montagnes (ligne G, F, E, D). Par contre, la proposition turque coupera plaine à un endroit plus large que la coupe de la ligne méridionale. En outre, elle laisse complètement du côté turc la petite vallée sur le Guenguir qui peut être considérée comme la continuation plutôt de la grande vallée de Soumar restant à la Perse que de la plaine de Mendéli, dont elle est séparée par le défilé entre les points F E.

4. Au point de vue militaire, l'acceptation de la ligne proposée par le commissaire ottoman laisserait en Turquie les prolongations méridionales de la rive droite de Guenguir qui commandent les accès à la plaine de Soumar, tandis que la ligne étroite des prolongations septentrionales de Kohnerig qui formerait la frontière et serait par conséquent partagée entre les deux États ne pourrait pas, le cas échéant, servir à la Perse pour la protection de Soumar. Des désavantages semblables résulteraient pour la Turquie dans le cas d'acceptation de la ligne méridionale, car alors les prolongations de Kohnerig pourraient être fortifiées par la Perse, sans que la Turquie puisse s'établir sur la crête servant de frontière.

Vu ce qui précède, nous croyons nécessaire de partager en deux la petite plaine entre Kohnerig et Kelle-Chouvan, sur le sort de laquelle nous ne trouvons pas de preuves documentaires, ainsi que de répartir les prolongations de la rive droite de Guenguir de façon à permettre à la Perse et à la Turquie de protéger suffisamment leurs possessions respectives sur la frontière, c'est-à-dire la grande vallée de Soumar et la plaine de Mendéli.

Ainsi nous décidons que la ligne-frontière arrivée à la crête de Kelle-Chouvan marquée D sur le croquis annexé ira en ligne directe sur la petite colline M sur la rive droite du Guenguir, puis montant en ligne directe sur le rocher G elle passera de la également en ligne directe sur la plus haute crête orientale de Kohnerig, reconnaissable par un petit tas de pierres sur son sommet (point H sur le croquis).

A. T. WILSON.
V. MINORSKY.

Mendéli, le 3 (16) *avril*, 1914.

[No. 3.]

Instructions remises à la Sous-Commission par MM. les Commissaires.

La Commission a chargé MM. le Capitaine Wilson, Salar Muzaffar (ou, en cas de son absence, Mansour-es-Saltaneh), Belaief et le Capitaine Abdul Hamid Bey, d'appliquer sur les lieux la décision de la Commission prise à la séance du 6 avril par rapport au tronçon de la frontière à partir de la borne No. 33 jusqu'au défilé de Kan-i-Sheikh, près de Mendéli.

La sous-commission devra ériger des bornes au nombre nécessaire :

1. Au défilé de Kan-i-Peleng ;
2. Au défilé de Mir-Ikhtiar ;

3. A l'embouchure du ruisseau de Gourre Ceg ;
4. Sur le Tépé Kalanan aux endroits pouvant servir de points de repère géographiques et devant être déterminés par la sous-commission elle-même ; et
5. Au défilé de Kan-i-Sheikh.

En cas de divergence d'opinion au sein de la sous-commission dans les limites de la tâche leur confiée, MM. le Capitaine Wilson et Belaief rempliront les fonctions d'arbitres sur la base des stipulations du paragraphe 4 du Protocole final de la Commission.

V. M.
A. C. W.
AZ. S.
E. M.

[No. 3.] *Rapport.*

Conformément aux instructions ci-annexées, données par MM. les commissaires, les soussignés se sont réunis le 8 avril, à 9 heures du matin, pour voir compléter la borne No. 31, dont la position, sur la rive gauche de la rivière de Bedraï, a été déterminée. On a érigé sur ce point une borne de 1 mètre de hauteur sur 2 mètres carrés en pierre cimentée avec du gypse.

Le 9 avril on a dû rester à Zorbathia par suite des pluies qui avaient tombé la nuit précédente, et de l'arrivée en retard du ciment de Kut-el-Amara.

Le 10 avril on a marché jusqu'à Khachmieh, une heure et demie au sud-ouest du défilé de Bagh Seïd Hassan, ou Sour-o-Chirin, connu sur la Carte identique comme Kan-Peleng.

La position de ce ravin a été fixée pendant la journée par le topographe indien, Hamid Gul.

Le 11 avril on a mis une borne (No. 34) dans le défilé susdit, après quoi on s'est rendu à Tépé Toursak, examinant en route l'embouchure de la rivière de Toursak (Ney Khydr), marqué sur la Carte identique comme Mar Aquediar.

Le 12 avril on a placé une borne sur la rive droite de ladite rivière, à une distance de 30,800 pieds de Tépé Toursak sur un azimut de 55 degrés est, vu dudit Tépé, laissant par conséquent en territoire ottoman les embranchements des deux canaux qui sortent de la rivière : l'un de la rive gauche à 700 pieds environ, et l'autre de la rive droite (Nahr Salameh) à 5,000 pieds comptant en aval de ladite borne No. 34.

On a constaté que la Carte identique est assez inexacte en ce qui concerne cet endroit, et les soussignés voudraient suggérer que la carte dressée sous leur surveillance soit annexée.

Le 13 avril on s'est rendu à Umariyat. Une borne a été érigée d'abord a 200 pieds environ en amont du canal (Nahr Hazam) qui part de la rive droite de la rivière Talkh Ab sur un endroit fixé par l'officier topographe ottoman, Mehmed Effendi. Après avoir construit cette borne, on a examiné avec soin le cours de la rivière indiquée sur la Carte identique comme "Gourre Ceg." On a constaté que la jonction de ce ruisseau avec le Talkh Ab est beaucoup plus au sud que la Carte identique ne le montre. Salar Muzaffar, du côté de la Perse, a demandé qu'une borne soit posée, selon la décision de la Commission, à la jonction même. Abdul Hamid Bey, du côté de la Turquie, a demandé qu'une borne soit mise sur le Talkh Ab à un endroit qui correspondrait à celui indiqué sur la Carte identique comme la jonction, c'est-à-dire a 1 mille à peu près au sud de la borne No. 37 ; il a aussi fait remarquer que la crête de Meymik ne s'approche pas du ruisseau Gourre Ceg comme il est indiqué sur la carte.

Les représentants de la Perse et de la Turquie n'ayant pas trouvé un moyen de se mettre d'accord sur cette question, on l'a référée, conformément aux instructions des commissaires, aux commissaires-adjoints britannique et russe, qui ont decidé que la borne No. 36 doit être placée à 70 pieds à peu près en amont du premier canal qui sort de la rive gauche du Talkh Ab, en amont de la jonction de ladite rivière avec le ruisseau Gourre Ceg.

En conséquence, on a érigé là une borne No. 36, après quoi on s'est rendu sur un point éminent de la colline Kalalan, et on y a érigé la borne No. 38. Un amoncellement de pierres, érigée par l'officier topographe ottoman, Mehmed Effendi, a été reconnu comme borne. Cette borne porte le No. 39.

Le 14 avril on est parti pour Mendéli, construisant en route la borne No. 40 dans le défilé de Kan-i-Sheikh.

A. T. WILSON, *Captain.*
SALAR MUZAFFAR.
BELAIEF.
ABDUL HAMID.

Enclosure 34 in No. 235.

Trente-deuxième Séance.

SEANCE tenue au bord de la rivière Abi-Neft, le 18 avril, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire persan.

Étaient présents tous les commissaires.

Les exemplaires persans de la Carte identique, feuilles 4 et 5, ont été signés, ainsi que les Procès-verbaux Nos. 28 et 29.

Le procès-verbal de la dernière séance a été lu et approuvé. De même le rapport (texte ci-annexé) de la sous-commission chargée d'appliquer la décision arbitrale de la trente-unième séance a été approuvé.

On a décidé de faire ériger deux bornes : l'une à l'endroit où la route Mendéli–Kasri-Chirine traverse la rivière Abi-Neft (Neft-Deressi du protocole), et l'autre sur le col du partage des eaux entre Moukati et l'Abi-Neft à l'endroit où la route susdite la coupe.

M. le commissaire persan demande qu'on reconnaisse aux Sindjabis le droit de profiter, comme par le passé, de leurs pâturages restes du côté ottoman. Ce droit, dit-il, a été reconnu pour les tribus turques venant à Dalamper.

M. le commissaire ottoman fait observer que, lors de la rédaction du Protocole final, il avait proposé une formule générale disant que les deux parties reconnaîtront aux tribus le droit de profiter de leurs pâturages restes de l'autre côté de la frontière. Cette proposition n'avait pas été, dit-il, agréée. Si, ajoute-t-il, on tient à ce que les Sindjabis profitent de leurs pâturages restés du côté ottoman, il ne pourra répondre qu'après s'être informé auprès des autorités de Kanikine s'ils ont ce droit.

M. le commissaire persan ajoute que le droit de pâturage des Sindjabis ne peut être mis en doute, et que le fait de la délimitation de frontière entre deux États ne peut porter atteinte aux droits privés.

La Commission décide de se rendre immédiatement sur les lieux pour déterminer le point où la route Mendéli–Kasri-Chirine coupe l'Abi-Neft, et y faire ériger la borne No. 46.

Cette borne a été construite sur la rive gauche de la susdite rivière.

On a chargé la sous-commission, composée de délégués de chaque Commission, de se rendre demain matin au col du partage des eaux entre Moukati et l'Abi-Neft, et faire ériger la borne No. 45. Des instructions écrites leur ont été données à ce propos.

La Commission ayant terminé ses travaux à cet endroit, il a été décidé de parcourir la partie de la frontière de Abi-Neft à Kani-Bez.

Fait au bord de l'Abi-Neft, le 18 avril, 1914.

ETELA-OL-MULK.
V. MINORSKY.
A. T. WILSON, *Captain.*
AZ. SAMIH.

Après les mots "s'ils ont ce droit" insérez ce qui suit :

"M. le commissaire russe convient que lors de la discussion du protocole on avait jugé préférable de ne pas généraliser explicitement ce qui a été reconnu pour Dalamper. On avait pensé, ajoute-t-il, que c'était une chose sous-entendue."

E. M.
V. M.
A. S.
A. T. W.

[No. 4.]

Instructions remises à la Sous-Commission envoyée au Défilé de Soumar.

La Commission a chargé MM. le Colonel Ryder, Abdurrazak Khan, le Capitaine Tskhakaya et le Lieutenant E. Kadri Effendi d'appliquer sur les lieux la décision arbitrale du 3 (16) avril, 1914, en érigeant des bornes aux endroits M et G, marqués sur la carte annexée, à ladite décision.

Il est bien entendu qu'en cas de divergence d'opinion quant à l'application de ladite décision, l'interprétation en reviendra aux représentants britannique et russe.

Fait à Mendéli, le 3 (16) avril, 1914.

A. T. WILSON, *Captain.*
ETELA-OL-MULK.
V. MINORSKY.
AZ. SAMIH.

[No. 4.] *Rapport de la Sous-Commission.*

Conformément aux instructions ci-annexées de la Commission en date du 3 (16) avril, 1914, les officiers suivants :

Pour la Grande-Bretagne : Le Colonel Ryder ;
" Perse : Abdurrazak Khan ;
" Russie : Le Capitaine Skhakaya ;
" Turquie : Le Lieutenant Kadri Effendi,

sont partis dans l'après-midi du 3 (16) avril, 1914, pour ériger les bornes nécessaires aux endroits indiqués par la Commission.

On a commencé par ériger une borne (point N de la décision arbitrale) No. 42 sur une petite colline entre deux ravins qui se trouvent entre les deux crêtes qui tombent de Djebel-Kohnerig vers la rivière Guenguir.

Ensuite, sur la proposition de Mirza Abdurrazak Khan, on a érigé une borne sur la route de Mendéli–Soumar.

Le temps faisant défaut, on a été obligé d'ajourner la suite des travaux au lendemain à 11 heures du matin.

Ce jour-là le Capitaine Wilson a remplacé le Colonel Ryder, et Mouhsin Khan a remplacé Abdurrazak Khan.

La petite colline G de la décision arbitrale a été jugée assez distinctive pour constituter elle-même une borne et elle a été reconnue comme telle No. 43.

On a construit une autre borne No. 44 sur le point H de la décision arbitrale qui correspond au point le plus élevé de la crête de Djebeli-Kohnerig.

Il a été déclaré par le Lieutenant Kadri Effendi que les bornes Nos. 41, 43, et 44 seront complétées d'une façon solide par les autorités de Mendéli.

C. H. D. RYDER,
Lieutenant-Colonel.
ABDARRAZAK.
TSKHAKAYA.
O. KADRI.

Enclosure 35 in No. 235.

Trente-troisième Séance.

SÉANCE tenue à Namaw, le 20 avril, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire russe.

Étaient présents tous les commissaires.

Les Procès-verbaux Nos. 30 et 31 ont été signés.

Le rapport de la Sous-Commission No. 5 a été lu. Il se trouve annexé au présent procès-verbal.

MM. les commissaires ont signé en outre les cartes-annexes No. 3 exemplaire persan ; No. 4 ottoman et persan ; No. 5 original, britannique, ottoman et persan.

M. le commissaire russe invite ses collègues à se prononcer sur le tronçon de la frontière parcourue le 19 avril.

M. le commissaire ottoman fait remarquer qu'une source de pétrole se trouvant située sur la rive gauche de l'Abi-Neft, il faut que la frontière contourne cette source à une certaine distance. Avec cette petite rectification, il accepte l'Abi-Neft comme frontière pour cette partie.

M. le commissaire persan ayant déclaré qu'il accepte comme frontière l'Abi-Neft, MM. les commissaires examinent la carte dressée par les soins du corps technique britannique.

Après discussion on convient que la frontière doit suivre le tracé suivant :

La ligne-frontière, à partir de la borne No. 46 suivra en amont la rivière d'Abi-Neft jusqu'à un point où un autre courant venant du nord se jette à ce cours d'eau. L'endroit de cette jonction se trouve à une distance d'à peu près 1 mille au sud-ouest de Goumbedi-Tchami-Hammam. Un puits de naphte se trouvant à une distance d'environ 20 mètres sur la rive gauche de l'Abi-Neft, en face des grandes sources de naphte qui se trouvent sur la rive droite de ladite rivière, formera une enclave qui restera à la Turquie. Cette enclave sera formée par le segment de la circonférence tracée du centre du susdit puits avec un rayon de 30 mètres.

Pour cette partie de la frontière il a été jugé inutile de faire ériger des bornes.

La Commission a décidé de partir pour Kani-Bez.

Fait à Namaw, le 20 avril, 1914.

A. T. WILSON, *Captain.*
ETELA-OL-MULK.
V. MINORSKY
AZ. SAMIH.

[No. 5.] *Instructions.*

La sous-commission, composée de :

Pour la Grande-Bretagne : Le Colonel Ryder ;
„ Perse : Mansour-es-Saltanah ;
„ Russie : Le Capitaine Alief ;
„ Turquie : Le Lieutenant Kadri Effendi ;

est chargée d'ériger une borne sur le col du partage des eaux entre Moukati et l'Abi-Neft (Varbulend du protocole) à l'endroit où la route Mendéli-Kasri-Chirine le coupe.

Il est entendu que la route en question est celle sur laquelle la borne No. 46 a été construite près d'Abi-Neft.

V. MINORSKY.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
A. T. WILSON, *Captain.*
AZ. SAMIH.

[No. 5.] *Rapport.*

La sous-commission s'est rendue à 7 heures du matin à l'endroit où conformément aux instructions écrites ci-annexées de la Commission, elle devait ériger la borne No. 45.

Celle-ci construite en pierre liée avec du ciment a 1 mètre de côté à la base et 1 metre 25 centimètres de hauteur. Sa distance de la borne No. 46 est de 2¾ milles.

Fait à Abi-Neft, le 19 avril, 1914.

RYDER.
MANSOUR-OS-SALTANEH.
E. KADRI.

Enclosure 36 in No. 235.

Trente-quatrième Séance.

SEANCE tenue à Kani-Bez le 23 avril, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire ottoman.

Étaient présents tous les commissaires.

Le procès-verbal de la dernière séance a été lu et approuvé.

On a décidé de se rendre sur les lieux pour marquer le point distant d'un quart d'heure en aval du confluent du cours d'eau de Guilan avec Elvend.

Ayant parcouru la rive gauche de l'Elvend et examiné la carte préparée par le corps technique britannique, la Commission a constaté l'existence d'un ravin correspondant aux stipulations du protocole. On convint que le rocher situé sur la rive gauche de ce ravin soit considéré et marqué comme une borne.

On remonte ce ravin pour une distance de 2 milles environ et on érigea une borne sur le plateau, qui se trouve au commencement de celui-ci.

On décida qu'à partir de ce point la frontière ira en ligne directe à la colline Tépé-Khirs ; le point de l'intersection de Zein-el-Kous avec cette ligne a été également marqué par une borne.

La prochaine séance a été fixée à demain, 24 avril, 1914.

Fait à Kani-Bez, le 23 avril, 1914.

AZ. SAMIH.
A. T. WILSON, *Captain.*
ETELA-OL-MULK.
V. MINORSKY.

Enclosure 37 in No. 235.

Trente-cinquième Séance.

SÉANCE tenue à Kani-Bez, le 24 avril, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire-adjoint britannique.

Étaient présents aussi les commissaires de Perse, de Russie et de Turquie.

Le Procès-verbal No. 32 a été signé ; celui de la dernière séance lu et approuvé.

MM. les commissaires ont signé également les exemplaires russe de la Carte identique, feuilles Nos. 4 et 5, l'exemplaire ottoman de la carte supplémentaire No. 3 ; l'exemplaire russe de la carte supplémentaire No. 4 ; les exemplaires britannique, russe, ottoman et celui des archives de la Carte identique, feuille No. 6.

M. le commissaire russe prie ses collègues de raccorder les deux tronçons déjà délimités, c'est-à-dire la partie située entre Neft-Deressi et Tépé-Khirs.

M. le commissaire ottoman déclare qu'il propose comme ligne-frontière pour cette partie la route bien marquée qui vient de Neft-Deressi à Kani-Bez.

M. le commissaire persan dit qu'il faudrait plutôt faire passer la frontière par le ravin d'Ab-Bakhchan jusqu'à l'endroit de son intersection avec la route de Neft-Deressi–Kani-Bez. De là, ajoute-il, elle pourrait suivre cette route.

Après discussion, MM. les commissaires persan et ottoman tombent d'accord sur le tracé suivant :

La ligne-frontière quitte le Neft-Deressi près de l'endroit où la rivière Ab-Bakhchan vient le rejoindre pour atteindre la route qui va à Gumbedi-Tchaï-Hammam (Gumbedi-Kutchka-Ab-Bakhchan). Elle suit cette route dans la direction nord-est pour un parcours d'environ 1 mille et quart et arrive à la grande route qui relie Mendeli à Kani-Bez, et la suit, dans la direction nord-nord-ouest jusqu'à la ligne de partage des eaux de l'Elvend et du Neft-Deressi. Elle continue à suivre la même route, atteint la colline de Tchigha-Sourkh située à une cinquantaine de mètres de ladite route, et arrive au cimetière Gauban (ou Boraz), marqué sur la Carte identique "Kabr-i-Ketchika." De là, toujours en suivant ladite route, elle arrive à l'intersection de celle-ci avec une autre route située à 1 mille et trois quarts au nord dudit cimetière. De ce point la frontière se dirige en ligne directe au sommet du Tépé-Khirs marqué par la borne No. 47. De là, elle va également en ligne directe à la borne No. 49, coupant la colline

de Zeynel-Kous à un point marqué par la borne No. 48. De la borne No. 49, située sur le plateau à une distance d'environ 1 mille du Guilan, la ligne frontière descend dans un ravin (sans nom) qu'elle suit jusqu'au point où il se joint à l'Elvend. Ce point est situé à environ 1 mille en aval du confluent de l'Elvend avec le cours d'eau de Guilan. Un rocher de 5 mètres de hauteur et de 5 mètres de largeur à la base, et situé sur la rive gauche dudit ravin a été reconnu comme la borne No. 50.

MM. les commissaires ont ensuite discuté l'application du protocole à la partie de la frontière de l'Elvend vers le nord.

Une divergence d'interprétation s'est manifestée à propos de Kani-Bez.

M. le commissaire ottoman déclare que Kani-Bez est le premier d'une série de postes-frontière située à environ 6 kilom. du point de jonction de l'Elvend et du Guilan.

M. le commissaire persan est d'avis que le poste-frontière de Kani-Bez se trouve à une heure et demie en aval de l'endroit désigné par son collègue ottoman.

Un accord ne pouvant s'établir entre les parties intéressées, MM. les commissaires médiateurs font la proposition suivante :

Les indications du Protocole final quant à la partie de la frontière située au nord de l'Elvend sont assez sommaires et si on s'en tient au tracé marqué sur la carte annexée à la note de l'Ambassade Impériale de Russie à Constantinople adressée à la Sublime Porte en date du 5 (18) août, 1913, on doit laisser à la Perse certaines localites qui sont actuellement en possession ottomane.

D'autre part, le tracé de la carte précitée ne correspond pas exactement avec celui décrit dans le protocole relativement à la frontière de la vallée de Serkalé (district de Zohab). En effet, d'après le Protocole, la partie septentrionale de cette vallée au delà de la rivière d'Abbasan doit rester à la Turquie ; tandis que le tracé de la note du 5 (18) août, 1913, laisse à la Perse la vallée de Serkalé.

Or, prenant en considération ces deux passages du protocole relatifs à Kani-Bez et à Serkalé, MM. les commissaires médiateurs proposent que le *statu quo* actuel soit maintenu à Kani-Bez et que par contre la Perse garde la petite partie de Serkalé au nord de la rivière Abbasan où la frontière passera comme il est indiqué sur la carte annexée à la susdite note.

La proposition ainsi énoncée a été acceptée par MM. les commissaires persan et ottoman et on décida de se rendre immédiatement sur les lieux pour procéder à la délimitation des terrains de Kani-Bez conformément au *statu quo* actuel.

Comme, toutefois, il y eut de nouvelles divergences d'opinions quant au tracé de la ligne séparant les champs du village persan de Chir-Sad-Khan de ceux du village turc de Khalife-Salib, les parties intéressées s'en remettent de nouveau à MM. les commissaires médiateurs, qui, séance tenante, émettent leur décision arbitrale en fixant sur les lieux l'emplacement de la borne No. 51 qui marque le passage de la ligne-frontière du *medium filum aquæ* sur la rive droite de l'Elvend ainsi que de la borne No. 52, et en statuant que la borne No. 53, sera érigée sur la crête de la colline de Sakyz-Aghatch sur la prolongation de la ligne droite entre les bornes Nos. 51 et 52.

Une sous-commission, été ensuite constituée avec instructions de faire ériger les susdites bornes No. 51, 52 et 53.

Sur la proposition de M. le commissaire britannique, la commission a décidé que la frontière suivra à partir de la borne No. 53 la ligne des postes-frontière ottomans déjà existants, jusqu'à la cinquième à partir de Kani-Bez.

La prochaine séance sera tenue à Kasr-i-Chirine. Une date n'a pas été fixée à ce propos.

Fait à Kani-Bez, le 24 avril, 1914.

A. T. WILSON, *Captain.*
ETELA-OL-MULK.
AZ. SAMIH.
V. MINORSKY.

Enclosure 38 in No. 235.

Trente-sixième Séance.

SÉANCE tenue à Kasr-i-Chirine, le 7 mai, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire persan.

Étaient présents :

Pour la Grande-Bretagne : Le Capitaine Wilson.
Pour la Perse : Etela-ol-Mulk.
Pour la Russie : M. Belayew.
Pour la Turquie : Le Major Aziz Samih Bey.

Les procès-verbaux des séances 33 et 34 ont été signés, ainsi que les cartes ci-après énumérées : six premières feuilles du deuxième et du troisième exemplaire britannique de la Carte identique, destinés à l'Ambassade de Constantinople et à la Légation de Téhéran ; six premières feuilles du deuxième exemplaire persan ; copie britannique de la carte supplémentaire No. 6 ; original de la carte supplémentaire No. 7.

La question des droits de pâturage des Sindjabis dans les terrains de Bagcha et Katar en territoire ottoman a occupé d'abord la Commission.

M. le commissaire ottoman fait savoir qu'il a reçu de son Gouvernement la réponse que cette question devra être traitée par voie diplomatique entre les deux Gouvernements intéressés et que son règlement n'entre donc pas dans les attributions de la Commission.

M. le commissaire persan cite comme précédent le cas de Dalamper (mentionné dans le protocole de Constantinople), qu'il considère comme une preuve de ce que la Commission est chargée de la discussion des droits de pâturage.

M. le commissaire britannique, appuyé par son collègue russe, propose que les commissaires des deux Puissances intéressées adressent à la Commission des déclarations en force exposant leurs points de vue ; après quoi il serait disposé à exprimer son propre avis. De cette façon les vues des commissaires se trouveraient résumées au procès-verbal de la séance, dont des copies pourraient être remises immédiatement aux quatre Gouvernements. Cette proposition a été agréée par MM. les commissaires persan et ottoman. M. le commissaire persan exige toutefois que les Sindjabis soient laissés en jouissance des pâturages jusqu'à ce qu'une décision définitive ait été prise.

Ensuite la Commission s'est appliquée à la délimitation de la frontière à partir du poste ottoman No. 5.

L'application du protocole présente quelques difficultés à l'égard de la portion de la frontière entre ce poste et les environs de Kourétou. D'après le texte du protocole, la ligne-frontière passe le long des crêtes des monts Kishka et Ak-Dagh. Cependant ces deux montagnes se trouvent situées, selon la Carte identique, sur des lignes à peu près parallèles, de sorte que la frontière ne saurait pas suivre les crêtes de toutes les deux.

M. le commissaire persan a indiqué alors sur la carte un tracé qui lui paraît se conformer à la ligne-frontière telle qu'elle a été entendue par les Ambassadeurs à Constantinople. Il affirme qu'il existe deux montagnes portant le nom d'Ak-Dagh, dont celle à laquelle le protocole se rapporte est située à l'ouest de celle marquée sur la carte identique. Ce fut, d'ailleurs, le *statu quo* qu'on a accepté comme base pour cette portion de la frontière.

M. le commissaire ottoman, au contraire, croit que le mont Ak-Dagh mentionné dans le protocole est bien le même qui se trouve marqué sur la Carte identique. Le nom du mont Kishka a dû être ajouté dans le protocole par mégarde.

En vue des difficultés survenues, on décide de remettre la discussion de cette question à une séance ultérieure.

Enfin on a considéré la question des bornes à l'endroit où la frontière suit la ligne des postes ottomans.

M. le commissaire persan voudrait faire ériger des bornes sur ce tronçon de frontière, mais en décide enfin que les postes eux-mêmes devront constituer le bornage, étant d'un caractère plus solide et permanent que les bornes qu'on pourrait construire.

MM. les commissaires persan et ottoman s'étant accordés sur la nécessité d'aller visiter les environs de Kourétou, avant de déterminer la ligne de frontière, on décide de s'y rendre demain après séance préalable.

En conséquence, on a discuté au cours de cette séance :

1. La question des droits de pâturage des Sindjabis ;
2. La frontière aux environs de Kourétou ; et
3. Le bornage de la frontière près des postes ottomans.

Fait à Kasr-i-Chirine, le 7 mai, 1914.

A. T. WILSON, *Captain.*
ETELA-OL-MULK.
AZ. SAMIH.
D. BELAYEW.

Enclosure 39 in No. 235.

Trente-septième Séance.

SÉANCE tenue à Kasr-i-Chirine, le 8 mai, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire russe.

Étaient présents M. le commissaire-adjoint britannique et les commissaires des trois autres Puissances.

Le procès-verbal de la trente-cinquième séance a été lu et approuvé, et les exemplaires russes des cartes supplémentaires Nos. 3, 5, 7 et 8 ont été signés.

MM. les commissaires ont discuté la différence qu'on avait constatée à la dernière séance entre la description de la frontière donnée dans le protocole et le tracé de la carte annexée à la note identique des Ambassades de la Grande-Bretagne et de Russie à la Sublime-Porte en date du 5 (18) août, 1913.

MM. les commissaires russe et britannique font référence à la correspondance et aux délibérations qui précédaient la signature du protocole. M. le commissaire russe déclare que celles-ci le mènent à la conclusion que la ligne qu'on avait en vue était celle du mont Ak-Dagh, indiqué sur la Carte identique réduite. M. le commissaire britannique dit de même qu'il n'entretient aucun doute à ce sujet.

M. le commissaire persan cite le passage suivant de la notice adressée par la Sublime-Porte aux ambassades des deux Puissances médiatrices en date du 31 mars, 1913 : ". . . . et partageant en deux parties égales le Deschti Kizil, traversera le cours d'eau de Kourétou et rejoindra la ligne actuelle de démarcation sur la ligne des sommets de la chaîne d'Ak-Dagh." "La ligne de démarcation actuelle," ajoute-il, "est la ligne actuelle des postes-frontière."

M. le commissaire russe fait observer que pour Guérébi, pour Var-Boulend et dans d'autres cas, on a suivi le tracé de la carte annexée. L'échange de Kani-Bez et de Serkalé a été également arrangée sur la base de ladite carte.

M. le commissaire ottoman déclare que la ligne actuelle de démarcation mentionnée dans la note de la Sublime-Porte ne peut pas être la ligne des postes-frontière, car celles-ci ne sont jamais établies sur la ligne même, mais bien en arrière, et il y a toujours entre les postes et la frontière un certain espace. D'autre parte, la Sublime-Porte précise cette ligne de démarcation en disant qu'elle se trouve sur la ligne des sommets de la chaîne d'Ak-Dagh.

M. le commissaire persan dit qu'il tient au mot de "Kishka," inclus dans la description de la frontière d'après le protocole.

On a parlé ensuite de la question de Kourétou, et MM. les commissaires ottoman et persan se sont engagés à se rendre le lendemain à Kourétou pour etudier cette question.

Fait à Kasr-i-Chirine, le 8 mai, 1914.

V. MINORSKY.
A. T. WILSON.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
AZ. SAMIH.

Enclosure 40 in No. 235.

Trente-huitième Séance.

SÉANCE tenue à Kasr-i-Chirine, le 9 mai, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire ottoman.

Étaient présents M. le commissaire-adjoint britannique et les commissaires des trois autres Puissances.

MM. les commissaires ont signé la seconde série des exemplaires persans de Carte identique, feuilles Nos. 1 à 8, ainsi que les feuilles 6, 7 et 8 de la troisième série ; la troisième série des exemplaires russes, feuilles Nos. 1 à 8 ; l'original et l'exemplaire britannique de la Carte supplémentaire No. 8.

Après examen de la carte dressée par le corps technique, on est tombé d'accord sur le tracé suivant de la frontière à partir de l'Elvendi. La ligne-frontière quitte le *medium filum aquæ* de l'Elvend et se dirige à la colline dite Sakyz-Agatch en ligne directe, de façon à séparer, autant qu'il peut se faire, les champs appartenant au village Halife Saleh (côté ottoman) de ceux appartenant au village Chir Zad (côté persan). De ce point la frontière va en ligne droite au poste-frontière ottoman No. 2, à partir d'où elle suit la ligne des postes-frontière ottomans jusqu'au poste qui précède celui d'Omarova. De ce poste elle va directement à un point se trouvant à 15 mètres en face (à l'est) du poste d'Omarova, et, suivant les crêtes des petites collines, descend dans un ravin près du poste de Derbendjik (No. 6).

La frontière suit ce ravin en aval jusqu'à son confluent avec un autre grand ravin nommé "Khir," ou "ravin de Derbendjik," qu'elle suit en amont pour une distance de 200 mètres, jusqu'à l'endroit où le chemin qui va du poste de Derbendjik à celui de Seïfieh (No. 7) vient le couper.

A partir de ce point la frontière suit ledit chemin jusqu'à l'endroit ou celui-ci traverse un ravin venant de la direction du nord. Elle suit le ravin susdit en amont et atteint une colline située à 600 mètres à l'est du poste ottoman de Karapoule (No. 9). De là elle suit les crêtes d'une rangée de collines s'étendant vers l'est-nord-est et atteint les crêtes du mont Ak-Dagh. Elle suit ces crêtes et, arrivée à la tête d'un ravin, qui débouche dans la rivière de Kourétou à 1 mille et demi à l'ouest du village du même nom, elle descend dans le ravin et le suit jusqu'à la rivière de Kourétou.

La ligne-frontière remonte ensuite la rivière de Kourétou en [illegible] ivant le *medium filum aquæ* jusqu'à Teng-i-Hammam.

Trois sous-commissions ont été constituées pour appliquer sur les lieux le tracé arrêté.

MM. les commissaires persan et ottoman ayant constaté la nationalité des habitants du village de Kourétou, il est décidé que ce village fera partie du territoire persan.

En conséquence, on a arrêté au cours de cette séance : (1) la ligne-frontière entre la rivière de l'Elvend jusqu'à Tong-i-Hammam, et (2) le sort du village de Kourétou.

Fait à Kasr-i-Chirine, le 9 mai, 1914.

AZ. SAMIH.
V. MINORSKY.
(Pour le Capitaine Wilson),
A. C. WRATISLAW
ETELA-OL-MULK.

Enclosure 41 in No. 235.

Trente-neuvième Séance.

SÉANCE tenue à Mamychan, le 16 mai, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire-adjoint britannique.

Étaient présents M. le commissaire-adjoint britannique et les commissaires des trois autres Puissances.

Les procès-verbaux des séances Nos. 35 et 36 ont été signés.

Les rapports des trois sous-commissions nommées à la trente-sixième seance ont été lus et approuvés par la Commission, qui a décidé qu'ils soient annexés au présent procès-verbal.

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On a fait lecture ensuite des déclarations présentées par MM. les commissaires persan et ottoman conformément à la résolution prise à la trente-sixième séance concernant le droit de pâturage des Sindjabis. Ces déclarations se trouvent annexées au présent procès-verbal. MM. les commissaires britannique et russe font savoir qu'il émettront un exposé de leur vue sur cette question à une prochaine séance.

Sur la proposition de M. le commissaire britannique, la Commission décide de rassembler toutes les descriptions de la frontière depuis Fao jusqu'au fleuve de Sirvan en un seul recueil qui sera examine minutieusement et annexé à un procès-versal ultérieur. Le secrétariat a été chargé de faire ce qui est nécessaire.

MM. les commissaires examinent ensuite les cartes dressées par le corps technique et appliquent sur celles-ci la description donnée par le protocole de la partie de la frontière entre la rivière de Kourétou et Bendi-Bamu.

Le tracé suivant a été accepté par la Commission :

Après avoir quitté la rivière de Kourétou à l'endroit marqué par la borne No. 59, la frontière suit la crête qui constitue le partage des eaux des plaines de Tchia Sourk et de Zohab, et qui porte successivement les noms Asengueran, Bishken et Beziran ; ensuite, passant par le col de Kal-i-Huan, elle se dirige dans la direction du nord-ouest vers Kal-i-Tilaku en passant le long du partage des eaux de Sirvan et d'Abbassan. Quittant cette crête à un point situé à un demi-mille au sud de Kali-i-Tilaku, elle continue dans la direction du nord-nord-est en suivant toujours le partage des eaux entre les plaines de Hajilar et de Tilaku et coupe les deux chemins qui conduisent respectivement à Tchia Sourkh et à Hajilar. A partir de là, la frontière remonte la crête du mont Schevaldyr, qu'elle descend de ce point le plus élevé (point astronomique) ; elle descend de ce point dans la vallée d'Abassan et se dirige sur Bard-i-Schaïtan, un entassement de pierres qui se trouve à côté du chemin de Serkalé à Hourine à droite de la rivière d'Abbassan et près de la rive droite d'un ravin. La frontière suit ledit ravin dans la direction de l'est jusqu'à la première crête au pied occidental de Bendi Bamou. Elle monte sur cette crête et la suit dans la direction du sud-est, jusqu'à son extrémité méridionale, en traversant le ravin de Bavoussi (Babassi). A partir de là, elle tourne vers le nord-est pour atteindre le contrefort sud-ouest de Bamou, qu'elle remonte jusqu'au sommet.

Deux sous-commissions ont été constituées pour appliquer ce tracé sur les lieux.

M. le commissaire ottoman relève qu'une partie des propriétés d'Abdullah Beg restera du côté persan, et il demande que celui-ci jouisse de ses droits de propriété.

Fait à Mamychan, le 16 mai, 1914.

A. T. WILSON.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
V. MINORSKY.
AZ. SAMIH.

Déclaration communiquée par M. le Commissaire persan aux Commissaires des Puissances médiatrices en date du 13 mai, 1914.

Le droit du pâturage des tribus persanes et particulièrement les Sindjabis dans les territoires cédés à la Turquie est chose incontestable ; Dervich Pacha et Khourchid Pacha l'affirment dans leurs rapports, et MM. les commissaires ont pu s'en informer et constater surtout l'existence des quartiers divers de cette tribus dans les territoires cédés.

Ceci étant, il est, je crois, trop difficile, sinon impossible à la Commission de se rallier à la déclaration de M. le commissaire ottoman, suivant laquelle la Commission n'aurait pas de compétence pour solutionner la question du droit de pâturage des Sindjabis. Car la mission même de délimiter la frontière comporte celle de solutionner les questions subsidiaires qui surgiraient à cet effet.

Des précédents essentiellement frappants existent dans les annales, si l'on peut ainsi dire, de notre Commission. En effet, le Protocole de Constantinople a solutionné la question de pâturage des Kader Vyssi à Dalamper. La Commission elle-même a déjà pris une décision relativement aux droits privés des Filis et du Vali de Poucht-i-Kouh à Bagsaye.

Bien plus, si M. le commissaire ottoman ne se croyait pas compétent pour réglementer la question du droit de pâturage des Sindjabis, comment l'aurait-il abordée et discutée

* Chapitre 29, rapport de Dervich Pacha.

dans les séances tenues à l'Abi Naft et à Kanibuz ?—séances dans lesquelles il n'a nullement soulevé son incompétence et a seulement demandé du temps pour se renseigner à Khaneguine.

Dans ce cas je ne puis donc nullement me rallier à son opinion et laisser en suspense le règlement définitif de cette question.

En conséquence, je prie MM. les commissaires des Puissances médiatrices de vouloir bien, conformément au principe d'après lequel le transfert d'un territoire par un État à un autre ne peut porter aucune atteinte aux droits des habitants, reconnaître formellement et au sein de la séance l'existence, comme par le passé, du droit de pâturage des Sindjabis et autres droits privés (propriété, &c.) que les tribus persanes peuvent avoir dans les territoires cédés.

Je dois, en terminant, ajouter que si malgré l'invraisemblance de décliner la compétence, MM. les commissaires des Puissances médiatrices croiraient devoir se rallier à l'opinion de mon collègue ottoman et remettre la solution définitive de la question à des négociations diplomatiques, la Commission devra au moins décider que l'état des choses actuellement existant sera respecté jusqu'au règlement définitif de la question par voie diplomatique.

Kasr, le 13 mai, 1914.

ETELA-OL-MULK.

Déclaration communiquée par M. le Commissaire ottoman aux Commissaires des Puissances médiatrices en date du 10 mai, 1914.

Je soussigné, commissaire Imperial ottoman, déclare que j'ai reçu de mon Gouvernement des instructions me prescrivant de communiquer à la Commission que la question du pâturage des Sindjabis ne figurant pas parmi les attributions de la Commission, la solution doit être réservée à des négociations ultérieures entre les deux Gouvernements.

Kasr-i-Chirine, le 10 mai, 1914.

AZ. SAMIH.

[No. 7.]

Rapport.

Conformément à l'instruction écrite ci-annexée, la sous-commission s'est rendue le 11 mai, 1914, à 5 heures et demie du matin aux postes-frontière ottomans pour y faire ériger des bornes.

En premier lieu elle s'est rendue au poste de Derbendjik (poste No. 7 de l'instruction), et a commencé par l'érection d'une borne (No. 55) sur la colline située à peu près 200 mètres au nord-est du poste ottoman mentionné.

Entre-temps, elle a chargé Mehmed Effendi, auquel elle a adjoint Mohsen Khan, de se rendre au poste ottoman d'Amarova (No. 6 de l'instruction) afin d'y faire ériger la borne No. 54.

Ces messieurs ayant constaté que le poste ottoman est construit sur une colline dont le côté est descend à pic dans un ravin et il n'y a à son sommet qu'une espace de 15 mètres entre le poste et le bord du ravin, ont décidé de construire la borne No. 54 à cette distance d'environ 15 mètres à l'est du poste ottoman, décision que la sous-commission a approuvée.

Ensuite la sous-commission s'est rendue au ravin mentionné dans ses instructions (ravin ou Kher de Derbendjik). A cet endroit elle a fait ériger la borne No. 56, qui se trouve située environ à 100 mètres à l'est du ravin marqué sur la carte nouvellement dressée et près la piste allant du poste ottoman de Derbendjik au poste de Seïfieh.

La sous-commission s'est enfin rendue au poste de Karapoulé et y a fait ériger la borne No. 57. Celle-ci se trouve sur une colline située à peu près à 600 mètres à l'est du poste de Karapoulé (No. 9 de l'instruction).

Fait à Kasr, le 13 mai, 1914.

MANSOUR-OS-SALTANEH.
MEHMED KAMI.
CAPITAINE ALIEW.

[No. 7.]

Instructions.

La sous-commission composée de MM. le Capitaine Alief, Mansouros-Saltaneh, Mehmed Effendi, a été chargée de se rendre après-demain sur les lieux et d'ériger quatre bornes:

1. A 30 mètres à l'est du koulé No. 6;
2. Sur le crête de la colline située à 200 mètres environ au nord-est du koulé No. 7, près du ravin marqué sur la carte;
3. Sur le grand ravin à l'embouchure d'un petit ravin venant du nord du koulé No. 9.
4. Sur la colline située à 800 mètres environ à l'est du koulé No. 9.

Les numéros sont marqués d'après la carte.

V. MINORSKY.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
AZ. SAMIH.
A. T. WILSON.

[No. 9.]

Rapport.

Conformément aux instructions ci-annexées de la Commission, les soussignés se sont rendus le 11 mai, 1914, à 10 heures du matin au Teng-i-Hamman, et ont fait ériger une borne en face du point astronomique de Karaïz tout près de la rive gauche de la rivière de Kourétou, en face d'un ravin qui remonte dans la direction du nord jusqu'au sommet de Asengueran.

Dimensions: Hauteur, 1 mètre; diamètre à la base, 1½ mètre.

Construction de pierre et de ciment.

C. H. D. RYDER.
Lieutenant-Colonel, R.E.
AZ. SAMIH.
ABDARRAZAK.

[No. 9.]

Instructions.

La Commission a chargé MM. le Major Aziz Samih Bey, le Colonel Ryder, Abdarrazak Khan de faire ériger une borne sur la rivière de Kourétou à l'endroit dit Teng-i-Hammam.

V. MINORSKY.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
AZ. SAMIH.
A. T. WILSON.

Kasr-i-Chirine, le 19 mai, 1914.

[No. 8.]

Conformément aux instructions ci-annexées de la Commission, les soussignés se sont rendus, le 10 mai, 1914, à Kourétou, et ont fait ériger une borne à la rive droite du ravin à sa jonction avec la rivière de Kourétou, à une distance d'à peu pres 1½ mille à l'ouest du village de Kourétou, en pierre liée avec du ciment. Hauteur, 1 mètre. Diamètre à la base, 1½ mètre. Enfin, ils sont montés sur l'Ak-Dagh et ont choisi l'emplacement de la deuxième borne sur un sommet d'Ak-Dagh à la tête du susdit ravin; à cause du manque d'ouvriers, cette borne n'a été construite que le 11 mai, en pierre liée avec du ciment. Hauteur, 1¾ mètre; diamètre à la base, 2 mètres; et visitée par les représentants persan et turc.

C. H. D. RYDER,
Lieutenant-Colonel, R.E.
KAN. TAKHAKAYA.
DJALIL-OL-MOLK.
MÉHMED NAMI.

Le 11 mai, 1914.

[No. 8.]

La sous-commission composée de MM. le Colonel Ryder, Djalil-ol-Mulk, le Capitaine Takhakaya, Mehmed Effendi, est chargée d'ériger deux bornes:

1. A la jonction d'un ravin avec la rivière de Kourétou à environ 1½ mille à l'ouest du village de ce nom; et
2. Sur l'Ak-Dagh, à la tête du même ravin.

V. MINORSKY.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
AZ. SAMIH.
(Pour le Capitaine Wilson),
A. C. WRATISLAW.

Kasr-i-Chirine, le 10 mai, 1914.

Enclosure 42 in No. 235.

Quarantième Séance.

SEANCE tenue à Mamyschan, le 18 mai, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire persan.

Étaient présents M. le commissaire-adjoint britannique et les commissaires des trois autres Puissances.

Les procès-verbaux des séances 37 et 39 ont été lus et approuvés. La Commission ayant terminé ses travaux à Mamyschan, il a été décidé de se diriger vers la rivière Sirvan en parcourant la frontière.

MM. les commissaires ottoman et persan sont tombés d'accord que la frontière, ayant atteint l'extrémité méridionale de Bamou, en suit la crête dans la direction du nord jusqu'à l'endroit où les collines formant le partage des eaux de l'Abbassan et du Poucht-i-Gherrav la rejoignent du côté oriental. De là la frontière suit ledit partage des eaux dans la direction de l'est jusqu'à la colline s'élevant à l'ouest de Decht-i-Ban-i-dar.

Arrivés à Deré Koundjid, le 20 mai, les commissaires se sont rendus à Decht-i-Ban-i-dar et y ont fait ériger une borne sur la colline susmentionnée.

D'autre part, une sous-commission a été chargée d'ériger une borne à l'endroit où le chemin entre les villages d'Azguelé et de Pouchti traversé le partage des eaux de l'Abbassan et d'Arkhawandoul.

En conséquence, on a arrêté au cours de cette séance la ligne-frontière entre Bend-i-Bamou et Decht-i-Ban-i-dar.

Fait à Deré Koundjid, le 20 mai, 1914.

ETELA-OL-MULK.
(Pour le Capitaine Wilson),
A. C. WRATISLAW.
V. MINORSKY.
AZ. SAMIH.

Enclosure 43 in No. 235.

Quarante et unième Séance.

SÉANCE tenue à Zarène, le 21 mai, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire russe.

Étaient présents M. le commissaire-adjoint britannique et les commissaires des trois autres Puissances.

Les procès-verbaux des séances 37 et 39 ont été signés et ceux des séances 38 et 40 lus et approuvés.

Les rapports des deux sous-commissions chargées respectivement de l'érection des bornes Nos. 61 à 64 et 65 à 67 ont été lus et approuvés.

Ils se trouvent annexés au présent procès-verbal.

Ensuite on a discuté le tracé de la prochaine partie de la frontière qui a été arrêté de la manière suivante: La ligne-frontière, à partir de Ban-i-dar, suit vers le nord le partage des eaux du Poucht-i-Gherrav et du Zimkan qui aboutit du côté sud du

confluent du Zimkan et du Poucht-i-Gherrav (Arkhawandoul). Ensuite la frontière traverse le Zimkan et monte en ligne directe sur le sommet occidental de la montagne de Beyzel dont elle suit dans la direction de l'est la ligne des crêtes jusqu'au sommet principal (à peu près 1,550 mètres de hauteur). Elle descend ensuite au confluent du Zimkan et du Sirvan en suivant le contrefort de Beyzal qui va dans la direction du nord et en passant par le cimetière de Khaki-Divane et un ancien koulé en ruine.

La prochaine séance a été fixée pour le 27 courant à Tawila (Tavalé).

En conséquence, on a arrêté au cours de cette séance la ligne-frontière entre Ban-i-dar et le Sirvan.

Fait à Zarène, le 21 mai, 1914.

V. MINORSKY.
(Pour le Capitaine Wilson),
A. C. WRATISLAW.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
AZ. SAMIH.

[No. 10.] *Rapport de la Sous-Commission.*

Conformément aux instructions ci-annexées de la Commission, les soussignés sommes rendus à la plaine de Tilaku et avons fait construire, sur la ligne du partage des eaux situées entre la montagne de Kouli-Baghan (Carte identique) et Schevaldyr, deux bornes. Ces deux bornes ont été érigées, l'une sur la route qui vient de Tilaku à Serkalé et l'autre sur celle reliant Hajilar à Serkalé. Celle située sur la route Tilaku-Serkalé No. 61 a 2 mètres de hauteur et 3½ mètres de base, construite entièrement en pierres arrosées de gypse.

Celle située sur la route Hajilar-Serkalé No. 62 a 1½ mètre de hauteur et 1½ mètre de base, construite entièrement en pierres liées avec du gypse.

MÉHMED NAMI.
MOUZAFFER.
H. M. COWRIE, *Major, R.E.*
D. BELAYEW.

Tilaku, le 17 *mai*, 1914.

Conformément aux instructions ci-annexées de la Commission, les soussignés sommes rendus à la rivière d'Abbassan, le 18 mai, et avons fait construire sur la rive gauche de ladite rivière au sommet d'un monticule indiqué sur la carte supplémentaire une borne en pierres liées avec du gypse ayant 1½ mètre de hauteur et 1½ mètre de base et portant le No. 63.

Ensuite les soussignés sommes rendus sur la rive droite de la même rivière et avons constaté un grand amoncellement de pierres de 15 mètres sur 7 mètres de base et 3 mètres de hauteur situé sur la rive droite du ravin de Berde-Cheïtan sur la route reliant Hourine à Serkalé. Cet amoncellement, portant également le nom de Berde-Cheïtan, a été accepté comme la borne No. 64.

L'azimut entre la borne No. 63 et la borne No. 64 est de 42 degrés avec le nord.

D. BELAYEW.
MOUZAFFER.
MÉHMED NAMI.

Mamyschan, le 18 *mai*, 1914.

[No. 10.] *Instructions.*

La Commission a chargé le Major Cowie, Salar Muzaffar, Mehmed Effendi, M. Belayew de mettre en vigueur la décision de la Commission en date du 16 mai et d'ériger les bornes suivantes :

1. Sur le partage des eaux entre Tilaku et Hajilar sur les deux routes indiquées sur la carte comme allant de Hajilar à Serkalé.

2. Le point où la frontière quittant Shavaldar descend vers la rive gauche d'Abbassan, sur un monticule indiqué sur la carte.

A. T. W.
V. M.
AZ. S.
E. M.

Le 16 *mai*, 1914.

[No. 11.] *Rapport.*

La sous-commission, conformément à l'instruction écrite ci-annexée, s'est rendue sur les lieux et a fait ériger les bornes suivantes :

1. A la fin du ravin qui vient joindre la rivière d'Abbassan près l'endroit nommé Besd-Chêïtan ;
2. Sur la colline située environ 1,000 mètres au sud de la borne susmentionnée, du côté nord du ravin de Bawisi ;
3. Sur la colline située environ 1,400 mètres à l'est de la seconde borne.

Toutes ces bornes ont été construites avec des pierres qui, dans les deux premières, sont couvertes de gypse et dans la troisième peintes en rouge. La première et la seconde borne ont chacune 2 mètres de hauteur et 3 mètres de diamètre à la base, et la troisième a la même base avec 2½ mètres de hauteur.

Fait à Mamyschan, le 17 mai, 1914.

M. S.
A. T. W.
AZ. S.

[No. 11.] *Instructions.*

La Commission a chargé le Capitaine Wilson, Mansouros-Saltaneh, le Major Aziz Bey d'ériger les bornes suivantes :

1 et 2. Sur les deux pics des collines à droite et à gauche du ravin de Bawisi aux endroits marqués sur la carte.

3. Sur la crête au-dessus d'un ravin de la rive gauche d'Abbassan passant du côté sud de Bendi-Cheïtan.

V. M.
AZ. S.
A. T. W.
E. M.

Le 16 *mai*, 1914.

Enclosure 44 in No 235.

Quarante-deuxième Séance.

SÉANCE tenue à Balkha, le 27 mai, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire ottoman.

Étaient présents tous les commissaires.

Les Procès-verbaux Nos. 38 et 40 ont été signés et celui de la dernière séance lu et approuvé.

Lecture a été donnée de l'exposé de MM. les commissaires britannique et russe de leur point de vue au sujet des droits de pâturage des Sindjabis. Il a été décidé d'annexer cet exposé au présent procès-verbal.

MM. les commissaires ont discuté ensuite l'application des stipulations du protocole se rapportant à la partie de la frontière au nord du Sirvan.

M. le commissaire persan déclare que, lors des pourparlers qui ont précédé la conclusion du protocole, on ne savait pas au juste où se trouvaient les dix-sept villages réclamés pour la Perse. C'est pour cette raison qu'on a confié la délimitation de cette partie de la frontière à la Commission. Il cite à l'appui de sa thèse le mémorandum annexé à la note de l'Ambassade de Russie adressée à la Sublime Porte en date du

5 (18) août, 1913, ainsi que le chapitre xxxix du livre de Dervich Pacha. Ayant constaté que les dix-sept villages se trouvent tous au nord de Nowsoud, il demande que pour la partie de la frontière située entre ledit village et le Sirvan on se rapporte au *statu quo* de 1848.

M. le commissaire ottoman fait observer que les stipulations du protocole sont très explicites, qui disent que la frontière devra être délimitée, à titre exceptionnel, en prenant en considération les changements survenus jusqu'à l'année 1905.

M. le commissaire britannique dit que lesdits villages n'entrent pas en question pour ce qui concerne le principe de délimitation ; le protocole n'en fait pas mention. Ces stipulations sont nées d'un compromis octroyant des avantages à la Turquie en matière des modifications survenues entre 1848 et 1905, celle-ci ayant, en revanche, fait des concessions à la Perse dans la partie septentrionale de la frontière.

M. le commissaire russe fait la récapitulation de négociations qui ont eu lieu à Constantinople. Il partage l'opinion de son collègue britannique que les dispositions du protocole sont suffisamment explicites. La Commission a comme tâche de constater les changements apportés au *statu quo* jusqu'à l'année 1905, et de délimiter la frontière sur cette base.

Sur la prière de MM. les commissaires russe et britannique, M. le commissaire persan communique la liste suivante des villages réclamés par la Perse :

Appartenant à Avromani Lohoun : Nowsoud, Hadjidj, Nowdéché, Cherrekan, Nervi, Cheïkhan, Tachar, Chouchme, Dezaver, Balkha-Oulia et Balkha-Vousta, Khan-i-Guermélé (avec ses dépendances, Kéminé, Khanedon, Ber-Ervaz, Derrémur, Guetchini, Deymé-djou). Ces villages sont, comme il déclare, en possession persane, à l'exception de Khan-i-Guermélé et ses dépendances. Il ajoute la liste suivante des villages situés au nord d'Avromani Lohoun : Zalem, Khanegol et Bani-Cher. Ses informations sur ce dernier n'étant pas très précises, M. le commissaire promet de les vérifier et de faire part à la Commission du résultat.

Les villages suivants auraient été occupés par le Gouvernement ottoman avant 1905 : Yalamper, Bani-Bunuk et Sousekan.

M. le commissaire ottoman s'est ensuite engagé à donner sa réponse à la liste précitée à la prochaine séance.

La prochaine séance a été fixée pour le lendemain, à 3 heures. En conséquence, on a discuté pendant cette séance la frontière entre le Sirvan et la montagne de Kemadjar, et particulièrement la question des villages persans et ottomans.

Fait à Balkha, le 27 mai, 1914.

AZ. SAMIH.
A. C. WRATISLAW.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
V. MINORSKY.

Déclaration.

Se rapportant à la discussion qui a eu lieu à la séance du 16 mai concernant les droits des Sindjabis sur les terrains près de la montagne de Baghtché, les commissaires britannique et russe croient devoir exposer le résultat de leurs investigations personnelles à ce sujet :

1. D'après Dervich Pacha (chapitre xxix de son rapport), du temps de la visite de la première Commission (1849–52), les hivernages des Sindjabis s'étendaient sur les plaines : entre Khanékine, Kyzyl Robat, la rive droite de l'Abi-Naft et la rive gauche du Guilan ; les Sindjabis regardaient ces yaylas comme leur propriété personnelle et ne payaient pas d'impôts à Bagdad.

2. Les rapports récents des représentants officiels britanniques et russe confirment également la présence des Sindjabis en hiver sur les territoires s'étendant jusqu'à Kyzyl Robat.

3. Les soussignés ont pu constater personnellement la présence des nombreux campements Sindjabis à l'est de la montagne de Baghtché entre l'Abi-Naft et l'Elvend. On nous a également confirmé le fait que les Sindjabis échangent et vendent exclusivement entre eux-mêmes leurs pâturages à Baghtché. Il est surtout à noter qu'actuellement il n'a pas d'autres tribus qui viennent aux pâturages susmentionnés près de Baghtché et qui puissent en contester la possession aux Sindjabis.

Vu ce qui précède, nous croirions juste que la tribu des Sindjabis restât en pleine jouissance de tous leurs droits de pâturages sur les territoires à l'est de Baghtché transférés à la Turquie à la suite de la présente délimitation basée sur le Protocole final.

V. MINORSKY
A. T. W.

Balkha, le 13 (26) *mai*, 1914.

Enclosure 45 in No. 235.

Quarante-troisième Séance.

SÉANCE tenue à Balkha, le 28 mai, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire britannique.

Étaient présents tous les commissaires.

Le procès-verbal de la dernière séance a été lu et approuvé et celui de l'avant-dernière séance signé. Le rapport de la sous-commission nommée à la quarantième séance a été lu et approuvé. Il se trouve annexé au présent procès-verbal.

M. le commissaire ottoman donne d'abord sa réponse aux réclamations de M. le commissaire persan concernant les villages situés dans le district d'Avroman.

Il résume ainsi la liste des villages :

Nowsoud, Cherrekan et Nervi : De ces trois villages on recrutait des soldats depuis 1848. En 1288 (A.H.) le bureau de recrutement du district a demandé des recrues, mais Osman Pacha, Gouverneur d'Alebdjé, a répondu que ces villages étaient inhabités. Le mobile de cette réponse fut que le pacha était parent de Djafer Sultan. On ne s'est pas rappelé depuis de ces villages.

Khan-i-Guermélé, Queimène (Kemine), Kani-Dink (Khanedon), Ber-Ervaz et Dereï-Mar (Derremur) : Ces cinq villages appartenaient en 1848 à la Turquie ; ils payaient les impôts et fournissaient des recrues. Sur les petites collines au nord de Khan-i-Guermélé il existe les ruines du poste-frontière ottoman.

Dezaver : Celui-ci dépend de Tavilé (Tavalé).

Balkha : Il y a deux villages portant ce nom, et non trois comme le dit M. le commissaire persan. L'un, Balkha-Oulia est le village qui est situé au sud-ouest de la route d'Alebdjé à Tavilé, dans le ravin ; l'autre, Balkha-Soufla, se trouve dans le même ravin un peu plus au sud. Le troisième dont parle M. le commissaire persan n'est qu'une dépendance de Balkha-Oulia. Les quelques maisons qui s'y trouvent ont été construites l'année dernière par les habitants de celui-ci. Ces deux villages ont de tout temps payé les impôts et fourni des recrues.

Guetchini et Deymé-djou : Ces villages sont situés près de la plaine de Chehr-i-Zor. Ils donnent des recrues et payent les impôts. Le dernier fait partie des domaines de la Couronne.

Bani-Cher et Khani-Koul (Khaneghol) : Ces villages se trouvent au nord de Kemadjar, et cette partie de la frontière se trouve délimitée par le Protocole final. Aucun représentant de la Perse n'y est jamais arrivé. Nasrullah Khan est un réfugié ; il a grandi chez Mahmoud Pacha.

Yalampié, Bani-Bunuk et Sousekan : Ces villages appartiennent à la Turquie ; leur occupation avant 1905 a été reconnue par M. le commissaire persan. Tous ces villages sont administrés, leurs terrains sont enregistrés et les impôts y sont prélevés. Les habitants figurent dans les registres de recensement de l'État. Ils ont fourni des recrues à l'armée.

Il y a d'autres villages qui ne figurent pas parmi ceux réclamés par M. le commissaire persan. Leur appartenance à la Turquie n'est donc pas contestée.

M. le commissaire russe considère que le protocole n'envisage pas les changements transitoires du *statu quo*, mais seulement ceux d'un caractère permanent.

M. le commissaire persan soutient qu'en considérant le tronçon de la frontière entre le Zimkan et Kemadjar, la Commission doit le diviser en deux parties. Pour la première de ces parties, c'est-à-dire depuis le Zimkan jusqu'aux confins des terrains de Nowsoud, le principe du *statu quo* de 1848 devra prévaloir ; seule la partie qui reste devra être délimitée "en prenant en considération les changements qui ont pu s'y produire à partir de l'année 1848 jusqu'à l'année 1905." Cette dernière phrase, dit-il, a été insérée dan

le protocole ayant en vue le cas des dix-sept villages et ne doit, par conséquent, être appliquée qu'à la région qui comprend lesdits villages.

M. le commissaire ottoman s'oppose à cette interprétation, en demandant que le *statu quo* 1905, soit appliqué à toute la région en question.

M. le commissaire persan ayant exprimé le désire de soumettre à l'arbitrage des commissaires médiateurs la question de l'interprétation du Protocole final en ce qui concerne la frontière entre le Zimkan et les terrains de Nowsoud, et M. le commissaire ottoman y ayant donné son assentiment, MM. les commissaires britannique et russe se sont retirés en séance privée.

Ensuite, à la séance plénière, ils ont annoncé leur décision dans ces termes: L'interprétation du protocole donnée par M. le commissaire persan ne peut être fondée, vu que l'expression du protocole "le reste de la frontière jusqu'au Sirvan" ne prévoit aucune exception.

La prochaine séance a été fixée pour le surlendemain à 4 heures.

En conséquence, on a repris pendant cette séance la discussion de la frontière entre le Sirvan et Kemadjar.

Fait à Balkha, le 28 mai, 1914.

A. C. WRATISLAW.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
V. MINORSKY.
AZ. SAMIH.

[No. 12.] *Rapport.*

Conformément aux instructions de la Commission, nous soussignés nous sommes rendus, le 20 mai, sur le col du partage des eaux entre les bassins d'Abbassan et d'Arkhawandoul sur la route entre Azguélé et Sérabé-Kalé et nous avons construit une borne en pierres liées avec du gypse, à environ 2 mètres à l'ouest de ladite route, ayant 3 mètres de base et 2½ mètres de hauteur et portant le No. 68.

D. BELAYEW.
MOUZAFFER.
MÉHMED NAMI.

[No. 12.] *Instructions.*

La Commission a chargé M. Belayew, Méhmed Effendi, Salar Muzaffar d'ériger une borne sur le col du partage des eaux entre les basins d'Abbassan et d'Arkhawandoul sur la route entre Azguélé et Sérabé-Kalé.

V. MINORSKY.
A. T. WILSON.
AZ. SAMIH.
ETELA-OL-MULK.

Enclosure 46 in No. 235.

Quarante-quatrième Séance.

SÉANCE tenue à Balkha, le 30 mai, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire persan.

Le procès-verbal de la dernière sèance a été lu et approuvé et celui de l'avant-dernière séance signé. Le rapport de la sous-commission chargée de l'érection de bornes entre l'Elvend et Sakyz-Agatch a été lu et adopté; il se trouve annexé au présent procès-verbal.

MM. les commissaires ont commencé par étudier la carte du voisinage dressée par le corps technique; après quoi M. le commissaire ottoman propose, comme étant le *statu quo* de 1905, la ligne définie ainsi que suit:

La ligne-frontière quitte la chaîne d'Avroman près de la source du ruisseau situé au sud de Ketchiné. Elle suit ce ruisseau et, contournant du côté ouest le village de Khan-Guerméléé, se dirige vers l'est en suivant une rivière qui se tourne au sud de ce village. Puis elle tourne vers le nord-est et, suivant les crêtes d'une série de collines,

regagne la chaîne d'Avroman, dont elle suit les crêtes. Arrivée au contrefort situé à l'est du point où la rivière qui passe à l'est de Dezaver se dégage de la chaîne d'Avroman, la frontière suit ce contrefort et continue à descendre vers le sud en suivant la ligne du partage des eaux situé à l'est de Dezaver, de Sousekan et de Palami et au sud de Tavilé. De là elle descend dans le ruisseau qui passe de Chuchmé et suivant celui-ci, arrive au Sirvan.

M. le commissaire persan oppose le tracé suivant:

La frontière quitte le Sirvan en face de la chaîne de Chenervi pour atteindre les collines situées entre Sazan et Bouine, qu'elle suit et arrive à la chaîne de Chenervi. Elle suit les crêtes de cette chaîne et celles de Kourano et atteint le sommet septentrional de Kav-Kouch. Ensuite, laissant Havar à la Turquie, elle se dirige vers le nord-est en suivant les crêtes des collines situées à l'est de Palani, Sousekan et Tavilé. Arrivée au nord de Tavilé, elle se dirige vers le sud-ouest et arrive à la route allant de Tavilé à Balkha, qu'elle suit jusqu'à ce dernier village. Elle passe entre Balkha-Vousta et Balkha-Sufla et arrive à la route de Tavilé-Biaré. Elle suit cette route et arrive près de Dega-Cheïkhan, traverse la colline située au nord-ouest de ce village et passe entre Khan-Guérmélé et Biaré de manière à séparer les champs et jardins de ces deux villages. Ensuite, suivant les collines situées au nord de Biaré, elle atteint la route qui va à Kulpé, suit cette route et entre dans la vallée où se trouvent Hanedund et Serhat. De Serhat elle se dirige vers l'est pour atteindre la crête de Kemadjar.

MM. les commissaires médiateurs ayant tâché de rapprocher les deux tracés susdits, M. le commissaire persan propose que la Commission fasse des enquêtes locales afin d'établir le *statu quo* avant 1905. M. le commissaire ottoman trouve que les enquêtes locales ne peuvent être pratiques ni justes, et déclare que les actes et registres officiels de l'État doivent être examinés pour déterminer les faits.

MM. les commissaires médiateurs offrent à préparer un tracé de frontière répondant, à leur avis, aux nécessités de la situation et de le présenter à la prochaine séance. MM. les commissaires persan et ottoman acceptent cette proposition.

La prochaine séance a été fixée pour le lendemain à 3 heures.

En conséquence, MM. les commissaires ottoman et persan ont présenté à cette séance leurs projets de frontière respectifs pour le district entre le Sirvan et Kemadjar.

Fait à Balkha, le 30 mai, 1914.

ETELA-OL-MULK.
A. C. WRATISLAW.
(Pour M. Minorsky),
D. BELAYEW.
AZ. SAMIH.

[No. 6.] *Rapport.*

Conformément aux ordres de la Commission, les soussignés ont fait ériger, le 25 avril, les bornes suivantes:

No. 51, sur la rive droite de l'Elvend entre les villages Khalité-Salch et Chirzad Khan à une distance de 420 mètres en aval de l'extrémité sud dudit village de Chirzad Khan.

No. 52, à une distance de 174 mètres de la borne No. 51. Azimut pris de cette dernière borne, 309 degrés.

No. 53, sur la prolongation de la ligne droite qui relie les deux bornes Nos. 51 et 52, sur la colline de Sakyz-Agatch, 876 mètres distante de la borne No. 52.

Toutes les trois bornes sont en pierre liée avec du ciment. Hauteur, 1½ mètre. Diamètre à la base, 1½ mètre.

CAPITAINE ALIEW.
O. KADRI.
MOHSEN.

[No. 6.] *Instructions.*

La Commission a chargé MM. Mohsen Khan, le Capitaine Aliew, le Lieutenant Kadri Effendi de construire les bornes Nos. 51 et 52 aux endroits fixés d'après la décision arbitrale entre les champs des villages de Chir-Zad Khan et de Khalifé-Saleh.

Cette sous-commission érigera également la borne No. 53 sur la colline à côté du koulé ("birindji") sur la prolongation de la ligne directe entre les bornes Nos. 51 et 52.

A. T. WILSON, *Captain.*
ETELA-OL-MULK.
V. MINORSKY.
AZ. SAMIH.

Liste des Cartes portant le Tracé final de la Frontière turco-persane.

Numéro et Description de la Carte.	Échelle.	Région illustrée.	Bornes marquées.
Carte identique, feuille No. 1 ..	1 : 73,050	Depuis le commencement de la frontière à l'embouchure du Chatt-el-Arab jusqu'au Nahr-el-Khayin, y compris l'ancrage de Mohammerah	—
Carte supplémentaire No. 1 ..	"	Alentours du Nahr-el-Khayin et du Nahr-Dzedji	1 à 4
Carte identique, feuille No. 2 ..	"	Du parallèle 30° 30' au parallèle 31° 15', y compris Kouchk-i-Basri	5 à 14
Carte identique, feuille No 3 ..	"	Du parallèle 31° 15' jusqu'au Oum-Chir ..	15 et 16
Carte supplémentaire No. 2 ..	"	D'Oum-Chir jusqu'au Douveridj, y compris le Chatt-el-Amma	17 à 22
Cartes supplémentaires Nos. 3 et 4 .	"	Du Douveridj jusqu'au Tyb	23 et 24
Carte identique, feuilles 4 et 5 ..	"	Du Tyb jusqu'au ravin de Zafarani	—
Carte supplémentaire No. 5 ..	"	Baksai et ses alentours, du ravin de Zafarani jusqu'à la rivière de Tchengoulé ..	25 et 26
Carte supplémentaire No. 6 ..	"	Terrains de Saïd Hassan de Tchengoulé jusqu'au Mont Bendi-Koulik-Boumourg ..	27 à 33
Carte supplémentaire No. 7 ..	1 : 353,440	Du Mont Bendi-Koulik-Boumourg jusqu'à l'extrémité ouest du Djebel-Kélé-Chourume ..	34 à 40
Carte supplémentaire No. 8 ..	1 : 73,050	Plaine de Boumar et défilé de la rivière de Guenguir	41 à 44
Carte supplémentaire No. 9 ..	"	De la borne No. 44 jusqu'à l'Elvend, y compris les montagnes de Koulme-Rig et Var-Boulend et la rivière Ab-i-Naft	45 à 50
Carte supplémentaire No. 10 ..	"	De l'Elvend jusqu'au parallèle 34° 45', y compris les montagnes d'Ak-Dagh et d'Acongueran et la rivière de Kouretou ..	51 à 60
Carte supplémentaire No. 11 ..	"	Du parallèle 34° 45' jusqu'au confluent du Zimkam et du Sirvan, y compris la plaine de Sericale et les montagnes de Bamou et de Bayzal	61 à 69
Carte identique, feuille No. 7 ..	"	La Rivière Sirvan depuis l'embouchure du Zimkam jusqu'au face du Mont Kalagha ..	—
Carte supplémentaire No. 12 avec une Carte détaillée	"	Du Sirvan jusqu'à la chaîne magistrale des montagnes d'Avroman	70 à 83
Carte identique, feuille No. 7 ..	"	La chaîne d'Avroman jusqu'à la partie appelée Sourene	—
Carte supplémentaire No. 13 ..	"	De Sourene jusqu'au col de Kal-i-Melaik ..	84 à 95
Carte supplémentaire No. 14 ..	"	De Kal-i-Melaik jusqu'au Mont Galasch ..	96 à 99
Carte supplémentaire No. 15 ..	"	De Mont Calauch jusqu'au Zab	100 à 103
Carte identique, feuille No. 9 ..	"	La Rivière Kialou ou petit Zab	—
Carte supplémentaire No. 18, avec trois Cartes détaillées, Nos. 18 A, 18 B, et 18 C	1 : 84,000	De la Rivière Kialou jusqu'à Vezné ..	104 à 117
Carte supplémentaire No. 17 ..	"	Du parallèle 36° 24' à 36° 48'	118 et 119
Carte supplémentaire No. 18 ..	"	Du parallèle 36° 48' à 37° 12'	120 à 126
Carte supplémentaire No. 19, avec une Carte détaillée, No. 19 A	"	Du parallèle 37° 12' à 37° 36'	127 à 140
Carte supplémentaire No. 20, avec une Carte détaillée, No. 20A	"	Du parallèle 37° 36' à 38° 0'	141 à 158
Carte supplémentaire No. 21, avec une Carte détaillée, No. 21 A	"	Du parallèle 38° 0' à 38° 24'	158 à 170
Carte supplémentaire No. 22 ..	"	Du parallèle 38° 24' à 38° 48'	181 à 186
Carte détaillée, No. 22 A	"	Région de Kotour	—
Carte supplémentaire No. 23 ..	"	Du parallèle 38° 48' à 39° 12'	187 à 197
Carte supplémentaire No. 24, avec une Carte détaillée, No. 24 A	"	Du parallèle 39° 12' au méridien 44° 20' ..	198 à 220
Carte supplémentaire, No. 25, avec une Carte détaillée, No. 25 A	"	Du méridien 44° 20' jusqu'au Mont Ararat ..	221 à 233

Liste des Sous-Commissions.

No. de la Sous-Commission.	No. de la Séance à laquelle la Sous-Commission a été nommée.	No. du Procès-verbal auquel le Rapport a été annexé.	Travaux accomplis par la Sous-Commission.
1	3	6	Érection des bornes Nos. 5, 6 et 7 à Dâédji.
2	23	26	Démarcation de la frontière depuis Zaferani jusqu'au ravin de Palk.
3	26	31	Démarcation de la frontière entre la borne 33 et Kan-i-Cheikh.
4	31	32	Érection des bornes 41–44 au ravin de Soumar.
5	32	33	Érection de la borne 45 sur Var-boulend.
6	35	44	Érection des bornes 51–53 entre l'Elvend et Sakyz-Agatch.
7	38	39	Érection des bornes 54–57 entre les postes-frontière Nos. 5 et 9.
8	38	39	Érection des bornes 58 et 59 sur l'Ak-Dagh et à l'ouest de Kouretou.
9	38	39	Érection de la borne 60 au Teng-i-Hammam.
10	39	41	Érection des bornes 61–64 à Tilaku.
11	39	41	Érection des bornes 65-67 au pied du Bend-i-Bamu.
12	40	43	Érection de la borne 68 près de Pouchte.
13	45	49	Érection des bornes 70–72 sur Kalaga, Palani et la route Tabile–Chouchme.
14	46	49	Érection de la borne 77 à Néli-Kémine.
15	45	51	Érection des bornes 78 et 79 près de la route de Dega–Cheikh-Khan.
16	50	51	Érection de la borne 83 sur le chemin Ber–Ervaz–Khanedeuk.
17	52	53	Érection de la borne 84 sur le pic au-dessus de Kani-Sef.
18	52	53	Érection de la borne 86 sur le partage des eaux au nord de Piran.
19	53	54	Érection des bornes 89 et 90 sur le col de Navi-Sar et près du ruisseau de Bnava-Souta.
20	53	54	Érection des bornes 91 et 92 aux jonctions du Bnava-Souta et du Kyzyldja et du Kyzyldja avec le Khalil-Abad.
21	54	57	Érection de la borne 95 sur le chemin Khalouza–Kana-Serd.
22	55	57	Érection des bornes 96-99 entre Now–Khouvan et le chemin Pendjevine–Bane.
23	59	61	Érection des bornes 104–106 près de Tépé-Salos.
24	60	61	Érection des bornes 107–109 aux cols de Lagav-Ghird et de Kani-Resch.
25	61	65	Érection des bornes 110 et 111 sur le col de Malimos, et description de la frontière dans cette partie.
26	61	64	Érection de la borne 112 au ruisseau de Narzeng.
27	62	63	Érection des bornes 113 et 114 près de Kani-Kavatman.
28	63	65	Érection des bornes 115–117 entre Tchawrine (Djasousan) et Zinve-Khouar, et description de cette partie de la frontière.
29	65	67	Érection des bornes 118–121 entre Gauri-Chinke et Guélé-Zerd.
30	66	81	Érection des bornes 122–125 aux cols de Kélé-chine et de Khrena.
31	67	71	Érection de la borne 126 sur le col de Kélé-chine Mergaver.
32	67	71	Érection de la borne 127 au col de Zinvi-Sour.
33	71	72	Érection des bornes 134–137 entre Mt. Zont et R. Arzine.
34	71	72	Érection des bornes 138–140 entre R. Arzine et Seri-Baydost.
35	72	73	Érection des bornes 141–145 entre Kouhne Mich et R. Ekmaluk.
36	72	73	Érection des bornes 146–152 entre R. Ekmaluk et Mt. Kotoul.
37	74	75	Érection de la borne 153 sur le col de Meidan.
38	74	75	Érection de la borne 154 sur le col de Peri Khan.
39	74	75	Érection des bornes 155 et 156 sur le col de Soultani et Berhebine.
40	74	75	Érection de la borne 157 sur le col de Kélé-reche.
41	74	75	Érection des bornes 158 et 159 sur le col de Djourouf et Ziaret.

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No. de la Sous-Commission.	No. de la Séance à laquelle la Sous-Commission a été nommée.	No. du Procès-verbal auquel le Rapport a été annexé.	Travaux accomplis par la Sous-Commission.
42	74	75	Érection des bornes 160, 161 et 162 sur le col de Sotounreche, Khane-Sour et Katch-Guéduki.
43	74	75	Érection des bornes 163, 164 et 165 sur le col de Bourouch Khoran et Deuchivan.
44	75	76	Érection des bornes 166 A, 166 B, 166 C et 170.
45	74	75	Bornes 167, 168, 169 sur le cols de Kach Koul.
46	78	79	Érection des bornes 181–183, Khydhr Baba et Kourdjan
47	78	79	Érection des bornes 184–185 sur le col de Nazar Beg.
48	78	79	Érection des bornes 186–187, cols de Tavra et Agh Spi.
49	78	79	Érection des bornes 188–189 sur les routes de Reschkan et Kotchkyran à Kara-déré.
50	78	79	Érection des bornes 190–193, cols de Nawour et Djeligueul.
51	78	79	Érection des bornes 194–196, col de Karabourga.
52	79	83	Érection de la borne 200, col au sud Egri-Tchay.
53	..	83	Érection des bornes 201–204, vallée d'Egri-Tchay.
54	81	83	Érection des bornes 205–220, Kyzyl Kaya et Khazine Guédouk.
55	83	84	Érection des bornes 221–226, Ak Dagh et Bazyrgan.

Section de la Frontière délimitée.

	Numéro de la Séance.
Fao–Touweidjat (porte et ancrage de Mohammerah)	2
Touweidjat–Daedji	3
Daedji–Kouchk-i-Basri–31e parallèle	4
31e parallèle–Oum Chir	7
Oum Chir–Chatt-el-Amma–Tybe (décision arbitrale)	8
Tybe–Zaaferani	14
Zaaferani–Tchengouleh–Palk–Goundjiun-Tchem (terrains de Seid Hassan) (décision arbitrale)	23
Goundjiun-Tchem–Guerebi–Kélé-Chouvan	25
Kélé-Chouvan–Guenguir–Kouhne Rig (Plaine de Soumar) (décision arbitrale)	31
Kouhne Rig–Varboulend–Ab-i-Naft	—
Ab-i-Naft (Puits de Naphte)	33
Ab-i-Naft–Elvend	35
Elvend–Postes-frontière ottomans–Ak Dagh–Teng-i-Hammam (Village de Kouretou)	38
Teng-i-Hammam–Bamu (Zohab et Serkale)	39
Bamu–Ban-i-Dar	40
Ban-i-Dar–Beyzel–Sirvan	41
Sirvan–Kemadjar (Dezaver–Tavile, séance 46; Biare–Khan-Guermélé, séance 50) (décision arbitrale)	45
Kemadjar–Tchakan–Sekouh (Piran-Toutman)	51
Sekouh–Kyzyldja–Khalil-Abad	53
Khalil-Abad–Kouhi-Kocé–Rescha–Kélé Melaik	54
Kélé Melaik–Voul Gouza–Galasch	55
Galasch–Sourkew (Tchamperaw–Siah-Gouveza) (décision arbitrale)	57
Sourkew–Zab	58
Zab–Doulan	59
Doulan–Abou'l Fath	60
Abou'l Fath–Rivière de Vezné	61
Rivière de Vezné–Tchawrine (Djasousan)	62
Tchawrine–Zinve-Khouar	63
Zinve-Khouar–Guele-Zerd	65
Guele-Zerd–Col de Khrena	66
Col de Khrena–Col de Zinou	67
Col de Zinou–Mont Sitawour	68
Mont Sitawour–Mont Khizan (Mont Zont)	69
Mont Zont–Seri Baydost	70 et 71
Seri Baydost–Kotoul Dagh	72
Kotoul Dagh–Mont Sourawou	73
Mont Khydyr Baba–Mont Kyzyl Ziaret	78
Mont Kyzyl Ziaret–Khazine Guedouk	82
Khazine Guedouk–Bazyrgan	83
Bazyrgan–Boulak Bachi	84
Boulak Bachi–Ararat	85

[74125]

No. 236.

Captain Wilson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 35.)

Sir,

Camp near Maku, October 27, 1914.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 25, dated the 8th October, I have the honour to enclose herewith, for your information, a copy of the despatch which I have addressed to His Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople, describing the proceedings of this Commission from the 9th October until its termination on the 26th October.

I have, &c.

A. T. WILSON, *Captain, I.A., British Commissioner, Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.*

Enclosure in No. 236.

Captain Wilson to Sir L. Mallet.

(No. 62.)

Sir,

Camp near Maku, October 27, 1914.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 54, dated the 8th October, I have the honour to submit, for your Excellency's information, the following report upon the proceedings of this Commission subsequent to that date:—

2. On the 14th October the three commissioners received a letter from their Turkish colleague, under date the 13th October, stating that he had received orders to cease work and to return. He left for Erzeroum next day.

After discussion with M. Minorsky we sent an identic telegram* to our respective embassies requesting instructions.

On the following day, after seeing the Turkish deputy commissioner, we sent a further identic telegram.†

3. To these telegrams no reply was received from your Excellency, but M. Minorsky informed me that he had received a telegram from M. de Giers stating that the Grand Vizier had promised to give orders for the deputy Turkish commissioner to complete the work of delimitation. On the 17th instant Aziz Bey informed us that Colonel Fuad Bey, Ottoman delegate on the Turco-Russian Commission, who had just arrived at Bayazid, would replace him, and would finish the work of demarcation. In his absence the Turkish deputy commissioner would act for him and would do his best to finish as quickly as possible.

M. Minorsky and I thereupon sent a further identic telegram‡ apprising our embassies of this new development. On the following day a meeting was held, at which the Turkish deputy commissioner was present, and a further portion of the frontier up to Bazyrgan was settled.

The Turkish deputy commissioner, however, when called on to arrange for the evacuation of Djowzer, a small hamlet on the Persian side of the frontier, declared his inability, owing to the mobilisation, to evacuate either this post or that of Boulak-Bachi.

5. The post of Djowzer was not known by any of us to exist, until discovered during the work of demarcation, and the question of its evacuation could not therefore have been foreseen, but the Boulak-Bachi post has for many years formed the subject of diplomatic correspondence and is specially mentioned in the protocol. We thought it desirable, therefore, to inform our embassies by telegraph of this declaration, and we sent an identic telegram§ next day.

* "Venons de recevoir d'Aziz Bey lettre datée 13 octobre, disant qu'il a reçu ordres de cesser délimitation et de rentrer. Adjoint-commissaire ottoman viendrait chez nous le 14 pour liquider les travaux. Sollicitons instructions."—(October 14.)

† "Adjoint-commissaire ottoman, arrivé à Bazyrgan le 14 octobre, déclare n'avoir autres pouvoirs que pour signer copies cartes. Il ignore cause cessation délimitation. On tiendra encore une séance dans trois jours pour signature copies documents. Conditions climatiques permettent encore de travailler et toutes cartes nécessaires sont prêtes."—(October 15.)

‡ "Commissaire ottoman a été remplacé par Colonel Fuad Bey. Jusque arrivée ce dernier, adjoint-commissaire agira *ad interim*. Redoutons nouveaux retards cause nouvelle nomination au moment où il ne reste que trois quatre jours de travail. Il faudra certain temps au nouveau commissaire se mettre au courant affaires. Adjoint-commissaire pourrait compléter toute frontière en conformité article 3 notre règlement."—(October 19.)

§ "Adjoint-commissaire ottoman, alléguant mobilisation, déclare ne pas avoir pouvoirs pour évacuation de Djowzer et de Boulak-Bachi. Il promet demander autorisation spéciale son Gouvernement. Prions vos Excellences appuyer exécution protocole final."—(October 21.)

6. At a further meeting held on the 21st October a further portion of the frontier was satisfactorily settled after much futile discussion; the next meeting was, however, posponed to the 23rd, the Turkish deputy commissioner declaring that he had orders from Fuad Zia Bey not to demarcate beyond Sary Sou, pending his arrival, unless this was delayed beyond the 23rd.

7. The meeting, on the 23rd, was held at Boulak-Bachi; Fuad Zia Bey did not arrive, having left on the previous day for Tiflis. During the meeting I received your Excellency's reply* to our representations regarding Fuad Zia Bey's nomination.

Abdul Hamid Bey commenced by declaring that he had received orders to finish work only on condition that no pillars were to be erected, the line being merely marked on the map. We prevailed upon him, however, to erect two on the Yarim Kaya plain close by, whilst for the rest of the frontier he accepted without much demur a line proposed by us running straight up the hill towards pillar No. 37 of the Turco-Russian frontier and passing through a series of prominent peaks and along a watershed—an admirable natural frontier requiring no artificial marks.

8. The pillars were erected during the afternoon, and M. Minorsky and I sent a final identic telegram† reporting the completion of the work of demarcation.

The next *séance* was fixed for the 26th instant to enable M. Minorsky to visit pillar No. 37 of the Turco-Russian frontier.

The Turkish secretary left on the 24th instant for Tiflis; the Turkish topographical officers had already gone to Erzeroum, and the task of finishing their maps devolved, not for the first time, on Colonel Ryder. The Russian commissioner likewise has had a very inadequate staff for some time, as he appeared unable to induce his deputy and his topographical officers, with whom he is very unpopular, to leave their comfortable quarters at Maku, where they have been for the last three weeks.

9. On the 20th October, at the 83rd sitting, the mediating commissioners made two declarations of some importance:—

(1.) Regarding the old frontier between latitude 34 and 35, as reported in my despatch No. 61, dated the 26th October.

(2.) Regarding the frontier of Kotour as defined in the protocol of the 4th (17th) November, 1913.

The latter declaration defined accurately, with the aid of a detailed map, the frontier of Kotour as laid down in the protocol and suggested a slight alteration therein which seemed called for on geographical and administrative grounds. Should it be necessary later on to demarcate this frontier on the ground it will, I think, be found that the terms of this declaration, coupled with the map, are so precise that no misunderstanding could arise in process of giving effect thereto.

The Turkish representative contented himself by stating that both declarations were *ultra vires* on our part.

10. At the final sitting of the Commission, held on the 26th October, after the transaction of some formal business, M. Minorsky announced that he had just received a telegram from his Ambassador to the effect that the Grand Vizier had consented to have the frontier of Kotour marked on the map and had promised to issue the necessary orders to the Turkish representative on the Commission.

The latter had, however, received no such orders; it was therefore decided to consider this as the final sitting of the Commission and to hold a supplementary sitting on the 28th October, at which the question of Kotour could be discussed, if the Turkish deputy commissioner had in the meantime received his orders. M. Minorsky and I sent an identic telegram the‡ same day to our respective embassies.

I will report the result of this meeting in a separate despatch.

11. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Foreign Office.

I have, &c.

A. T. WILSON, *Captain, I.A., British Commissioner, Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.*

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* "Sur représentations de mon collègue russe et moi, Grand Vizir a promis retenir commissaire turc."—(October 22.)

† "Délimitation jusque Ararat terminée excepté pour Kotour. Boulak-Bachi délimité mais n'a pas été évacué. Dernière séance le 26 octobre (N.S.)."—(October 23.)

‡ "Commissaire ottoman pas encore reçu ordre promis concernant délimitation Kotour. Pour cette question tiendrons séance supplémentaire 28 octobre. Sollicitons instructions."—(October 26.)

[74126]

No. 237.

Captain Wilson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 36.)

Sir,

Camp Maku, October 27, 1914.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 22, dated the 26th August, I have the honour to enclose, for your information, a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople giving cover to the *procès-verbaux* of sittings Nos. 74 to 87 of this Commission.

When the enclosures to this despatch are printed, I beg that the action referred to in paragraph 2 thereof may be taken with the copies in the archives of His Majesty's Foreign Office.

I have, &c.

A. T. WILSON, *Captain, I.A.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 237.

Captain Wilson to Sir L. Mallet.

(No. 63.)

Sir,

Camp Maku, October 27, 1914.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 51, dated the 26th August, I have the honour to enclose, for your Excellency's information, copies of the *procès-verbaux* of sittings Nos. 74 to 87 of this Commission, together with (1) an annex to *Procès-verbal* No. 71 and (2) a list of authoritative corrections to the provisional description of the frontier which was annexed to the *procès-verbal* of the 63rd *séance*.

2. Annexed to the *procès-verbal* of the last *séance* is a description of the frontier from pillar 104 northwards. It has been agreed to detach from the *procès-verbal* of the 63rd *séance*, and attach to this document, the provisional description of the frontier from pillars 1–103 referred to above, duly corrected, so as to form a single document containing a complete description of the frontier as required by article 15 of Annexe (A) of the protocol of the 4th (17th) November, 1913. I beg that your Excellency will be good enough to cause this to be done with the copy in the archives of His Majesty's Embassy.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch, with enclosures, to His Majesty's Foreign Office.

I have, &c.

A. T. WILSON, *Captain, I.A.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 237.

Annex to Procès-verbal No. 71.

Rapport.

(No. 32.)

NOUS, soussignés, nous sommes rendus au col de Zinvi et avons fait ériger une borne (No. 125) sur un monticule situé au milieu du partage des eaux.

Cette borne a été construite en pierres et ciment et a 2 mètres de base et 1½ mètre de hauteur.

Fait à Kala-Zéva, le 6 août, 1914.

SALAR MOUZAFFER.
D. BELAIEF.
O. KADRI.

Instructions.

La Commission a chargé MM. Salar Mouzaffer, D. Belaïef, Kadri Bey, d'ériger une borne au col de Zinvi.

A. T. WILSON.
V. MINORSKY.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
AZ. SAMIH.

Enclosure 3 in No. 237.

Procès-verbal of Seventy-fourth Meeting of Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

Séance tenue à Berduk, le 27 août, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire ottoman.

Étaient présents tous les commissaires.

Le procès-verbal de la dernière séance a été lu et approuvé et ceux de l'avant-dernière et de la soixante-huitième séance signés, ainsi que les cartes suivantes :

Carte identique, feuille 8, trois exemplaires russes.
Carte identique, feuille 9, deux exemplaires russes et deux exemplaires ottomans.
Carte identique, feuille 10, deux exemplaires ottomans.

La nouvelle carte de la portion de la frontière au nord de Kotoul-Dagh ayant été examinée, l'emplacement de trois bornes a été fixé et une sous-commission a été nommée pour l'érection de chacune de ces bornes. (Voir instructions Nos. 37, 31 et 39.)

Il a été entendu que la Commission se réunira le 30 courant à Dostan.

Fait à Berduk, le 27 août, 1914.

AZ. SAMIH,
(Pour Etela-ol-Mulk),
MANSOUR-ES-SULTANEH.
C. H. D. RYDER, *Lieutenant-Colonel.*
V. MINORSKY.

Enclosure 4 in No. 237.

Procès-verbal of Seventy-fifth Meeting of Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

LA Commission n'avait pas jugé nécessaire de tenir séance à Dostan. On avait seulement formé les sous-commissions Nos. 40, 41, 42, 43 et 45 pour l'érection des bornes aux endroits désignés dans les instructions qui leur furent remises, et la séance a été tenue à Razi, le 7 septembre, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire-adjoint britannique.

Étaient présents :

Pour la Grande-Bretagne : le Colonel Ryder.
Pour la Perse : Mansour-es-Sultaneh.
Pour la Russie : M. Minorsky.
Pour la Turquie : Az. Samih Bey.

La Carte supplémentaire No. XI, exemplaire persan, a été signée. Les rapports de ces sous-commissions et ceux des Nos. 37, 38 et 39 ont été lus. Ils se trouvent annexés au présent procès-verbal.

La frontière se trouve ainsi arrêtée et appliquée jusqu'au col traversé par la route principale allant de Kachkoul à Guirnavouk, situé au nord-ouest du mont Sourava.

Néanmoins, le partage des eaux entre Kotour et Khanyk, formé par les crêtes s'étendant à l'est de Sourava jusqu'au bassin de Deuchivan ayant été difficile à établir, une sous-commission technique fut chargée de se rendre sur les lieux, trouver le partage des eaux et le marquer par des bornes. Cette sous-commission a été également chargée de faire ériger une borne au col situé entre Kirotou et la ruine de Mir-Omar.

MM. les commissaires ont ensuite considéré la frontière du district de Kotour.

M. le commissaire ottoman déclare que, d'après le protocole final, le protocole de Sary-Gamiche doit être appliqué de sorte que, c'est-à-dire de façon que, à condition que les villages de Biledjik, Razi, Haratil, les deux Djelliks et Panamerik restent à la Perse. Il dit trouver dans ce passage du protocole final une modification qui doit prévaloir. Ainsi, ajoute-t-il, ces villages seuls doivent rester à la Perse et rien d'autre.

M. le commissaire russe fait observer que les vieilles données cartographiques sont assez défectueuses et que, avant d'entamer l'examen de la question, il serait préférable d'examiner la nouvelle carte que le corps technique est sur le point d'achever.

MM. les commissaires se rangent à cet avis et décident d'ajourner la discussion de cette question à la prochaine séance.

M. le commissaire ottoman fait observer qu'une grande animosité existant entre les Chemsekis, habitants des villages qui doivent être cédés à la Perse, à Kotour et les Abdouis, il demande de son collègue persan les garanties suffisantes pour leur bon entretien.

MM. les commissaires trouvent que cette question doit être prise en considération et discutée à la prochaine réunion. Ils approuvent la description de la frontière de la rivière de Kialou (petit Zab) à la borne No. 170, préparée par le secrétariat et le corps technique, et décident de l'annexer à ce procès-verbal.*

Fait à Razi, le 7 septembre, 1914.

C. H. D. RYDER, *Lieutenant-Colonel.*
V. MINORSKY.
AZ. SAMIH.
MANSOUR-ES-SULTANEH.

Rapport.

(No. 37.)

Conformément aux instructions ci-annexées de la Commission, nous, les soussignés, nous sommes rendus aux lieux et avons construit la borne suivante :

No. 153. En pierres liées avec du ciment ; hauteur, 2 mètres ; largeur à la base, 2 mètres ; située sur le col de Meydan à 20 mètres à l'est de la route Kasran–Berdouk.

C. H. D. RYDER.
ABDURRAZAGH.
Capitaine YEMILIANOF.
O. KADRY.

Instructions.

La commission a chargé MM. le Capitaine Yemilianof, Kadry Bey, Etela-ol-Mulk, le Colonel Ryder, d'ériger une borne (No. 153) sur le col de Meydan.

Réunion le 23, à 7 heures du matin, chez la Commission persane.

AZ. SAMIH.
A. T. WILSON.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
V. MINORSKY.

Rapport.

(No. 38.)

Conformément à l'ordre de la Commission ci-annexé, les soussignés se sont rendus sur les lieux et ont fait ériger la borne suivante :

No. 154. Construction, entassement de pierres ; dimensions, 4 × 3 mètres ; située sur le col de Parikhan à 40 mètres au nord de la route, sur le partage des eaux.

D. BELAIEF.
A. T. WILSON, *Captain.*
MANSOUR-ES-SULTANEH.
AZ. SAMIH.

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* Détachée et annexée au procès-verbal de la 83e séance.

Instructions.

La Commission a chargé MM. Mansour-es-Sultaneh, Aziz Bey, le Capitaine Wilson, Belaïef, d'ériger une borne (No. 154) sur le col de Parikhan.

Réunion le 28, à 7 heures du matin, chez la Commission russe.

AZ. SAMIH.
A. T. WILSON.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
V. MINORSKY.

Rapport.

(No. 39.)

Nous, soussignés, nous sommes rendus sur les lieux et avons fait ériger les bornes suivantes :

No. 155, au col de Kiskani (Soultani), à quelques mètres à l'est de la route de Berdouk à Khochkan. Construction en pierres et ciment, 2 mètres × 1½ mètre.

No. 156, au col de Berhebine, à 800 mètres environ au nord-ouest du col précédent, à l'endroit où la route qui suit le partage des eaux de Hassani et Dostan et qui va rejoindre la route de Khochkan, en territoire ottoman, traverse la chaîne de Berhebine. Entassement de pierres, 1¾ mètre × 1 mètre.

Fait à Hassani, le 29 aout, 1914.

SALAR MOUZAFFER.
V. MINORSKY.
H. BASRI.

Instructions.

La Commission a chargé MM. Salar Mouzaffer, V. Minorsky, Basri Bey, d'ériger une borne au col de Soultani.

A. T. WILSON.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
V. MINORSKY.
AZ. SAMIH.

Rapport.

(No. 40.)

Nous, soussignés, nous sommes rendus au col de Kélé-Reche et avons fait construire une borne (No. 157) sur le col même à environ 1 mètre au sud de la route allant du village de Kélé-Reche au village de Meydan. Diamètre à la base, 2½ mètres ; hauteur, 2 mètres.

La borne se trouvant dans une excavation existante est construite en pierres et ciment.

SALAR MOUZAFFER.
D. BELAIEF.
A. HAMID.

Le 30 *août*, 1914.

Instructions.

La Commission a chargé MM. Salar Mouzaffer, D. Belaïef, A. Hamid Bey, d'ériger une borne au col de Kélé-Reche.

AZ. SAMIH.
A. T. WILSON.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
V. MINORSKY.

Rapport.

(No. 41.)

Nous, soussignés, nous sommes rendus sur les lieux et avons fait ériger les bornes suivantes :

No. 158, située sur un monticule environ 200 mètres au nord du col par lequel passe la route allant du village de Tarava (turc) à Kalik (persan), sur le partage des eaux, 1,000 mètres environ au nord-est d'un petit lac, près du poste ottoman de Djourouf. Dimensions, 3 mètres × 2 mètres. Entassement de pierres.

No. 159, située sur le contrefort à 200 mètres environ au nord, par lequel passe la route allant de Kyzyldja (turc) à Kotchke-Soumou (persan), près de l'endroit connu sous le nom de Ziaret. Dimensions, 2 mètres × 1½ mètre. Entassement de pierres.

A. T. WILSON.
ABDURRAZAGH.
AZ. SAMIH.

Instructions.

La Commission a chargé MM. le Capitaine Wilson, Abdurrazagh Khan, Aziz Bey, d'ériger une borne au col situé entre Kalik et Tarava et une autre au col d'Ambi, entre Djourouf et Kalik.

AZ. SAMIH.
A. T. WILSON.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
V. MINORSKY

Rapport.

(No. 42.)

Nous, soussignés, nous sommes rendus sur les lieux et avons fait ériger les bornes suivantes :

No. 160, située à l'endroit où la route Sotoun-Reche (Soutounradje) et l'encampement d'été de Kyzyldja traverse le partage des eaux et environ à 10 mètres au nord de cette route. Dimensions : 2 mètres × 1½ mètre. Pierres liées avec du plâtre.

No. 161, au col de Khané-Sour, du côté sud de la route Kadjiafan–Khané-Sour. Dimensions : 2 mètres × 2 mètres. Entassement de pierres.

No. 162, au col de Khatch-Gueduki, environ à 40 mètres au sud de la route Awbarza–Khané-Sour. Dimensions : 3 mètres × 2 mètres. Entassement de pierres.

MANSOUR-ES-SULTANEH.
V. MINORSKY.
O. KADRI.

Instructions.

La Commission a chargé MM. Mansour-es-Sultaneh, V. Minorsky, O. Kadri, d'ériger des bornes aux cols de Kyzyldja et Khané-Sour.

AZ. SAMIH.
A. T. WILSON.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
V MINORSKY.

Rapport.

(No. 43.)

Nous, soussignés, nous sommes rendus sur les lieux et avons fait ériger les bornes suivantes :

No. 163, au col connu, à ce qu'il paraît, sous le nom de Karadaghi, à 60 mètres environ au sud de la route de Khanyk à Achnouk. Entassement de pierres : 1 mètre × 1 mètre.

No. 164, au col de Bourouch-Kouran, à l'endroit où la route de Khanyk au village de Bourouch-Khouran traverse le partage des eaux. Entassement de pierres : 1 mètre × 1 mètre.

No. 165, au col de Deuchivan (Douchman), à quelque distance au nord de la route qui va de Khanyk à Deiryk et Keuhné-Chehr. Entassement de pierres : 1½ mètre × 1 mètre.

Fait à Kachkoul, le 3 septembre, 1914.

C. H. D. RYDER.
MANSOUR-ES-SULTANEH.
D. BELAIEF.
H. BASRI.

Instructions.

La Commission a chargé MM. le Colonel Ryder, Mansour-es-Sultaneh, D. Belaief, H. Basri, d'ériger des bornes aux cols de Bourouch-Kouran et au col oriental de Deuchivan.

A. T. WILSON.
MANSOUR-ES-SULTANEH.
V. MINORSKY.
AZ. SAMIH.

Rapport.

(No. 45.)

Nous, soussignés, nous sommes rendus sur les lieux et avons fait ériger les bornes suivantes :

No. 167, au col situé immédiatement au nord du mont Sourava, à quelques mètres au sud de la route de Kachkoul à Ravian. Entassement de pierres liées avec du plâtre : 2 mètres × 1½ mètre.

No. 168, au col traversé par le chemin allant de Kachkoul à Guernavouk, à quelques mètres à l'ouest dudit chemin. Entassement de pierres liées avec du plâtre : 1½ mètre × 1 mètre.

No. 169, au col traversé par la route principale allant de Kachkoul à Guernavouk, à 5 mètres environ à l'ouest de cette route. Entassement de pierres liées avec du plâtre : 2 mètres × 2 mètres.

Fait à Kachkoul, le 4 septembre, 1914.

MANSOUR-ES-SULTANEH.
D. BELAIEF.
AZ. SAMIH.

Instructions.

La Commission a chargé MM. Aziz Bey, de Belaief, Mansour-os-Sultaneh, pour ériger des bornes sur le col de Kachkoul.

A. T. WILSON.
V. MINORSKY.
MANSOUR-ES-SULTANEH.
AZ. SAMIH.

Le 3 septembre, 1914.

Enclosure 5 in No. 237.

Procès-verbal of Seventy-sixth Meeting of Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

SÉANCE tenue à Kotour, le 10 septembre, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire-adjoint persan.

Étaient présents :

Pour la Grande-Bretagne : M. le Colonel Ryder.
Pour la Perse : Mansour-es-Sultaneh.
Pour la Russie : M. Minorsky.
Pour la Turquie : Aziz Samih Bey.

Le procès-verbal de la dernière séance a été signé.

Le rapport de la sous-commission No. 44 a été lu et se trouve annexé au présent procès-verbal.

M. le commissaire ottoman déclare qu'il a reçu de son Gouvernement ordre de cesser la délimitation.

MM. les autres commissaires, n'ayant pas reçu communication pareille, disent qu'ils vont se référer à leurs Gouvernements respectifs pour exposer les faits et demander instructions. En attendant, on décide de compléter les cartes jusqu'à Mir Omar Dagh.

Les cartes suivantes ont été signées :

Carte identique No. 11 : deux exemplaires persans et deux exemplaires russes.

Carte identique No. 12 : trois exemplaires anglais, deux exemplaires persans, trois russes et deux ottomans.

Carte supplémentaire		No. 13 :	exemplaire persan.	
,,	,,	No. 15 :	,,	,,
,,	,,	No. 16 :	,,	persan, russe, ottoman.
,,	,,	No. 17 :	,,	ottoman, persan.
,,	,,	No. 18 :	,,	ottoman.
,,	,,	No. 19 :	,,	persan, ottoman.
,,	,,	No. 20 :	,,	anglais.
,,	,,	No. 21 :	,,	anglais, russe.

MM. les commissaires discutent ensuite s'il est absolument nécessaire de faire deux copies des Cartes supplémentaires.

M. le commissaire ottoman pense qu'il faut en faire deux.

M. le commissaire-adjoint britannique dit qu'il y a des Cartes supplémentaires de la première série qui n'ont pas été achevées. Dans ces conditions, il trouve qu'il faudrait trop de temps pour pouvoir faire la seconde série.

Après courte discussion, on décide qu'en attendant les instructions pour la suspension des travaux on complétera la première série.

La prochaine séance a été fixée au 14 septembre, 1914, à Kotour.

Fait à Kotour, le 10 septembre, 1914.

MANSOUR-ES-SULTANEH.
C. H. D. RYDER.
A. SAMIH.
(Pour V. Minorsky),
D. BELAIEF.

Rapport.

(No. 44.)

Conformément aux instructions de la Commission ci-annexées, nous, soussignés, nous sommes rendus sur les crêtes s'étendant à l'est de Sourawou et avons construit les bornes suivantes :

No. 166 : Sur le col de Deuchivan Nord sur un monticule à l'est de la route allant de Khanyk à Tchar-Setoun. Entassement de pierres de 1½ mètre de hauteur et 1½ mètre de diamètre à la base.

No. 166 A : Sur la ligne du partage des eaux à l'ouest d'une maison en ruine et au sud d'un petit marécage situé sur la ligne des crêtes. Construction en pierres et ciment de 2 mètres de hauteur et 2 mètres de diamètre à la base.

No. 166 B : Sur une petite colline à l'est du susdit marécage. Entassement de pierres de 1 mètre de hauteur et 1 mètre de base.

No. 166 C. Sur la ligne du partage des eaux sur la piste conduisant de Khanyk à la vallée de Ravian sur la route reliant ces deux villages. Construction en pierres et ciment de 1½ mètre de hauteur et 1½ mètre de diamètre à la base.

Conformément aux mêmes instructions, nous nous sommes rendus sur le col de Mir Omar et avons construit une borne (No. 170) sur le col même à 2 mètres à l'ouest de la route allant de Kiréton aux ruines de Mir Omar.

Construction en pierres et ciment de 2½ mètres de hauteur et 2 mètres de diamètre à la base.

SALAR MOUZAFFER.
Capitaine TSKHAKAYA.
O. KADRI.

Le 12 septembre, 1914.

Instructions.

La Commission a chargé MM. Salar Mouzaffer, Kadri Effendi, Capitaine Tskhakaya, d'ériger un nombre suffisant de bornes sur le partage des eaux entre Kotour et Khanyk sur les crêtes s'étendant à l'est de Sourawou jusqu'au bassin de Deuchivan.

C. H. D. RYDER.
MANSOUR-ES-SULTANEH.
V. MINORSKY.
AZ. SAMIH.

Le 7 septembre, 1914.

La même sous-commission est chargée d'ériger une borne au col entre Kirétou et la ruine de Mir Omar sur le partage des eaux.

C. H. D. R.
M. S.
V. M.
A. S.

Enclosure 6 in No. 237.

Procès-verbal of Seventy-seventh Meeting of Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

SÉANCE tenue à Koutour, le 17 septembre, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire russe.

Étaient présents :

Pour la Grande-Bretagne : M. le Colonel Ryder.
Pour la Perse : Etela-ol-Mulk.
Pour la Russie : M. Minorsky.
Pour la Turquie : Az. Samih Bey.

Le procès-verbal de la dernière séance a été lu et approuvé.

MM. les commissaires ont prié le commissaire-adjoint britannique de transmettre à Mr. Hubbard, secrétaire de la délégation britannique, leurs vifs regrets à l'occasion du malheureux accident qui l'obligea à rentrer et par là priva la Commission de ses services appréciés. Tous ont souhaité prompte guérison pour le sympathique secrétaire. M. le commissaire-adjoint britannique s'est chargé de communiquer à Mr. Hubbard les vœux de la Commission.

On a ensuite signé les cartes suivantes :

Carte identique, feuille	No. 8 : deux exemplaires ottomans.
,, ,, ,,	No. 11 : deux exemplaires ottomans.
Carte supplémentaire	No. 12 : exemplaire russe deux series.
,, ,,	No. 10 : exemplaire russe.
,, ,,	No. 11 : exemplaire russe.
,, ,,	No. 12 : exemplaire anglais-persan, russe.
,, ,,	No. 13 : exemplaire ottoman, russe.
,, ,,	No. 14 : exemplaire persan, russe.
,, ,,	No. 18 : exemplaire persan, russe.
,, ,,	No. 19 : exemplaire persan, russe.
,, ,,	No. 20 : exemplaire persan, russe.
,, ,,	No. 21 : exemplaire persan, russe.
Carte détaillée	No. 16 A : exemplaire persan, russe.
,, ,,	No. 16 B : exemplaire persan, russe.

Carte détaillée	No. 16 C : exemplaire persan, russe.
,, ,,	No. 19 A : exemplaire anglais.
,, ,,	No. 20 A : exemplaire persan, russe.
,, ,,	No. 21 A : exemplaire anglais, persan, russe et ottoman.

On reprend ensuite la discussion de la séance précédente à propos de la seconde série des cartes supplémentaires.

Sur la proposition de M. le commissaire russe, on décide de laisser à chaque commission le soin de déterminer personnellement le nombre et la nécessité de la seconde série. Pareilles cartes présentées à MM. les commissaires seront signées.

M. le commissaire ottoman déclare qu'il a reçu nouvel ordre de son Gouvernement lui prescrivant de communiquer à la Commission que divers considérations obligent le Gouvernement ottoman de laisser à plus tard la délimitation du tronçon de la frontière située entre Mir Omar Dagh et le mont Khydyr-Baba. Pour cette partie, dit-il, le *statu quo* actuel restera en vigueur et on continuera la démarcation vers le nord. M. le commissaire fait observer en outre que l'article 13 du protocole donnant droit à la Commission d'ajourner la délimitation d'une partie de la frontière, il n'y aura aucune dérogation aux stipulations dudit acte.

M. le commissaire persan dit qu'il s'est déjà référé à son Gouvernement pour cette question et qu'il est d'avis qu'on devra marquer la frontière de cette région sur la carte et laisser à une date ultérieure l'évacuation des endroits qui reviendraient à la Perse.

M. le commissaire ottoman décline cette proposition.

Après discussion, la Commission prend acte de la déclaration ottomane, mais demande au commissaire ottoman s'il va se soumettre à la majorité des voix, d'après l'article 13 du Règlement intérieur de la Commission établi et signé par les représentants des quatre Gouvernements.

M. le commissaire ottoman déclare ne pouvoir se soumettre à la majorité des voix.

M. le commissaire russe fait observer alors que pour ne pas perdre du temps et eu égard aux conditions du climat, on doit continuer la démarcation. Mais en même temps, dit-il, il faut noter que le refus du commissaire ottoman est contraire au Règlement intérieur et notifier ceci aux Gouvernements respectifs.

Après mûres discussions, MM. les commissaires se rangent à l'avis de M. le commissaire russe et décident de réprendre la délimitation à partir de Khydyr-Baba.

M. le commissaire russe, devant partir pour Khoï, déclare qu'en son absence son adjoint le remplacera.

Prochaine séance le 20 septembre, à Seraï.

C. H. D. RYDER, *Lieutenant-Colonel.*
ETELA-OL-MULK.
AZ. SAMIH.
(Pour V. Minorsky),
D. BELAIEF.

Enclosure 7 in No. 237.

Procès-verbal of Seventy-eighth Meeting of Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

SÉANCE tenue près de Seraï, le 20 septembre, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire ottoman.

Étaient présents :

Pour la Grande-Bretagne : M. le Colonel Ryder.
Pour la Perse : Etela-ol-Mulk.
Pour la Russie : M. Belaïef.
Pour la Turquie : Az. Samih Bey.

Le procès-verbal de la dernière séance a été lu et approuvé, celui de l'avant-dernière signé. MM. les commissaires ont également signé les exemplaires ottomans des Cartes supplémentaires Nos. 14, 15, 20, 19A et 20A.

M. le président donne lecture de la partie du protocole relatif à la description de la frontière située au nord de Khydyr-Baba. Le tracé définitif fut ainsi arrêté : la

frontière suit les crêtes du partage des eaux formé par les monts Khydyr-Baba, Gevri-Mahine, Bevra-begzadan; les collines entre Akhourek et Tavra, Reschkan, Avdal-daschi; les collines entre les bassins d'Ayry-tchaï (persan) et Djelli-gol (turc), Kara-bourga, Doumanlu, Sarytchimene et Kyzyl-Ziaret.

On forme les sous-commissions Nos. 46, 47, 48, 49, 50 et 51 pour l'érection des bornes aux endroits désignés dans les instructions qui leur furent remises.

M. le commissaire persan rapporte qu'il avait saisi son collègue ottoman du fait qu'il lui a été rapporté que des soldats ottomans auraient réoccupés Sero et Sartyk. Le commissaire ottoman, dit-il, avait immédiatement télégraphié à Constantinople et vient de recevoir la réponse que si pareil fait a eu lieu, des ordres seront donnés pour la retraite de ces soldats. M. le commissaire remercie son collègue ottoman de cette réponse, qui, dit-il, démontre la bonne volonté du Gouvernement ottoman.

Prochaine séance à Guevri-Chamian, le 27 septembre, 1914.

C. H. D. RYDER, *Lieutenant-Colonel.*
AZ. SAMIH.
ETELA-OL-MOLK.
(Pour D. Belaief),
V. MINORSKY.

Enclosure 8 in No. 237.

Procès-verbal of Seventy-ninth Meeting of Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

SÉANCE tenue à Guevri-Chamian, le 27 septembre, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire adjoint britannique.

Étaient présents:

Pour la Grande-Bretagne: M. le Colonel Ryder.
Pour la Perse: Etela-ol-Mulk.
Pour la Russie: M. Belaïef.
Pour la Turquie: Aziz Samih Bey.

MM. les commissaires, en arrivant à Guevri-Chamian, avaient fait ériger les trois bornes suivantes:

No. 197: au col de Khan-Guedouk; entassement de pierres ayant 1 mètre de hauteur et 1 mètre de base;

No. 198: au col nord de Khan-Guedouk; entassement de pierres ayant 1 mètre de hauteur et 1 mètre de base.

No. 199: au col d'Akhdjadj; construction de pierres et du ciment: hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre, 1 mètre.

Le procès-verbal de la dernière séance a été lu et approuvé, celui de l'avant-dernière signé. Les rapports des six sous-commissions nommées à la dernière séance ont été également lus et se trouvent annexés au présent procès-verbal.

MM. les commissaires, après avoir examiné la carte du district dressée par le corps technique, décident de faire ériger une borne à l'endroit où la route allant de Guevri-Chamian à Avadjik, traverse le partage des eaux, au sud du mont Kyzyl-Ziaret.

Une sous-commission (No. 52) a été chargée de faire construire cette borne.

On a décidé de se rendre à Kazly-Goul pour examiner et établir la frontière de cette région.

Fait à Guevri-Chamian, le 27 septembre, 1914.

(Pour D. Belaief),
V. MINORSKY.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
C. H. D. RYDER.
(Pour A. Samih),
A. HAMID.

Instructions.

(No. 46.)

La Commission a chargé MM. le Colonel Ryder, Mansour-es-Sultaneh, Salih Effendi, le Capitaine Bortnikof, d'ériger des bornes au sommet du mont Khydyr-Baba et aux deux cols de Kourdjan.

C. H. D. RYDER.
AZ. SAMIH.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
D. BELAIEF.

Le 20 septembre, 1914.

Rapport.

Conformément aux instructions de la Commission, nous, soussignés, nous sommes rendus sur les lieux et avons fait ériger les bornes suivantes:

No. 181: au sommet de Khydyr-Baba à une distance d'environ 1 mille à l'ouest du sommet à l'endroit où les trois partages des eaux de Beledjik, Scheref-Khané et de Diza se joignent; entassement de pierres: hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre à la base, 2½ mètres.

No. 182: sur le col au nord-est de Kourdjan et environ 100 mètres au nord de la route Scheref-Khané–Diza; grand rocher blanc: hauteur, 1 mètre; diamètre, 3 mètres.

No. 183: située à 100 mètres à l'est de la route Kourdjan-Diza, sur un monticule sur le partage des eaux; construction en pierres et ciment: hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre, 2½ mètres.

C. H. D. RYDER.
MANSOUR-ES-SULTANEH.
H. SALIH.
BORTNIKOF.

Le 21 septembre, 1914.

Instructions.

(No. 47.)

La Commission a chargé MM. Salar Mouzaffer, Belaïef, Az. Samih Bey, d'ériger des bornes aux deux cols de Nazar-beg.

C. H. D. RYDER.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
AZ. SAMIH BEY.
D. BELAIEF.

Le 20 septembre, 1914.

Rapport.

Conformément aux instructions de la Commission, nous, soussignés, nous sommes rendus sur les lieux et avons fait ériger les bornes suivantes:

No. 184: au col sud de Nazar-beg-Gueduki à une distance de 10 mètres au nord de la route de Kourdjan à Elend; construction en pierres et plâtre: hauteur, 1½ mètres; base, 1½ mètre.

No. 185: au col nord de Nazar-beg-Gueduki sur la route de Kharabeï-Soryk à Elend; entasssement de pierres: hauteur, 1½ mètre; base, 1½ mètre.

D. BELAIEF.
AZ. SAMIH.
SALAR MOUZAFFER.

Instructions.

(No. 48.)

La Commission a chargé MM. Mansour-es-Sultaneh, Az. Samih Bey, le Capitaine Bortnikof, d'ériger les bornes suivantes:

1 : à l'endroit où la route d'Akhourek à Kerkuk traverse le partage des eaux (col de Tavra).

2 : au col d'Ak-Sipi.

AZ. SAMIH.
C. H. D. RYDER.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
D. BELAÏEF.

Le 23 septembre, 1914.

Rapport.

Conformément aux instructions de la Commission, nous, soussignés, nous sommes rendus sur les lieux et avons fait ériger les bornes suivantes :

No. 186 : sur le col de Tavra, à l'endroit où la route d'Akhourek-Youkari aux ruines de Tavra traverse le partage des eaux ; construction en pierres et plâtre : hauteur, 1½ mètre ; base, 1 mètre.

No. 187 : sur le col d'Ak-Sipi à 150 mètres au sud de la route qui traverse ce col ; entassement de pierres : hauteur, 2¼ mètres ; base, 2 mètres.

MANSOUR-ES-SULTANEH.
AZ. SAMIH.
BORTNIKOF.

Instructions.

(No. 49.)

La Commission a chargé MM. le Colonel Ryder, Etela-ol-Mulk, D. Belaïef, Salih Effendi d'ériger des bornes sur le partage des eaux entre Kara-Déré et le bassin de Enghiz et sur la route de Kotchkiran-Achaghi à Kara-Déré.

ETELA-OL-MULK.
C. H. D. RYDER.
D. BELAIEF.
AZ. SAMIH.

Le 23 septembre, 1914.

Rapport.

Conformément aux instructions de la Commission, nous, soussignés, nous sommes rendus sur les lieux et avons fait ériger les bornes suivantes :

No. 188 : sur le partage des eaux de Kara-Déré et le bassin d'Enghiz au nord de route de Reschkan à Kara-Déré ; entassement de pierres : hauteur, 2 mètres ; diamètre, 2 mètres.

No. 189 : sur le même partage des eaux sur une colline à 300 mètres au nord de la route de Kotchkiran-Achaghi à Kara-Déré ; entassement de pierres : hauteur, 3 mètres ; diamètre, 4 mètres.

C. H. D. RYDER.
M. SALIH.
D. BELAÏEF.
ETELA-OL-MULK.

Instructions.

(No. 50.)

La Commission a chargé MM. Salar Mouzaffer, D. Belaïef, Az. Samih Bey, d'ériger les bornes suivantes :

1. Au col de Navour.
2. Au col de Djelli-gol.
3. A l'endroit où la route de Djelli-Youkari à Cheikh-Sullo-Youkari traverse le partage des eaux.

4. A l'endroit où la route de Harabeï-Djelli-Achaghi à Cheikh-Sullo-Youkari traverse le partage des eaux.

ETELA-OL-MULK.
C. H. D. RYDER.
AZ. SAMIH.
D. BELAIEF.

Rapport.

Conformément aux instructions de la Commission, nous, soussignés, nous sommes rendus sur les lieux et avons fait ériger les bornes suivantes :

No. 190 : au col de Navour à 3 mètres à l'ouest de la route de Kotchkiran-Youkari à Navour ; construction en pierres et ciment : hauteur, 1½ mètre ; base, 1½ mètre.

No. 191 : au col de Djelli-gol près de la route de Djelli-Youkari à Cheikh-Sullo-Achaghi ; construction en pierres et ciment : hauteur, 1½ mètre ; base, 1½ mètre.

No. 192 : sur la route de Djelli-Youkari à Cheikh-Sullo-Youkari, à l'endroit où cette route traverse le partage des eaux ; entassement de pierres ; hauteur, 1½ mètre ; base, 1½ mètre.

No. 193 : sur la route de Kharabeï-Djelli-Achaghi à Cheikh-Sullo-Youkari ; entassement de pierres : hauteur, 1½ mètre ; base, 1½ mètre.

D. BELAIEF.
SALAR MOUZAFFER.
AZ. SAMIH.

Instructions.

(No. 51.)

La Commission a chargé MM. le Colonel Ryder, Abdurrazagh Khan, D. Belaief et Salih Effendi d'ériger les bornes suivantes :

1. A l'endroit où la route de Cheikh-Choudjaa au pâturage de Laguène traverse le partage des eaux.
2. Sur la route de Cheikh-Choudjaa à Kareini.
3. Au col de Kara-bourga.

ETELA-OL-MULK.
C. H. D. RYDER.
D. BELAIEF.
AZ. SAMIH.

Rapport.

Conformément aux instructions de la Commission, nous, soussignés, nous sommes rendus sur les lieux et avons fait ériger les bornes suivantes :

No. 194 : à l'endroit où la route de Cheikh-Choudjaa au pâturage de Laguène traverse le partage des eaux, dans un cimetière. Entassement de pierres : hauteur, 1½ mètre ; diamètre, 1½ mètre.

No. 195 : située sur un rocher sur le partage des eaux à 200 mètres au nord de la route de Chiekh-Choudjaa à Kareini. Construction en pierres et ciment : hauteur, 1½ mètre ; diamètre, 1½ mètre.

No. 196 : au col de Kara-bourga traversé par la route de Nazarowa à Kareini, dans un cimetière connu sous le nom de Cheikh-Eboubekr. Construction en pierres et ciment : hauteur, 2½ mètres ; diamètre, 3 mètres.

C. H. D. RYDER.
D. BELAIEF.
SALAR MOUZAFFER.
M. SALIH.

Enclosure 9 in No. 237.

Procès-verbal of Eightieth Meeting of Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

SEANCE tenue à Kazly-gueul, le 30 septembre, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire persan.

Étaient présents :

Pour la Grande-Bretagne : M. le Colonel Ryder
Pour la Perse : Etela-ol-Mulk.
Pour la Russie : M. Minorsky.
Pour la Turquie : Az. Samih Bey.

MM. les commissaires ont examiné la Carte détaillée d'Égri-Tchay et des environs de Kyzyl-Kaya.

M. le commissaire ottoman prie ses collègues de remettre à la séance prochaine la discussion de cette partie de la frontière, pour avoir le temps de visiter les endroits.

On décide alors de se rendre le lendemain après-midi sur les lieux pour examiner la situation géographique du village de Kyzyl-Kaya et établir la frontière de cet endroit.

Fait à Kazly-gueul, le 30 septembre, 1914.

V. MINORSKY.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
C. H. D. RYDER.
(Pour Az. Samih)
A. HAMID.

Enclosure 10 in No. 237.

Procès-verbal of Eighty-first Meeting of Turco-Persian Frontier Cammission.

CONFORMÉMENT à la résolution prise à la dernière séance, MM. les commissaires se sont rendus le 1er octobre, 1914, à Kyzyl-Kaya.

Ils ont constaté que ce village est situé sur le versant ouest du partage des eaux. On a alors suivi le partage des eaux entre Kyzyl-Kaya et le village de Silow-Magoul. Ce partage a été établi jusqu'au lac de Kourou-gueul et marqué sur la Carte détaillée.

Une sous-commission (No. 54) a été alors chargée de faire ériger des bornes sur le partage des eaux ainsi établi.

MM. les commissaires eux-mêmes, séance tenante, ont fait ériger une borne au sommet de la colline située au nord-est de Silow-Magoul et connue sous le nom de Nanay-Tepessi. Cette borne, construite en pierres et gypse, a 1½ mètre de base et autant de hauteur. Elle a le No. 212.

Ensuite le rapport de la sous-commission No. 30 a été lu et approuvé, et le commissaire de Russie a confirmé qu'il a érigé les deux bornes près de Kélé-Chine.

Fait à Kazly-gueul, le 1er octobre, 1914.

ETELA-OL-MULK.
V. MINORSKY.
C. H. D. RYDER.
(Pour Az. Samih),
A. HAMID.

Rapport.

(No. 30.)

Nous, soussignés, nous sommes rendus au col de Khrena, connu, à ce qu'il paraît, sous le nom de Guirdi-Sour, et avons fait ériger une borne sur un monticule situé au nord de la route qui traverse ce col ; dimensions, 2 mètres de base ; hauteur, 1½ mètre ; construction, pierres et ciment.

Vu le manque de temps et peu d'importance, on a renoncé à construire la borne au nord du village de Khrena. On a tout de même constaté que ce col était connu sous le nom de Berde-Bou.

Fait à Ouchnou, le 2 août, 1914.

SALAR MOUZAFFER.
A. SAMIH.

M. Minorsky s'est chargé de faire ériger les deux bornes : No. 122, hauteur 1½ mètre, diamètre 2½ mètres, à environ 200 mètres et azimut 205°, pris de la stèle de Kélé-Chine, et No. 124, hauteur 1¾ mètre, diamètre 2 mètres, à environ 150 mètres, et azimut 334°, pris de la susdite stèle.

V. MINORSKY.

Instructions.

(No. 30.)

La Commission a chargé MM. Aziz Bey, Salar Mouzaffer et le Capitaine Tskhakaya d'ériger des bornes aux extrémités des chaînes au sud-ouest et au nord-ouest du col de Kélé-Chine, et aux deux cols près de Khrena décrits dans le Procès-verbal No. 68.

V. MINORSKY.
C. H. D. RYDER.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
AZ. SAMIH.

Enclosure 11 in No. 237.

Procès-verbal of Eighty-second Meeting of Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

SÉANCE tenue à Kazly-gueul le 2 octobre, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire ottoman.

Étaient présents le commissaire-adjoint britannique et les autres commissaires.

Les cartes suivantes ont été signées :

Carte identique, feuille No. 13 : trois exemplaires anglais et trois exemplaires russes.
Carte supplémentaire, Nos. 1 à 8 : exemplaires ottomans (deuxième serie).
" " No. 15 : exemplaires ottomans et russes (deuxième série).
" " No. 16 : exemplaires ottomans (deuxième série).
" " No. 17 : exemplaires ottoman et russe (deuxième série).
" " No. 20 : exemplaire ottoman (deuxième série).
" " No. 21 : exemplaire ottoman (deuxième série).
" " No. 21 : exemplaire ottoman (deuxième série).

Le commissaire ottoman fait observer qu'il a été convenu de faire ériger une borne sur le chemin secondaire de Guevri-Chemian à Avadjik, passant au sud de Kyzyl-Ziaret, tandis que la borne a été construite sur une route au nord de cette montagne. Il dit que le passage d'Egri-tchay devant être discuté, cette borne ne doit pas être prise en considération.

M. le commissaire-adjoint britannique approuve l'observation du commissaire ottoman.

Le commissaire russe dit que la question principale est de savoir comment la frontière va traverser la vallée d'Egri-tchay, et que la question de l'approbation de la borne érigée par la sous-commission y est complètement subordonnée ; il invite, donc, ses collègues ottoman et persan à formuler le tracé qu'ils jugent opportun pour la vallée d'Egri-tchay.

M. le commissaire ottoman dit que le nom de Kyzyl-Ziaret étant marqué sur la Carte identique à la chaîne de montagnes située immédiatement à l'ouest de Nado, la frontière doit aller de Kyzyl-Ziaret à Devedji en traversant Egri-tchay à l'endroit où un contrefort de ladite chaîne s'avance vers le nord dans la vallée à l'ouest de Nado. Ce tracé, ajoute-t-il, répond exactement à l'esprit du protocole.

M. le commissaire persan dit que cette partie de la frontière n'étant pas précisée dans le protocole, le *statu quo* de 1848 doit être prise en considération. D'après mes renseignements, dit-il, ce *statu quo* est la grande route de Van à Bayazid nouvellement rendu carrossable.

On tâche de rapprocher les deux tracés.

M. le commissaire ottoman demande une ligne qu'il trace sur la Carte détaillée, passant par un grand rocher situé au sommet d'un pic, au sud-est du village de d'Egri-tchay (Bekir Kendi) à un autre grand rocher, sur le partage des eaux au nord-est dudit village.

M. le commissaire persan insiste sur un tracé laissant à la Perse Egri-tchay (Bekir Kendi), en disant que la construction de ce village n'est que de sept à huit mois.

MM. les commissaires médiateurs considèrent comme preuve que la construction du village turc à Egri-tchay est d'une date tout à fait récente. Pourtant, pour ne pas introduire trop de changements à la frontière, ils recommandent d'une part d'accepter le tracé du commissaire ottoman pour la vallée d'Egri-tchay, main en revanche proposent que la frontière laisse en Perse le lac de Kourou-gueul, formant un petit bassin indépendant.

Ils ajoutent que ce procédé leur paraît équitable et si même la question est remise à leur arbitrage la décision ne pourrait guère être autre que la proposition qu'ils viennent de faire.

M. le commissaire persan déclare que, dans ces conditions, il accepte le compromis.

Le tracé ainsi arrêté fut porté sur la Carte détaillée et une sous-commission fut chargée de l'appliquer sur les lieux.

Fait à Kazli-gueul, le 2 octobre, 1914.

(Pour Az. Samih),
A. HAMID.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
C. H. D. RYDER.
V. MINORSKY.

Enclosure 12 in No. 237.

Procès-verbal of Eighty-third Meeting of Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

SÉANCE tenue à Bazyrgan, le 14 octobre, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire britannique.

Étaient présents le commissaire-adjoint ottoman et les autres commissaires.

Les Procès-verbaux Nos. 79, 80, 81 et 82 ont été lus, approuvés et signés. Les rapports des sous-commissions Nos. 52, 53 et 54 ont été lus et se trouvent annexés au présent procès-verbal. MM. les commissaires ont également signé les cartes suivantes :

Carte identique, feuille No. 13 : deux exemplaires persans.

Carte identique, feuille No. 14 : trois exemplaires britanniques ; deux exemplaires persans et deux exemplaires russes.

Carte supplémentaire Nos. 9 à 23 avec les annexes détaillées : exemplaires persans (2e série).

Carte supplémentaire Nos. 9 à 20 avec annexes détaillées : exemplaires ottomans (2e série).

Carte supplémentaire No. 16 : exemplaire russe (2e serie).
" " 16 A " "
" " 18 " "
" " 19 A " "
" " 20 " "
" " 21 " "
" " 23 " "
" " 24 : exemplaires russe et anglais (1re série).
" " 24 A : deux exemplaires russes.

Le tableau descriptif de la frontière et des bornes des Nos. 181 à 220 a été lu, approuvé et signé.

On décide de détacher tous les tableaux des procès-verbaux auxquels ils étaient annexés et d'en faire un cahier à part. Les corrections définitives proposées par M. le

commissaire russe pour l'orthographe des noms de la première description ont été approuvées. Ces corrections seront portées à la main sur cette description.

On convient de corriger, dans le Procès-verbal No. 75, le No. 169 et écrire 170.

M. le commissaire-adjoint ottoman déclare que son commissaire a adressé à MM. les commissaires une lettre datée du 13 octobre, 1914, pour leur communiquer qu'il a reçu ordres de cesser la délimitation.

MM. les autres commissaires, prenant acte de la déclaration ottomane, ajoutent qu'ils n'ont pas reçu pareils ordres et qu'ils espèrent que les travaux pourront être repris.

M. le commissaire persan, se référant à la discussion de la borne No. 200 durant la séance précédente, fait remarquer que cette borne doit être approuvée par le fait même que le tracé arrêté passe par cette borne.

M. le commissaire britannique dit que la frontière arrêtée comprenant en territoire ottoman le village de Kyzyl-Kaya, les informations prises le porte à croire que la route de Van à Bayazid reste entièrement en Turquie. Il ajoute que le passage du protocole relatif à cette route reste par là caduc.

Les commissaires persan et russe se rangent de son opinion.

M. le commissaire-adjoint ottoman fait observer que cette route n'est pas celle qui fait objet du protocole. L'ancienne grande route passe par Kazli-gol et c'est de celle-ci que le Gouvernment ottoman aura droit d'usage.

MM. les commissaires britannique et russe donnent lecture des deux déclarations ci-annexées.

M. le commissaire-adjoint ottoman déclare que l'objet de ces déclarations sont en dehors des attributions de la Commission. Elles ne peuvent avoir de valeur officielle, car elles ne représentent que leurs points de vue personnels.

Fait à Bazyrgan, le 14 octobre, 1914.

A. T. WILSON, *Captain.*
ETELA-OL-MULK.
V. MINORSKY.
A. HAMID.

Rapport.

Nous, soussignés, nous sommes rendus sur les lieux et avons fait ériger la borne suivante :

No. 200 : sur une élévation située à environ 6 mètres au nord du col traversé par la route allant de Guevri-Chamian à Avadjik et à Kazli-gol. Entassement de pierres. Dimensions : hauteur, 1½ mètre ; diamètre à la base, 1½ mètre.

H. BASRI.
Capitaine TSKHAKAYA.
SALAR MOUZAFFER.

Kazli-gol, le 2 octobre, 1914.

Instructions.

(No. 52.)

La Commission a chargé MM. Salar Mouzaffer, Bortnikof, H. Basri Bey, d'ériger une borne à l'endroit où la route de Guevri-Chamian à Avadjik traverse le partage des eaux.

C. H. D. R.
AZ. S.
E. M.
D. B.

Rapport.

(No. 53.)

Nous, soussignés, nous nommes rendus sur les lieux et avons fait ériger les bornes suivantes :

No. 201 : Grand rocher blanc au sommet d'un pic connu, à ce qu'il paraît, sous le nom de Kala-Agh-dach et situé au sud-est du village d'Eghri-Tchay (Bekir Kendi).

No. 202 : A environ 60 mètres au nord de la rivière d'Eghri-Tchay, presque sur la ligne droite reliant les bornes Nos. 201 et 203. Construction en pierres et ciment. Dimensions : hauteur, 2 mètres ; diamètre à la base, 1½ mètre.

No. 203 : Grand rocher blanc sur la pente du partage des eaux au nord de la vallée Eghri-Tchay et au nord-ouest du village Eghri-Tchay (Bekir Kendi), connu, à ce qu'il paraît, sous le nom de Top-Agh-dach.

No. 204 : Située à quelques mètres à l'ouest de la route allant de Bekir Kendi à Silow-Magoul, sur le partage des eaux, au nord d'Eghri-Tchay. Entassement de pierres. Dimensions : hauteur, 2 mètres ; diamètre à la base, 2½ mètres.

H. BASRI.
C. H. D. RYDER.
V. MINORSKY.
SALAR MOUZAFFER.

Kilessé-Kendi, le 4 octobre, 1914.

Instructions.

La Commission à chargé MM. le Colonel Ryder, Salar Mouzaffer, Minorsky, Basri Bey, d'appliquer sur les lieux la frontière tracée sur la Carte détaillée et faire ériger les bornes nécessaires.

AZ. SAMIH BEY.
C. H. D. RYDER.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
V. MINORSKY.

Kazly-gueul, le 2 octobre, 1914.

Rapport.

(No. 54.)

Conformément aux instructions de la Commission, nous, soussignés, nous sommes rendus sur les lieux et avons appliqué la partie de la frontière tracée sur la Carte détaillée, avec le concours de M. le topographe Hamid Gul.

Nous avons fait ériger à cet effet les bornes suivantes :

No. 205 : Au pied du mont Kara-Guney, sur un petit contrefort situé à l'ouest du village de Silow-Magoul. Construction en pierres et ciment. Dimensions : hauteur, 2 mètres ; diamètre à la base, 1½ mètre.

No. 206 : Sur le même contrefort à une trentaine de mètres à l'est du ruisseau qui coule à Kyzyl-Kaya. Construction en pierres et ciment. Dimensions : hauteur, 1½ mètre ; diamètre à la base, 1½ mètre. Azimut pris de la borne précédente, 0°.

No. 207 : Presque au milieu de la ligne droite reliant les deux bornes Nos. 206 et 208 ; à quelque distance au nord du chemin allant de Kyzyl-Kaya à Silow-Magoul. Dimensions : hauteur, 1½ mètre ; diamètre à la base, 1½ mètre. Azimut pris de la borne précédente, 30° ; sa distance de la borne No. 208 dans la direction du sud-ouest est de 1,000 pieds.

No. 208 : Située sur un rocher volcanique, à l'est de Kyzyl-Kaya. Construction en pierres et ciment. Dimensions : hauteur, 2 mètres ; diamètre à la base, 1½ mètre. Azimut pris de la borne précédente, 30°.

No. 209 : Située sur un grand rocher volcanique, au sud-est de Kyzyl-Kaya. Entassement de rochers. Dimensions : hauteur, 3 mètres ; diamètre à la base, 2 mètres. Azimut pris de la borne précédente, 57°.

No. 210 : Située sur un rocher volcanique. Entassement de pierres. Dimensions : hauteur, 2 mètres ; diamètre à la base, 2 mètres. Azimut pris de la borne précédente, 90°.

No. 211 : Située sur un grand rocher volcanique à l'ouest de Nanay-Tepessi. Entassement de pierres. Dimensions : hauteur, 1½ mètre ; diamètre à la base, 1½ mètre. Azimut pris de la borne précédente, 136°.

No. 212. Borne construite au sommet de Nanay Tepessi, par la Commission elle-même.

No. 213. Sur le partage des eaux, au sud-ouest du lac de Kourougueul, à une cinquantaine de mètres au nord du chemin Kyzyl-Kaya–Teperiz. Entassement de pierres. Dimensions : hauteur, 1½ mètre ; diamètre à la base, 1½ mètre.

No. 214 : Sur le partage des eaux à l'ouest de Kourou-gueul. Entassement de pierres. Dimensions : hauteur, 2½ mètres ; diamètre à la base, 2 mètres.

No. 215 : Sur le partage des eaux, au nord-ouest de Kourou-gueul. Entassement de pierres. Dimensions : hauteur, 2 mètres ; diamètre à la base, 2 mètres.

No. 216. Sur le partage des eaux, au nord-ouest de Kourou-gueul, près de la route allant de Djemal-Kendi à Teperiz. Entassement de pierres. Dimensions : hauteur, 1½ mètre. Diamètre à la base, 1½ mètre.

No. 217 : Sur le partage des eaux, au nord de Kourou-gueul, sur un rocher [illegible] r. Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 1½ mètre. Diamètre à la base, 1½ mètre.

No. 218 : Au sud-est de Bouz-dagh et à environ 50 mètres à l'ouest de la route Kyzyl-Kaya-Bayezid. Entassement de pierres. Dimensions : hauteur, 2 mètres ; diamètre à la base, 2 mètres.

No. 219 : A l'est de Bouz-dagh, sur un rocher volcanique à l'ouest de la même route. Entassement de pierres. Dimensions : hauteur, 2 mètres ; diamètres à la base, 2 mètres.

No. 220 : Au col de Khazine-Guedouk à environ 4 mètres à l'ouest de la route Makou-Bayezid. Entassement de pierres. Dimensions : hauteur, 3 mètres ; diamètre à la base, 2 mètres.

H. BASRY.
SALAR MOUZAFFER.

Kilissé-Kendi, le 4 octobre, 1914.

Instructions.

(No. 54.)

La Commission a chargé MM. Salar Mouzaffer, Basri Bey, de construire des bornes aux endroits choisis au sein de la séance et marqués sur la Carte détaillée.

1. Borne sur le partage des eaux ouest du lac de Kourou-gueul.
2. Sur le col de Khaziné.

C. H. D. R.
E. M.
V. MINORSKY.
A. SAMIH.

Kazli-gol, le 2 octobre, 1914.

Se rendant compte de l'importance qu'il y aurait à enregistrer des renseignements précis concernant la frontière turco-persane entre les parallèles 34 et 45, telle que celle-ci était reconnue de fait antérieurement à la délimitation de la frontière actuelle et ayant en vue de définir avec plus de précision "les territoires à l'est de Baghtche" auxquels mention a été faite dans leur déclaration en date du 13 (26) mai, 1914.

Les représentants britannique et russe croient utile d'exposer le résultat de leurs investigations personnelles à ce sujet.

Après avoir quitté le Sirvan, la susdite frontière du *statu quo* avant la délimitation se dirige vers le sud pour atteindre le sommet du mont Beyzel ; elle en suit la crête dans la direction de l'ouest et descend ensuite au Zimkan à la jonction de celui-ci avec le Poucht-i-Guerraw. (Jusqu'à ce point la ligne indiquée ne diffère aucunement de la frontière établie par la Commission de Délimitation.)

Ensuite, la ligne remonte le ruisseau de Poucht-i-Guerraw jusqu'au confluent du ruisseau d'Arkhawandoul et le suit pour monter au col de Kargamil. De là, elle suit le Zimna-Kouh (Zamin) et rejoint le Sirvan au défilé de Derbend-i-Khan. Le Sirvan constitue ensuite la frontière jusqu'au premier poste ottoman ("birinji kulle"), qui est situé à environ 4 milles en aval de la jonction de la rivière de Kourétou avec le Sirvan ; à partir de là elle suit la ligne des postes dans la direction du sud-sud-est jusqu'au poste connu sous le nom de "kulle yahudi," qui est près de Kani-Bez.

La ligne suit en aval la rivière d'Elvend jusqu'au confluent de ruisseau de Palkana, où elle la quitte pour remonter le contrefort nord de Djebel Louti Baghtche, qui constitue le partage des eaux à l'ouest du Palkana. Arrivée au sommet, elle suit le contrefort sud du Djebel Louti Baghtche, qui forme le partage des eaux à l'ouest de l'Ab-i-Naft (Naft-Deressi) et continue le long dudit partage des eaux

jusqu'à ce qu'elle tombe dans l'Ab-i-Naft au point où le chemin de Mendeli à Kasr-i-Chirine le traverse (endroit marqué par la borne No. XLVI de la frontière actuelle).

La ligne ci-haut décrite se trouve indiquée par une ligne rouge coupée sur les Cartes supplémentaires Nos. 2, 10 et 11 ci-annexées.

V. MINORSKY.
A. T. WILSON, *Captain.*

Le 1er (14) *octobre*, 1914.

Vu la déclaration du commissaire Impérial ottoman (voir le Procès-verbal No. 77), la délimitation du Kotour a dû être ajournée à un autre temps.

Nous croyons pourtant nécessaire d'exposer nos vues à ce sujet, nous basant sur nos enquêtes sur les lieux et sur les nouveaux matériaux topographiques résumés sur les Cartes supplémentaires Nos. 21, 22A. :

1. Nous pensons que le protocole final du 4 (17) novembre, 1913, n'a fait que confirmer le protocole du 15 juillet, 1880, dit de Sary-Kamiche et la spécification de certains villages qui resteront à la Turquie et à la Perse respectivement, n'est pas une restriction du protocole de Sary-Kamiche, mais sert simplement à éclaircir sa teneur, les villages susmentionnées correspondant précisément à la carte annexée au protocole de 1880.

2. Le protocole de Sary-Kamiche dit clairement qu'à partir des montagnes à l'ouest de Chiwe-reche (Schiwa-resch) la frontière rejoint les monts de Mir-Omar "par la ligne de partage des eaux de Kotour et de l'Alback-tchai." Il est donc évident que tout le bassin de Tchelik-tchai (affluent droit du Kotour-tchai)—comme il se trouve corrigé sur les nouvelles cartes—y compris le village de Dawdava qui n'existait évidemment pas du temps de la compilation de la Carte identique, mais qui se trouve situé dans le bassin de Tchelik-tchai, entre les villages persans Panamerik et Tchelik-Achagha devra appartenir à la Perse.

Donc la frontière à partir de Mir-Omar suivra les crêtes de Koutch, Keli-Divana, Seri-Baderek, Kara-Hissar et Keni-Saryk, laissant du côté turc toutes les eaux de l'Albak.

3. Au nord de Kani-Saryk la frontière en conformité du protocole de Sary-Kamiche doit être tracée comme indiquée par la ligne rouge sur le croquis ci-annexé pris de la Carte supplémentaire No. 22 A.

Toutefois, les nouvelles données cartographiques nous portent à croire qu'il serait utile d'établir la frontière avec une rectification comme marquée en vert sur le croquis annexé.

Les arguments en faveur d'un tel échange sont les suivants:

(*a.*) La route passant par le défilé de Kotour en amont de Razi va en zigzag, et pour la ligne "au nord" de ladite route on ne pourrait pas trouver d'appui géographique.

(*b.*) Le tracé de 1880 a été proposé en toute évidence sur la supposition que le village de Haratil se trouve au sud de Razi (voir Carte identique), tandis qu'il se trouve à l'ouest de Razi, et les champs dans la vallée de Kotour peuvent seulement appartenir à Haratil.

(*c.*) Les crêtes à l'ouest du ravin précisément correspondant au Schiwe-resch du protocole de Sary-Kamiche sont plutôt de larges plateaux difficiles à délimiter, et le profond ravin lui-même forme une frontière beaucoup meilleure au point de vue technique. Comme ce ravin en haut à trois branches la frontière suivra celle du milieu ainsi qu'il est montré sur le croquis.

(*d.*) Tout le bassin du "vallon d'Aman-yourt" et les hauteurs à l'ouest du ravin susmentionné restent ainsi à la Turquie, tandis que la Perse garde la partie de la route passant entre deux tronçons de son territoire (Beledjik et Haratil) et les terrains cultivables de Haratil ne restent pas désunis.

C. H. D. RYDER.
V. MINORSKY.

Le 29 *septembre*, 1914.

Enclosure 13 in No. 237.

Procès-verbal of Eighty-fourth Meeting of Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

SÉANCE tenue à Bazyrgan, le 20 octobre, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire persan.

Étaient présents le commissaire-adjoint ottoman et les autres commissaires.

Le procès-verbal de la dernière séance a été lu, approuvé et signé. Ont été également signées:

La Carte supplémentaire No. 21: deux exemplaires ottomans.
" " No. 22: deux " "
" " No. 23: deux " "
La Carte détaillée No. 16 C: exemplaire russe (2e serie).

Les observations du commissaire-adjoint ottoman concernant la délimitation du Kotour dans le dernier procès-verbal a soulevé une discussion.

Le commissaire russe fait des objections à la phrase que la délimitation de ce district se trouve "en dehors des attributions de la Commission," le protocole final mentionnant le tracé précis de la frontière de Kotour. Les trois commissaires ont déjà protesté contre le délai dans la délimitation de ce district résultant du refus du Gouvernement ottoman contraire à l'article 13 du Règlement intérieur. Les instructions reçues par le commissaire de Russie de son Ambassadeur à Constantinople le portent à croire qu'il a été convenu de continuer la délimitation, avec la seule condition que les villages à l'ouest de Kotour ne seront pas évacués temporairement par les postes turcs. Aucune mention n'a été faite de ce que Kotour doit rester non délimité.

M. le commissaire britannique croit également que les déclarations des commissaires médiateurs ne sont pas en dehors des attributions des commissaires médiateurs.

M. le commissaire-adjoint ottoman déclare que son commissaire a été remplacé par le Colonel d'État-Major Fouad Zia Bey, commissaire ottoman à la frontière turco-russe. Il ajoute qu'en attendant il a les pouvoirs de continuer la délimitation.

Le président donne lecture du protocole relatif au tronçon de la frontière entre Khazine-Guedouk et Yarym-Kaya. On examine la Carte supplémentaire de cette partie. On tombe d'accord pour le tracé suivant: De Khazine-Guedouk, la frontière suit toujours le partage des eaux entre Bayazid et Avadjik passant par les crêtes de Kalender et d'Ak-Dagh, puis laissant du côté ottoman une partie des champs appartenant aux villages persans de Pir-Ahmed et de Salman-Abad et actuellement cultivés et possédés par leurs habitants, fait un angle vers le nord, sépare les champs du village persan Nifto de ceux du village ottoman Deuchurma et passe par les crêtes de Kanly-Baba et Zindo-Dachy, laissant en Perse le petit village de Djowzer, appartenant au sujet ottoman Haidar Effendi. De Zindo-Dachy la frontière suit toujours le partage des eaux et laisse en Perse les ruines de Kasorlou et de Chekh-Asker, puis arrivant aux rochers de Kodja-Dagh, elle traverse le col situé entre Tawla (turc) et Maro-Keumou (persan) et suit le partage des eaux entre les villages ottomans: Kara-Koymaz, Nazik et Gurdji-boulak, et les villages persans: Maro-Keumou, Bach-Kendi, Kedjot et Bazyrgan, jusqu'à la colline de Guir-beran, qui se trouve à l'ouest de Tchoukour-reche.

M. le commissaire-adjoint ottoman déclare que Djowzer appartenant à un sujet ottoman, le droit de celui-ci doit être reconnu par le Gouvernement persan.

M. le commissaire persan déclare à son tour que certains champs de Pir-Ahmed et de Salmanabad, sont restés du côté ottoman. Il demande la même reconnaissance par le Gouvernement ottoman.

MM. les commissaires persan et ottoman reconnaissent mutuellement ces droits pour les propriétaires des deux pays.

Le commissaire persan demande l'évacuation de Djowser, actuellement occupé par un détachement ottoman.

M. le commissaire-adjoint ottoman déclare qu'à la suite de la mobilisation, il n'a pas personnellement les pouvoirs pour faire évacuer les endroits qui reviennent à la Perse à la suite de la délimitation.

Il promet de faire les démarches pour les faire évacuer.

MM. les commissaires prennent acte de cette promesse.

A la suite des réserves du commissaire-adjoint ottoman, on décide de signer la Carte détaillée de Kotour avec la mention: "Approuvée sans tracé de la frontière."

Une sous-commission a été chargée de faire ériger des bornes aux endroits désignés dans les instructions qui leur ont été remises.

On décide de se rendre demain à 10 heures à Guir-Beran pour examiner et établir cette partie de la frontière.

Fait à Bazyrgan, le 20 octobre, 1914.

ETELA-OL-MULK.
A. T. WILSON, *Captain.*
V. MINORSKY.
A. HAMID.

Enclosure 14 in No. 237.

Procès-verbal of Eighty-fifth Meeting of Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

CONFORMÉMENT à la résolution prise à la dernière séance, MM. les commissaires se sont rendus le 21 octobre au village de Guir-Beran. Le procès-verbal de la dernière séance a été lu et approuvé.

Les cartes suivantes ont été signées :

Carte identique No. 2 : deux exemplaires ottomans.
Kotour XXII A : exemplaire ottoman.

Ils ont examiné la Carte détaillée des environs du village de Guir-Beran et étudié le terrain. Après mûres discussions les commissaires de Perse et de Turquie sont tombés d'accord pour la ligne suivante : De la crête de la colline de Guir-Beran, marquée par la borne No. 226, la frontière descend en ligne directe à la borne No. 227, érigée du côté sud-est d'un champ situé entre les ruines de Cheitanabad (Mato-Kendi) et le village de Guir-Beran ; puis laissant du côté turc le susdit champ et du côté persan les ruines de Cheitanabad, la frontière passe par la borne No. 228, qui marque l'extrémité nord-est dudit champ, et se dirige en ligne directe et sur un azimut de 50° au centre d'un groupe de rochers volcaniques lequel a été reconnu comme borne No. 229 ; de là, tournant vers le nord-nord-est sur l'azimut de 10° la frontière suit une bande de rochers jusqu'à son extrémité nord marqué par la borne No. 230. Ensuite la frontière—qui traverse ici un vallon marécageux—va en ligne directe et sur un azimut de 9° à la borne No. 231, située à environ 40 mètres au nord-est d'un groupe de rochers noirs. De là, en ligne directe, elle se dirige sur le rocher situé au sud-est de Boulak-bachi et mi-chemin coupe la rivière de Sary-Sou près de son embouchure au marais de Yarym-Kaya.

Fait à Guir-Beran, le 21 octobre, 1914.

ETELA-OL-MULK.
A. T. WILSON, *Captain.*
V. MINORSKY.
A. HAMID.

Rapport.

(No. 55.)

Conformément aux instructions ci-annexées, nous, les soussignés, nous sommes rendus sur les lieux et avons fait ériger les bornes suivantes :

No. 221 : Sur le sommet d'Ak-Dagh. Entassement de pierres : hauteur, 1½ mètre ; diamètre, 1 mètre.

No. 222 : Sur le sommet de la colline au nord-ouest du village de Nifto. Entassement de pierres : hauteur, 1½ mètre ; diamètre, 1½ mètre.

No. 223 : Sur le col à l'est de Ziaret Sary Kaya, où la route de Bazyrgan à Gurdji-boulak traverse le partage des eaux. Construction de pierres et de ciment : hauteur, 2 mètres ; diamètre, 2 mètres.

No. 224 : Sur le col de Kelaman, où la route est de Bazyrgan à Gurdji-boulak traverse le partage des eaux. Construction de pierres et de ciment : hauteur, 2 mètres ; diamètre, 2 mètres.

No. 225 : Sur un petit monticule sur le susdit partage des eaux. Construction de pierres et de ciment : hauteur, 1½ mètre ; diamètre, 1½ mètre.

No. 226 : Sur le sommet de Guir-Beran à l ouest ce Tchoukhour-reche. Entassement de pierres : hauteur, 2½ mètres ; diamètre, 4 mètres.

C. H. D. RYDER.
V. MINORSKY.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
H. BASRY.

Le 20 octobre, 1914.

Instructions.

La Commission a chargé MM. le Colonel Ryder, Etela-ol-Mulk, Minorsky, Basri Bey, d'ériger les bornes suivantes :

No. 221 : au sommet d'Ak-Dagh.
No. 222 : au sommet de la colline au nord-ouest de Nifto.
No. 223 : au col où passe la route de Bazyrgan à Gurdji-Boulak.
No. 224 : au col où passe la route est entre les deux villages susdites.
No. 225 : au petit sommet entre bornes Nos. 224 et 226.
No. 226 : au sommet de mont Guir-Beran.

A. T. WILSON, *Captain.*
V. MINORSKY.
A. HAMID.
ETELA-OL-MULK.

Le 20 octobre, 1914.

Enclosure 15 in No. 237.

Procès-verbal of Eighty-sixth Meeting of Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

SÉANCE tenue à Boulak-Bachi, le 23 octobre, 1914, sur la présidence de M. le commissaire ottoman.

Étaient présents M. le commissaire-adjoint ottoman et les autres commissaires.

Le procès-verbal de la dernière séance a été lu, approuvé et signé ; celui de l'avant-dernière séance a été signé. Ont été également signées :

La Carte supplémentaire No. 11 : deuxième exemplaire ottoman.
" " No. 24 : " "

M. le commissaire-adjoint ottoman déclare qu'il a reçu ordre de laisser à plus tard à cause de la mobilisation l'évacuation de Boulak-Bachi.

Après longues discussions, on tombe d'accord pour la ligne suivante :

Quittant l'embouchure de Sary-Sou la ligne se dirige sur un azimut de 350° directement à un amas de rochers (borne No. 232) situé à 500 mètres environ au sud-est du poste de Boulak-Bachi. De là, la frontière va en ligne droite sur un azimut de 287° à la borne No. 233 au pied de la lave à l'endroit correspondant à 49° 22′ de longitude et 30° 28′ de latitude.

De là, elle se dirige en ligne droite vers le nord jusqu'au Karni Yarykh Dagh (2,296 mètres). De là, elle suit le partage des eaux, laissant à la Perse le système des eaux et les localités de Silow-Kosa et Saryntch, et à la Turquie la localité et le système des eaux d'Inek. Elle arrive ainsi au mont Betchare (3,076 mètres) puis, continue vers le nord-nord-ouest en suivant toujours le même partage des eaux jusqu'à un endroit situé sur le contrefort à un azimut de 246° et distante de 1,900 mètres de la borne No. 37 de la frontière turco-russe, qu'elle atteint en ligne directe.

M. le commissaire persan, en attendant les instructions de son Gouvernement à propos de Boulak-Bachi, prie son collègue ottoman de donner des ordres nécessaires pour que les habitants de Yarym Kaya viennent faire paître leurs troupeaux dans la localité de Boulak-Bachi.

M. le commissaire-adjoint ottoman promet de faire les démarches nécessaires.

M. le commissaire-adjoint ottoman demande des garanties pour la coupe de roseaux aux marécages de Yarym Kaya.

Après discussion, on convient que les objets ottomans auront droit de couper les roseaux en toute saison comme par le passé dans les marais situés entre Guir-Beran et Boulak-Bachi.

Fait à Boulak-Bachi, le 23 octobre, 1914.

A. HAMID.
A. T. WILSON, *Captain.*
ETELA-OL-MULK.
V. MINORSKY.

Enclosure 16 in No. 237.

Procès-verbal of Eighty-seventh Meeting of Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

SÉANCE tenue à Bazyrgan, le 26 octobre, 1914, sous la présidence de M. le commissaire britannique.

Étaient présents : M. le commissaire-adjoint ottoman et les autres commissaires.

Le procès-verbal de la dernière séance a été lu, approuvé et signé.

Ont été également signées :

Carte identique, feuille No. 14 : dix exemplaires.
Carte supplémentaire No. 25 : huit exemplaires.
" " No. 25 A : idem.
" " No. 22 : copie russe.
" " No. 22 A : exemplaire anglais, et 2e et 3e exemplaires russe et persan.
" " No. 24 : huit exemplaires.

La description de la frontière depuis la borne No. 220 jusqu'à la fin de la frontière a été lue, approuvée et signée. Elle se trouve attachée au présent protocole avec le reste de la description (voir le procès-verbal de la 83e séance).

Le tableau des frais de bornage dressé conformément à l'article 8 du règlement a été lu, approuvé et signé, et se trouve annexé au présent procès-verbal.

M. le commissaire persan fait ensuite la déclaration suivante :

"Quand le commissaire ottoman, s'appuyant sur l'article 13 du protocole de Constantinople, a demandé l'ajournement de la délimitation de Kotour, je lui ai fait observer que son point d'appui n'était pas conforme à l'esprit du protocole, vu qu'il est noté dans ce document 'à la majorité des voix,' tandis que à cette occasion mes autres collègues ne se ralliaient pas à cette proposition. Cependant, en attendant les instructions de nos Gouvernements, nous nous sommes vus obligés de continuer le travail au nord de Kotour.

"Je viens de recevoir de mon Gouvernement un ordre me prescrivant de ne pas quitter la frontière avant la termination de la délimitation de Kotour, et j'aime à croire que mon collègue ottoman se mettra d'accord avec moi pour recommencer les travaux de Kotour, vu les considérations suivantes :

"Je rappelle à la mémoire de mes collègues le mot 'temporairement' mentionné dans le protocole (article 13 du règlement) pour les adjournements des travaux d'une partie de la frontière. Cette expression prouve que les adjournements ne sont permis que pour la durée de la Commission. Maintenant que les travaux de la Commission prennent leur fin, il s'impose de recommencer les travaux temporairement ajournés à Kotour.

"En outre, vu l'article 6 du protocole final, les parties intéressées ont le droit d'occuper tous les endroits qui leur reviennent immédiatement après la délimitation. Or, je crois que la mobilisation ottomane ne fait aucun empêchement à l'évacuation des terrains adjugés à la Perse.

"Pas un seul soldat n'a été pris de Djowzer, et Boulak-bachi n'est qu'un poste consistant de deux maisons et n'ayant pas d'autres habitants.

"Dans ce cas, j'invite de nouveau mon collègue ottoman de faire évacuer ces deux localités."

M. le commissaire-adjoint ottoman dit que la question de l'évacuation est dehors de sa compétence à cause de la mobilisation ; il a pourtant écrit à son Gouvernement

sollicitant évacuation de Djowzer ; quant à Boulak Bachi, il lui a été communiqué officiellement que cet endroit restera occupé jusqu'à la fin de la mobilisation.

Concernant Kotour, il ne sait pas le point de vue de son Gouvernement.

Le commissaire de Russie déclare avoir reçu un télégramme de son Ambassadeur à Constantinople disant que son Altesse le Grand Vizir a bien voulu accéder à la proposition de délimiter le Kotour sur la nouvelle carte et a promis de donner les instructions nécessaires à cet effet.

M. le commissaire britannique propose au commissaire ottoman de donner une déclaration dans le sens que s'il recevait les ordres nécessaires il reconnaîtrait comme la frontière la ligne marquée sur la carte annexée à la déclaration des représentants britannique et russe en date du 1er (14) octobre.

Le commissaire ottoman dit qu'il n'a pas reçu permission même pour discuter la question de Kotour.

Le président propose de considérer la séance d'aujourd'hui comme la séance finale et d'attacher à son procès-verbal la description de toute la frontière excepté le Kotour, mais de tenir à Bazyrgan le 28 octobre une séance supplémentaire pour régler la question de Kotour. Il engage le commissaire ottoman de télégraphier de suite à son Gouvernement pour avoir une réponse avant le 28 octobre.

Le commissaire ottoman accepte la proposition, mais dit qu'il lui serait difficile d'attendre davantage.

La séance prochaine a été fixée à Bazyrgan, le 28 octobre, à 2 heures.

A la fin, la Commission exprime ses remerciements à M. Abdul Alim, l'infatigable sous-secrétaire de la Commission pour les excellents services qu'il a rendus.

Fait à Bazyrgan, le 28 octobre, 1914.

A. T. WILSON, *Captain.*
ETELA-OL-MULK.
V. MINORSKY.
A. HAMID.

Liste des Frais de Bornage versés par la Commission.

I.—Le 1er février au 12 mai (par l'intermédiaire du commissaire britannique).

	Rs.	a.	p.	Krans.
Billets de voyage par "Malamir" sur le Karoun pour ouvriers arabes ..	227	13	6	
Prix de ciment obtenu à Mohammerah	136	12	1	
Appointements de maçons et leurs frais de voyage	436	14	6	
Frais de transport par terre et par mer pour ciment et "gatch" ..	448	14	7	
Prix d'outils fournis aux maçons	9	11	8	
Prix de sacs vidés pour le ciment obtenus à Mendéli..	10	13	0	
	1,270	15	3	
A 370 pour cent			=	4,702·55

La somme de 4,702·55 krans a été dûment reçue des commissaires ottoman et persan par moitiés.

A. T. WILSON, *Captain,*
Commissaire britannique.

II.—Le 13 mai au 23 juillet (par l'intermédiaire du commissaire persan).

	Krans.
Trente-deux sacs : Kasre-Chirine	85·20
Plâtre 450 batmans : Kasre-Chirine	22·50
Transport de plâtre de four au camp : Kasre-Chirine	2·50
Ouvriers pour constructions de six bornes	52·50
Ouvriers de borne : Mamicham	8·00
" " Ser-Kalé..	10·00
" " "	4·00
" " "	3·00
Loyer de dix mulets pendant huit jours	450·00
Appointements de huit jours du maçon	40·00
Ouvriers de borne : Bord du Sirvan Chaine Kalaga	4·00
" " Tawile	14·00
Pierres de plâtre vingt-deux charges : Alabje	66·00
Bois pour le four : Alabje	34·50

	Krans.
Frais de cuisson : Alabje	42·00
Passoire pour plâtre	6·50
Ficelles pour sacs : Alabje	1·00
Bêche, pioche : Alabje	12·00
Gardiens du nuit : Alabje	13·50
Pourboire aux soldats : Khané-Guermélé, Assial-Berzé	18·50
Ouvriers de borne : Biaré-Déré-tekyé	12·00
Ouvriers et maçon pour borne : Banave-Souta	32·00
Ouvriers de borne : Massoud	6·00
Chaux 800 kilog. : Bané	240·00
Transport et pesage : Bané	6·50
Guide aller-retour à Bané : Bané	10·00
Sacs : Bané	12·50
Frais de route du maçon à Bané et retour	7·00
Appointements du maçon pour le mois de jouza	150·00
Loyer de dix mulets pendant les 31 jouza	1,550·00
Ouvriers de borne : sur le col entre Chine Guévézan et Nanor	18·00
" " Tchamparaw	8·00
" " sur le col de Zinwi-Ahmed Khan	16·00
Ouvriers deuxième jour : Tépé-Salos	11·00
Ouvriers de deux bornes : Col de Kani-Reche	16·00
Ficelle pour sacs : Serdacht	4·00
Transport de plâtre : Serdacht	2·00
Ouvriers de borne : Ravin de Narzeng	4·00
" " Pourde-Berdan	2·00
" " Col Zervinka	12·00
Plâtre, 5 kharvars et 50 batmans : de Soujboulak	250·00
Transport du plâtre : de Soujboulak à Vezné	126·00
Pelles, pioches, &c. : Serdacht	54·65
Loyer de dix mulets trente-deux jours de Saratan	1,600·00
Appointement d'Ali Akber, maçon	150·00
Appointement de sept jours de Chafih, maçon avec un aide	105·00
A l'ouvrier en pierre renvoyé	40·00
Frais de bornage d'après liste fournie par la Commission ottomane	245·00
	5,579·35

III.—Le 24 juillet au 23 septembre (par l'intermédiaire du commissaire persan).

	Krans.
Ouvriers de bornage : Chinie	40·00
" " Vezné	19·00
" " Barzine	6·00
" " Zerde-Guel	6·00
" " Merguever	15·00
" " Mirava	10·00
" " Bardouk	24·00
" " Dostan	24·00
" " Kachkoul-Khanik	20·00
" " "	32·00
Guides aux cols : Ourmiah	10·00
Prix du plâtre : Ourmiah	26·00
Prix du plâtre, 5 kharvars : Khoi	65·00
Transport à Kotour : Khoi	270·00
Traitement d'Ali-Akbar, maçon, assad	150·00
" Chafi, maçon, pour assad	450·00
Loyer de dix mulets pour le mois assad	1,550·00
Traitement Oustad Chafi pour sombla	450·00
Loyer de dix mulets pour le mois sombla	1,550·00
Dépenses effectuées par la Commission ottomane d'après liste (998 piastres à 50 krans les 108)	462·00
	5,179·00

IV.—Le 24 septembre au 14 octobre (par l'intermédiaire du commissaire persan).

	Krans.
La borne de Nezer-Beg	20·00
" Akharek-i-Oulya	16·00
" Makhmour	25·00
" Djely et Navour	17·00
" Eghri-Tchay	35·00
Les bornes d'Awadjik	50·00
Le plâtre (2 kharvars = 588 kilog.)	80·00
Sacs pour plâtre (No. 20)	40·00
Ouvrier qui dépend à l'apporteur du plâtre de maçon	6·00
Ravieh (à l'apporteur de l'eau)	100·00
Payement de dix mulets pour dix-sept jours	850·00
L'appointement du maçon et son ouvrier	450·00
	1,689·00

	Krans.	
I	4,702·55	
II	5,579·35	12,477·35.
III	5,179·00	
IV	1,689·00	
	17,149·90	

La somme de 12,447·35 krans a été dûment payée par moitié par les soussignés.

ETELA-OL-MULK.
A. HAMID.

Approuvé.
A. T. WILSON.
ETELA-OL-MULK.
V. MINORSKY.
A. HAMID.

Section de la Frontière délimitée.

	Numéro de la Séance.
Fao-Touweidjat (porte et ancrage de Mohammerah)	2
Touweidjat-Daedji	3
Daedji-Kouchk-i-Basri-31e parallèle	4
31e parallèle-Oum Chir	7
Oum Chir-Chatt-el-Amma-Tybe (décision arbitrale)	8
Tybe-Zaaferani	14
Zaaferani-Tchengouleh-Palk-Goundjiun-Tchem (terrains de Seid Hassan) (décision arbitrale)	23
Goundjiun-Tchem-Guerebi-Kélé-Chouvan	25
Kélé-Chouvan-Guenguir-Kouhne Rig (Plaine de Soumar) (décision arbitrale)	31
Kouhne Rig-Varboulend-Ab-i-Naft	—
Ab-i-Naft (Puits de Naphte)	33
Ab-i-Naft-Elvend	35
Elvend-Postes-frontière ottomans-Ak Dagh-Teng-i-Hammam (Village de Kouretou)	38
Teng-i-Hammam-Bamu (Zohab et Serkale)	39
Bamu-Ban-i-Dar	40
Ban-i-Dar-Beyzel-Sirvan	41
Sirvan-Kemadjar (Dezaver-Tavile, séance 46; Biare-Khan-Guermélé, séance 50) (décision arbitrale)	45
Kemadjar-Tchakan-Sekouh (Piran-Toutman)	51
Sekouh-Kyzyldja-Khalil-Abad	53
Khalil-Abad-Kouhi-Kocé-Rescha-Kélé Melaik	54
Kélé Melaik-Voul Gouza-Galasch	55
Galasch-Sourkew (Tchamperaw-Siah-Gouveza) (décision arbitrale)	57
Sourkew-Zab	58
Zab-Doulan	59
Doulan-Abou'l Fath	60
Abou'l Fath-Rivière de Vezné	61
Rivière de Vezné-Tchawrine (Djasousan)	62
Tchawrine-Zinve-Khouar	63
Zinve-Khouar-Guele-Zerd	65
Guele-Zerd-Col de Khrena	66
Col de Khrena-Col de Zinou	67
Col de Zinou-Mont Sitawour	68
Mont Sitawour-Mont Khizan (Mont Zont)	69
Mont Zont-Seri Baydost	70 et 71
Seri Baydost-Kotoul Dagh	72
Kotoul Dagh-Mont Sourawou	73
Mont Khydyr Baba-Mont Kyzyl Ziaret	78
Mont Kyzyl Ziaret-Khazine Guedouk	82
Khazine Guedouk-Bazyrgan	83
Bazyrgan-Boulak Bachi	84
Boulak Bachi-Ararat	85

Liste des Cartes portant le Tracé final de la Frontière turco-persane.

Numéro et Description de la Carte.	Échelle.	Région illustrée.	Bornes marquées.
Carte identique, feuille No. 1 ..	1 : 73,050	Depuis le commencement de la frontière à l'embouchure du Chatt-el-Arab jusqu'au Nahr-el-Khayin, y compris l'ancrage de Mohammerah ..	—
Carte supplémentaire No. 1 ..	"	Alentours du Nahr-el-Khayin et du Nahr-Dzedji ..	1 à 4
Carte identique, feuille No. 2 ..	"	Du parallèle 30° 30' au parallèle 31° 15', y compris Kouchk-i-Basri ..	5 à 14
Carte identique, feuille No 3 ..	"	Du parallèle 31° 15' jusqu'au Oum-Chir ..	15 et 16
Carte supplémentaire No. 2 ..	"	D'Oum-Chir jusqu'au Douveridj, y compris le Chatt-el-Amma ..	17 à 22
Cartes supplémentaires Nos. 3 et 4 .	"	Du Douveridj jusqu'au Tyb ..	23 et 24
Carte identique, feuilles 4 et 5 ..	"	Du Tyb jusqu'au ravin de Zafarani ..	—
Carte supplémentaire No. 5 ..	"	Bakeai et ses alentours, du ravin de Zafarani jusqu'à la rivière de Tchengoulé ..	25 et 26
Carte supplémentaire No. 6 ..	"	Terrains de Saïd Hassan de Tchengoulé jusqu'au Mont Bendi-Koulik-Boumourg ..	27 à 33
Carte supplémentaire No. 7 ..	1 : 353,440	Du Mont Bendi-Koulik-Boumourg jusqu'à l'extrémité ouest du Djebel-Kélé-Chourume ..	34 à 40
Carte supplémentaire No. 8 ..	1 : 73,050	Plaine de Boumar et défilé de la rivière de Guengair ..	41 à 44
Carte supplémentaire No. 9 ..	"	De la borne No. 44 jusqu'à l'Elvend, y compris les montagnes de Koulme-Itig et Varbouland et la rivière Ab-i-Naft ..	45 à 50
Carte supplémentaire No. 10 ..	"	De l'Elvend jusqu'au parallèle 34° 45', y compris les montagnes d'Ak-Dagh et d'Aconguerun et la rivière de Kourelou ..	51 à 60
Carte supplémentaire No. 11 ..	"	Du parallèle 34° 45' jusqu'au confluent du Zimkam et du Sirvan, y compris la plaine de Sericsle et les montagnes de Bamou et de Bayzal ..	61 à 69
Carte identique, feuille No. 7 ..	"	La Rivière Sirvan depuis l'embouchure du Zimkam jusqu'au face du Mont Kalagha ..	—
Carte supplémentaire No. 12 avec une Carte détaillée ..	"	Du Sirvan jusqu'à la chaîne magistrale des montagnes d'Avroman ..	70 à 83
Carte identique, feuille No. 7 ..	"	La chaîne d'Avroman jusqu'à la partie appelée Soureno ..	—
Carte supplémentaire No. 13 ..	"	De Soureno jusqu'au col de Kal-i-Méjaik ..	84 à 95
Carte supplémentaire No. 14 ..	"	De Kal-i-Méjaik jusqu'au Mont Galasch ..	96 à 99
Carte supplémentaire No. 15 ..	"	De Mont Calasch jusqu'au Zab ..	100 à 103
Carte identique, feuille No. 9 ..	"	La Rivière Kialou ou petit Zab ..	—
Carte supplémentaire No. 18, avec trois Cartes détaillées, Nos. 18 A, 18 B, et 18 C	1 : 84,000	De la Rivière Kialou jusqu'à Vezné ..	104 à 117
Carte supplémentaire No. 17 ..	"	Du parallèle 36° 24' à 36° 48' ..	118 et 119
Carte supplémentaire No. 18 ..	"	Du parallèle 36° 48' à 37° 12' ..	120 à 126
Carte supplémentaire No. 19, avec une Carte détaillée, No. 19 A	"	Du parallèle 37° 12' à 37° 36' ..	127 à 140
Carte supplémentaire No. 20, avec une Carte détaillée, No. 20 A	"	Du parallèle 37° 36' à 38° 0' ..	141 à 158
Carte supplémentaire No. 21, avec une Carte détaillée, No. 21 A	"	Du parallèle 38° 0' à 38° 24' ..	158 à 170
Carte supplémentaire No. 22 ..	"	Du parallèle 38° 24' à 38° 48' ..	181 à 186
Carte détaillée, No. 22 A ..	"	Région de Kokour ..	—
Carte supplémentaire No. 23 ..	"	Du parallèle 38° 48' à 39° 12' ..	187 à 197
Carte supplémentaire No. 24, avec une Carte détaillée, No. 24 A	"	Du parallèle 39° 12' au méridien 44° 20' ..	198 à 220
Carte supplémentaire, No. 25, avec une Carte détaillée, No. 25 A	"	Du méridien 44° 20' jusqu'au Mont Ararat ..	221 à 233

PROVISIONAL Description of Turco-Persian Frontier from Kialou to Mount Betchoré north-north-west to Azimuth 246°.

Description de la Frontière. (1.)	Nos. des Bornes. (2.)	Position des Bornes. (3.)	Latitude. (4.)	Longitude. (5.)	Distance de la Borne précédente. (6.)	Azimut observé de la Borne précédente. (7.)	Description des Bornes. (8.)	Observations. (9.)
La frontière suit en aval le *medium filum aquæ* du Kialou jusqu'à l'embouchure d'un ruisseau qui se verse dans cette rivière à la rive droite à un demi-mille à l'ouest d'Herzéné. Elle remonte ledit ruisseau jusqu'au confluent de ses deux branches, le Chivé Kouzedol et le Chivé Guerav, d'où elle remonte le contrefort de Tépé Salos formant le partage des eaux entre les deux branches du ruisseau susdites et atteint ainsi la borne No. 104.			° ′ ″	° ′ ″		Degrés.		
	104	Située sur le contrefort susdit à environ 500 mètres du confluent et à quelques mètres au sud de l'endroit où le chemin Kouzedol–Herzéné traverse le partage des eaux	36 01 08	45 20 54	..	..	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre, 2 mètres	La latitude et la longitude des bornes Nos. 104–117 sont prises de la Carte supplémentaire No. 16.
La frontière continue à remonter ce contrefort et gagne le sommet de Tépé Salos, d'où elle suit la crête jusqu'à la borne No. 105.								
	105	Située sur le col traversé par le chemin Kouzedol–Achkan, à quelques mètres dudit chemin	36 01 58	45 21 21	5,300 pieds (1,616 mètres)	25	Idem.	
La frontière continue à suivre la crête jusqu'au col de Zinvé-Ahmed-Khan (borne No. 106).								
	106	Située sur le col de Zinvé-Ahmed-Khan à 60 mètres au nord du chemin Kandol–Achkan	36 02 11	45 21 14	2,900 pieds (884 mètres)	341	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre, 1·90 mètre.	

Description de la Frontière. (1.)	Nos. des Bornes. (2.)	Position des Bornes. (3.)	Latitude. (4.)	Longitude. (5.)	Distance de la Borne précédente. (6.)	Azimut observé de la Borne précédente. (7.)	Description des Bornes. (8.)	Observations. (9.)
			° ′ ″	° ′ ″		Degrés.		
De là, elle remonte le contrefort menant au Mont Doulan et, passant par le pic appelé Kani-Guvèze, suit la crête du Mont Doulan jusqu'au sommet du Mont Gorfatyk. De ce point jusqu'au pic de Godjar (entre les bornes Nos. 111 et 112) la frontière suit toujours le partage des eaux principal. Elle atteint d'abord le col de Lagav-Guird (borne No. 107).								
	107	Située sur le col Lagav-Guird, à environ 10 mètres au sud du chemin Kandol-Serdacht	36 06 07	45 22 12	..	..	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 2½ mètres; diamètre, 4 mètres.	
Ensuite, en passant par les Monts Rehan et Dou-Paza, elle arrive au col de Kani-Reche (bornes Nos. 108 et 109).								
	108	Située sur le col de Kani-Reche en haut d'un monticule au sud du chemin Mamouret-ul-Hamidié-Serdacht	36 11 02	45 19 20	..	..	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre, 2 mètres.	
	109	Située à 300 mètres au nord-est de la borne No. 108	36 11 10	45 19 27	984 pieds (300 mètres)	10	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre, 3 mètres.	
De là, elle monte à la crête du Mont Boul Fatk (Berdé-Aboul-Fatyk) et, passant par la borne No. 110, gagne le sommet du Mont Malimos.								
	110	Située sur le col au sud du Mont Malimos	36 13 27	45 19 13	..	..	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre, 2 mètres.	
Elle passe par la borne No. 111 et atteint ainsi le pic de Godjar.								
	111	Située sur le col unissant le Mont Dolarma au Mont Godjar	36 14 04	45 17 24	9,800 pieds (2,987 mètres)	293	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 1 mètre; diamètre, 1½ mètre.	
Du pic de Godjar la frontière, descend en ligne droite à la source du ruisseau Nerzeng, qu'elle suit en aval jusqu'à sa jonction avec la rivière de Vezné.								

	112	Située à 7 mètres au sud-ouest du chemin Toujal-Chenié, à l'endroit ou ledit chemin traverse le ravin de Nerzeng	36 15 59	45 18 04	..	..	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre, 3 mètres.	
Elle suit en aval le *medium filum aquæ* de la rivière de Vezné pour une distance d'environ 3 milles jusqu'au pied du contrefort du Mont Tchawrine situé immédiatement à l'ouest de l'embouchure du ruisseau de Kani Kavatman. Elle remonte ce contrefort, en passant par les bornes Nos. 113 et 114, et gagne le sommet de Tchawrine.								
	113	Située sur le contrefort susdit, à environ 200 mètres au sud du chemin Souni-Dolatou	36 17 39	45 15 44	..	..	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre, 1½ mètre.	
	114	Située sur la crête du même contrefort à environ 100 mètres au nord dudit chemin	36 17 52	45 15 38	1,000 pieds (305 mètres)	338	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 1¾ mètre; diamètre, 1½ mètre.	
De là, elle suit la crête jusqu'au sommet de Djasousan, marqué par la borne No. 115.								
	115	Située sur le sommet de Djasousan	36 19 31	45 16 35	..	..	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 2½ mètres; diamètre, 4 mètres.	
Ensuite, elle suit le partage des eaux entre la vallée de Vezné et celle de Dola-Narte, en passant par Mont Dilko et le col de Zervinke (borne No. 116), et arrive au col de Khouar, marqué par la borne No. 117.								
	116	Située sur le col de Zervinke ..	36 21 25	45 16 34	..	..	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre, 1½ mètre.	
	117	Située sur le col de Khouar ..	36 23 51	45 15 15	..	..	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre, 2 mètres.	
De là, elle monte aux sommets de Bi-Kafkafkan (Séri-Kélé-Kéline) et de Séri-Kotrel. A partir d'ici la frontière suit le partage des eaux principal, formé par la rangée de Kandil, en passant par les sommets suivants: Galalan, Chahi-Sova, Cheikh-Cher, Kélé-Khodja-Ibrahim, Berde-pau, et Serapa et atteint le col de Garou-Chinke (borne No. 118)								

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Description de la Frontière. (1.)	Nos. des Bornes. (2.)	Position des Bornes. (3.)	Latitude. (4.)	Longitude. (5.)	Distance de la Borne précédente. (6.)	Azimut observé de la Borne précédente. (7.)	Description des Bornes. (8.)	Observations. (9.)
			° ′ ″	° ′ ″		Degrés.		
	118	Située sur le col de Garou-Chinke	36 39 48	44 59 13	..	..	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre, 1½ mètre	La latitude et la longitude des bornes Nos. 118 et 119 sont prises de la Carte supplémentaire No. 17, et celles des bornes Nos. 120-126 de la Carte supplémentaire No. 18.
A partir de ce col, jusqu'au col de Kélé-Chine, la frontière continue à suivre le partage des eaux principal (entre les eaux du Zab-el-Ala et du Lavène), en passant par les sommets de Chivé-Reche (Ser Chevi) et Kotchi-Gouma jusqu'au col de Berzine (borne No. 119).								
	119	Située sur le col de Berzine à 50 mètres à l'est du chemin qui traverse le col	36 45 00	45 04 05	..	..	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre, 2 mètres.	
Ensuite, passant par le sommet de Tchikhi-Déré (Boz), elle atteint le col de Mirekine, marqué par la borne No. 120.								
	120	Située sur le col de Mirekine à ½ mille au nord-est du cimetière du même nom	36 49 06	44 50 34	..	..	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 2½ mètres; diamètre, 3 mètres.	
De là, elle passe au col de Dola Maidan (Zerde-Guel), marqué par la borne No. 121.								
	121	Située sur le col de Dola Maidan	36 50 26	44 51 26	..	..	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 2¼ mètres; diamètre, 2½ mètres.	
Elle arrive ensuite au sommet de Siah Kouh, et de là au col de Kélé-Chine, où se trouvent les bornes Nos. 122, 123 et 124.								
	122	Située sur le col de Kélé-Chine, du côté sud de la stèle ci-dessous mentionnée	36 54 47	44 54 41	..	..	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 1¼ mètre; diamètre, 2¼ mètres.	
	123	Ancienne stèle sculptée sur le col de Kélé-Chine	36 54 51	44 54 43	..	25	Ancienne stèle sculptée.	
	124	Située sur le même col, du côté nord de la stèle susmentionnée	36 54 55	44 54 42	..	334	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 1¾ mètre; diamètre, 2 mètres.	

A partir de Kélé-Chine jusqu'au Mont Dalampère la frontière suit toujours le partage des eaux principal (entre les eaux du Zab et du Gadyr), en passant par le col de Khréna (borne No. 125) et Mont Berdé-Bouk.								
	125	Située sur le col de Khréna en haut d'un monticule au nord du chemin qui traverse le col	37 01 26	44 54 00	..	..	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre, 1 mètre.	
Du Mont Dalampère au col de Zinvé-Sour le partage des eaux principal (entre les eaux du Zab et de la plaine de Mergaver) constitue toujours la frontière. Celle-ci atteint d'abord le col de Kélé-Chine-Mergaver (borne No. 126).								
	126	Située sur le col de Kélé-Chine-Mergaver en haut d'un rocher compris entre les deux chemins qui descendent à Rowan et à Nervi	37 11 15	44 46 13	..	..	Idem.	
De là, elle passe par Mont Binar au col de Zinvé-Sour (borne No. 127).								
	127	Située sur le col de Zinvé-Sour en haut d'un grand monticule se trouvant sur la ligne même du partage des eaux	37 15 29	44 48 24	..	..	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre, 2 mètres	La latitude et la longitude des bornes Nos 127-140 ont été prises de la Carte supplémentaire No. 19.
La frontière continue à suivre le partage des eaux principal (entre les eaux du Zab et de la ville d'Ourmi) jusqu'au Mont Sitawour, en passant par les Mont Mai-Helane, Avroukh, et Beyram et le col de Taboutan (borne No. 128).								
	128	Située sur le col de Taboutan à 2 mètres au sud du chemin Chekeftan-Djerma dans un cimetière	37 22 53	44 43 01	..	..	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 2½ mètres; diamètre, 2½ mètres.	
Ensuite, elle passe par les Monts Mari-Chehidan, Kouna-Koter, Guirve-Chehinan, Ziaret-Beiboun et Tchalatchor (Tchil-Tchovri). Elle arrive ainsi au sommet de Sitawour, d'où elle descend au col de Kalankani, marqué par la borne No. 129.								
	129	Située sur le col de Kalankani du côté sud du chemin Hakki-Kalankani	37 35 05	44 43 22	..	..	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre, 2 mètres.	

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Description de la Frontière. (1.)	Nos. des Bornes. (2.)	Position des Bornes. (3.)	Latitude. (4.)	Longitude. (5.)	Distance de la Borne précédente. (6.)	Azimut observé de la Borne précédente. (7.)	Description des Bornes. (8.)	Observations. (9.)
La frontière remonte par le partage des eaux (sur lequel se trouvent les bornes Nos. 130, 131 et 132) au sommet du Mont Khizané (Mont Zont), où a été érigée la borne No. 133.			° ′ ″	° ′ ″		Degrés.		
	130	Située sur le partage des eaux susdit	37 35 09	44 43 28	751 pieds (229 mètres)	45	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre, 3 mètres.	
	131	Idem	37 35 31	44 43 50	2,000 pieds (914 mètres)	41	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 3 mètres; diamètre, 4 mètres.	
	132	Idem	37 35 36	44 43 57	800 pieds (244 mètres)	46	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre, 3 mètres.	
	133	Située sur le sommet du Mont Khizané	37 35 31	44 44 10	1,200 pieds (365 mètres)	117	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 3 mètres; diamètre, 4 mètres.	
De là, elle descend à une eminence de la crête qui partage les eaux d'Arzine des eaux de Kalankani (borne No. 134).								
	134	Située sur l'éminence susdite.	37 35 39	44 44 02	1,100 pieds (334 mètres)	324	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre, 3 mètres.	
Elle descend ensuite le contrefort de Khizané, qui se prolonge d'abord vers le nord et tourne bientôt vers le nord-est, et passant par les bornes Nos. 135 et 136 atteint la borne No. 137.								
	135	Située sur une éminence du même contrefort	37 35 51	44 44 02	1,150 pieds (350 mètres)	..	Idem.	
	136	Située sur un col du même contrefort	37 36 05	44 44 03	1,600 pieds (487 mètres)	1	Idem.	
	137	Située sur le même contrefort à quelques mètres à l'ouest de l'endroit ou le chemin Hakki-Kourte-Kawar le traverse	37 36 32	44 44 49	4,800 pieds (1,461 mètres)	55	Idem.	
De ce point la frontière passe en ligne droite, en traversant la rivière d'Arzine, à la borne No. 138.								

	138	Située a 20 mètres au nord du chemin qui longe la rive gauche de la rivière d'Arzine, près de l'embouchure d'un ravin à environ 2 milles en amont du village d'Arzine	37 37 18	44 44 35	..	345	Entassement de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 2½ mètres; diamètre, 2½ mètres.	
Elle remonte le ravin marqué par cette borne jusqu'à la tête (borne No. 139).								
	139	Située à la tête du ravin susdit à 3 mètres du côté nord du chemin Bekos-Baradost, près d'une source	37 37 38	44 44 26	..	340	Construction de pierres. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre, 2 mètres.	
De la borne No. 139 la frontière va en ligne droite au sommet le plus occidental du Mont Séri-Baydost, marqué par la borne No. 140.								
	140	Située sur le sommet le plus occidental de Séri-Baydost	37 38 06	44 44 03	3,500 pieds (1,067 mètres)	328	Construction de pierres. Hauteur, 3 mètres; diamètre, 3½ mètres.	
De la borne No. 140 la frontière suit vers l'ouest le partage des eaux et passant par la borne No. 141 sur le col de Kounc Mich atteint le sommet, qui s'élève à ¾ mille au sud du pic de Séri-Baydost. Elle tourne ensuite vers le nord et arrive audit pic de Séri-Baydost (hauteur indiquée sur la Carte supplémentaire No. 20, 2,820 mètres), d'où elle descend le contrefort s'étendant dans la direction du nord. Elle prend la branche la plus orientale de ce contrefort et arrive ainsi à la rivière de Khanyk à l'endroit nommé Kharabeh-i-Kasryk, où elle traverse la rivière pour atteindre la borne No. 142.								
	141	Sur le col de Kounc Mich ..	37 39 40	44 40 06	..	..	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre, 1½ mètre	La latitude et la longitude des bornes Nos. 140–157 sont prises de la Carte supplémentaire No. 20.
	142	Située au pied dudit contrefort en haut d'un grand rocher sur la rive gauche de la rivière de Khanyk	37 41 18	44 38 39	..	..	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre, 1½ mètre.	
La frontière descend la rivière pour une distance de plusieurs mètres jusqu'à l'embouchure du premier ravin du côté gauche. Elle s'engage dans ce ravin et le remonte pour gagner la crête séparant la rivière de Khanyk du ruisseau d'Ekmaluk à l'endroit marqué par la borne No. 143.								

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Description de la Frontière. (1.)	Nos. des Bornes. (2.)	Position des Bornes. (3.)	Latitude. (4.)	Longitude. (5.)	Distance de la Borne précédente. (6.)	Azimut observé de la Borne précédente. (7.)	Description des Bornes. (8.)	Observations. (9.)
			° ′ ″	° ′ ″		Degrés.		
	143	Sur une éminence de la crête susdite	37 41 50	44 38 07	4,000 pieds (1,219 mètres)	319	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre, 1½ mètre.	
Elle suit cette crête vers le nord-est jusqu'à son point le plus élevé marqué par la borne No. 144.								
	144	Sur le point le plus élevé de ladite crête	37 41 54	44 38 17	1,000 pieds (305 mètres)	58	Idem.	
De là, tournant vers le nord elle descend la crête jusqu'à la borne No. 145, d'où elle tombe par un contrefort au ruisseau d'Ekmaluk qu'elle traverse a l'endroit marqué par la borne No. 146.								
	145	Située sur ladite crête ..	37 42 06	44 38 16	1,150 pieds (350 mètres)	356	Idem.	
	146	Sur la rive droite du ruisseau d'Ekmaluk à 1¼ mille en amont de sa jonction avec le Tcham-i-Bajirgué	37 42 24	44 38 02	2,300 pieds (701 mètres)	325	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre, 2½ mètres.	
Elle monte ensuite en ligne directe sur la crête séparant le ruisseau d'Ekmaluk de la rivière de Bajirgué à l'endroit marque par la borne No. 147, et passant par la borne No. 148 à la tête du ravin situé sur le versant nord descend par ce ravin à la rivière de Bajirgué.								
	147	Sur une éminence dudit contrefort	37 42 29	44 37 39	2,000 pieds (610 mètres)	289	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre, 1½ mètre.	
	148	Sur la même éminence ..	37 42 34	44 37 36	450 pieds (137 mètres)	315	Idem.	
Elle traverse cette rivière en face de l'embouchure du ravin marqué par la borne et se trouvant à 1¼ mille en amont du village de Séro.								

[1691] Elle remonte ledit ravin jusqu'à sa tête marquée par la borne No. 150, d'où elle gagne en ligne droite la borne No. 151, située sur le contrefort se trouvant entre le ruisseau de Tcham-i-Kasran et le ravin au nord de Sartyk.	149	Située sur le côté nord du chemin Bajirgué-Séro à la rive gauche du Tcham-i-Bajirgué à une distance de 1¼ mille en amont de Séro	37 43 06	44 37 25	3,500 pieds (1,067 mètres)	345	Construction de pierres et du ciment. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre, 2 mètres.
	150	Sur un monticule à la tête dudit ravin	37 44 09	44 36 37	..	..	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre 1½ mètre.
	151	Sur le partage des eaux du ruisseau Tcham-i-Kasran et le ravin au nord de Sartyk	37 44 20	44 36 28	1,300 pieds (396 mètres)	330	Idem.
Ensuite, la frontière, passant par la borne No. 152, remonte par ce contrefort le sommet du mont Kotoul							
	152	Située sur le même partage des eaux	37 44 24	44 36 15	1,330 pieds (405 mètres)	285	Idem.
Étant arrivée au mont de Kotoul la frontière va à l'ouest en suivant la crête du partage des eaux entre Berdézi et la vallée de Kasran en passant par la montagne de Meidan et le col de ce nom, marqué par la borne No. 153.							
	153	Située sur le col de Meidan à 20 mètres à l'est de la route Kasran-Berdouk	37 46 30	44 32 25	..	..	Construction de pierres et du ciment. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre, 2 mètres.
Ensuite, elle suit la crête de Keifarouk, la montagne de Peri-Khan et le col de ce nom, marqué par la borne No. 154, les montagnes de Guiri Beran, Fatmo-Chiw, Bara-Zivan et la crête du partage des eaux entre les vallées persanes de Rehani et Soultani d'un côté, et la vallée Nowchiw restant à la Turquie. Elle passe par le col Soultani, marqué par la borne No. 155, par le mont Berhebine et le col de ce nom, borne No. 156.							
	154	Sur le col de Peri-Khan à 40 mètres au nord de la route sur le partage des eaux	37 46 25	44 26 51	..	..	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 3 mètres; diamètre, 4 mètres.
	155	Située sur le col de Kiskani (Soultani) à quelques mètres à l'est de la route de Berdouk à Kochkan	37 49 58	44 23 38	..	..	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 1½ mètres; diamètre, 2 mètres.

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			° ′ ″	° ′ ″		Degrés.		
Puis elle suit le partage des eaux entre la rivière de Zolatchai et le ruisseau d'Assengueran et ayant passé par les crêtes de Sorian se dirige vers le nord et passe par le col de Meidan-Guedigui (Kélé-Reche), borne No. 157, le col de Keikan, la chaîne de Kepper, le col conduisant de Kalik à Djourouf (borne No. 158), et col de Ziaret (borne No. 159), et le col entre Sotoun-Reche et le campement d'été de Kyzyldja borne No. 160.	156	Au col de Berhebine à 600 mètres environ au nord-est du col précédent, à l'endroit où la route qui suit le partage des eaux de Hassani et Dostan et qui va rejoindre la route de Kochkan, en territoire ottoman traverse la chaîne de Berhebine	37 51 00	44 24 17	..	..	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 1 mètre; diamètre, 1½ mètre.	
	157	Sur le col de Kélé-Reche à 1 mètre au sud de la route Kélé-Reche-Meidan	37 55 18	44 14 09	..	..	Construction de pierres et du ciment. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre, 2½ mètres.	
	158	Située sur un monticule environ 200 mètres au nord du col par lequel passe la route Tarava-Kalik, sur le partage des eaux, 1,000 mètres environ au nord-est d'un petit lac, près du poste ottoman de Djourouf	38 02 06	44 17 28	..	..	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre, 3 mètres	La latitude et la longitude des bornes Nos. 158–169 sont prises de la Carte supplémentaire No. 21.
	159	Située sur le contrefort à 200 mètres au nord de la route Kyzyldja-Kotchka-Soumou, près de l'endroit connu sous le nom de Ziaret	38 03 36	44 18 15	..	..	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre, 2 mètres.	
Puis, laissant du côté turc la vallée de Kadan et à la Perse les eaux se déversant à Zolatchai, la frontière passe par les monts de Sary-tchitchek, Belekou, le col de Khané-Sour (borne No. 161) et celui de Khatch-Gueduki (borne No. 162), monte à la montagne de Tavla et la chaîne de Harawil, qu'elle descend jusqu'au double col de Bourouch-Khoran, bornes Nos. 163 et 164.	160	Située à l'endroit où la route Sotoun-Reche (Soutounradje) et le campement d'été de Kyzyldja traverse le partage des eaux et à environ 10 mètres au nord de cette route	38 04 37	44 18 58	7,300 pieds (2,215 mètres)	29	Construction de pierres et du ciment. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre, 2 mètres.	
	161	Au col de Khané-Sour du côté sud de la route Hadjiafan-Khané-Sour	38 09 54	44 23 11	..	..	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre, 2 mètres.	
	162	Au col de Khatch-Gueduki, à environ 40 mètres au sud de la route Awbarza-Khané-Sour	38 10 32	43 23 33	4,500 pieds (1,372 mètres)	22	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre, 3 mètres.	
	163	Au col connu à ce qu'il paraît sous le nom de Karadaghi à 60 mètres au sud de la route Khanik-Achnouk	38 17 18	44 27 16	..	..	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 1 mètre; diamètre, 1 mètre.	
	164	Au col de Bourouch-Khoran à l'endroit où la route de Khanik à Bourouch-Khoran traverse le partage des eaux	38 17 57	44 28 05	5,600 pieds (1,707 mètres)	45	Idem.	
Puis elle passe par le col de Deuchivan (borne No. 165), et atteint le point sur le partage des eaux de Khanyk et de Deuchivan (borne No. 166).	165	Au col de Deuchivan à quelque distance au nord de la route qui va de Khanyk à Deirik et Keuhne-Chehr.	38 18 41	44 29 42	8,700 pieds (2,648 mètres)	60	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 1 mètre; diamètre, 1½ metre.	
De là, elle tourne à l'ouest et par le partage des eaux entre Khanyk et Kontour, marqué par les bornes Nos. 166 (*a*), 166 (*b*) et 166 (*c*) monte sur la montagne de Sourawou.	166	Sur le col de Deuchivan (nord) sur un monticule à l'est de la route allant de Khanyk à Tehar-Setoun	38 20 34	44 30 37	..	..	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre, 1½ mètre.	

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			° ′ ″	° ′ ″		Degrés.		
	166 *a*	Sur la ligne du partage des eaux à l'ouest d'une maison en ruine et au sud d'un petit marécage situé sur la ligne des crêtes	38 20 31	44 28 50	8,000 pieds (2,438 mètres)	250	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre, 2 mètres.	
	166 *b*	Sur une petite colline à l'est du susdit marécage	38 20 42	44 29 16	3,800 pieds (1,158 mètres)	20	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 1 mètre; diamètre, 1 mètre.	
	166 *c*	Sur la ligne du partage des eaux, sur la piste conduisant de Khanyk à la vallée de Ravian	38 21 06	44 28 25	3,700 pieds (1,128 mètres)	298	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre, 1½ mètre.	
De là, elle descend par les cols de Kachkoul, marqués par les bornes Nos. 167, 168 et 169 atteint le col de Mir Omar (borne No. 170).	167	Sur le col situé immédiatement au nord du mont Sourawou à quelques mètres au sud de la route de Kachkoul à Ravian	38 22 41	44 26 50	..	..	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre, 2 mètres.	
	168	Sur le col traversé par le chemin allant de Kachkoul à Guirnavouk à quelques mètres à l'ouest dudit chemin	38 22 31	44 25 33	6,500 pieds (1,970 mètres)	260	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 1 mètre; diamètre, 1½ mètre.	
	169	Au col traversé par la route principale allant de Kachkoul à Guirnavouk à 5 mètres environ à l'ouest de cette route	38 22 13	44 24 49	3,700 pieds (1,128 mètres)	243	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre, 2 mètres.	
	170	Sur le col de Mir Omar à 2 mètres à l'ouest de la route allant de Kirétou aux ruines de Mir Omar	38 21 35	44 22 19	..	..	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 2½ mètres; diamètre, 2 mètres.	

NOTE.—Kotour n'a pas été délimité (voir Procès-verbal No. 77), et les dix Nos. 171–180 ont été réservés pour les bornes qui seront érigées après.

A partir de Khydyr-baba (borne No. 181) la frontière va vers le nord suivant le partage des eaux entre Cheref-Khané et le district persan d'Alend.	181	Au sommet de Khydyrbaba à une distance d'environ un mille à l'ouest du sommet de Guir-Beran, à l'endroit où les trois partages des eaux de Beledjik Cheref-Khané et de Diza se joignent	38 34 35	44 19 10	..	..	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre, 2½ mètres	Les numéros 171–180 restent libres pour les bornes de Kotour. La latitude et la longitude des bornes Nos. 181–186 sont prises de la Carte supplémentaire No. 22.
Ensuite, elle passe par le col marqué par la borne No. 182 monte sur le mont de Guevri-Makhine et passant par le col se trouvant au nord-est de Kourdjan marqué par la borne No. 183 arrive aux deux cols de Nazar-beg-Guedouki marqués par les bornes Nos. 184 et 185.	182	Au col au sud-est de Kourdjan et à environ 100 mètres au nord de la route Cheref-Khané–Diza	38 36 05	44 18 40	..	..	Grand rocher. Hauteur, 1 mètre; diamètre, 3 mètre.	
	183	Située à 100 mètres à l'est de la route, sur un monticule sur le partage des eaux	38 37 56	44 17 47	..	..	Construction de pierres et du ciment. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre, 2½ mètres.	
	184	Au col sud de Nazar-beg-Guedouki à une distance de 10 mètres au nord de la route de Kourdjan à Elend	38 38 35	44 16 00	..	..	Construction de pierres et du ciment. Hauteur, 1½ mètre. Diamètre, 1½ mètre..	
	185	Au col nord de Nazar-beg-Guedouki sur la route Kharaba-Sourik à Elend	38 39 07	44 16 21	3,850 pieds (1,175 mètres)	30	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre, 1½ mètre.	
Ensuite, elle monte sur le mont de Guevri-Begzadan, traverse le col entre Kharaba-Sourik et Belesour, monte sur les crêtes du partage des eaux entre la localité persane de Davra et le district turc d'Akhourik et passe par le col se trouvant à l'est du village Akhourik-Youkhary (borne No. 186)	186	Sur le col de Davra à l'endroit où la route d'Akhourik-Youkhary aux ruines de Davra traverse le partage des eaux	38 46 16	44 16 50	..	..	Construction de pierres et du ciment. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre, 1 mètre.	

Description de la Frontière. (1.)	Nos. des Bornes. (2.)	Position des Bornes. (3.)	Latitude. (4.)	Longitude. (5.)	Distance de la Borne précédente. (6.)	Azimut observé de la Borne précédente. (7.)	Description des Bornes. (8.)	Observations. (9.)
			° ′ ″	° ′ ″		Degrés.		
Suivant toujours le partage des eaux, la frontière passe par le col d'Agh-spi (borne No. 187), et la colline de ce nom, par le col de Hadjibeg et la montagne de ce nom, par les monts de Richkan, de Karaoul et le col de Kotik (borne No. 188), situé à l'ouest du mont Makhmour.	187	Au col d'Agh-spi à 150 mètres au sud de la route qui traverse ce col	38 48 50	44 19 00	..	..	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 2¼ mètres; diamètre, 2 mètres	La latitude et la longitude des bornes Nos. 187–197 sont prises de la Carte supplémentaire No. 23.
	188	Située sur le partage des eaux de Kara-Déré et du bassin d'Enghiz au nord de la route de Richkan à Kara-Déré	38 51 44	44 14 54	..	..	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre, 2 mètres.	
Ensuite, la frontière passe par la borne No. 189, les sommets des collines du partage des eaux à l'ouest de la montagne d'Avdal-Tachy et par le mont de Nawour.	189	Sur le partage des eaux susdit sur une colline à 300 mètres au nord de la route de Kotch-Kyran–Achagha à Kara-Déré	38 52 55	44 13 20	..	..	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 3 mètres; diamètre, 4 mètres.	
De là, elle tourne à l'ouest, en passant par le col de Nawour (borne No. 190), monte sur la petite colline à l'ouest du col et se dirige de nouveau vers le nord en traversant les routes entre Ziareti–Nawour (turc) et la localité de Chekh-Sélo (persane) et passe par le col de Djili-gueul (borne No. 191).	190	Au col de Nawour à 3 mètres à l'ouest de la route Kotch-Kyran à Nawour	38 55 22	44 12 24	..	..	Construction de pierres et du ciment. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre, 1½ mètre.	
	191	Au col de Djili-gueul près de la route de Djili-gueul – Youkhary à Chekh-Sélo–Achagha	38 57 41	44 11 14	..	..	Idem.	

Ensuite, la frontière passe par le mont de Chekh-Sélo et les deux cols entre Djili et Chekh-Sélo–Youkhary, marqués par les bornes Nos. 192 et 193.	192	Sur la route de Djili–Youkhary à Chekh-Sélo – Youkhary à l'endroit où cette route traverse le partage des eaux	38 59 09	44 11 24	..	..	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre, 1½ mètre.	
	193	Au col sur la route de Kharaba-Djili – Achagha à Chekh-Sélo–Youkhary	38 59 30	44 11 40	4,200 pieds (1,280 mètres)	298	Idem.	
Puis la frontière monte sur les crêtes à l'est du village turc de Khor et sur les sommets de la montagne Aléguène, et passe par les collines et les cols entre Aléguène et Kyz-Katchan, marqués par les bornes Nos. 194, 195 et 196.	194	Située dans un cimetière à l'endroit où la route de Chekh-Soudja au pâturage d'Aléguène traverse le partage des eaux	39 02 51	44 12 14	..	..	Idem.	
	195	Située sur un grand rocher sur le partage des eaux à 200 mètres au nord de Chekh-Soudja à Kara-éini	39 03 30	44 12 08	4,100 pieds (1,250 mètres)	356	Construction de pierres et du ciment. Hauteur, 1¼ mètre; diamètre, 1½ mètre.	
De la borne No. 196 elle monte dans la direction nord et gagne la chaîne de Kyz-Katchan, dont elle suit les sommets ainsi que ceux des chaînes de Kyrkhlar et de Sarytchimen, et arrive au col de Khan-Guedouk, marqué par la borne No. 197.	196	Au col de Kara-bourga, traversé par la route de Nazarowa à Kara-éini, dans un cimetière connu sous le nom de Chekh-Eboubekr	39 04 28	44 11 30	..	..	Construction de pierres et du ciment. Hauteur, 2½ mètres; diamètre, 3 mètres.	
Ensuite, la frontière toujours suivant le partage des eaux entre les districts d'Avadjik (persan) et Abagha (turc) passe par le col de Khan Guedouk nord (borne No. 198) le mont Chaveni-dagh et le col d'Aghdjak (borne No. 199) et la borne No. 200 et arrive ainsi au rocher de Kala-agh-dach (borne No. 201).	197	Au col de Khan-Guedouk ..	39 11 47	44 07 50	..	..	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 1 mètre; diamètre, 1 mètre.	

Description de la Frontière. (1.)	Nos. des Bornes. (2.)	Position des Bornes. (3.)	Latitude. (4.)	Longitude. (5.)	Distance de la Borne précédente. (6.)	Azimut observé de la Borne précédente. (7.)	Description des Bornes. (8.)	Observations. (9.)
			° ′ ″	° ′ ″		Degrés.		
	198	Située au col de Khan-Guedouk-Nord	39 13 04	44 06 04	..	..	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 1 mètre; diamètre, 1 mètre	La latitude et la longitude des bornes Nos. 198–220 sont prises de la Carte supplémentaire No. 24.
	199	Située au col d'Aghdjak ..	39 17 20	44 06 19	..	..	Construction de pierres et du ciment. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre 1 mètre.	
	200	Sur une élévation située à environ 6 mètres au nord du col traversé par la route allant de Guevri-Chamian à Kazly-Gueul	39 20 34	44 04 44	..	..	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre, 1½ mètre.	
	201	Grand rocher blanc connu sous le nom de Kala-agh-dach, au sud-est du village d'Egri-tchay (Bekir Kendi)	39 20 29	44 04 32	1,600 pieds (488 mètres)	300		
Ensuite, la frontière traverse la vallée d'Egri-tchay et passant par la borne No. 202 arrive au rocher de Top-agh-dach (borne No. 203), laissant ainsi à la Perse le village de Nado et à la Turquie le village de Egri-tchay (Bekir Kendi).	202	A environ 60 mètres au nord du ruisseau d'Egri-tchay, et environ ½ mille à l'est du village du même nom (Bekir-Kendi)	39 20 44	44 04 39	2,300 pieds (701 mètres)	21	Construction de pierres et du ciment. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre, 2 mètres.	
	203	Grand rocher blanc connu sous le nom de Top-agh-dach, au nord-est du village d'Egri-tchay (Bekir-Kendi)	39 20 52	44 04 37	1,300 pieds (396 mètres)	356		
De là, la frontière suit le partage des eaux entre la vallée d'Egri-tchay et Kazli-Gueul, et passant par la borne No. 204 arrive au sommet de Kara-guney. De là, elle descend le contrefort qui forme le partage des eaux entre Silowmagoul (persan) et Kyzyl-Kaya (turc) jusqu'à la borne No. 205.								

	204	Située à quelques mètres à l'ouest de la route allant de Bekir-Kendi à Silow-magoul	39 20 54	44 04 25	1,500 pieds (457 mètres)	285	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètres, 2½ mètre.	
Ensuite, elle continue de suivre le susdit partage des eaux marqué par les bornes Nos. 206–211 et arrive à la colline connue sous le de Nanay Tepessi, borne No. 212.	205	Au pied du mont Kara-guney sur un petit contrefort situé à l'ouest du village de Silow-magoul	39 21 55	44 04 00	..	..	Construction de pierres et du ciment. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre 1½ mètre.	
	206	Sur le susdit contrefort 30 mètres à l'est du ruisseau qui coule vers Kyzyl-Kaya	39 21 59	44 04 00	600 pieds (183 mètres)	0	Construction de pierres et du ciment. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre, 1½ mètre.	
	207	Presque au milieu de la ligne droite reliant les deux bornes Nos. 206 et 208 à quelque distance au nord du chemin allant de Kyzyl-Kaya à Silow-magoul	39 22 05	44 04 06	1,100 pieds (355 mètres)	30	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre, 1½ mètre.	
	208	Située sur un rocher volcanique à l'est de Kyzyl-Kaya	39 22 10	44 04 08	1,000 pieds (305 mètres)	30	Construction de pierres et du ciment. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre 1½ mètre.	
	209	Située sur un grand rocher volcanique au sud-est de Kyzyl-Kaya	39 22 14	44 04 14	900 pieds (274 mètres)	57	Entassement de rochers. Hauteur, 3 mètres; diamètre, 2 mètres.	
	210	Située sur un rocher volcanique	39 22 12	44 04 23	1,000 pieds (305 mètres)	90	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre, 2 mètres.	
	211	Située sur un grand rocher volcanique à l'ouest de Nanay-tepessi	39 22 08	44 04 28	1,000 pieds (305 mètres)	136	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre, 1½ mètre.	
	212	Située sur le sommet de Nanay-tepessi	39 22 04	44 04 37	1,100 pieds (335 mètres)	122	Construction de pierres et de ciment. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre 1½ mètre.	
De là, suivant toujours le même partage des eaux, elle laisse le bassin de Kourou-gueul à la Perse et passant par les bornes Nos. 213–219 arrive au Khaziné-guedouk borne No. 220								
	213	Au sud-ouest du lac Kourou-gueul 50 mètres au nord du chemin Kyzyl-Kaya-Tépériz	39 22 34	44 04 19	..	..	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre, 1½ mètre.	
	214	Sur le partage des eaux à l'ouest de Kourou-gueul	39 22 41	44 04 15	1,300 pieds (396 mètres)	335	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 2½ mètres; diamètre, 2 mètres.	

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			° ′ ″	° ′ ″		Degrés.		
	215	Sur le partage des eaux au nord-ouest de Kourou-gueul	39 22 46	44 04 19	1,000 pieds (305 mètres)	40	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre, 2 mètres.	
	216	Sur le partage des eaux, au nord-ouest de Kourou-gueul près de la route de Djemalava à Tépériz	39 22 50	44 04 25	900 pieds (274 mètres)	40	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre, 1½ mètre.	
	217	Sur le partage des eaux au nord de Kourou-gueul, sur un rocher noir	39 22 50	44 04 30	600 pieds (183 mètres)	90	Idem.	
	218	Au sud-est de Bouz-dagh et à environ 50 mètres à l'ouest de la route Kyzyl-Kaya-Bayazid	39 22 59	44 04 52	3,000 pieds (914 mètres)	63	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre, 2 mètres.	
	219	A l'est de Bouz-dagh sur un rocher volcanique à l'ouest de la susdite route	39 23 08	44 05 03	1,800 pieds (549 mètres)	43	Idem.	
	220	Au col de Khaziné-guedouk à environ 4 mètres à l'ouest de la route Makou-Bayazid	39 22 59	44 05 39	4,400 pieds (1,340 mètres)	107	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 3 mètres; diamètre, 2 mètres.	
De Khaziné-guedouk la frontière suit toujours le partage des eaux entre Bayazid et Avadjik passant par les crêtes de Kalender et d'Ak-Dagh (borne No. 221), puis laissant du côté ottoman une partie des champs apppartenant aux villages persans de Pir-Ahmed et de Salman-abad et actuellement cultivés et possédés par leurs habitants, elle fait un angle vers le nord passe par la borne No. 222, sépare les champs du village persan Nifto de ceux du village ottoman Deuchurma et passe par les crêtes de Kanly-baba et Zindo-dachy, laissant en Perse le petit village de Djowzer, appartenant au sujet ottoman Haidar Effendi. De Zindo-dachy la frontière suit toujours le partage des eaux et laisse en Perse les ruines de Kasorlou et de Chekh-asker, puis arrivant aux rochers de Kodja-dagh, elle								

traverse le col situé entre Tawla (turc) et Maro-Keumou (persan) et suit le partage des eaux entre les villages ottomans: Kara-Koymaz, Nazik et Gurdji-boulak, et les villages persans: Maro-Keumou, Bach-Kendi, Kedjot et Bazyrgan, situés dans le district de Makou. Elle passe ensuite par les bornes Nos. 223, 224 et 225 et arrive à la colline de Guir-beran (borne No. 226), qui se trouve à l'ouest de Tchoukhour-reche.								
	221	Située sur le sommet d'Ak-Dagh	39 23 07	44 7 50	..	..	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre, 1 mètre.	
	222	Au sommet de la colline au nord-ouest du village de Nifto	39 23 34	44 9 30	..	..	Idem.	
	223	Sur le col nord-est de Ziaret Sary-Kaya, où la route de Bazyrgan à Gurdji-boulak traverse le partage des eaux	39 24 20	44 22 38	..	..	Construction de pierres et du ciment. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre, 2 mètres	La latitude et la longitude des bornes Nos. 223–233 sont prises de la Carte supplémentaire No. 25.
	224	Au col de Kelaman, où la route de Bazyrgan à Gurdji-boulak traverse le partage des eaux	39 24 35	44 22 56	2,200 pieds (670 mètres)	50	Idem.	
	225	Sur un petit monticule sur le susdit partage des eaux	39 24 30	44 23 19	1,600 pieds (488 mètres)	101	Construction de pierres et du ciment. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre, 1½ mètre.	
	226	Sur le sommet principal du mont Guir-beran	39 24 41	44 24 09	4,100 pieds (1,250 mètres)	74	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 2½ mètres; diamètre, 4 mètres.	
Ensuite, la frontière descend en ligne directe à la borne No. 227, et laissant du côté turc le champ mentionné dans la description de la borne No. 227 et du côté persan les ruines de Cheitan-abad, la frontière passe par la borne No. 228, qui marque l'extrémité nord-est dudit champ, et se dirige en ligne directe au centre d'un groupe de rochers volcaniques lequel a été reconnu comme borne No. 229.								
	227	A l'extrémité sud-est d'un champ situé entre les ruines de Cheitan-abad (Mato-Kendi) et le village de Guir-beran	39 24 37	44 24 40	2,700 pieds (823 mètres)	90	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre, 1½ mètre.	
	228	A l'extrémité nord-est dudit champ	39 24 38	44 24 45	250 pieds (76 mètres)	65	Idem.	

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Description de la Frontière. (1.)	Nos. des Bornes. (2.)	Position des Bornes. (3.)	Latitude. (4.)	Longitude. (5.)	Distance de la Borne précédente. (6.)	Azimut observé de la Borne précédente. (7.)	Description des Bornes. (8.)	Observations. (9.)
			° ′ ″	° ′ ″		Degrés.		
—	229	Le centre d'un groupe de rochers volcaniques divisé en quatre parties	39 24 51	44 25 02	1,850 pieds (564 mètres)	50	—	
De là, tournant vers le nord-nord-est la frontière suit une bande de rochers jusqu'à son extrémité nord marquée par la borne No. 230.	230	A l'extrémité nord d'une bande de rochers s'étendant entre les bornes 229 et 231	39 25 15	44 25 10	2,500 pieds (762 mètres)	10	Construction de pierres et du ciment. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre, 1½ mètre.	
Ensuite, la frontière, qui traverse ici un vallon marécageux, va en ligne directe à la borne No. 231.	231	Située à environ 40 mètres au nord-est d'un groupe de rochers noirs	39 25 40	44 25 13	2,600 pieds (792 mètres)	9		
De là, elle se dirige en ligne directe sur le rocher situé au sud-est de Boulak-bachi (borne No. 232) et à mi-chemin coupe la rivière de Sary-Sou, près de son embouchure au marais de Yarim-Kaya. Ensuite, elle tourne vers l'ouest et se dirige en ligne directe sur la borne No. 233, laissant la localité de Boulak-bachi à la Perse.	232	Située entre deux rochers volcaniques à 500 mètres au sud-est du poste de Boulak-bachi	39 27 26	44 24 42	..	350	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 2 mètres; diamètre, 2 mètres.	
	233	Au pied de la lave à l'endroit correspondant à 49° 22′ de longitude et 39° 28′ de latitude (voir le protocole du 4 (17) novembre, 1913)	39 28 00	44 22 00	..	287	Entassement de pierres. Hauteur, 1½ mètre; diamètre, 1 mètre.	
De là, elle se dirige en ligne droite vers le nord jusqu'au Karny Yarykh Dagh (2,296 mètres), en Kurde Guiri-Zygder ou Guiri-Zygkati, laissant à la Perse les localités de Kozly et de Salep. Ensuite, elle suit le partage des eaux, laissant à la Perse le système des eaux et les localités de Selakosa et Saryntch, et à la Turquie la localité et le système des eaux d'Inek. Elle arrive ainsi au mont Betcharé (3,076 mètres), puis continue vers le nord-nord-ouest, en suivant toujours le même partage des eaux jusqu'à un endroit situé sur le susdit partage des eaux à un azimut de 246° et à une distance d'environ 1,900 mètres de la borne No. 37 de la frontière turco-russe, qu'elle atteint en ligne directe.								

A. T. WILSON, *Captain.*
ETELA-OL-MULK.
V. MINORSKY.
ABDUL HAMID.

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CORRECTIONS définitives dans la Description de la Frontière depuis la borne No. 1 jusqu'à la borne No. 103 suggérées par le Commissaire russe et acceptées par les autres Commissaires.

Feuille 5	Tchengoule (2 fois)	au lieu de	Chengouleh.
„ 6	Koundjian-Tchem (Goundjian-Tchem) (5 fois)	„	Goundjian-Tchem.
„ 9	Ab-bakhchan	„	Ab-baktchan.
„ 9	puits	„	puit.
„ 9	un cercle ayant pour centre le puits a été tracé avec	„	un cercle —— ayant.
„ 9	dudit	„	de ladite.
„ 9	suit	„	prend.
„ 10	suit ensuite ce dernier chemin	„	prend ce chemin.
„ 10	Khalife	„	Halife.
„ 11	Khalife	„	Halife.
„ 11	portant le nom de Derbendjik	„	nom de ravin de Derbendjik.
„ 12	Karapoul	„	Karapoule.
„ 12	Kouretou	„	Kouretour.
„ 12	et Bichkan	„	Bishkan.
„ 13	un demi mille	„	une demie mille.
„ 13	De là, la frontière se dirige	„	La —— diverge.
„ 14	Pouchte	„	Poucht.
„ 14	Gherraw	„	Gerraw.
„ 14	Zimkan (3 fois)	„	Zinkan.
„ 15	Kalagha	„	Kalaga.
„ 15	Dezaver	„	Desaver.
„ 16	Dezaver	„	Desaver.
„ 18	Serdoch	„	Serdach.
„ 19	Pendjvine	„	Pendjevine.
„ 20	Keli-Malak (Kali Melaik)	„	Kali-Molaik.
„ 20	Vena	„	Venab.
„ 20	Mele-Yovalan	„	Milleh-Yovalan.
„ 21	Tchamparaw (4 fois)	„	Tchamperaw.
„ 21	Siah-guvez (3 fois)	„	Siah-guveza.
„ 21	Dounes	„	Dunes.

Dans la Liste des Cartes.

Tyb (2 fois)	au lieu de	Tybe.
Tchengoule	„	Chengouleh.
d'Akdagh et d'Acengueran	„	d'Akdagh et Acengueran.
Zimkan (2 fois)	„	Zinkan.
Kalagha	„	Kalaga.

[74551] No. 238.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 264.)

Sir, *Tehran, October* 28, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the usual summary of events in Persia since the 24th September.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 238.

Summary of Events in Persia for Period September 24 to October 28.

Tehran.

Swedish Gendarmerie.—The Government owes the gendarmerie over 200,000 tomans (excluding Fars and Kerman). The Swedish officers are consequently extremely dissatisfied, and are contemplating giving up the service altogether. It is hoped that General Hjalmarson will leave Sweden for Tehran at once, and that he may be able to do something to keep the force together a little longer. The Persian Government, however, appears to be unable, owing partly to the effect of the war on her customs

receipts, to pay for the gendarmerie on its present scale. The withdrawal of the Swedes and the breaking up of the force will certainly bring about disaster.

Finances.—The situation grows daily worse, and bankruptcy is now confronting the Persian Government. The Russians still hold a large sum of money collected by their agents on account of "Maliat" in the northern provinces. The customs receipts have greatly fallen off owing to the war. The Persian Government have addressed notes to the British and Russian Legations, pointing out their difficulties and asking (1) for a year's grace as to the repayment of advances, and (2) for an advance of 3,000,000 tomans jointly from England and Russia to tide them over.

Persia's Neutrality.—The Persians thought the opportunity was a good one to bring about the withdrawal of Russian troops from Azerbaijan, and proposed to declare their neutrality in the present war, but pointed out that for such neutrality to be effective, foreign troops should not occupy their territory. These efforts, however, led to no results.

Provincial Governors.—Semsam-es-Sultaneh is being withdrawn from Ispahan and Sardar Mohtashem is replacing him from Kerman, Morteza Kuli Khan has left for Ispahan to act until the new Governor's arrival when he will proceed to Yezd as Governor. Sardar Zafar is shortly leaving Tehran for Kerman as Governor. He will take his son, Salar Masoud, who is an officer in the gendarmerie, with him, Dr. Ismaïl Khan, who was educated in France and is reliable in every way, is going to Ispahan as Deputy Governor. The above arrangements have been made with the entire approval of His Majesty's Minister, and it is hoped that the Ispahan arrangements will lead to a good result as far as relations with the Russians are concerned. Semsam-es-Sultaneh is satisfied by the appointment of his son to Yezd. Amir Mufakham is working to get the Governorship of Kermanshah. If he succeeds, five important southern provinces extending from the Indian to the Turkish frontiers will be under Bakhtiari rule, viz., Kerman, Yezd, Ispahan, Bakhtiaristan and Kermanshah.

The Medjliss.—The necessary quorum of deputies which would enable the Medjliss to be opened has not yet been formed at Tehran. New deputies arrive from time to time from the provinces and it is hoped that the necessary number will shortly be assembled. The general public is, however, apathetic.

The Press.—The most widely read paper publishes translations of Reuter's telegrams concerning the war. The German telegrams find their way into other papers.

Tabriz.

German interests in Azerbaijan have been entrusted to the Turkish consulate and the German consul has left.

As reported by telegraph on the 24th September, some fighting has taken place between the Russian troops and some Kurdish tribesmen near Dilman. Fighting subsequently took place near Urmia, and among the slain on the Kurdish side was a Turkish officer. Reports have now been received by the Persian Government of the arrival of Salar-ed-Dowleh near Soujboulak, in the direction of Sardasht, where he is said to be collecting forces.

The Persian Government propose to appoint the Valiahd (heir apparent) as Governor-General of Azerbaijan with a vice-governor, and have approached the Russian Government accordingly.

Resht.

On the 6th October M. Owseenko assumed charge of the Russian consulate-general. There is no news of interest to report. The Governor of the province, Haji Mufakher-ed-Dowleh, is a creature of the Russians, and apparently gives satisfaction.

Meshed.

The Governor-General, Prince Nayer-ed-Dowleh, was reported, at the end of September, to have been pressed by the Persian Ministers for money. The first proposal was that he should raise 200,000 tomans over and above the ordinary revenue and remit the same to Tehran. He replied that this was impossible, and the demand was eventually reduced to 50,000. Nothing, however, came of the proposal.

Ispahan.

The Russian consul, M. Preobrajensky, died at his post on the 5th October. M. Hildebrand, acting consul at Tehran, has been sent to Ispahan temporarily.

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The Swedish gendarmerie, under Major Folke, are being admirably organised. About 300 reinforcements arrived on the 11th instant from Burujird. Unfortunately, the lack of money referred under Tehran news, affects this service very considerably and Major Folke has been forced to borrow money locally, but is now at the end of his tether.

Demonstrations took place in the middle of October, and still continue to a lesser extent, in protest against the imminent departure of the Governor, Semsam-es-Sultaneh, who sent in his resignation owing to the hostility of the Russian towards him. Sardar Mohtashem has been appointed in his place and in the meantime Morteza Kuli Khan (Semsam's son) will act.

The roads are tolerably safe though Reza Khan Joozani is still at large. The gendarmerie have lately caught and hanged a number of robbers.

Yezd.

Moazed-es-Sultaneh has arrived at Tehran. Muntazim-ed-Dowleh Bakhtiari has been acting-governor for some time, but has now been ordered to Kerman. Morteza Kuli Khan Bakhtiari has been given the governorship and will take up his post after he has been relieved of his duties at Ispahan.

Roads are tolerably safe though some robbers are said to be at work in some places.

Shiraz.

Mukhber-es-Sultaneh, the Governor-General, is by no means satisfactory, but the Prime Minister is unwilling to charge him. The gendarmerie are protesting against control of their expenditure by the financial agent. Two of the Swedish officers will have completed their contracts in a month's time and will leave a very junior officer in charge. This will seriously jeopardise the efficiency of the force. A suitable successor to the Shiraz Commandant, though ready in Sweden, will not be sent out owing to the financial uncertainty.

The province and roads generally seem to be in good order.

Seistan.

His Majesty's consul, who has been in Birjand for the summer, is now on his way back to Seistan.

Measures are being taken to seize certain properties belonging to Hissam-ed-Dowleh and his son Hashmat-ul-Mulk on account of the losses sustained by British traders owing to the mismanagement and incompetence of the latter while deputy Governor of Seistan. Hashmat-ul-Mulk is still in Tehran, and occasionally calls at the legation to protest his innocence and loyalty.

Shaukat-ul-Mulk is at Birjand, and contemplated a journey to Seistan, of which district he is also Governor.

The two provinces are quiet and apparently free from robbers.

Kerman.

Sardar Mohtashem, the Bakhtiari Governor, who is being transferred to Isfahan, has given general satisfaction according to His Majesty's consul and the officer commanding the gendarmerie, who speak highly of him. Some local mischief-makers, however, have sent telegrams to Tehran complaining of him and of the Bakhtiaris in general. Some minor disturbances and robberies are reported, but the Governor has taken steps to deal with them. The carpet-weaving industry is reported to have been greatly affected by the war.

Kermanshah.

Since the departure of Farman Farma there has been a great improvement in the condition of the Khanikin road under the Acting Governor, Sardar Motazid. Farman Farma is endeavouring to get himself reappointed, but this would be, from our point of view, a great misfortune.

Persian Gulf.

There is nothing of interest to report.

G. P. CHURCHILL, *Oriental Secretary.*

[74552]

No. 239.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 265. Confidential.)

Sir,

Tehran, October 29, 1914.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 234, Confidential, of the 2nd September last, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a report which I have recived from Captain A. T. Wilson, Acting British Commissioner on the Turco-Persian Frontier Commission, describing the situation which has been created in the Salmas, Khoi and Maku districts by Russian military and political action during the past two or three years.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 239.

Captain Wilson to Sir W. Townley.

Sir,

Camp Maku, October 4, 1914.

IN my despatches of the 15th and 16th August I attempted to describe the situation that has been created in the Urmia and Soujboulak districts (covering the western and south-western portions of Azerbaijan) by Russian military and political action during the past two or three years.

I have now the honour to submit, for your Excellency's information, a report embodying the results of investigations on the same subject, covering the Salmas (Dilman), Khoi and Maku districts of North-Western Azerbaijan.

2. The gross official land revenue of these districts amounts in value (in cash and in kind) to about 40,000*l.* a year, and if extra taxes other than customs be included the gross amount realisable is certainly not less than 50,000*l.* The present rate of assessment is roughly equivalent to 10 per cent. on the cash value of the average gross grain harvest.

The figures on which the above statements are based have been supplied me confidentially by the Belgian financial agent in North-Western Azerbaijan.

These districts, particularly the first two, are densely populated, well watered, and very fertile, and few if any more fertile plains are to be found anywhere in Azerbaijan or in Persia.

3. The Salmas district, which I will deal with first, includes a number of villages, whose lot previous to the Russian occupation was by no means a happy one. The local officials of the Persian Government harassed them, and made no attempt to protect them from the depredations of the nomad or settled Kurdish tribes, who were encouraged by Turkish frontier officials to give full play to their natural predatory and fanatical instincts.

4. To the Christians then, as well as to the bulk of the Mahommedan agriculturists in this district, the Russian occupation was hailed with gratitude; but it is the more enterprising Nestorian and Armenian communities who have derived the greatest benefit therefrom.

In the town of Dilman new shops and other substantial buildings are under construction, the streets are well lighted, and some improvement has been made in the water supply.

Outside the town, fine blocks of barracks, built for the Russian Government by Haji Hassan Sarraf of Khoi, the Russian tajirbashi, are nearing completion.

The carrying of arms is prohibited, and the various roads in the district are picketed by Russian posts to enforce this order; movements on the roads is generally prohibited after dark, and all roads leading from the principal passes are strongly held.

The district as a whole has an air of prosperity and security which is rare in the north and unknown in the south of Persia.

5. The Russian garrison of Dilman consists of two battalions of the 7th Caucasian Tirailleurs (each of four companies—250 men) with four mountain guns and a full complement of departmental officers and details, including much military transport. The troops at present are in summer quarters at the foot of the hills some 5 miles south of the town, but small detachments are posted on all roads leading to the frontier, at a distance of about 10 miles from the latter, and there are 100 men in Dilman itself.

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6. There are two Russian priests in the town, who are carrying on an active evangelistic campaign with the object of bringing the Nestorian Christians into the Orthodox fold; they have met with considerable success, being able to promise substantial temporal advantages in the form of Russian protection to all converts. They exercise considerable influence even over Persian officials.

7. The Russians have their own telephone and telegraph line from Khoi to Dilman, and their own telegraphists; they have connected up Chehrik (Ismaïl Agha's residence), Kuhne Shahr, their present camp, and other points by telephone.

The Khoi–Dilman road has been made fit for carts, and Russian goods (and troops) can enter the district from the north much more easily than formerly.

There is no Russian consular officer at Dilman, but the local officials, who take their orders from Khoi, are Russian nominees and are quite content, as at Urmia, to maintain cordial relations with their new masters, so long as the latter permit them to peculate in the time-honoured manner.

8. The local officials, though useful in their humble ways, are not, however, as at Urmia and Soujboulak, the stalking horse behind which the Russian consul pursues the objects of his ambition, whether these be political, for the good of his Government, or financial, for his personal benefit.

It is the late Ismaïl Agha (Simko) of Chehrik, formerly of Kotur, who has for the past three years, occupied this rôle, to the profit alike of his patrons of the Russian consular service and of himself. His activities extended to the districts of Khoi, Kotur, Dilman (Salmas), Somai and Baradust, and are dealt with in greater detail elsewhere; he enjoyed till recently a subsidy of 4,000 tomans per mensem from the Persian Government as Warden of the Marches, thanks to recommendations made to this effect by his Russian patrons. The bankruptcy of the local treasury has, however, prevented payment of this sum for the last few months, and I understand that it is the Russian consul who paid it up to the date of Ismaïl Agha's death, doubtless out of Persian revenue.

9. By far the greater proportion of the inhabitants of this district have been induced, sometimes against their will, to declare themselves Russian protégés. The local authorities refuse, in consequence, to assist the Belgian Financial Administration to collect revenue in the district unless expressly ordered to do so by the Governor-General; the latter has hitherto invariably declined to issue such orders. The town of Kuhne Shahr, consisting of some 800 houses, was taken under Russian protection some two years ago by virtue of a simple declaration to this effect by M. Tcherkof, Russian consul at Khoi, and the Deputy Governor of the town was until recently actually collecting the taxes on behalf of the Russian consulate.

10. Russian troops in this district have confiscated the arms of the staff of the Financial Administration in this district; on two separate occasions they have arrested the assistant to the financial agent (a Persian) on a trumped-up charge, kept him in prison for a month, and then released him without explanation.

11. *The Khoi District.*—This district, not less prosperous than that of Salmas, first became the object of active interest on the part of Russia in the autumn of 1911, when M. Tcherkof was appointed Russian consul in supersession to M. Preobajensky.

The *laissez-faire* policy of the latter was at once reversed and troops soon after entered the district—nominally to restore order—under circumstances well known to His Majesty's Government.

12. As in Dilman, the Russian occupation has been followed by an increase in public security, and, in consequence, of trade and of general prosperity.

The townspeople are convinced that the maintenance of this state of things is bound up with the continued presence of Russian troops, and there is no indication that any important section of the people resent the existence of a Russian garrison. The important Nestorian and Armenian communities are certainly strongly in favour of their remaining here permanently; the Russian priests pursue a line of policy similar to that of their brethren at Dilman and Urmia, which I have already described, and their efforts appear to be seconded by the Armenian archimandrite, whose relations with the Russian authorities are most cordial.

13. The Russian garrison consists of:—

2 battalions, 6th Caucasian Regiment;
1 battalion, 8th Caucasian Regiment;
2 mountain batteries;
500 men, 1st Caucasian Pioneers;
1 regiment Cossacks at full strength (with all reservists);

and a full complement of departmental officers, men, and impedimenta. It is at Khoi that General Vreboranof, commanding the Russian forces in Azerbaijan (Maku excluded), has his headquarters.

A large block of barracks is under construction close to the town, the owner being as a Dilman, the Russian tajirbashi, who also owns the new Russian consulate, an imposing building.

The Julfa–Khoi road has been made fit for carts, at considerable expense, and can even be used by motor cars; a Russian telephone and telegraph line runs along it, and Russian telegraphists are, in addition, installed in the Persian telegraph offices at Dilman and Khoi, where they monopolise the Persian line for the greater part of the day.

14. M. Piret, the Belgian financial agent at Khoi, furnished me with very full information regarding the working of his office, and showed me a quantity of correspondence relating to various matters at issue between him and the Russian consul. From the documents in question, amplified and explained in conversation with M. Piret, I venture to cite the following examples of recent Russian action:—

(*a.*) Russian subjects were first ordered to pay all their taxes to the Russian consulate early in 1912, on the strength, it appears, of an alleged request by M. Mornard to the Russian Minister for the assistance of Russian consuls in dealing with recalcitrant Russian tax-payers. This was soon after extended to Russian protégés, who, at the time, numbered only a score or less in this district; their numbers, however, increased very rapidly shortly afterwards, and now runs into thousands.

(*b.*) The Governor of Khoi was on good terms with the Belgian financial agent at first. The Russian consul induced the latter not to pay the Governor his salary on grounds of misconduct This was done. The Governor then asked the Russian consul to help him obtain his salary. The Russian consul agreed; the Governor became a Russian protégé, the Russian consul interceded for him, and now pays the Governors' salary through the consulate.

(*c.*) With the assistance of the Governor and the tajirbashi M. Tcherkof made Russian weights the legal standard in the bazaar.

(*d.*) "Khaliseh" villages (*i.e.*, Crown property), have been made to pay their revenue to the Russian consulate. Those who refused to do so have been threatened with pillage by Simko, the Russian protégé.

(*e.*) The Persian financial agent in Dilman was expelled by the Russians because he endeavoured to ascertain the names of those who paid taxes to the Russian consulate, and the amounts paid by them.

(*f.*) Haji Musa Khan, the Russian consular agent at Marand, demanded payment of a revenue from a nomad tribe, the Ainalu; on their refusing, he seized three horses and four men as hostages.

(*g.*) The printed notices affixed by the Financial Administration in the Khoi bazaar are habitually torn down by uniformed menials of the Russian consulate.

(*h.*) M. Tcherkof, whilst insisting that all Russian subjects and protégés must pay all their taxes, current or in arrear, to the consulate, invariably refused to provide the financial agent with a list of such persons or of the sums paid into the consulate. He even refused to permit of copies being taken of the certificates of protection of individuals.

Nor would he ever contradict the assertion of any person that he was a Russian protégé; the mere fact that he made such a claim was apparently held by M. Tcherkof to constitute a claim to Russian protection.

It is easy to see that this policy makes the collection of revenue by the Belgian Administration impossible, for if a Persian subject is pressed to pay, he claims Russian protection, thus avoiding payment.

15. *The Maku District.*—The town of Maku, which until recently consisted of some 400 houses, has, during the last twelve months, nearly doubled in size. Half-a-dozen substantial buildings in European style have sprung up, including a fine Russian consulate. As elsewhere in Azerbaijan, where the Russians are in strength, a general air of security and prosperity prevails, despite the possibility of war with Turkey.

The Russian garrison at Maku was until recently quite small, a mere consulate guard of fifty men. The Khan of Maku was more or less independent, and held aloof from his self-constituted protectors, with whom he had a bad reputation, which he enhanced by acts of pillage and oppression which, when committed by a Russian protégé like Ismaïl Agha, are condoned if not actually encouraged.

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During August the intrigues of the Khan with the Turks became more active, and information reached M. Serge Olferief, the Russian consul, that a *coup* was in contemplation—the idea apparently being that the Kurds from Turkey should invade Maku by invitation, and that the Turks should then declare it to be a Turkish possession.

So serious a view did M. Olferief take of the matter that he deported the Khan to Tiflis, on his own initiative, two days before the date fixed for the contemplated *coup*, a drastic step which was, he told me, sharply criticised by the Russian Government. At the instance of the Persian Government, the Russian Government has guaranteed that the Khan's local properties shall not be touched and that he shall continue to enjoy the revenue thereof; this undertaking affords them ample excuse for intervention locally on a large scale, the Khan's properties being very numerous.

16. M. Olferief impressed me most favourably; his attitude to M. Piret, who visited Maku with me, was reasonable; he promised to assist the Financial Administation in every way provided that they would devote a proportion of the revenue realised to local needs—notably towards the construction of a cart road from the Russian frontier at Shah Takhteh. He possesses private means, is well-read, financially above suspicion, and enjoys an excellent reputation for impartiality and fair dealing. He is altogether a different type of man to his colleagues at Khoi, Urumia, and Soujboulak.

16. The Russian troops now at Maku include two Cossack regiments at full strength and 400 infantry of 1st Caucasian Tirailleurs, with some guns and a wireless telegraphy installation, which is in communication with Julfa.

17. The garrison is commanded by a general, recently arrived with troops from Russian Turkestan, who is independent of the general at Khoi. This force cannot be considered as a permanent garrison: Maku is so little fitted by situation and resources to accommodate a large body of troops, and so close to the Russian frontier, that there can be little doubt that their presence here is due to strategical exigencies, and that the bulk of them will be withdrawn as soon as the situation permits.

18. A permanent pontoon bridge has replaced the ferry over the Araxes on the Russo-Persian frontier at Shah Takhteh, and active measures are in progress to improve the Shah Takhteh–Maku track sufficiently to make it passable for motor cars and heavy waggons.

19. The principal ruling families of Maku have near relations occupying similar positions in Russian territory at Erivan, where one of their number commands a Cossack regiment. Their sons are sent to school in Russia from the age of eight upwards, and wear Russian uniforms; all alike speak Russian and Turkish, but not Persian. One of them has taken an advanced diploma at St. Petersburgh in law and literature.

20. Maku is a Russian post of observation to some extent for Turkey, and when I was at Maku I met one "Najib Badr Khanza, Abdur Razak Khan," living with the consul and acting as secretary. This man is of the ruling family of the Turkish tribe of Bhutan Kurds; he was originally in the Turkish diplomatic service at St. Petersburgh, later on master of ceremonies to the Sultan, and finally in chains for four years in Tripoli, whence he was released, I believe, soon after Sultan Abdul Hamid's deposition.

The present Khan's brother-in-law, Ali Khan, an immensely corpulent man of 20 stone, is honorary secretary to the Russian consulate, wears the uniform of a second lieutenant in the Russian army, lunches with the consul, and acts as butler at ceremonial dinners, when he hands the sauce to his brother the Governor, a combination of functions surely impossible except in a Russian *ménage*.

In such circumstances it is inevitable that Russian influence should be predominant at Maku, and it is inconceivable that the Persian Government can ever re-establish its authority here. There is no Persian telegraph office and only a very slow weekly postal service with Khoi, whereas there is a daily consular post to Russia.

21. I will now beg leave to revert to a matter concerning, in greater or less degree, the whole district, viz., the position occupied by the late Ismaïl Agha (Simko) in local Russian policy.

This man, who in 1911 was dependent of the Khan of Maku, resident at Kotur, and distinguished from his brothers only by his unscrupulousness, was selected by M. Tcherkof, when he first arrived at Khoi, as a suitable tool for the furtherance of his private and official ends.

His influence over the districts near Khoi was consolidated and greatly extended thanks to the gift of 1,000 rifles, which were obtained from the Russian Government on representations by Russian officials that Turkish aggression could be stemmed in this way. Thus armed, Simko commenced to harry the villagers for 50 miles round, till all owned his sway and paid handsomely for his protection. He became a Russian protégé, and thus brought under the protection of his patrons some 600 villagers, including most of the Crown property in the district. The fantastic subsidy of 4,000 tomans a month as Warden of the Marches was, later on, obtained for him from the Persian Government.

His habitual acts of violence against villages on both sides of the frontier were for a long time connived at, and up to the date of his death, at the beginning of the present month, he still enjoyed the confidence and support of the Russian military authorities, with whom he fraternised freely. Signs were not lacking, however, that Russian consular officers (now that M. Tchernof is no longer in the district) were tired of Simko and all his works, and the news of his death was received with outspoken satisfaction by every local Russian officer I have met. All realised that he had misused the support given to him, and that their policy in regard to him was extremely unpopular.

He had already made his fortune, however, and, if universally-believed stories go for anything, had also helped to make a substantial fortune for his first patron, by methods which I need not specify here.

22. He is not, however, the only local notable who has contrived, whilst treading out the corn for his Muscovite masters, to take an ample share for himself. Haji Hassan Sarraf, of Khoi, the Russian tajirbashi, who ten years ago was an obscure merchant, is now one of the richest men in North-West Azerbaijan, and owns barracks, consulates, &c., and other valuable property all over the district.

Hussain Agha, one of the Persian clerks of the Russian consulate, on a salary of about 3*l.* a month, has recently built houses at a cost of about 1,000*l.* out of the emoluments of his post during the past two years.

Incredible as it may seem, this man, with his brother, who occupies a similar position, is now under arrest in the consulate prison, charged with having instigated the murder of a Russian soldier. It appears that when last a Russian soldier was murdered in the town these brothers were entrusted with the duty of investigating the crime and collecting 3,000 tomans compensation. They found the occasion so lucrative (as also did their master) that they arranged for a repetition of the offence: they were only found out after several months, and after many innocent notables had been arrested at their instigation and released after paying large sums.

23. I will conclude this already too lengthy report by a few remarks as to the objects of the Russian Government in occupying this part of Persia, so far as it can be gauged from observations on the spot.

I understand from my Russian comrades that the position of their troops at Urmia is officially considered to be strategetically unsound, the defence of the town and plain necessitating a wide dispersion of troops; the disposition of the forces now quartered at Maku, Khoi, and Dilman, on the other hand, is undoubtedly determined primarily by military considerations; the troops effectively protect the western flank of the Caucasus from any attack by the Turks through Persia, unless in large numbers, and I have little doubt that, in the event of war with Turkey, the regiment at Urmia would be withdrawn to Dilman or Khoi.

At the present moment, all the passes leading across the inner range of mountains, some 15 miles east of the frontier, are guarded by Russian troops.

Russian officers assure me that in the event of declaration of war the regiments now here would at once move on to the frontier, seize the main passes, and advance, as in 1878, on Erzeroum. The neutrality of Prussia would in fact be violated by Russia just as that of Belgium was violated by Germany, and for much the same reasons.

24. Large scale maps of the whole Perso-Turkish frontier were completed during 1912–13, and a special officer of the general staff, Colonel Andrewsky, has been Resident at Urmia since 1912, charged with the study of the frontier questions.

The information in their possession regarding Turkish territory seems, however, to be very defective, our own information being, I believe, far more detailed and accurate.

25. Thus though the original influx of troops may have been political in aim (M. Belaief told me that for two years before the troops came Russian consuls had been urging this step on an unsympathetic Foreign Office), I think there can be no doubt that their continued retention in their present large numbers of Urmia, Dilman, Khoi and Maku, is ascribable to strategical rather than tn political ambitions. Public order could be well maintained in north-western Azerbaijan by a Russian force considerably smaller than that now quartered there. The barracks now ready or under construction would accommodate about half the force now in the district.

On the other hand thoughtful Russian officers like M. Minorsky and M. Olferief

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have often expressed to me, I believe with sincerity, their disapproval at the present policy of most Russian consuls in Azerbaijan, and have said that Russia itself is so backward and so badly in need of funds that it is folly to undertake now responsibilities in Azerbaijan, which profit Russia not at all.

From discussion with them I have gained the impression that local Russian policy in Azerbaijan is largely settled by consuls locally, with the general approval of their Minister at Tehran, and that the Russian Government is often not informed of the detailed working of such policy. On the other hand, the activities of the priests appear to be inspired direct from Russia.

As for our own policy in Azerbaijan. Whilst on the one hand publicists in England urge that we should insist on the evacuation of the province by Russia, regardless of the consequences, there is, I believe, no considerable body of native or European opinion in the province in favour of this course. Notwithstanding the crudeness of Russian methods, and the low standard of official purity prevailing, the general condition of those portions of the province occupied by them is better than it has been for many years, and I believe that the blunt assertions, made two decades ago by an English traveller, and quoted in the margin,* express accurately enough the unbiassed views of many foreigners and natives who are free from political predilections.

Nor should it be forgotten that the popularity of Russia in north-eastern Turkey in Asia is steadily growing, as a result of the oppression and misgovernment of the Turks, particularly at such moments as the present.

26. A prominent member of the Persian Commission, with considerable administrative experience in Government offices in Tehran, tells me that on his return to Tehran he will strongly advocate an arrangement giving to Russia whatever she wants in Azerbaijan, provided that her aggressions in other parts of Persia finally cease, and in conversation he made it clear that his views did not differ substantially from those which I have submitted above. Other members of the Persian Commission have recalled the fact that the Treaty of Berlin, embodying the decisions of the last great European Congress, included a clause regarding Azerbaijan (Article 60—Kotur frontier), and have expressed the hope that the next European treaty will specifically reaffirm the independence of Persia in general and of Azerbaijan in particular.

I have, &c.
A. T. WILSON, *Captain, I.A*

[74406] No. 240.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 692.)
(Telegraphic.) *Petrograd, November* 23, 1914.

YOUR telegram No. 1078 of 22nd November: Persian Cabinet.

I spoke with Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning, and he assured me that he would be as conciliatory as possible, and not press either of the two ex-Ministers.

He is, however, much annoyed with the Persian Government for again pressing for withdrawal of Russian troops, and proposes leaving above-mentioned communication without an answer.

[74895] No. 241.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 353.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, November* 24, 1914.

IN spite of protests of Persian Government, which received Russian Minister's support, Shuja-ed-Dowleh has been allowed to return to Tabriz, where he arrived in a military automobile and drove straight to Russian consulate-general. He is now at

* "If it is on political grounds that we wish to preserve in a part of Persia in which we have no interest a state of government that is a disgrace to humanity, we ought to be ashamed of ourselves . . . . for absolute cruelty, corruption, and oppression, Azerbaijan stands unparalleled in my experience; nor are we likely to see redress until Russia has seized the reins of power."—From "Batoum to Bagdad," pp. 105 and 106. W. B. Harris, F.R.G.S., 1896. Blackwood and Sons.

Nehmetabad, the Russian village outside Tabriz, and will, it is stated, proceed to his estates at Saragha. His presence in the province makes position of Acting Governor-General miserable, as they are bitter enemies, and it is believed that Shuja-ed-Dowleh has come back with full Russian support. My colleague has promised to warn him that he must keep quiet.

It seems a pity that Russian Government should find it necessary to take such a step as this at the present somewhat critical moment. It engenders a feeling of mistrust of their assurances, and that wishes of the Government should be so completely ignored increases the deep hatred of Russia, which appears to me to be increasing.

(Repeated to Petrograd.)

[74914] No. 242.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 356.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, November* 24, 1914.

RUSSIAN Government have complained of the action of Acting Governor-General of Ispahan, Samsam's son, in the matter of proclamation having a strong anti-Russian bias, issued in answer to our manifesto setting forth our case against Turkey. A complaint is also made against a munshi of Imperial Bank of Persia, said to have been responsible as censor for the publication.

I am making enquiry on this point, and have explained to my Russian colleague that the Acting Governor-General did all that was possible to suppress circulation of the proclamation as soon as he heard of it.

Apart from the fact that it is a little unreasonable that we should claim monopoly of publication of statements of a neutral country, moment seems to me very ill chosen for raising these frivolous complaints about occurrences which are not considered serious at the legation.

(Repeated to Petrograd.)

[74915] No. 243.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 358.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, November* 24, 1914.

YOUR telegram No. 302 of 21st November: British interests in South Persia.

Most effective influences among Persian tribesmen are personal and financial. I have great belief in the former, but it requires to be followed up by latter. Certain British officials are well known for influence they have acquired among tribesmen. It appeared to me that such men might be used as local officials, or in some such capacity, to get into close touch with tribal chiefs, whose permanent good-will could of course only be secured by money. If once railway is run through situation should be assured, but it appears most problematical if railway can be built unless good-will of influential chiefs on road can be first assured. There is at present some talk of opening of road from Khoremabad to Dizful.

Nizam-es-Sultaneh professes his ability to do so, but wants money that is not forthcoming. Since his arrival at Burujird, his Excellency has increased his unenviable reputation for corruption and avarice. All that can be done for the present is being done to improve relations between Bakhtiaris and Sheikh of Mohammerah. Great danger respecting loyalty to us of former is their future position at Ispahan. Unless we can secure them in enjoyment of their properties, they will inevitably sooner or later follow example of Zil-es-Sultan and seek other help. We must humour them for the present by getting them the governorships, whilst forcing them to become as good governors as possible. Only way in which Russian methods in Ispahan can be countered, pending a general settlement, is by appointing governors who do not lend themselves entirely to their execution. Samsam did good work in this direction as long as he lasted.

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[74916] No. 244

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 359.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, November* 24, 1914.

AT a meeting at the Russian Legation, at which Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Russian Minister, and myself were present, Prime Minister expressed request that Russia would withdraw her troops from all places in North Persia other than Azerbaijan. His Highness expressed his regret that Russian Government had not agreed to withdraw their troops from that province before, but recognised, much as he still wished it were possible, that it was too late to do so now. He argued that task of Persian Government would be made much easier if the Russian troops were withdrawn from other places in Persia, because people hostile to neutral policy of Government would then have less occasion to jeer at a neutrality which consisted in tolerating the presence on Persian soil of troops of a foreign country at war with a Mussulman State. It transpires that Turkish Ambassador has lately used threatening language, and has said that if Russian troops remain in parts of Persia other than Azerbaijan Turkey will no longer consider herself bound to respect Persian neutrality.

Russian Minister represented that if Russia were now to concede Persia's request it might well be considered by general public as a yielding to Turkey's threats. This might not discourage, but rather encourage, party in favour of Turkey.

It would, I think, be well, as far as it may be possible, to make some concession to Persia in direction of this request.

State of country does not necessitate presence of Russian troops in Mazandaran and Meshed, but it would be well to keep them at Kazvin and Resht until the war is over. A specially good impression would, I think, be made if the troops were withdrawn from Meshed, and such a step could hardly be construed by public as a yielding to Turkish pressure. My Russian colleague is telegraphing to Petrograd in this sense.

(Repeated to Petrograd.)

[74910] No. 245.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 696.)
(Telegraphic.) *Petrograd, November* 24, 1914.

YOUR telegram No. 1,089 of 23rd November: Persian neutrality.

Minister for Foreign Affairs assures me that necessary instructions were sent long ago to Russian Minister at Tehran, and that latter has been acting in entirely unauthorised manner. He would like, he said, to recall him, but it was impossible to do so at present moment. He has asked me to send him an *aide-mémoire* so that he may enquire into the matter.

(Repeated to Tehran.)

[75729] No. 246.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 361.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, November* 26, 1914.

MY telegram No. 353 of 24th November.

Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me yesterday that Shuja has taken up his abode at the Russian consul-general's summer quarters at Mehmetabad. Though Shuja has no official status he is summoning certain non-effective Azerbaijan regiments to arms. Minister for Foreign Affairs is in communication with the Russian Minister on the subject, and has telegraphed to Persian Ministers at London and Petrograd, but he also desired to bring the matter to my notice.

Such action, which the Russians would have no difficulty in preventing if they wish, makes the position of the Governor-General intolerable, and puts the Government, which is anxious to be friendly, in a most awkward position, if, as the Minister for Foreign Affairs supposes, Shuja's action is meant to force Persia into war against Turkey on our side; such attempts to do so are not at all likely to achieve their object—rather the reverse.

(Repeated to Petrograd.)

[74916] No. 247.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 1106.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November* 26, 1914.

SIR W. TOWNLEY'S telegram No. 359 of 24th November: Russian troops in Persia.

Russian Government, I believe, fully share our view as to advantages of conciliating Persian opinion at present juncture, and I therefore hope that they may be disposed to try the effect on Persian sentiment of a withdrawal of troops from Meshed.

Your Excellency should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of above, and of substance of Sir W. Townley's telegram referred to.

(Repeated to Tehran.)

[74895] No. 248.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 1107.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November* 26, 1914.

TEHRAN telegram No. 353 of 24th November: Shuja.

It appears evident that the return of Shuja can only have unfortunate consequences, and you should mention it privately, but emphatically, to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and urge that Shuja should not be allowed to remain.

I fully realise that it concerns the Russian sphere especially. But at the present time, when the two Governments are most closely concerned in the whole Persian situation, this man's return may upset the situation and thereby embarrass us all. It is most desirable to make things easy for the Persians and keep them friendly in this crisis, while it can be done without imperilling material Russian or British interests.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 308.)

[75758] No. 249.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 707.)
(Telegraphic.) *Petrograd, November* 26, 1914.

MY telegram No. 696 of 24th November.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that there must have been misunderstanding, as in a telegram dated 20th November Russian Minister had stated that he had not failed to call attention of Persian Government to the fact that the Turks had violated Persian territory.

Persian Government had replied that Turkish invasion had been provoked by the presence of the Russian troops in Azerbaijan, and had repeated request that measures might be taken to prevent that province becoming theatre of military operations.

Minister for Foreign Affairs added that he would reprimand the Russian Minister for his unauthorised language reported in Tehran telegram No 351 of 21st November.

(Sent to Tehran.)

[78959] No. 250.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 364.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, December* 4, 1914.

MY immediately preceding telegram of 3rd December: Persia.

Minister for Foreign Affairs being indisposed, I yesterday saw chef de cabinet, who informed me that the Persian Government are telegraphing to Persian Ambassador at Constantinople to find out whether Salar is still there. Reports received by the Persian Government confirm the news that there is considerable excitement on the western frontier of Persia, but the Persian Government are urging on inhabitants necessity for neutrality.

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Soujboulak has been occupied by some 450 Turks under Mutessarif of Kerkuk and 400 Kurds under Sheikh Jeobtleddin of Rayet, who appears to be behaving well. Persian Government have telegraphed to Persian Cossacks at Soujboulak not to interfere with them. In the meantime, the Persian Government are protesting to the Turkish Ambassador, who says that his Government are obliged to take such measures in self-defence as long as Persian neutrality is not respected by Russia. Persian Government are afraid that, should this state of things continue, war may spread to other parts of Persia, as Turks openly declare that they may be obliged to fight Russians wherever they find them in Persia.

Chef de cabinet further informed me that Sheikh-ul-Islam of Constantinople has sent to press here proclamation for a holy war against the allies, but that Persian Government had prevented its publication.

He added that Shuja is leaving Maraga for Mian-du-ob, whilst Russian consul-general, he says, has fled. Shuja is raising men and calling to arms Persian regiments which are on indefinite leave. That he is being employed by the Russians is shown by a telegram from His Majesty's consul at Tabriz, stating that Russian consul-general told him that he did not anticipate further advance of Turks on Tabriz, and that such an advance, if made, could be dealt with in the first instance by Shuja, who has been provided with a supply of rifles of modern pattern.

Chef de cabinet again insisted that the presence of Shuja in Persia is a constant source of trouble to the Persian Government.

I may add that the generally correct conduct and good behaviour of the Turks in Persia as compared with Russian action has been commented on here.

(Repeated to Petrograd.)

[79257] No. 251.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 365.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Tehran, December 5, 1914.*

MEDJLISS opened to-day by Shah.

[73465] No. 252.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 314.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, December 9, 1914.*

YOUR telegram No. 346 of 20th November: Islands and Strick concession.

I have informed Messrs. Strick that, pending definite result of negotiations between His Majesty's Government and Persian Government for lease of certain islands, of which there is no immediate prospect, His Majesty's Government will not oppose renewal of firm's concession; but that His Majesty's Government are not prepared to support Messrs. Strick to exclusion of any other British firm, such as Ellinger.

[81602] No. 253.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 370.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, December 11, 1914.*

GENERAL HJALMARSON called on me yesterday evening on his return to Tehran to inform me officially, under instructions of the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, that it had been definitely decided that Swedish gendarmerie mission would be withdrawn from Persia on 1st March.

General added that this step had been decided on in consequence of determined Russian opposition with which Swedish officers found themselves confronted.

General made a less categorical statement in a somewhat similar sense to Minister for Foreign Affairs, and left me to make a like communication to the Russian Minister. French Minister contends that such a communication should have been made through himself, and doubts general's authority to make it.

Before considering what steps should be taken to meet situation that is greatly

disastrous for Persia and foreign trade in Persia, I would venture to suggest that it might be ascertained at Stockholm whether the decision to recall mission is irrevocable, and whether in that case Swedish officers who might wish to remain in Persian service without the mission having an official character would be allowed to do so. I still consider maintenance of gendarmerie under foreign officers essential.

[81616] No. 254.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 372.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, December 11, 1914.*

MY telegram No. 364 of 4th December.

I am informed officially that there is reason to believe that Turkish expedition to Soujboulak, having failed to secure Kurd adherents, has been recalled to Turkish territory. Renewed complaints are made by Persian Government of the action of Russian military authorities in supplying Shuja with arms and setting him up to resist advance of Turks with Persian force. Not only is it pointed out that Persia might have thus become embroiled in war against her will, but all arguments against Turkish enlistment of Persian Kurds are thereby stultified.

Government affect to fear lest Shuja, who is considered as a rebel, may move on Tehran now that he has felt his power. I do not think that there is any fear of this, but the inconsiderate action of Russian authorities in arming Shuja after having given assurances that he was merely returning to look after his properties has made a deplorable impression.

(Repeated to Petrograd.)

[82135] No. 255.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 374.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, December 13, 1914.*

MY telegram No. 372 of 11th December.

Russian Minister called on me this morning to ask in the name of his Government if I would co-operate with him in endeavouring to persuade Persian Government to authorise Shuja to organise resistance to advance of Turks into Azerbaijan.

I replied that I could not take any action in the sense desired without your instructions, and on being pressed for my personal opinion by my colleague, I added that it seemed to me rather too much to urge Persian Government, however unofficially, to recognise as their champion a man in whom they had no confidence, and that I was further convinced that they would never agree. I continued that it appeared to me rather a mean way to endeavour to drag Persia into the quarrel, and it would look as if Russia wanted her faithful Shuja to do work for her which would make Persia a belligerent, because she has no troops to spare for the purpose herself. I expressed my opinion that it was one thing frankly to seek Persian co-operation if that was wanted, making such conditions as Persia might feel justified in asking, but that it was quite another story to, as it were, trick her into becoming a belligerent through the actions of a man who is looked upon as a rebel.

My colleague seemed greatly ashamed of his mission.

Russian Minister said that Turks have not left Soujboulak, but are now busily preparing a further advance, and have looted Russian consulate.

Minister for Foreign Affairs complained to me that Shuja intercepts the telegrams from Soujboulak, and that Government is consequently not aware of what is happening there.

(Repeated to Petrograd.)

[81616] No. 256.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 1190.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December* 13, 1914.

SIR W. TOWNLEY'S telegram No. 372 of 11th December: Shuja.

I have received most satisfactory reports of Persia's attitude at present, and I feel that the recall of Shuja from Persia, or at least to Tabriz, would have excellent effect and greatly help Persian Government. In any case, I hope that Russian Government will, instead of supplying him with arms, instruct him to cease his military activity, which has developed apparently since M. Sazonof's remarks reported in your telegrams No. 711 of 27th November and No. 746 of 4th December.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 317.)

[82294] No. 257.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 267.)
Sir, *Tehran, November* 9, 1914.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 258 of the 10th ultimo, enclosing copy of a note addressed to the Russian Minister by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, requesting the withdrawal of the Russian troops in North Persia, and to telegraphic correspondence upon the subject of Persia's neutrality in the present war, I have the honour to transmit herewith the translation of a note addressed to the Russian Minister by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which the latter repeats the intention of the Persian Government to declare its neutrality. Ala-es-Sultaneh at the same time acknowledges the receipt of M. Korostovetz's note, in which he explained the reasons why the Russian Government could not accede to the Persian request that they should withdraw their troops. His Highness took occasion in this note to add that the Persian Government would be justified, under the circumstances, in holding the Russian Government responsible for any loss the country might suffer as the result of possible hostilities between Russian and Turkish troops on Persian territory.

Since the date of the note hostilities have actually broken out between the above-named countries, and I understand from my Russian colleague that he has given the Persian Government verbal assurances that the continued presence in North Persia in no way implies that Russia has any intention to annex any part of Persia, that indeed any such idea is quite foreign to the intentions of the Russian Government, and that full compensation will be made to the Persian Government for any material losses they may suffer as a result of the hostilities on Persian soil. M. Korostovetz remarked, when telling me this, that the position of Persia to-day is similar to that of China during the Russo-Japanese war of 1904, when a much larger area was the theatre of war between two alien belligerents, and when compensation was paid to China, who preserved a strict neutrality. M. Korostovetz has been asked to repeat his assurances in writing.

So far no news has reached Tehran of what has occurred in Azerbaijan, and it is not known whether a collision between Russian and Turkish troops has yet occurred on Persian territory. The fact that the Russian army of the Caucasus has crossed the Turkish frontier and is marching on Erzeroum, is a proof that Russia at least has not sought to take advantage of her privileged position, and that if hostilities occur on Persian soil Turkey will be the aggressor. In discussing the situation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs last Wednesday, I expressed my opinion that the presence of Russian troops in Azerbaijan was the best safeguard that Persian territory would not be devastated, because the Turks might think twice before attacking the Russian forces, which presumably occupy the most favourable positions, whereas there is every reason to suppose that, had Azerbaijan been free of Russian troops, the Turks would not have hesitated, after the manner of their German advisers in Belgium, to have endeavoured to penetrate through the province into the Caucasus. I have also the honour to transmit to you herewith, Sir, translation of a note addressed to me by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, enclosing a copy of the Shah's Firman proclaiming Persia's neutrality in the present war. With a view to securing a genuine observance of this neutrality, the Government has, since war with Turkey was declared, summoned

the leading members of the clergy, the nobility, and of the press, and has impressed upon them that they should adopt a strictly impartial attitude, and do nothing that may tend to favour or prejudice the one or the other of the belligerents.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 257.

Ala-es-Sultaneh to Russian Minister.

(Translation.)
Your Excellency, *November* 1, 1914.

IN continuation of my note of the 3rd ultimo respecting the decision of my Government to declare its neutrality in the European war, and to obtain the means necessary for making that neutrality effective, and in reply to your Excellency's note of the 7th ultimo respecting your Government's inability at the present moment to withdraw the Russian troops, I have the honour to point out to your Excellency that this request of my Government was both in keeping with the repeated promises of the Imperial Russian Government, and in the interests of the two Governments in its desire to prevent any untoward incidents on the Persian frontier. My Government much regretted the non-concurrence of the Imperial Russian Government with its good intentions. As your Excellency has thought the presence of Russian troops necessary for the security of foreign subjects, I must draw your attention to the fact that before the arrival of the Russian troops in Azerbaijan, no one interfered with or made any attempt on foreign subjects. If the Persian Government had received assistance in strengthening its military force, that force would have carried out that duty and the reason for the presence of the Russian troops, referred to by your Excellency, would have been removed.

If the above facts are taken into consideration it will be clearly seen that my Government has adopted all possible measures to prevent the effects of the unfortunate war in Europe being felt on the Persian frontier, but as my Government has, unfortunately, not received the support which it expected in its good intentions, I am sure that the Imperial Russian Government will agree with me that the Persian Government will be justified in holding the Imperial Government responsible for any political and substantial losses which this country and the Government may suffer.

With regard to certain unfortunate incidents for which, as stated by your Excellency, the Kurds have been responsible, I have the honour to point out that one of the principal objects in the proposal made by my Government was to prevent such occurrences, and to stop the spread of conflagrations as a result of such incidents.

I avail, &c.
ALA-ES-SULTANEH.

Enclosure 2 in No. 257.

Ala-es-Sultaneh to Sir W. Townley.

(Translation.)
Your Excellency, *November* 2, 1914.

FROM the beginning of the war, still unfortunately raging in Europe, the Imperial Government of Persia has maintained its neutrality and has intended to declare officially that neutrality to all the Powers. Now that the conflagation of war is increasing every day, that new Powers are joining it and that it is possible that it may be extended to the frontiers of Persia, the Persian Government has carried out its above-mentioned intention.

I therefore have the honour to transmit herewith the Imperial Firman declaring the neutrality of Persia in the present European war, especially in the war which may break out on the Persian frontier.

I trust your Excellency will oblige me by communicating the contents of the Imperial Firman to your Government and your nationals.

Your Excellency is at the same time requested to use your good offices with your Government that the neutrality of Persia may be respected and hostilities on Persian territory avoided. By obtaining the support of your Government to the neutrality of

Persia, you may save this country and people from the hardship and disasters which may be brought about by the carrying of the war into Persia by the belligerent Powers.

I avail, &c.
ALA-ES-SULTANEH.

Enclosure 3 in No. 257.

Imperial Firman.

WHEREAS a war is unfortunately raging among the European Powers which may approach near to the frontier of this country, and whereas our friendly relations by the Grace of God continue with the belligerent Powers, in order that all the inhabitants of the country may be informed of our sacred intentions in maintaining these friendly relations with the belligerent Powers, we order his Highness the Mustaufi-el-Mamelek, President of the Council of the Ministers, and the Minister of the Interior, to communicate the Imperial command to the governors of the provinces and the officials that our Government are neutral and maintain as before friendly relations with the belligerent Powers. For this reason the attention of the Government officials should be drawn to the fact that they must not in any way, by land or sea, help or oppose any of the belligerent Powers, or prepare or transport war materials or arms for any of the parties. They must avoid helping any of the belligerent Powers, and respect the neutrality of their Government.

Further commands will be issued for the execution of any more decisions which may be arrived at by our Ministers and submitted to Us for the perfection of our neutrality and the maintenance of our friendly relations with the Powers.

H. I. M. THE SHAH.

November 2, 1914.

[82296] No. 258.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 269.)

Sir, *Tehran, November* 11, 1914.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 274 of the 17th September, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note which I have received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs setting forth that, in consequence of the war, the revenues of the southern customs have fallen off to such an extent that it is feared they will not suffice to meet the service of the various loans and advances secured upon them, and asking that the above-mentioned service may be suspended for one year, and the Persian Government permitted to encash the entire revenues of the southern customs. The note further calls the attention of the British and Russian Governments to the financial situation of Persia, and requests that a joint advance of 3,000,000 tomans (about 500,000*l.*), may be made to the Persian Government by the two Governments. A similar note was addressed to the Russian Legation, to whom a request was equally made that the payments from the northern customs receipts may be postponed for one year.

At an interview subsequent to the reception of the note with the Prime Minister, at which the Ministers of Finance and Foreign Affairs were present, I represented the unreasonableness of Persia making such a request without even hinting at how it was proposed that the money would be secured and eventually refunded. No attempt was even made, I showed, to indicate from what source the service of the interest of the new advance was to be derived, whilst it was not encouraging to see in the same note an appeal for the postponement of the service of the already existing loans and advances.

Mustaufi-el-Mamelek replied that there was no hope for Persia if the question was to be treated from a purely business point of view, but that the Government had relied in making the request upon the long-tried benevolence towards Persia of the British Government.

To this I answered that this was a sentimental policy, and that the days of ntiment appeared to me to have given place to those of common sense, and that,

moreover, I was by no means sure that the sentimental policy adopted towards Persia in the past in financial matters had not contributed rather to her undoing than to her welfare. Succeeding Governments had learnt too readily to trust to the goodwill of friends and had not, for that reason, made sufficiently strenuous efforts to make the resources of Persia suffice for her needs.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 258.

Memorandum communicated to Sir W. Townley by Ala-us-Sultaneh.

(Translation.)

THE Persian Government has the honour to inform the British Government that, owing to the war in Europe, Persian trade with foreign countries is passing through a grave crisis, which has reduced the customs revenues of the country. If the war between the European Powers is not brought to a speedy conclusion it is feared that the condition of the customs will continue to get worse. It is also feared that, even after the war, the commercial relations with foreign countries will not recover their normal condition for several months.

In these circumstances it is almost certain that the fall in the customs revenue, which is the result of the present war, will prevent the Persian Government repaying its debts, that is to say, the advances made on the security of the revenues of the southern customs.

In the countries at war a respite for a certain time has been given, and arrangements have been made to prevent as much as possible the bankruptcy of those who have suffered by the war.

The Persian Government is not directly implicated in this war, but there can be no doubt that owing to its position Persia has suffered from the serious consequences of the hostilities, which have effected its revenues in an incredible manner.

The Persian Government earnestly hope that His Majesty's Government will take these circumstances into consideration and see whether it is possible that for one year, *i.e.*, until October 1915, the repayment of the instalments on loans and advances made by arrangement with the British Government, and amounting to more than 10,000*l.* a month, can be postponed, and the whole of the customs revenue of the south be left at the disposal of the Persian Government for the above-mentioned year.

The Persian Government earnestly hope that as soon as their foreign commercial relations resume their former condition the customs revenue will increase, and that it will not be obliged to delay the repayment of the interest and the sinking funds more than one year.

The Persian Government trust that this request will be met favourably by His Britannic Majesty's Government, and that the surplus revenue of the customs of the south will be put at its disposal.

It is time that the Persian Government should draw the attention of the British and Russian Governments to the most difficult position of the Persian treasury, and the grave crisis through which it has been passing during a whole year. The reason of this grave situation is the expenses which the Persian Government has had to bear on account of the frequent troubles created during the last four years by the tribes. These incidents not only have caused great expense to the Persian Government, but on account of the plunder of various districts and the damage done to the harvests in the country for several years have greatly affected the collection of the internal revenue, so that the revenues foreseen in the budget have not been collected.

The Persian Government is confident that there will be no difficulty in the British and Russian Governments realising the genuineness of the above statements, and that they will agree that the Persian Government have not failed to take suitable measures to remedy this state of affairs.

Since the Persian Government cannot by its own resources improve the situation, it has perfect hope in the assistance of the British and Russian Governments, who have not refused it on similar occasions, and request that a joint loan of 3,000,000 tomans be made to the Persian Government. The latter think that this sum will be sufficient to meet the present requirements of the treasury, amounting to 2,500,000

tomans. When this is done the Persian Government will be able to improve its position and carry out with confidence the measures now under consideration by the Cabinet, until such a time as the finances of the country shall have recovered their normal position.

October 17, 1914.

[82297] No. 259.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 270.)

Sir, *Tehran, November* 12, 1914.

I MUCH regret to have to report that the recent progress of the negotiations for the purchase of the islands in the Persian Gulf off Bunder Abbas have been most unsatisfactory in their results, which is especially disheartening seeing that the proposal, when first submitted to the late Minister for Foreign Affairs, Vossuk-ed-Dowleh, to the present Prime Minister, Mustaufi-ul-Mamalek, and to the present Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ala-es-Sultaneh, appeared to meet with a much more favourable reception than I had anticipated would be the case.

Upon receipt of your telegram No. 252 of the 7th ultimo, I presented a memorandum in French to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, of which I have the honour to enclose a copy, setting forth the very favourable conditions upon which His Majesty's Government was prepared to negotiate for the purchase of the said islands.

Nothing in the manner in which Ala-es-Sultaneh received the memorandum led me to suppose that there was any change in his Highness's attitude towards the proposal, and I was promised an early answer, for which I pressed in consequence of the urgent nature of certain financial arrangements which the Persian Government found itself called upon to make in order to avoid a disaster.

No answer having been returned to the memorandum, I sought an interview with the Prime Minister, at which I requested the presence also of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Finance, for the purpose of examining the financial situation with a view to seeing whether or not the gendarmerie could be maintained; in order to discuss the proposal made by the Persian Government respecting the revenues of the southern customs and a new advance from the British and Russian Governments, which forms the subject of an accompanying despatch; and to ascertain definitely the views of the Cabinet respecting the sale of the islands.

I pointed out that you, Sir, could not fail to be disappointed, if not seriously annoyed, at the attitude adopted by the Government in ignoring our proposal to provide money in return for something tangible in the place of the usual shadowy promises that have been accepted in the past, and in making instead a most unreasonable proposal without, on this occasion, even attempting to hint at any security for the suggested advance. As it was evident that the Minister of Finance was at the back of the group in the Cabinet that is hostile to the purchase proposal, I turned my attention more especially to that notoriously corrupt official, and told him in very plain language that as long as a Minister of his calibre remained at the head of the financial administration, Persia need not expect that any money would be forthcoming from either Great Britain or Russia. I let Mohtesham-es-Sultaneh know clearly that I am fully conversant with the intrigues of himself and his secretary-general, by means of which they hope to sow discord among their Belgian employés and so to get a larger control of the finances of the country into their own hands, the road from which to their pockets is a short one.

I then turned to the Prime Minister and told his Highness that I could not submit this fresh unreasonable proposal for financial assistance to you, Sir, unless I could add at the same time that the Cabinet was considering in a favourable spirit the proposal I had submitted for the purchase of the islands. Mustaufi-ul-Mamalek, after some hesitation, which was not unnatural seeing that the proposal had previously been well entertained by him, said that the scheme was one that was of such vital importance to Persia, since it concerned the sale of a portion of her territory, that the Government could not deal with it without the presence of the Medjliss, which would meet in a very short time.

I then pressed the Prime Minister to give me an assurance that the measure would be laid before the Medjliss as soon as it assembled and would receive the strong support of the Cabinet. Mustaufi-ul-Mamalek would not commit himself to this, and said that he must consult his colleagues, two of the most important of whom were

present. I was consequently by no means surprised to receive a thoroughly unsatisfactory memorandum, of which I have the honour to enclose a translation, couched in vague language that carefully avoids the question at issue.

It is of small real value to report that Ala-es-Sultaneh, in communicating this memorandum, told me verbally that I must be patient and that I should eventually get what is wanted.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 259.

Memorandum communicated to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, October 14, 1914.

A PLUSIEURS reprises ces temps derniers, leurs Altesses le Président du Conseil et le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères ont saisi le Ministre d'Angleterre de la situation pénible dans laquelle se trouve le Gouvernement Impérial de Perse à cause de la pénurie d'argent et des grands frais encourus pour le maintien de la gendarmerie gouvernementale et de l'administration financière—deux services qui sont tout à fait essentiels, afin de garantir le bon ordre dans le pays et une gestion satisfaisante des ressources financières. L'attention du Ministre de la Grande-Bretagne a été en même temps attirée sur le fait que la guerre qui sévit si malheureusement en Europe est venu ajouter aux difficultés budgétaires de la Perse en ce que, au moins momentanément, les revenus des douanes ont sensiblement diminué. Il a été en plus démontré par des tableaux dressés par M. Mornard, l'ex-Trésorier général, que les revenus du pays ne suffisent pas actuellement aux dépenses qui doivent être encourues.

Sir Walter Townley n'a pas manqué d'attirer l'attention de son Gouvernement sur ce déplorable état de choses, en ajoutant que les susdits Ministres du Gouvernement Impérial l'avaient prié de demander à Sir E. Grey si le Gouvernement britannique ne serait pas disposé de venir encore une fois en aide à la Perse par le moyen d'une nouvelle avance. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique a répondu à cet appel en faisant une nouvelle avance de 50,000*l.* destinée à l'entretien de la gendarmerie gouvernementale dans les provinces de Fars et Kerman, où les intérêts britanniques sont les plus importants.

Il paraitrait, toutefois, que ce secours n'a pas suffi à améliorer la situation, et l'attention de Sir Walter Townley a été de nouveau attirée sur l'état vraiment désespéré des finances persanes. Saisi encore une fois des difficultés de la Perse, Sir E. Grey a répondu que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique ne saurait faire une autre avance. Il suggère pourtant que, si la Perse a vraiment besoin d'argent, elle devrait se décider à faire un sacrifice de son côté pour s'en procurer. Il y a quelque temps Sir E. Grey avait proposé au Gouvernement persan de vendre les bijoux de la Couronne. Il reconnait que le moment actuel n'est pas favorable pour une telle vente et il propose maintenant au Gouvernement Impérial de vendre à la Grande-Bretagne certaines îles qui se trouvent dans le Golfe Persique à proximité de Bender Abbas, à savoir, Hormuz, Kishm Larak, Henjam et Sheikh Shuaib.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté est prêt à donner à la Perse 300,000*l.* (soit environ 1,890,000 tomans au cours actuel) argent comptant pour les îles susnommées et de rayer la dette de la Perse à la Grande-Bretagne, qui remonte aujourd'hui à 790,000*l.* (soit environ 4,977,000 tomans), qui coûtent à la Perse plus de 50,000*l.* (soit 300,000 tomans) par an, frais d'intérêts et d'amortissement.

C'est-à-dire que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté se déclare prêt à donner à la Perse pour les îles une somme d'argent qui équivaudrait, si l'on considère l'intérêt qu'il y aurait à payer sur les 300,000*l.*, à plus de 70,000*l.* (420,000 tomans) par an, et la Perse n'aura plus à rembourser l'argent qu'elle doit à la Grande-Bretagne. Il serait peut-être à propos de rappeler à son Altesse le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères que, d'après les engagements pris, la Perse est tenue à rembourser à la Grande-Bretagne les dernières avances faites, dont le montant est de 490,000*l.*, à raison de 100,000*l.* (600,000 tomans) par an, dans deux moitiés égales, et que le premier versement doit se faire le 1er juillet de l'année prochaine. Vu qu'il y a déjà un déficit de 11,000*l.* sur le service des emprunts garantis sur les douanes du sud pour les deux derniers mois, il est probable que le Gouvernement persan se trouvera gêné de faire le remboursement des avances dans les conditions actuelles.

Téhéran, le 12 *octobre*, 1914.

Enclosure 2 in No. 259.

Memorandum communicated to Sir W. Townley.

(Translation.)

IN reply to the unsigned memorandum of his Excellency the British Minister addressed to the Persian Foreign Office on the 12th October [? 14th October], the Minister for Foreign Affairs has the honour to refer his Excellency to the various verbal communications recently made respecting the present financial difficulties of the Persian Government.

As pointed out by the Foreign Office in its note of the 27th October, the Persian Government expected the British Minister, who is well aware of their present financial difficulties, to draw the attention of the British Government to the unsatisfactory condition of the Persian Government and give personal support to the views of the latter.

The British Minister is well aware that the present financial straits of the Persian Government are due, firstly, to the recent years of trouble in the country, the natural result of the change of the old system, and to the expenses incurred in the restoration of order for the good of foreign and internal trade. For this object the Persian Government were obliged to undertake heavy expenses in despatching forces to different parts of the country. His Excellency is also well acquainted with the other difficulties which the Persian Government had to meet. When the Persian Government were free of these difficulties, they tried to put the security of the country on a firm basis. The gendarmerie was created and a large sum of money was spent for that purpose. The good result of the gendarmerie cannot be denied.

Secondly, the grave commercial crisis in Persia is due to the present war unfortunately raging in Europe. This has greatly affected the Customs revenues, one of the important resources of the country, and it is feared that the Government may not be able to meet its liabilities out of the Customs revenues, which are the security for the recent loans and advances. In view of these facts, the attention of the British Minister was drawn, in the note above mentioned, to the financial crisis. His Excellency no doubt concurs with me that the contents of his memorandum must have surprised and grieved the Persian Government. The Minister for Foreign Affairs feels sure that the British Government, who have on more difficult occasions given their sincere support to Persia, would not take advantage of the Persian financial difficulties and make such proposals which the Persian Government would be unable to accept, and, if accepted, would bring her face to face with a more serious crisis.

It is true that after the opening of the Medjliss the Government is obliged, with the approval of the Chamber, to find new resources to meet the budget deficiencies as well as the necessary expenses, but for the immediate and necessary expenses it looks to His Britannic Majesty's Government for substantial support.

The Ala-es-Sultaneh feels confident that after careful consideration of the difficulties of the Persian Government the British Minister will bring the facts to the notice of his Government, and will not fail to take energetic measures with a view to obtaining the sincere support of the British Government in removing the present crisis in this country.

Foreign Office, Tehran, November 1, 1914.

[83647] No. 260.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 218.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 14, 1914.

THE Persian Minister came to-day to urge upon me a proposal of the Persian Government with regard to finance. They had suffered in revenue, as many other countries were suffering at this moment, and they wished to have a moratorium with regard to the instalments due on previous loans. They also wished to have a loan of 600,000*l.* from the Russian Government and ourselves, to enable them to reorganise their finances. The Minister admitted, in reply to a question, that there was no security to be offered for this new loan, except certain new taxes, including one on opium, and the royalties on oil produced in Persia.

I said that I should have to consider this with the India Office and the Russian Government, which would take a little time. It was not easy to make loans at a moment when not only our allies but every neutral country seemed to wish to raise loans in London.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[83648] No. 261.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 219.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 14, 1914.

THE Persian Minister spoke to me to-day about Shuja-ed-Dowleh. He had ordered two tribal regiments to join him, and the Russian consul-general in Azerbaijan had said that they ought to obey him. He was against the Turks, and his action would bring into the field other tribes, who were favourable to the Turks. The Minister thought that Shuja-ed-Dowleh could be of very little use to Russia, seeing that the result of his action would be to excite other tribes, who favoured the Turks.

I said that I gathered that the Turkish Kurds, even before there was war between Russia and Turkey, had attacked Persian territory.

The Minister said that this was so; the Turks were always making aggressions on that part of Persia. Even after the delimitation of the boundary the other day, they had violated Persian territory.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[83649] No. 262.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 220.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 14, 1914.

THE Persian Minister spoke to me to-day about the collection of taxes in the north of Persia. He said that there was due to the Persian Government about 60,000*l.* of these taxes; the taxes had been collected by the Russians, who had not paid them over to the Persians.

I said that, in discussing with the Russian Government the question of a loan to Persia, about which the Minister had spoken to me to-day, I would bear in mind the difficulty about Shuja-ed-Dowleh, which the Minister had just mentioned to me, and the difficulty about the revenue in the north of Persia.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[82697] No. 263.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 15.)

(No. 796.)

(Telegraphic.) *Petrograd, December* 14, 1914.

YOUR telegram No. 1190 of 13th December.

I communicated to Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning substance of Tehran telegram No. 372 of 11th December, and expressed hope that Russian Government would either cause Shuja to leave or would, at all events, insist on his ceasing his military activity.

His Excellency said that he had sacrificed Shuja in order to be agreeable to His Majesty's Government, although, as Governor of Tabriz, he had rendered Russia and Russian commerce invaluable service, but that it had been impossible for him to prevent his returning to protect his own property. On my reminding him of corruption and gross cruelty of which he had been guilty, his Excellency declared that he was not worse than other Persian Governors in these respects, but that any Persian who was friendly disposed towards Russia was sure to incur hostility of British Legation. Whatever his faults, Shuja was one of the few strong men in Persia, and it was thanks to him that Russian consul had been able to return to Soujboulak. His

Excellency, who showed considerable irritation at my having reverted to the subject, insisted that at a moment like the present, when there was danger of Turkish attack, a strong man like Shuja might be very useful.

His Excellency then gave me *aide-mémoire*, of which I am sending translation in a separate telegram, complaining of present Persian Government, whom he described as weak, incapable, and openly hostile to Russia. On my remarking that, unfortunately, Russia had never done anything to gain Persian sympathies, his Excellency protested, saying that it was thanks to Russian intervention that Turks had not some time ago incorporated the whole of Urmia district. His Majesty's Government, he said, would never realise that Russia as a limitrophe country had most important interests to liquidate, and though they were continually complaining of what Russia did, he must confess that he did not understand what their real policy was. I replied that it was to maintain Persia's independence and integrity in spirit of 1907 agreement. His Excellency assented, but said that he would like to know how this was possible with a moribund country that could not stand alone. We should be no more successful with Persia than we had been with Turkey. In any case, only thing to be done was for us to come to some definite understanding about Persia when the war was over.

(Sent to Tehran.)

[82653] No. 264.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 15.)

(No. 797.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Petrograd, December* 14, 1914.

FOLLOWING is text of *aide-mémoire* referred to in my immediately preceding telegram :—

"Russian Minister at Tehran has informed Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs that Sir W. Townley has the intention not only of abstaining from all connection with the question of constitution of new Persian Cabinet, but even of leaving Tehran during ministerial crisis.

"Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs consider it its duty to insist on the necessity of the two Legations guiding the young Shah in the choice of new Ministers, and especially in selection of Minister for Foreign Affairs, as the Imperial Government have many grounds of complaint against the attitude and proceedings of Ala-es-Sultaneh, who, thanks to his advanced age and feebleness of health, is entirely under the pernicious influence of his son, Moin-ul-Vezare, head of Young Persian party and member of Anglo-Persian Committee, a body which makes no secret of its ill-will towards Russia.

"Imperial Government accordingly hope that immediate instructions will be sent to Sir W. Townley to take active part in forming the new Cabinet, and to co-operate cordially with his Russian colleague with a view to arriving at satisfactory solution of this question, and especially with a view to finding a successor to Ala-es-Sultaneh."

(Sent to Tehran.)

[83100] No. 265.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 800.)
Telegraphic.) *Petrograd, December* 15, 1914.

MY telegram No. 796 of 14th December.

Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning said he had been mistaken in telling me that Russian consul had returned to Soujboulak. What Shuja had done was to drive off an incursion of Turks and Kurds between that place and Maragha, where his estates are, and in so doing he was rendering Persian Government service.

As conversation again turned on moribund condition of Persia, I remarked that, though what his Excellency had said on the subject might be true, I could not feel any sympathy for policy pursued by Russian Government. It seemed aimed at

putting an end to sufferings of the sick man by hastening his death, while we were endeavouring to prolong his days in the hope of one day restoring his health.

His Excellency replied that I was mistaken in thinking Russia wanted to annex any part of Persia, though he did not believe she could continue to exist without our exercising an effective control in our respective spheres of influence.

[83519] No. 266.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 375.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, December* 16, 1914.

I MUST protest emphatically against false interpretation of my words and actions contained in summary of Russian *aide-mémoire* telegraphed by Sir G. Buchanan in his Excellency's telegram No. 797 of 14th December.

My Russian colleague suffers from a very short memory or from inability to repeat correctly what has been said to him.

The facts are as follows :—

As soon as it was decided that Medjliss should meet at an early date, the members of the Moderate party, which forms the majority of the chamber as at present constituted, made up their differences with the Democrats and sent an emissary to me to say that they wished to leave the Cabinet a free hand as long as the war lasted, but that in order to do so they must have a Cabinet in which they had confidence and to ask my advice. Ain-ed-Dowleh was the statesman, my informant told me, whom they would prefer to form new Cabinet or to assume prominent position in Mustaufi-ul-Mamalek's Cabinet.

I replied that I was sure that my Government would appreciate the desire of the Medjliss to do nothing to render present difficult situation more difficult, and I exhorted my visitor to impress on his friends the necessity of conciliating Russia, whose great stake in Persia made it right that her interests should receive special consideration. I urged that Vossuk-ed-Dowleh or Saad-ed-Dowleh should be included in the Cabinet, and pointed out that Ain-ed-Dowleh's presence might be misinterpreted, suggesting that his place might be taken by Farman Farma.

I did not speak to my Russian colleague because I felt sure that he would misunderstand my motives or misrepresent my action, and I decided to go away for a few days during Moharrem in order that any Cabinet change that was to take place might be made in my absence. This I did, taking an English telegraph clerk with me that I might be in constant touch with the legation.

On my return I found nothing had been done, and when I saw my colleague I told him what had passed and the reason why I had left Tehran, which, I said, was in order that he should not be able to say, as he had done most unjustly in the case of the present Cabinet, that I had formed a new one. I said that for this reason I did not propose to take any part in further negotiations. Russian Minister replied that it was all the same to him who formed the Cabinet, that after eleven months' experience of Persia he had come to the conclusion that whoever was Minister for Foreign Affairs or Prime Minister it made no difference, and he always had to deal with the detestable Muin-el-Vezareh. He positively refused to give me any lead as to whom he would like to see form the new Cabinet or enter the present one.

There is no Cabinet crisis, as will be evident from the above, and I cannot be accused of refusing to act with a colleague who appears to be unable to discuss the situation intelligently and refuses to make any suggestion beyond Saad and Vossuk-ed-Dowleh, taking special pains to make it clear that Petrograd, not he, is supporting them. As I told my colleague at our last interview, I have no objection to Vossuk-ed-Dowleh, but I am impotent to persuade Medjliss to legalise him or Saad. The young Shah appears to take no interest in public affairs.

(Repeated to Petrograd.)

[83522] No. 267.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 17.)

(No. 806.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Petrograd, December* 16, 1914.

I HAVE received *aide-mémoire* from Russian Government to the following effect:—

According to recent information received by Ministry for Foreign Affairs, a Turkish detachment accompanied by Kurdish cavalry recently arrived at Soujboulak, announcing intention of expelling Russians from Azerbaijan. There is danger of local Persian Kurds, numbering some 50,000 horsemen, joining Turks to attack and plunder Tabriz. Russian force could not be sent so far from Caucasian base, and in these circumstances rôle of Shuja, who has great influence among local tribes, becomes of utmost importance. Persian Government fail to grasp the danger to Tabriz, and, inspired only by their suspicion of Shuja, instead of supporting him, do all they can to thwart his plans. General attitude of Persian Government of late gives ground for suspicion that Tehran Cabinet's sympathies are with Turkey, and perhaps Kerkouk Mutessarif was not far wrong in saying in his letter to Shuja that Turkish troops had crossed the frontier with the consent of Persian Government to rid them of Russians.

Russian Government insist on danger of present situation in Persia and serious consequences that may ensue, and hope that His Majesty's Government will assist them in promptly remedying state of affairs.

Only way of so doing would be to replace present weak and ill-intentioned Cabinet by another, and bring to bear an energetic activity inspired by feelings of good-will towards Russia and England. Henceforth it would seem necessary that representatives of the two Powers should agree at once to announce at Tehran determination of the two Governments to put an end to present situation.

Russian Government propose formation of Cabinet under presidency of Mustaufi-ul-Mamalek, with Farman Farma as Minister of Interior and Vossuk-ed-Dowleh as Minister for Foreign Affairs, the other members to be chosen by these three in agreement, and decision to be communicated to Shah by the President.

Eventual opposition of the Medjliss could be got over by further reducing the already restricted number of deputies so as to bring about a dissolution through absence of necessary quorum.

(Sent to Tehran.)

[84670] No. 268.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 19.)

(No. 815.)
(Telegraphic.) *Petrograd, December* 18, 1914.

PERSIAN Minister called two days ago and begged me to use my good offices to relieve tension which he feared was rapidly growing between Russian and Persian Governments. His own Government, he admitted, had been ill-advised in addressing protest after protest to the Russian Government about Russian troops, but the latter's attitude with regard to Shuja, Medjliss, and present Persian Government was causing him anxiety. Situation might become critical, as both Germans and Turks were employing secret agents and distributing bribes with a view to stirring up trouble with Russia. He begged that I would treat what he had told me as private and confidential.

I took advantage of a conversation which I had alone with Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday afternoon to impress on him necessity of adopting a more conciliatory attitude towards the Persian Government. A man like Shuja might perhaps be useful at the present moment, but it was but natural that the Persian Government should object to his acting as he was doing without their authority and to his receiving his instructions and supplies from Russian consul-general at Tabriz, just as if Azerbaijan was a Russian province. If his services were indispensable, Russian Government should have represented this at Tehran, and should have endeavoured to induce Persian Government to authorise him to take measures to ward off invasion of Turks. It may not even now be too late to do this, and I would therefore put forward personal suggestion that his Excellency should approach the Persian Government with a view to regularising his position.

Minister for Foreign Affairs denies that Shuja was acting by Russian orders, though he might have received assistance in the shape of rifles. He would, he said, consider my suggestion.

I then read him Tehran telegram No. 375 of 16th December, explaining that Sir W. Townley's attitude had been misrepresented. It would, I thought, be a great mistake for his Excellency to insist, as I gathered from *aide-mémoire* summarised in my telegram No. 806 of 16th December that it was his intention to do, on dismissal of the whole Cabinet. He ought to be contented with strengthening of it by the admission of one or two new members.

Minister for Foreign Affairs eventually said he would be satisfied if Ala-es-Saltaneh and Moin-el-Vezareh were got rid of and if Vossuk-ed-Dowleh and Farman Farma entered Cabinet. He blamed Sir W. Townley for not having taken his Russian colleague into his confidence, as it was entirely owing to his silence that misunderstanding had arisen.

As regards Medjliss, I begged his Excellency not to press for its dissolution. It might, however, be possible, from a remark recently made to me by the Persian Minister, for new Cabinet to arrange that its sittings should be suspended till war was over, owing to its present number being only little above necessary quorum.

His Excellency said that some arrangement of this kind might be sufficient.

Since writing the above, I have received and communicated to M. Sazonof your telegram No. 1203 of 17th December, begging him not to act for the present on my suggestion with regard to Shuja.

His Excellency said that if I would send him an *aide-mémoire*, giving your reply to Russian Ambassador, he would see what he could do. He repeated, however, what was reported in my telegram No. 806 of 16th December as to impossibility of sending Russian force.

(Repeated to Tehran.)

[84792] No. 269.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 19.)

(No. 378.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, December* 19, 1914.

MY telegram No. 370 of 11th December: Gendarmerie.

French Minister has received instructions to inform Persian Government that in consequence of political situation Swedish Government consider contracts of the Swedish instructors broken by *force majeure*.

My colleague has asked for explanations.

Many of the Swedish officers are most anxious to remain, and all are much perturbed by reason given for rupture of contracts. It is a most unfortunate moment for Swedish officers to be withdrawn, as the gendarmerie is the only reliable force to which Government could look for support in case of trouble.

It is much to be hoped that, even if official mission is withdrawn, such officers as wish to remain may be allowed to do so.

General Hjalmarson has been invited to go to China to consult about formation there of a provincial gendarmerie under Swedish officers.

[84807] No. 270.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 19.)

(No. 379.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, December* 19, 1914.

SIR G. BUCHANAN'S telegram No. 806 of 16th December: Persia.

Farman Farma read me yesterday a letter from his estate agent at Soujboulak dated ten days ago. He said that a Turkish force of 300 men had arrived with some 600 Turkish Kurds, but that they had not succeeded in making any recruits among the tribesmen. This report confirms information received from other sources that there is no great danger of a serious Turkish incursion, and it is hard to see where the 50,000 men mentioned in the Russian *aide-mémoire* were to come from.

Modern Persia has never seen such a force assembled, and thousands here generally become hundreds or even tens on closer scrutiny.

It is true that one cannot claim much strength for present Cabinet (I dubbed it

weak when formed), but I cannot see any sort of ground for suspicion that it has any sympathy with Turkey, and I have no hesitation in asserting that Mutessarif of Kerkuk had no reason for saying that Turkish troops had crossed the frontier with the consent of the Persian Government. As soon as Turkey's incursion was reported here, a strong protest was addressed to Turkish Ambassador and to Turkish Government through Persian Ambassador at Constantinople.

The Petrograd Cabinet does not appear to be aware that there is strong feeling here in favour of German-Turks.

This has so far been successfully muzzled by efforts of Cabinet, which cannot in justice be called ill-intentioned towards us and which shows but little trace of general hatred of Russia and her policy in Persia which is felt here by all classes, even by those who for private reasons have to appear well disposed towards Russia.

It is possible that a Cabinet such as M. Sazonof desires may be formed in due time, but anything in the nature of high-handed action such as would appear to be intended in last three paragraphs of Sir G. Buchanan's telegram is, in my opinion, much to be deprecated at a moment when a spark would suffice to ignite a popular conflagration against a Cabinet which refuses to listen to the daily appeals of the sacred men of Nedjef and Kerbela.

Present rumour that German Emperor and his people have embraced Islam is believed by many.

(Repeated to Petrograd.)

[84808]

No. 271.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 380.)
(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 19, 1914.

TELEGRAM has been received from Kerbela stating that all Ulemas have set out in direction of Basra to oppose onward march of infidels. Such telegrams are sedulously circulated by Turkish adherents and make no small impression on the populace, which is restless under goading of Turkish and German emissaries. Farman Farma assured me yesterday that situation is becoming disquieting. His object was not improbably to impress on me the necessity of a strong man like himself being appointed Minister of the Interior, but one cannot afford entirely to ignore warning of an influential man, who declares that his adherents are falling away because of his known anti-Turkish sentiments. Sardar Assad Bakhtiari, who, although blind and infirm, knows much about what is going on, assured me, on the other hand, that there is no cause for apprehension.

I credit friendly assurances of Government, but I am carefully watching effect on people of untiring Turco-German propaganda, and I am endeavouring to combat it.

(Sent to India, Bushire, and Petrograd.)

[84873]

No. 272.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 819.)
(Telegraphic.)

Petrograd, December 19, 1914.

IN the course of the conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs reported in my telegram No. 815 of 18th December, I said I wished to speak to him seriously on the subject of Persia. I had, however, no instructions to do so, and anything that I said must be regarded as expressly my own personal views.

His Excellency had often told me that in his eyes friendship with England far outweighed all Persian interests, and that when war was over we should find no difficulty in coming to an understanding about Persia. I begged with respect to differ from him, and in order to refresh his memory with regard to divergencies of our views, I read him that portion of my despatch No. 192 of 25th June which recorded my conversation with Emperor. His Excellency remarked at all events question of collection of taxes had since been regulated. I said even if this was the case views of two Governments with regard to future of Persia were diametrically opposed. His Excellency had recently spoken to me of an effective control to be exercised by two Governments in their respective spheres, and had even mentioned the word protectorate. We, on the contrary, wished to

avoid any step that would savour of partition. What had united the whole British Empire in the war in which England and Russia were allies was the violation of Belgian neutrality, and one of the principles for which we were fighting was the right of small nations to live independent without being absorbed by their more powerful neighbours. In 1907 England and Russia had recognised this right in the case of Persia, and were Russia to advocate her partition, Russia's former critics in England would accuse her of having no more respect for treaties than Germany. Could, moreover, his Excellency affirm that Russian Government, or, rather, Russian consuls, had during last seven years honestly endeavoured to uphold principle of our agreement? To this Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that when 1907 agreement was concluded Russian Government believed in Persia's recuperative powers, but that now situation was hopeless. I remarked that this change for the worse was mainly due to the action of Russian consuls.

I then proceeded to say that after the war Great Britain and Russia would be the two most powerful world Empires, and that if they remained friends the world's peace would be assured. It was therefore essential to remove the only likely cause of friction. His Excellency had spoken of a settlement of Persian question at end of war. My personal view was that we should then be so absorbed by peace negotiations that we should have no time to spare for Persia, and that, peace once signed, we should all want a holiday and leave Persian question to take care of itself. I therefore thought, while signature of any new agreement might be left over till peace had been concluded, we should now resume our conversations at point at which they were broken off last summer and discuss, at any rate, general lines which that agreement was to take. Before submitting this suggestion to you I should like to know his views. Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that he was ready to begin such a discussion at any moment either here or in London. It was useless to entrust it to our Ministers at Tehran in view of their somewhat strained relations.

Though fully realising pressure of work imposed by war, I am strongly of opinion that we shall be in better position to negotiate before, rather than after, conclusion of peace. If you approve our doing so, I would venture to submit certain considerations. In first place I am convinced that there must be complete revision of 1907 agreement. Azerbaijan is irretrievably lost to Persia, and Russia is determined to have free hand there. I believe best solution for all parties would be to allow her to lease it from Persian Government, as we have suggested doing with regard to islands. As regards rest of North Persia, we can only endeavour to obtain guarantees that present process of russification will be kept within reasonable bounds. As regards neutral zone, we shall have to decide whether we are to incorporate any portion of it in our own sphere. Our chief effort should be directed to excluding all Russian political influence outside Russian sphere, and to clearly defining respective rights of Russia and Great Britain as regards oil, mining, and railway concessions in neutral sphere. Trans-Persia railway scheme is not likely to be revived for years to come.

If, on the contrary, you do not favour resumption of negotiations at present, I would strongly urge that we should at any rate begin to draw up concrete proposals for eventual settlement of Persian question, so that we may be in a position to submit them to Russian Government as soon as peace negotiations commence. Otherwise Persian question will be an open sore that may at any moment prove fatal to Anglo-Russian Alliance.

[84902]

No. 273.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 821.)
(Telegraphic.)

Petrograd, December 20, 1914.

MY telegram No. 806 of 16th December.

Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me this morning that in order to support Shuja, who might not have been able if left alone to stem Turkish invasion, 700 Russian troops had been sent, but without artillery, as there was none to spare. Russian Government, he repeated, could not dispense with Shuja's services, as it was of utmost importance to them to ward off danger of Turkish attacks.

(Sent to Tehran.)

[84873] No. 274.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 1227.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December* 22, 1914.

YOUR telegrams No. 815 of 18th December and No. 819 of 19th December.

I am glad you have spoken so fully to Minister for Foreign Affairs. You can tell him that I agree that Persian Agreement must be revised, and I shall be ready to enter upon discussions when there is opportunity. But we can hardly begin them while the war is in a critical state and we are all working under great pressure.

Meanwhile you should again impress upon Minister for Foreign Affairs that trouble with Persia will make trouble with Mahommedans elsewhere, and be serious embarrassment to us in prosecution of war.

Any high-handed action just now at Tehran with regard to Central Government or Medjliss is most undesirable. We cannot become a party to it, for it might gravely prejudice our position in India, and would increase influence of Turkish propaganda amongst Mahommedans everywhere, who hitherto resist it.

I would therefore beg Minister for Foreign Affairs for reasons of large policy to give most definite instructions to Russian Minister and agents in Persia to avoid high-handed action and adopt a conciliatory attitude to Persian Government. As regards collection of taxes by Russians, it is stated that some 60,000*l.* collected has not been paid to Persian revenue.

On the other hand, no objection shall be taken to local measures really necessary to repel Turkish invasion. If Russian force cannot be sent and Minister for Foreign Affairs believes Shuja can be of use, I agree with your suggestion that he should endeavour to regularise Shuja's position.

Nor do I raise objection to the two personal changes desired by Minister for Foreign Affairs in Persian Cabinet (your telegram No. 815 of 18th December), if they can be effected without undue pressure.

But unless Russian agents in Persia adopt a conciliatory policy, especially at Tehran, the Turco-German propaganda will succeed in exciting all Persia against us. Good relations with the Central Government at Tehran are the only barrier to the trouble that this Turco-German propaganda will cause in Persia and elsewhere if it succeeds.

I should even be prepared to join in a small loan to Persian Government if by that means it could be kept together and its favourable attitude be secured while the war lasts. We should do all we can to enlist and support efforts of Persian Government to suppress popular excitement and counteract pro-Turkish feeling.

(Repeated to Tehran.)

[84873] No. 275.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 1229.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December* 22, 1914.

YOUR telegram No. 819 of 19th December and my telegram No. 1227 of 22nd December: Persia.

Though I cannot in present strenuous days send you instructions, I do not want to discourage you from discussing prospective revision of Anglo-Russian agreement about Persia. Indeed, I am glad you have opened the subject with Minister for Foreign Affairs, and I think your suggestion of a Russian lease of Azerbaijan as part of a general agreement is useful.

[86662] No. 276.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 24.)

(No. 383.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, December* 24, 1914.

MY telegram No. 379 of 19th December.

At the request of Minister for Foreign Affairs, my Russian colleague and I went to the Palace yesterday afternoon to discuss matters with himself and Prime Minister. I had been led to believe that financial situation was to have been topic of conversation, and I should have excused myself had I known that Russia's policy in Persia was to be sole object of meeting. Prime Minister made a long speech, which can be résuméd in a few words. He requested that Russian troops in Azerbaijan should be recalled in order that Turkey might be persuaded to cease from her violation of Persian territory. He protested against use Russia was making of Shuja, pointing out effect such action had on public opinion, and he solemnly assured us, upon his word of honour, that Persian Government had most faithfully conformed in strictest sense to neutrality Shah had proclaimed, and that our two Governments had been misinformed if they had, as he understood, some suspicion that the Cabinet had shown sympathy for Turkey.

My Russian colleague appearing unwilling to reply, I took up the third point, and said that it was true that some doubt had been expressed as to whether protests addressed to Turkish Government had been couched in very determined language. I was, I said, quite prepared to accept His Highness's assurances, but I felt it my duty to call the serious attention of Government to fact that the munshis of the Turkish Embassy, the German Legation, and the Austrian Legation were organising a formidable propaganda against us quite openly, and, as far as I could ascertain, quite unchecked by the Government. This appeared to me an infringement of neutrality of a friendly State.

The Prime Minister replied that recent Russian action in Azerbaijan had done more than any propaganda to irritate public opinion.

My Russian colleague then spoke much in the sense of Petrograd telegram No. 821 of 20th December to you, and made little or no concealment of the fact that Russia, or rather Russian military authorities of the Caucasus, looked upon Shuja as necessary to protect them from a possible Turkish flank attack. He added, although he personally saw fairness of the Persian request for recall of Russian troops, he was sure that it would have most deplorable reception at Petrograd, where he much feared that present good-will of the Cabinet would become even more suspected. He also hinted at possibility of further measures still more distasteful to Persia being taken. He consented, however, to submit request upon the reiterated and determined demand of the Prime Minister, who put forward all the oft-used arguments to show why he considered it in the interest of Russia, as much as in that of Persia, that troops should be withdrawn.

On being asked for my opinion as to what is the chief cause of grudging ill-feeling towards us, I could only say that advent of Shuja in part he is now playing appeared to me to have much incensed public opinion. Believing it to be most important in interests of all that some compromise should be made, if possible, I suggested that, if Russian Government were able to withdraw their troops, Persian Government should guarantee withdrawal of Turkish troops from Persian soil, whilst Shuja should be left as generalissimo of all Persian troops in Azerbaijan, with Vali as Governor-General. (End of R.)

Even the most ardent friends of Russia have deplored to me recently unconciliatory attitude of Russian Government, which they point out is doing much to swell ranks of Turco-German party. Unless Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs can be persuaded to look upon Persian question in a more conciliatory spirit, and to believe the assurances of Cabinet Ministers, who are, I am convinced, well disposed towards us, I much fear it will be impossible to stem the tide of popular feeling that is setting strongly against us. If police and gendarmerie remain loyal, it is probable that hand of Government would not be forced, but it is hard to determine what might be moral effect upon other Mussulman peoples of a religious movement, even though it proved unsuccessful.

(Repeated to Petrograd.)

[86662] No. 277.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 322.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December* 25, 1914.

YOUR telegram No. 383 of 24th December: Russia and Persia.

Pending consideration of the several points raised in your above-mentioned telegram, it would be useful if you could inform me in what manner the Persian

Government, in the event of withdrawal of Russian troops from Azerbaijan, would propose to preserve law and order and secure the protection of the foreigners and the Christian population in that province.

Please repeat to Petrograd with your reply.

[86747] No. 278.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 26.)

(No. 841.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Petrograd, December* 25, 1914.

TEHRAN telegram No. 383 of 24th December.

Minister for Foreign Affairs referred in conversation this morning to proposal that Russian troops should be withdrawn and Shuja appointed general. He said that it was quite absurd to expect Russia to leave her flank open to attack on a guarantee from Persian Government that Turkish troops would be withdrawn, as such a guarantee was absolutely worthless. It was also, he added, very remarkable, after all that had been said against Shuja, that his name should be now put forward for such an important post. Minister for Foreign Affairs has promised me an early reply to *aide-mémoire* embodying your telegram No. 1227 of 22nd December.

[87364] No. 279.

Sir W Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 272.)
Sir, *Tehran, November* 26, 1914.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 267 of the 9th instant, I have the honour to transmit copy of further correspondence between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Russian Legation on the subject of the presence of Russian troops in Azerbaijan in connection with Persian neutrality.

I have, &c.
(For the Minister),
C. RAMSDEN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 279.

Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Sir W. Townley.

Tehran, November 19, 1914.

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to His Britannic Majesty's Minister and transmits, for his Excellency's information, a copy of his note of the 7th November, addressed in reply to the Russian Legation.

I avail, &c.

Enclosure 2 in No. 279.

Russian Minister to Ala-es-Sultaneh.

November 7, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Persian Government has recently stated on several occasions that the Turks will strictly observe Persia's neutrality.

The vice-consul of the Imperial Russian Government at Urumia now reports that Javid Bey, at the head of some Kurds, with one gun attacked the Russian troops the 12th (25th) October, that is, thirteen days ago. In the fighting which ensued Javid Bey was defeated, losing 100 Kurds. His gun was disabled, the Kurds fled, and Javid Bey himself was compelled to make good his escape. Seventeen capes belonging to the Turks killed together, with some surgical instruments, have been sent to Urumia. Javid Bey has now asked for reinforcements.

I avail, &c.

Enclosure 3 in No. 279.

Ala-es-Sultaneh to Russian Minister.

November 18, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 7th instant, and in reply I beg to state that, although protests have been made here and at Constantinople against all actions of the Ottoman Government which might constitute a violation of my Government's neutrality in the present war, I must draw your Excellency's attention to the following fact :—

Before the declaration of war with Russia and Turkey, when, foreseeing the unfortunate events in Azerbaijan, I discussed with your Excellency the question of the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Azerbaijan, it was pointed out that the Ottoman Government promised that no encroachment would be made on Persian territory, provided that the Russian Government accepted the proposal of the Persian Government, which was equally n the interests of Russia and of Persia. Unfortunately the Russian Government, attributing the proposal of the Persian Government to an intention to take advantage of the war, refused to order the withdrawal of the Russian troops on the ground that their presence was necessary for the maintenance of order on the border of the Caucasus. However, reports now received show that the Russian Government have gone beyond their expressed intention of keeping order on the border of the Caucasus by attempting to despatch troops into Turkish territory through Persia. The result of this action is a most deplorable situation in Azerbaijan, which may lead to murder and plunder, the evil consequences of which will fall upon the Persian Government.

I have the honour to draw your Excellency's attention to the previous communication and negotiations and to ask you, in view of the friendship happily existing between the Governments of Russia and Persia, to oblige the Persian Government by urging your Government to observe the neutrality of Persia by preventing Azerbaijan from becoming the theatre of war.

[87668] No. 280.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 384.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, December* 28, 1914.

RUSSIAN Minister has informed Persian Government in an official note dated 24th December that it has been found necessary to provide sum of 4,298 r. 50 c. to enable two detachments of Persian Cossacks with artillery to proceed to the assistance of Shuja, and that further monthly allowance of 4,850 roubles, commencing from 21st November, will be provided by Imperial Government, since Persian Cossacks are no longer paid, such moneys to be eventually refunded by Persian Government.

Minister for Foreign Affairs requested me to inform you by telegraph of this new Russian departure. His Highness protests vigorously against the use of force hitherto officially considered as Persian against Turks, without even any previous consultation with Persian Government. It is also urged that this action conclusively proves falseness of Russian assurances that Shuja had no official capacity, but was merely defending with his own peasants his property at Maraga against a possible Turkish or Kurd raid.

I have strongly advised Minister for Foreign Affairs to exercise moderation in his reply to Russian note, although he maintains that it brands so-called Persian Cossack brigade with its true character.

There is no chance of restraining popular feeling if it is policy of Russia to goad Persia by such imprudencies. Russian Minister never alluded to step about to be taken during conversation which took place on 22nd December, nor did he prepare the Government in any way for fact that it was coming.

(Repeated to Petrograd.)

[87677] No. 281*.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 385.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, December 28, 1914.*

ATTITUDE of Persia towards the war.

(Secret.)

I believe that I have sufficient influence with the Persian Government to induce them to rally to the side of the Allies; but should you desire me to initiate a discussion with that object, it is essential that I should be made the sole channel of the negotiations. So rooted is the distrust entertained towards the Russian Minister here, that pourparlers would immediately break down if the Persian Government were to suppose him interested in them. Even prominent Russian sympathisers, like the Armenian leader, Mirza Yanz, and Farman Farma, have recently emphasised in my hearing the necessity of excluding from all critical discussions, whether on the subject of Cabinet changes or other important matters, the Russian representative. On the other hand, I see no objection to negotiations being conducted through the Mushir-ul-Mulk in London.

If public opinion here could be definitely assured by the Government that revived financial stability and secure political independence and integrity would result from armed co-operation with Russia, Persia might consent to join forces with its northern neighbour. But, unfortunately, the Cabinet are convinced that the present unfriendly policy of Russia will continue; and, realising this, they anticipate a moment when circumstances must compel them to take sides against us—a course which, they well understand, would be fatal to their country.

In this connection I would remind you of M. de Sazonof's objection to Persian co-operation on the score that neither Russia nor we could effectually protect her central frontier from attack by Turkey (please see Sir G. Buchanan's telegram No. 645 of the 14th November last). I cannot think there is much real foundation for the argument. The Bakhtiari, Lurs, and Sinjabis, who are keenly desirous of coming in on our side, would constitute a fighting force fully equal to any possible concentration that Turkey could spare; and it might be practicable to support these local levies with, say, a gendarmerie force numbering 4,000 men, officered by British and equipped with Maxims. There is daily increasing evidence of Persia's inability, in face of the exasperating character of Russian proceedings in the province of Azerbaijan, to preserve neutrality.

I have also to report the recent appearance of threatening letters. A warning that an attempt on the lives of the British and Russian Ministers would be made by means of bombs was recently received by my Russian colleague. It is noteworthy that on the evening of the date appointed for the outrage an individual was, as a matter of fact, killed in the vicinity of this Legation by the premature discharge of a bomb which he was carrying.

[87690] No. 281.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 386.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, December 28, 1914.*

MY telegram No. 358 of 24th November.

Swedish officer in command of gendarmerie at Burujird tells me that he is confident that order could be permanently restored in Luristan and road opened to Dizful next autumn provided there was a fairly honest Governor at Burujird. He says that many of the local chiefs against whom the gendarmerie have been fighting have quite realised that the gendarmes are not their enemies, but have merely been doing their duty in endeavouring to restore order. He says that he has visited them in their camps and has been everywhere well received. He is of opinion that the chiefs are tired of a life of plunder and would gladly give it up if they were not forced to it by the exactions of the Governor-General. He gives Nizam-es-Sultaneh a deplorable character, and says that it is not in his interest that order should be re-established, because by setting one chief against another he can extort fines from the weaker on the flimsiest charges. He would like Samsam-es-Sultaneh or Sardar Bahadur to be appointed. I should prefer the latter, as a younger man.

Appointment of a Bakhtiari would probably not be favourably received at Bushire, but it is perhaps not quite realised that the better chiefs have become more civilised. They are, in my opinion, as good men as can be found in Persia to-day, and much superior to the old-fashioned intriguing thieves of the Nizam-es-Sultaneh type. Those mentioned are genuinely devoted to our interests, which is more than I should like to assert in favour of Nizam-es-Sultaneh, who is an oily opportunist.

(Sent to India and Bushire.)

[87689] No. 282.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 387. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, December 28, 1914.*

YOUR telegram No. 294 of 17th November.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has communicated to me, in strictest confidence, copies of series of notes which have been addressed to Turkish Ambassador between 7th October and 27th December protesting in most formal and energetic manner against Turkish incursions upon Persian territory, holding Turkey responsible for original occupation of Azerbaijan by Russian troops, and for their continued presence there, demanding immediate recall of Turkish troops in Soujboulak district, and appealing to Turkish Government on grounds of two countries holding same religious belief to assist Persia to secure evacuation of her territory by other foreign troops by at once recalling Turkish troops, who are violating Persia's neutrality. One note, obviously in answer to Turkish protests, holds Turkey alone responsible for return of Shuja, since had Turkish troops not invaded Persia he would not have returned.

I do not think that a Government which is powerless to do more than protest could have used more energetic language than that employed in notes, from which it is clear that Turks violated Persian territory before war broke out with Russia.

I have been requested not to communicate these notes to my Russian colleague.

(Repeated to Petrograd.)

[88061] No. 283.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 855.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Petrograd, December 29, 1914.*

RUSSIAN Government inform me that Russian vice-consul at Urmia has informed them of the contents of a letter addressed to Moustafa Lutfi, a Turkish

officer at Souldouz, to Kurdish tribe of Zergas at Ouchnoue. Author of this letter maintains :—

1. That there is a treaty of alliance between Turkey and Persia by which Persian Kurds are to organise general rising to expel Russians from Azerbaijan.

2. That any refusal to obey Turks constitutes an act of insubordination against Government of Shah, who is supposed to have given orders to Karapapakhs and Maches to advance on Urmia with Turks.

3. That present moment is most auspicious for triumph of Islam, to attain which all Mussulmans must rise against infidels.

Similar letters have been addressed to all tribes of Persian Kurdistan, which have hitherto not taken part in movement.

In the opinion of Russian vice-consul, these letters are of great importance.

Russian Government state that Kurds are convinced of solidarity of Persian Government with Turkey, an impression which appears to Russian Government to be all the more justifiable in view of the fact that there are no signs of Persian Government taking necessary steps to frustrate Turkish intrigues.

(Sent to Tehran.)

[88450]

No. 284.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 388.)
(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 30, 1914.

IN accordance with instructions contained in your telegram No. 322 of 25th December, I asked Prime Minister yesterday afternoon how he proposed to guarantee order and protection of life and property of Christians in Azerbaijan if Russian troops were withdrawn, and how possibility of Turkish incursions would be met.

He replied that he proposed to employ Cossacks at Tabriz, who should number 1,200 men, and to summon about 3,000 men of the old regiments, which contain good fighting material, making a force of about 5,000 men. He expressed his firm conviction that there would be no disorders, and that this small force would prove amply sufficient to cope with situation.

Azerbaijan, he added, could furnish 25,000 men, but the resources of the country could not support more than the number named. Competent commander, even Shuja if necessary, would be found to command force with capable European-trained officers under him. Cossacks would keep their own officers. Situation would also be much improved by presence of Valiahd, who would be sent to Tabriz.

His Highness stated emphatically and officially that if Turks did not evacuate Persian territory after the withdrawal of Russian troops Persia would fight, and he expressed his conviction that with the forces already mentioned, Cossack brigade, gendarmerie, and tribal levies she could command, she would prove more than master of any forces Turkey could spare to send against her. But, he added, Turkey would evacuate Persian territory, he was convinced, though he could not positively say so until he had seen the Ambassador after favourable answer had been received from Petrograd.

It would be suicide of Turkey, whose position in the Mussulman world is so distinctly shaken, to risk seeing a Moslem State arrayed against her.

By withdrawing her troops Russia would, he said sarcastically in conclusion, achieve the end she had in view. Either Turkish pressure on her flank would be removed or she would have Persia fighting on her side, and her troops could return as friends.

(Repeated to Petrograd.)

[88451]

No. 285.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 389.)
(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 30, 1914.

IN the course of conversation referred to in my telegram No. 388 of 30th December I told Prime Minister that some doubt was felt as to whether present Cabinet is strong enough to cope with the actual situation, and whether their apparent policy

of drift might not so encourage the parties hostile to us that the Government migth be forced by a popular movement to take sides against us. I suggested that Farman Farma might enter into the Cabinet as Minister of the Interior, and Vossuk-ed-Dowleh replace Ala-es-Sultaneh, whose great age made it hard for him to fulfil his duties to the satisfaction of all.

Moreover, his son, Muin-ul-Vezareh, has made himself unpopular as his prompter.

I suggested that he might go abroad, perhaps as Chargé d'Affaires at London, whilst his brother came here, where he could be made useful in some capacity.

Prime Minister replied that he could take neither Farman Farma nor Vossuk-ed-Dowleh into his Cabinet, their policy not being the same as his own. He expressed his great esteem for Ala-es-Sultaneh, and thought it would be difficult to replace him. Persian Minister in London might possibly make a good substitute. He added that his own health made it imperative that he should find a Minister of the Interior, but he had made no decision yet.

He said that danger of a popular movement has been much exaggerated, and that he was absolutely certain that nothing of the sort would occur here, though he regretted to have to say that he felt pretty sure that western provinces would declare for Turkey unless Russia changed her policy of creating fresh difficulties for Persia almost daily. In any case he could assure me formally and officially that so long as he remained in office no movement would drive present Cabinet into siding with Turks.

His Highness then said that he had twice tendered his resignation, and that he now intended to insist on its acceptance. He first put forward the plea of ill-health, but then avowed that he refuses to continue n office if Russia did not alter her policy in Persia, since he felt convinced that it must lead to a rising by the provinces against her and us as her ally, and he did not wish to suffer the disgrace of being President of Cabinet at a moment when sympathy of Persia might be alienated from a friendly Power that had done so much for Persia.

Previous to my conversation with Prime Minister I had long talk with my Russian colleague.

(Repeated to Petrograd.)

[88432] No. 286.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 390.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, December* 30, 1914.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

It is quite clear to me that the Prime Minister would rather resign than have either Farman Farma or Vossuk in his Cabinet. Russian insistence upon changes will therefore produce [group omitted], which appears to me most undesirable at the present moment. I told my Russian colleague yesterday morning that I would do my best to form any Cabinet he liked, but I warned him that the present one is very popular, and that a new one, containing such men as pass for Russia's friends, though formed by me, would be branded as Russian Cabinet, and that his friends of to-day, as was the case with Ain-ed-Dowleh, would be his enemies in two months unless Russia changed her policy.

He argued in the words of Farman that with present Cabinet we are drifting to disaster. I asked whether we should not hasten catastrophe by endeavouring to force an unpalatable Cabinet on the Medjliss and people.

(Repeated to Petrograd.)

[88453] No. 287.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 31.)

(No. 392.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, December* 30, 1914.

MY telegram No. 388 of 30th December.

Persian Government learns from Governor-General of Tabriz that force under Shuja-ed-Dowleh has been totally defeated, and that Shuja himself has fled to Maragha. The Kurdo-Turkish force is now at Miandoab, about four or five days from Tabriz,

[88900] No. 286*.

Mr. Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 31.)

Sir, 91, *Victoria Street, London, December* 21, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith some notes on the demarcation of the Turco-Persian frontier from Mohammerah to Vazneh.

I have, &c.
A. C. WRATISLAW,
(*Late British Commissioner, Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.*)

Enclosure in No. 286*.

Notes by Mr. Wratislaw on the Demarcation of the Turco-Persian Frontier from Mohammerah to Vazneh.

A DETAILED description of the frontier line has been drawn up by the Commission in conformity with the provisions of the Constantinople Protocol of the 17th November, 1913, and the considerations on which it is based are fully stated in the *procès-verbaux* of the Commission, but it is as well to recapitulate it in general terms, indicating the points which presented especial difficulty, and which may possibly give rise to questions hereafter. It is convenient here to note that the fundamental principle which the commissioners were bound to follow throughout was the restoration of the *status quo* of 1848 (date of the Treaty of Erzeroum), and that the frontier of 1848, so far as it can be discovered, was by no means an ideal one, its deficiencies and anomalies, indeed, having led to the critical relations between Turkey and Persia which originally called for the mediation of Great Britain and Russia.

From Ararat to a few miles south of Mendali, the protocol indicated with some detail the general line which the frontier should follow, while the Anglo-Turkish Agreement of the 29th July, 1913 (embodied in the protocol) provided in the same manner for the frontier between the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab and Umm Chir. From Umm Chir, however, nearly to Mendali, the Commission was left a freer hand, it being understood that the *status quo* was to be restored as far as possible.

The first difficulty occurred in connection with the extensive swamps between parallel 31 and Umm Chir. No landmarks exist in this locality, there was no dry passage through the marshes, nor could any channel be discovered coinciding even approximately with the frontier line as laid down by the protocol. The only solution therefore was to lay down a line on the map, and even this could not be made to follow throughout a line of longitude owing to the provision of the protocol by which "a small lake called Azem" was to be left in Turkish territory. However, the nature of the district and the extreme paucity of its inhabitants render any disputes unlikely unless at some future time the marshes should be drained.

From Umm Chir to the Duvarij River, a distance of about 27 miles, such local testimony as was available indicated the Shatt-el-Amma as the *status quo* frontier between the territories of the two Empires. The Shatt-el-Amma is the ancient channel of the Duvarij, and is boldly marked on the identic map. In practice, however, it was found to be difficult to trace it throughout its entire length. Portions of the old channel are still broad and deep, but in parts the main bed has degenerated into two or several courses, which in some cases are little more than ditches, and the Commission was sometimes at a loss to decide which was the real Simon Pure. The mounds of earth erected to mark the frontier line as laid down in these doubtful sections are liable to be carried away by floods, and any dispute will have to be decided by the map. The district is entirely without fixed habitations, but is frequented at times by Arab shepherds, mainly Persian subjects.

From the Duvarij to the River Tyb the frontier follows first Jebel Fokka and then Jebel Hamrin, both low ranges of sand hills. The country traversed is quite barren, but affords pasturage at certain seasons to Arab flocks from Turkish territory. It is difficult to believe that this section can ever cause serious misunderstanding, and the map should be a sufficient guide to the frontier, though it was not practicable to erect boundary marks, sand being the only material available.

The next section, from the River Tyb to the other side of Zorbathia, contains the two districts which have given rise to the most acrimonious disputes in the history of the whole frontier question, viz., Bagsai and the "lands of Seyyid Hassan." Their importance arises from the fact that they are comparatively well-watered, and therefore capable of cultivation.

Starting from the Tyb, the frontier coincides with the junction of the Pushtikuh foothills and the Mesopotamian desert. All the evidence before the Commission (which was not so conclusive as could have been desired, and was found mainly in the writings of Dervish Pasha and General Tcharikof, the Ottoman and Russian representatives on the first Commission) indicated that the *status quo* in this direction was the hill country to the Persians, *i.e.*, the Vali of Pushtikuh, a semi-autonomous chieftain, and the plains to Turkey; and on the strength of this testimony and geographical considerations, Bagsai was awarded to Turkey and Seyyid Hassan to Persia as the least unsatisfactory compromise of which the circumstances permitted. The Bagsai district lies entirely in the plain, and therefore fell to Turkey in conformity with the principle adopted by the Commission that the territory of Pushtikuh stopped short at the foot of the hills. The "lands of Seyyid Hassan" are situated in a gap between the two ranges of hills, and geographically appeared to belong rather to the hills than to the plain.

The drawbacks to this settlement are (1) that a small part of the Bagsai fields have for long been cultivated by subjects of the Vali of Pushtikuh, and (2) that the small Turkish town of Zorbathia and its date groves depend for their water supply on the River Goundjiun-Tchem, which first irrigates the "lands of Seyyid Hassan," and that the possessor of the latter territory could, if maliciously disposed, divert the greater part of the water.

The first objection was met by establishing the principle that the private proprietary rights of the Vali should be maintained at Bagsai, while in the second case it was hoped that his good behaviour would be secured by the hostages he gave in his property at Bagsai, and also at Zorbathia where he is a considerable owner. The right bank of the Goundjiun-Tchem is also left in Turkish territory nearly as far as the head of the Seyyid Hassan Valley.

After Seyyid Hassan, the frontier passes along Mount Bend-i-Koulik, and, following a nearly continuous chain of low hills, joins on to Djebel Guerebi, the point to which the protocol brings the boundary down from the north, and distant about 10 miles south-west of the Turkish town of Mendali. From here onwards the Commission had only to apply on the ground the directions of the protocol, a task which was at times rendered difficult owing to the inaccuracy of the identic map on which the protocol was based.

Apart from the frontier, the Commission was instructed to decide the question of the division of the water of the Guenguir River between the Persians and Turks. This stream rises in the Persian mountains to the north-east of Mendali, runs for some 40 miles through Persian territory, and then passes through Mendali, the extensive date groves which surround the town absorbing almost all the water. For many years the water question has given rise to acrimonious disputes between the townspeople and the Persian kurds who cultivated the valley of Somar through which the Guenguir flows before reaching Mendali. In winter and spring there is enough water to irrigate both Somar and Mendali, but in summer when the river is low it barely suffices for Mendali alone. The townspeople for several generations paid rent to the Persians for the water, but a few years ago they settled the question in an arbitrary fashion by forcibly driving out the kurds from Somar and burning their settlement.

The Turkish Commissioner declared that Mendali required the whole of the Guenguir water, and he therefore proposed that the Turkish Government should either buy the entire water rights or become proprietor of the Somar Valley either by purchase or exchange, which the Persian commissioner also agreed was the best solution. It was first necessary to ascertain what proportion of the water belonged equitably to either side, and the Commission decided that they ought to be regarded as owning equal shares in a river which ran through the territory of both.

The needs of the people of Mendali were certainly the greater, but I do not see

what other proportion could justly have been fixed. No arrangement has apparently been come to yet between the two Governments, and the matter is complicated by the fact that the Vali of Pushtikuh has by some means become owner of the Somar Valley. The Vali honoured the Commission by a visit at Bagsai, and did not impress us favourably. He manifested bitter and unreasoning hostility towards the Turks, of whom he spoke constantly as "my blood-enemies." The Persian Government seem to have little control over him.

Owing to my absence through illness, Captain Wilson was in charge of the British commission while the section from Mendali to the Sirvan River was being delimitated. The southern portion of this section, from Mendali to Kasr-i-Shirin, is quite the most barren and desolate tract dealt with along the whole frontier, and is completely abandoned by the nomad tribes once the summer heat has set in. This year, fortunately, the season was quite a month behindhand, and it was found possible to complete the work without incurring undue hardships.

The only important question which arose was connected with the right of pasturage of the Sinjabi (Persian) kurds on territory which was formerly a no-man's land, and is now placed definitely on the Turkish side of the frontier. The arbitrating commissioners expressed the formal opinion that these rights should be maintained.

Northwards of Kasr-i-Shirin the frontier begins to follow, in the main, well-defined watersheds and rivers, and there should be little opening for subsequent disputes. One notable exception exists, however, in the Nowsoud district, immediately north of the Sirvan. Here an ideal frontier was present to hand in the shape of that river up to the lofty Avroman range, and then the summit of the range itself. Unfortunately, at some time prior to the Treaty of Erzeroum, Persian kurds had taken possession of certain villages on what should have been the Turkish side of the natural frontier, and the *status quo* thus formed was necessarily recognised in the protocol. The Commission had therefore to do its best with unpromising materials. The district is full of villages lying in the midst of extensive groves of walnut and mulberry trees, and in some cases there are continuous plantations extending from a Persian to a Turkish village with no line of separation between the properties of the two. This was notably the case between the villages of Khan Guermelé (Persian) and Biaré (Turkish), where the properties overlapped one another to a considerable extent, and it was found impossible to run the frontier between the two without leaving Turkish orchards in Persia and *vice versâ*. The matter was complicated by the water supply being common to two or more villages, the Persians usually having the advantage of the up-stream situation. Our solution, arrived at after a minute study of the local conditions, though probably the best of which the circumstances permitted, cannot be regarded as entirely satisfactory, and it may have left a door open to petty quarrels.

A somewhat similar situation arose in connection with the village of Tchamperaw (latitude 35° 50′). The protocol instructed the commissioners to decide the fate of this village "sur la base du principe accepté du *statu quo*," and all the evidence procurable tended to show that at the time of the Treaty of Erzeroum, Tchamperaw was Persian. Unfortunately, it lies on the Turkish side of the watershed forming the frontier both east and west of it, and the unavoidable departure from this natural feature resulted in a clumsy compromise with an arbitrary line of demarcation between the fields of Tchamperaw and the adjoining Turkish village of Siah Guvez.

From this point onward as far as Vazneh, where I finally left the Commission, the frontier follows well-defined natural features.

where Governor reports that there is panic. I have not had news from Consul Shipley.

When asked for my advice to-day by Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs as to course Persian Government should pursue, I replied that crisis had come quicker than was to have been foreseen. It appeared to me most improbable that Government would be able to withstand pressure of public opinion spurred on by this Turkish success unless they took their courage in both hands and declared for us, threatening Turkey with war if she advanced further. Such action would possibly result in Persia's ultimate salvation, whereas if she allowed herself to be dragged into war in Turkey's wake her doom would be sealed. Mushaver-ul-Mamalek replied that he had always been in favour of siding with us, but that no Cabinet could declare war on Turkey and live unless Russia would help Persia by withdrawing her troops. He promised to convey my message to the Prime Minister.

It would seem to me that Russia might well make this concession. Either Turkish troops would be withdrawn from Persian territory and her anxiety respecting flank attack would be relieved, or she could return to Azerbaijan in a few days as Persia's protector.

(Repeated to Petrograd.)

[88882]

No. 288.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 31.)

(No. 393.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, December 31, 1914.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Governor-General reports from Tabriz that Shuja's force was defeated by Persian tribesmen. He appears to have run away as soon as he found himself in a difficulty. He was accompanied by Russian consul at Soujboulak and had 800 Russian troops with him, who appear, however, to have operated independently and not under his orders. They extricated themselves safely, losing, it is said, nine men.

Sardar Reshid appears to be full of courage, and reports that he is collecting a force to oppose tribesmen, which, being Persians, are rebels. He says there are about 2,000 Russian troops with four guns at Tabriz, and that Turkish force at Soujboulak is small. He adds that after telegraphic conversation with Shuja, Russian consul had come to say good-bye.

I have no news from His Majesty's consul, but propose to instruct him to remain at his post until the situation becomes more critical than would appear to be the case from Governor-General's report.

(Repeated to Petrograd.)

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